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Summary of Thesis submitted for PhD degree 
by Geoffrey Mark Matthews  
on 
MUSEUM•DESIGN•ORGANIZATION 
an Exploration of Spatialities and 
a Project in Modelling Museum Design Activity 
The metaphorization of space creates possibilities for modelling (epistemologically) 
‘complex’ phenomena. Four generic spatialities are explored - physical, social, 
documentary and paradigmatic. 
There are four irreducible constructions of physical space - realist, dualist, 
idealist and pluralist. The generic conception of social space plays off the static 
(pure relations) against the dynamic (contests of interests and concerns). 
Documentary space is the product of contingently defined formal and informational 
qualities. Paradigmatic space is divided into discreet regions, each defined in 
incommensurable terms, with the proviso that an ironic, reflexive position may exist 
beyond the dissolution of metaphysics. 
Organization is the differentiation of space and its subsequent narrative/visual 
reconstruction embodied in a temporal blur. ‘Design’ has an ontologically focussed 
meaning - designed objects, designs as objects - and an epistemologically focussed one - 
design processes, design as knowledge. The museum comprises an archaeology of instit-
utional forms, has an uncertain material/social boundary and is a reflexive organization. 
The organization of design presents a constellation of four complex objects - 
product (designed object, object as design), programme (object of design), process 
(ideal and experienced processes of designing), and philosophy (ideology of design, 
design rationale). The design of museum design involves a reconstruction of ideolo-
gically-charged, multidisciplinary, reflexive practice. Organizations display conserva-
tive, ‘museographical’ qualities and radically-creative, ‘new-museological’ qualities. 
The museum-design-organization complex places the practitioner at the ‘moment’ 
of forward-projecting (designerly) and backward-projecting (museal) processes of 
material culture. This promotes productive processes of organizational perversion, 
subversion and inversion. Design is an organizational virus, the museum radically 
adaptive because multiply infected. Through consideration of organizational and 
museological objects, design research may find its centre. 
May 1996 
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1.0  Introduction 
This introduction is in three parts. The first explains the 
origins of the project in terms of a history – an auto-
biography – a personal relation to certain discourses. The 
second explains the process of focussing the object of the 
project and the strategy for preparing a Ph.D. submission. 
And the third explains the technics of exposition in terms 
of a writing and reading process – the possible relations 
between expectation and method – and outlines the 
structure of the whole paper. 
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1.1 Origins of the Project 
Biography 
My own background, in academic terms, is essentially that 
of an outsider. Where I come from bookish pursuits are 
frowned upon. In 1973 I turned down the offer of a 
university place to read psychology and mathematics and 
chose instead to pursue an education framed in a different 
tradition, that of art and design. My interests became 
focussed on creative practice - music, architecture, 
painting, performance, poetry and design all competed for 
my attention and actively engaged my efforts: I became 
committed to making and doing as the principal means of 
existence and my reading of history, philosophy, 
psychology, poetry and science although consistent 
became subservient to that central, all-consuming passion 
for practical and visionary self-fulfilment. I took a first 
degree in three-dimensional design (interior design) - it 
could have been just as easily in fine art or architecture - 
and on graduating I launched myself into performance 
work with a poet and a musician, and into painting. By 
1979 I had lived below the breadline for as long as I could 
bear. I felt trapped and was probably heading for a 
breakdown. I had had my first encounter with the 
bureaucracy and, as far as I could see, the blindness and 
corruption of regional arts administration, and I needed to 
get out. The opportunity to change direction was 
provided, ironically, by a government department. I was 
plucked out of provincial poverty by the Home Civil 
Service and placed in the central London design studio of 
the Department for National Savings. A series of creative 
challenges was prepared for me by my great mentors, Bob 
Young, at that time one of the most senior graphics 
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officers in the Civil Service, and Peter North, DNS’s 
Exhibition Designer, and a new practical education in 
communication, organization and politics began in earnest. 
I woke up: I became a designer. After less than two years I 
was forced into a sideways move and ended up in what I 
now believe to have been one of the most challenging, 
intriguing and complex environments in which to work as 
a designer during the 1980s, a national museum. 
Museum Experience 
At the National Maritime Museum, in the idyllic 
surroundings of Greenwich park, I met, and for the first 
time had to work very closely with, individuals of the 
highest intellectual calibre, many of them world-renowned 
authorities representing the widest range of academic and 
museographical disciplines - archaeology, social and 
military history, conservation science, literature, 
engineering, art history, astronomy, and computer science 
amongst others. Unlike many junior members of the 
museum establishment, in a relatively short period of time, 
I worked with individuals from every part of the museum 
(this was one of the privileges of being a designer) and I 
found myself with an overview of the museum as an 
organization for which, I am sure, the director would have 
given his back teeth: I saw the informal structure beneath 
the mask of formal hierarchy, the short-circuiting lines of 
communication upon which functional effectiveness relied, 
and the benign subversions that supported the status quo. 
I saw the place from the inside, from the bottom up, and I 
saw both curatorial territoriality and conservatorial 
solidarity tested by the contingent demands of the 
exhibition project and toyed with by the director and 
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certain over-enthusiastic, some might say ‘meddlesome’, 
trustees. 
Lessons of Praxis 
I learned some very important lessons: (1) The ability to 
use words, to use a powerful vocabulary – the vocabulary 
of one privileged academic elite or another – fluently is 
highly respected and brings with it influence and 
authority. (2) Many highly intelligent and educated 
experts are unable to communicate effectively with 
ordinary people – they tend to end up with one vocabulary 
only, the vocabulary of their peers. (3) These same experts 
often have no (visual and practical) imagination – 
somewhere along the line the rigours of institutionalized 
academicism suppress most of the visionary, experimental, 
speculative capabilities they may once have had. And (4) 
consequently they have little understanding of, and a poor 
appreciation, of the value of ‘design’ in its broadest sense - 
design as the process of conceiving, planning and effecting 
radical change in the human environment. They seem not 
to understand the nature of the complexity that design is 
best able to tackle. All privileged vocabularies represent 
each other’s inadequacies and they are, in the main, 
incommensurable. This condition of uncertainty, of 
conflicting understandings of a practical situation, of 
counteracting forces and contradictory requirements, is 
exactly the condition in which design thrives. Design is the 
process of effecting change, whether desirable or necessary 
or not, when there is an incomplete understanding of, or a 
dispute about, how and why change should be effected. 
Design takes over where engineering, decision-making ... 
procedural technique in general, reaches the limits of 
practical rationality. (5) The scope for change in some 
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environments is, in any case, artificially limited by the 
nature of certain human organizations. Mature 
organizations, institutions like the museum, tend to 
become primarily concerned with self-perpetuation and 
only secondarily concerned with their supposedly principal 
purposes, even if these are evolving. (6) In a complex 
practical situation it is not that difficult, given a designerly 
approach, to hammer out enough common ground to be 
able to pilot a team, even one made up of antagonistic 
intellectual heavyweights, through a process of radical 
change, and to do so from, in intellectual, political and 
social terms, an inferior position. What seems to matter 
most in such situations is not intellect or academic status, 
not control of policy making and resource management, 
and certainly not age, long service or social achievement – 
what matters is the nodal position in a network of 
communications that the design process forces upon the 
designer, and the ability to organize and manage multiple 
conversations by acting as a translating, filtering, conduit. 
Interpretation 
I learned these lessons in an environment which initially 
provided the support necessary for innovations in 
procedure and technique but which eventually became one 
in which creative organizational transformations, powered 
from within, were overtaken and subsumed by those who 
feared their apparent lack of control over largely 
autonomous collection-based departments and non-
curatorial functions. The formal restructuring of the 
museum, to create separate collection management and 
research divisions, at one stroke wiped out traditional 
curatorial territories and put senior staff firmly back in 
control of museum development. The design studio was 
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first reduced and then swallowed up by a new exhibitions 
division headed by a senior curator. Computer systems, 
formerly a small section of the printed books and 
manuscripts department, were similarly restructured and 
subsumed by a larger documentation project group that 
drew in mainly younger curators from all of the former 
collection-based departments. Another senior curator who 
reported directly to the deputy director of the museum 
then headed this museum-wide operation. Such 
‘rationalization’ has continued into the 1990s. 
In retrospect, this process can be seen as an ‘obvious’ 
response to the political and economic climate of the times 
– the so-called ‘enterprise culture’ of the Thatcherite 1980s 
– and one must admit that positive things came out of the 
process as well as some regrettably negative ones. 
However, the greatest loss has been to museum design 
itself. To a large extent the fledgling discipline was turfed 
out of the nest just at the time when it was beginning to 
develop museographical credibility and even beginning to 
be recognized in some quarters as essential to creative 
management and appropriate development in wider 
museum terms. Independent museum design consultancy 
boomed in the 1980s, fed largely by the exodus of design 
talent from the national and larger provincial museums and 
by the influx of new graduates from an expanding higher 
education sector, but at the cost of a coherent environ-
ment in which to work. A museum generally cannot afford 
to hire consultant designers to get under the skin of the 
institution, to find out what makes it tick, and to work 
from within at a grass-roots level. Such designers are, 
therefore, normally limited to superficial involvements 
that are carefully structured by ‘official’ lines of 
communication and the strictures concomitant with one-
off projects. Museum directors and the designers 
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themselves have drawn attention to the positive aspect of 
this arrangement: the fresh eye and approach the outsider 
is able to bring to the situation. However, the difficulty 
with this is that the consultant designer may only see a 
snap shot of the organization which tends to present the 
illusion of stability and coherence, and may only be 
permitted to deal with ‘directed’ or prescribed change. 
What has been lost is the opportunity for a deeper 
creativity rooted in collective dynamics, which has the 
potential to deal with the immanent possibilities of change. 
This is a more open-ended process, which takes place over 
an extended period and requires the organization as a 
whole to learn from its mistakes and to learn how to take 
risks successfully. 
Project as Journey 
In the views expressed above the language may have 
changed and the narrative may be tighter but, as closely as 
I can reconstruct them, they are the views I held in 1987. I 
left the National Maritime Museum in 1986 to take up a 
lecturing post in Museum & Exhibition Design at what is 
now the University of Humberside and, with the 
encouragement of the then Head of School, Brian 
Brennan, I decided to pursue the issues raised by my 
experience through further research. Therefore, there is a 
sense in which these views constitute my project: they 
represent its origins in terms of an experience, both 
professional and emotional, and an aroused intellectual 
curiosity. There is a charge that can be made, that I have 
decided what the outcome should be before I have even 
begun to question the validity of these views and to 
explore the alternatives, but I am not worried by this. I 
believe it is important to be honest at the beginning about 
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where one is coming from and to know what prejudices 
and preconceptions one is bringing to the work. It is 
important, not because the outcome is predetermined but, 
because they constitute my initial position in raw 
unequivocal terms. They always were open to change, they 
have changed, and they remain ‘provisional’. In this project 
I expected to travel into new territory and I did not know 
whether I would pass over the old ground again. Some of it 
I did but it looked very different. 
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1.2 Focus and Strategy 
Process 
There were three stages in the process of narrowing and 
focussing the project. Initially the aim was nothing less 
than a ‘paradigm shift’ – to reframe the Praxis of Science as 
‘Design’ using the museum as a microcosmic context in 
which the complexity of the condition of modernity/ 
postmodernity was amply reflected. This over-ambitious 
scheme narrowed at first to one of exploring the 
interdisciplinary problem of the multidimensionality of 
design. In this, incommensurability and theories of space 
have to be accommodated in a workable model, and the 
forms and transformations of the model have then to be 
‘proved’ in a praxiological exposition. Finally, it has 
become clear that much of the detailed creative work 
implied in the previous formulation of the project is, to be 
realistic, of a postdoctoral nature. Therefore, the Ph.D. 
problem has been focussed even further. 
The focus is on the development of a multidim-
ensional expression of museum design in the form of a 
theoretical model and an appraisal of its implications for 
general theory in organization and design. This involves 
(1) Background theory – a survey of concepts and theories 
in modelling, (2) Focal theory – a critique of existing 
notions of organization and Praxis in museums and in 
Design, (3) Model theory – the development and present-
ation of a more adequate scheme, and (4) Contribution - 
the evaluation of its potential as a generalization. 
Background Theory 
In the first part of the programme it has been necessary to 
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ask a specific question about Philosophy – does any 
specific paradigm offer an adequate conceptual scheme and 
‘language’ in which to work? And if not, what do so-called 
post-Philosophical approaches – radical pragmatism, 
ironism – have to offer in terms of a workable strategy, 
perhaps one that is recognizably ‘designerly’ in approach. 
In addition the definition and clarification of a wide 
range of incommensurable notions of ‘space’ has had to be 
undertaken to be clear that the complexity with which 
design, in the generic sense, engages has a particular 
character which is quite distinct from that of disciplines 
such as Science, History, and Politics which are 
traditionally inclined towards epochal paradigmatic 
solidarity and towards contingent epistemological 
coherence. The designer is, arguably, more of a chameleon 
than is the scientist or the historian or the politician, more 
so even than are the novelist and the ethnographer whom 
Rorty cites as latterly more crucial figures.1 This ‘quixotic’ 
aspect of the designer’s position is crucial to any argument 
about personal integrity and social value: this enigmatic 
journeyman and traveller follows a lonely path guided by 
emotional (instinctual) as much as by intellectual and 
practical imperatives. 
Focal Theory 
1. ...it is the disciplines which
specialize in thick description of
the private and the idiosyncratic
which are assigned [the job of 
fostering solidarity] ...In partic-
ular novels and ethnographies
which sensitize one to the pain of
those who do not speak our lan-
guage must do the job... 
RORTY Richard. Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity. Cambri-
dge University Press, 1989. p.94 
The second part of the programme has involved two 
operations: (1) a critical investigation, in some detail, of 
the discourses of organization, design and museography/ 
museology; and (2) an opening up of the intervals between 
them, that is, an exploration their three interfaces - 
organization-design; design-museum; and museum-
organization.  
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Model Theory 
The second part of the programme is drawn towards the 
final part by proposing a visible constellation of spatial 
concepts and exposing the tensions, which characterize 
their performativity. In this the adequacy of the proposed 
model is evaluated in terms of the specific context of the 
museum as an organizational type – a creative-admin-
istrative nexus – and in terms of its potential value as a 
generalization. This latter point has involved consideration 
of the possible ‘museal’ quality of organization in general 
and a reappraisal of the values of design above and beyond 
the institutionalized professionally delineated and 
administered discipline of Design practice. 
Contribution 
The conclusions emphasize the difficulty of boundary 
crossing enterprises such as this project. A considerable 
effort has gone into deferring the synthetic instinct that all 
theory tends, sooner or later, to exemplify. However, not 
just for the sake of form, I make clear some specific and 
critical points in relation to the ‘new’ space established by 
this investigation of museum-design-organization. 
The museum design discipline has good reason to 
expound a communication-led collaborative philosophy 
and to have the strength to develop its discourse in more 
sophisticated intellectual circles. 
In general there is a central message that emerges from 
the museum-design-organization complex which in one 
sense bolsters the ironist/new pragmatist stance in 
engaged theory but also reminds us that to be engaged one 
must develop skills and capacities that are independent of 
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the logics of language, that are irrational and yet 
invaluable. 
And in future the interdisciplinary (as distinct from 
the multidisciplinary) platform must speak its name and be 
generous. If one is met with incomprehension, resistance, 
threat response, or out and out hostility one has failed to 
understand the nature of design. One does not wait to be 
invited in; neither does one go straight for the jugular. 
One makes a home, a communal place, a common ground. 
One finds the hearth and kindles in it a new flame, a new 
light. One arranges a meeting of minds prepared to 
enchant with and to be enchanted by new visions and new 
stories. And one helps each soul along its journey with no 
more than a gentle nudge in a promising direction in the 
certain knowledge that the whole process will need to be 
repeated tomorrow and that this will remain the case for 
each tomorrow. 
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1.3 On Writing and Reading 
In the process of writing the flow of words is as certain as 
is disjunction in the circumstance of its production.1
1.  The activity of writing is 
constrained by its practicalities: 
proficient keyboard skill has no 
logical connection with lingu-
istic proficiency and neither of 
these with the condition of 
either having or not having 
something worth the writing. 
The consequence is a paradox: 
the act of writing, even in its 
least interrupted moments, may 
result in statements that fail to 
hang together as one would wish. 
Equally, the most fragmented 
process may beget an apparently 
seamless text of irresistible 
power. In William Burroughs' 
The Naked Lunch Hank and 
Martin, two young writers, argue 
the point over coffee: 
H: ... To re-think a flow and a 
rhythm, a tumbling out of the 
words, is a betrayal. That's a sin 
Martin ... 
M: ... I don I accept your catholic 
interpretation of my compulsive 
necessity to rewrite every single 
word at least a hundred times. 
Guilt is the key. ... Guilt re not 
considering everything from every 
Possible angle ... 
H: Well how about guilt re 
censoring your best thoughts, your 
most honest, primitive, real 
thoughts? 
[from the film The Naked Lunch, 
David Cronenberg, 1993.] 
If only there could be a real 
choice between the perfect 
conjunction of time, place and 
thought and the certain 
effectiveness of a fragmentary 
craft process. The story of The 
Naked Lunch proceeds to 
explore an extreme dislocation of 
the writer's conscious intentions 
from the nature of what he is 
able to produce. 
Michel Foucault concludes that a principled and essential 
conjunction of [poetic forms and psychological structures] 
is impossible.2
One can also say that ‘disjunction’ implies ‘conjunction’ 
and ‘flow’ implies ‘interruption’: without such implications 
neither is remarkable, neither can be an issue.3 In this 
paper great play is made in the midst of four peculiar 
discourses – philosophy, organization theory, design 
theory, and new museology – the writing depends upon 
objects whose connections are multiple, layered and ironic, 
or even paradoxical, and I would not wish to impose on 
this, even if it were possible, a single correct (linear) 
process of reading.4 However, something must be said 
about how the work is written, if only as a preparation for 
the kinds of disjunction and conjunction the reader may 
expect to find and as a chance to acclimatize to the flow of 
the writing and the ways in which it can be interrupted. 
These first few sentences are illustrated by some of the 
characteristic types of note the reader will encounter in the 
thesis. Note 1 is a discursive commentary – an elaboration 
of a concept that attempts to make a connection that has 
specific resonance. In this case three facets of the idea of a 
‘process of writing’ are differentiated – manual skill, 
articulacy, and intellectual preparedness. The point is made 
that they are not logically connected, that there is a 
disjunction between the process of writing and its product. 
That the former carries no guarantee that the latter will 
have particular qualities is illustrated with a quote from 
William Burroughs (via David Cronenberg) whose 
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existential insight and creative genius provide a particularly 
cogent expression of the central point. The second note is 
a straightforward reference to the source of a quote. Often 
I might add qualifying commentary to such a reference 
particularly if a special use is being made of an idea that 
might otherwise look out of place.5 Note number 3 is a 
cross-reference, in this case forwards in the text, to the 
point where an important concept is explicated. To make 
too detailed a use of the concepts of ‘difference’ and 
‘différance’ at this stage would cause a hiatus in one thread 
of the argument: elaboration is therefore deferred and the 
deferral pointed out. Where links backwards in the text are 
made, this is to avoid unnecessary repetition at the same 
time as facilitating a reader in recapitulation. Note 4 is a 
reference to which a discursive commentary is added. In 
this case, a lengthy discussion in the critical literature, 
concerning a theoretical difficulty in the relationship 
between reading and writing, is called upon to add 
credibility to an approach that might otherwise seem to 
make unreasonable demands on the reader. 
2. DERRIDA, Jacques. [1967] 
Writing and Difference. Trans. 
Alan Bass. Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1978. p.170. 
Earlier in the book Derrida says: 
[Writing] does not know where it 
is going, no knowledge can keep it 
from the essential precipitation 
toward the meaning that it 
constitutes and that is, primarily, 
its future. (p.11.) 
3. The proposition that meaning 
arises out of difference, that a 
term is unstable and defined by 
that from which it differs, in an 
endless play of différance. See 
below 2.2 Organization - 
Difference. 
4. See: DERRIDA, Jacques. 
‘Living On - Border Lines’ in 
BLOOM, Harold. et al 
Deconstruction and Criticism, 
New York: The Seabury Press, 
1979. pp.75-176. 
Derrida uses a single footnote 
that extends the full length of 
the main text. This parallel text 
purportedly addresses the 
translator of the work in a text 
which, though it must itself be 
translated, uncovers the 
untranslatability of all texts. In 
fact, Derrida primarily addresses 
the reader even though what is 
read, if Derrida is to be taken at 
his (?) word, is bound to be, at 
least in translation, not quite 
what he meant to say. 
This thesis presents a similar 
paradox in the necessary 
relationship between writing and 
reading. Reading cannot be 
simply a process of playing back 
the writing. Reading itself 
involves a form of translation - 
one which renders differences in, 
what Rorty calls, ‘final vocab-
ulary’ peculiarly potent. As long 
There are sequences in the paper where the notes run on 
ahead of the main text. Although the ‘main text’ is 
certainly composed to carry the key elements and thrust of 
the argument it is also true that the elaboration of, or 
commentary on, the text occasionally necessitates a mass 
and momentum of it own and, indeed, may come close to 
challenging for the reader’s attention as the ‘main text’. 
Whatever happens to the notes, therefore, it could be said 
that the ‘main text’ always catches up, takes over, 
overtakes. The purpose of this conceit is to point up a 
fundamental issue, that of linearity in process. 
Writing may be thought of as a process of 
organization - of organizing meaningful statements into 
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extended exposition. We expect a text to read in a certain 
way, to make sense if we start at the beginning and read on 
methodically to the end where we expect to find some 
form of closure – an end to the story, a conclusion to the 
argument, an evaluation of the evidence. We assume that 
the structure of a text is the result of an intentional 
process of writing and therefore that writing itself is 
ideally linear with a beginning, a middle and an end. But 
are such expectations always reasonable? Is linearity 
inevitable or is it simply a (usually useful) artifice?6
as what I write is worth the 
reading there must be the 
possibility of ‘different’ readings. 
5. In this instance I might add 
that: although Derrida’s context 
is that of the ironic closeness of 
two disjoined discourses - critical 
discourse and clinical discourse - 
the Foucauldian point applies 
more directly here to a 
disjunction in the process of 
writing between cognitive 
processes (the internalized) and 
the form of expression (the 
externalized). 
6. Philosophers who proclaim 
the primacy of speech over 
writing - ‘the existentialist 
fastens his attention primarily on 
the spoken word’ [MAC-
QUARRIE, John. Existentialism. 
New York: World Publishing, 
1972. p.110.] - in so doing 
proclaim also the primacy of 
action over thought, of freedom 
over conformity, of creativity 
over interpretation, and of Being 
over having. The speech act 
happens, has its impact and is 
over and lost in the past before 
anyone can do anything about it 
whereas whatever foolishness 
finds itself committed to paper is 
also likely to find itself trapped 
in a perpetual present and open 
to this and every subsequent 
generation’s critical attention. 
7. LAWSON, Hilary. Reflex-
ivity: The Post-modern Predic-
ament. London: Hutchinson, 
1985. 
When posed with the task of investigating phenomena 
that inhabit or construct some non-linear reality, one 
enters into the realm of non-linear possibilities. In the 
postmodern frame of praxis the relations in discourse 
become reflexive. They turn upon themselves and lead to 
circles of reference, which quickly become littered with 
paradoxical moments, discontinuities, indeterminate terms 
and Gordian knots. Such is the character of philosophy 
when it reflects on its own language. Similarly it is that of 
organization theory that reflects on its own organization, 
of design theory that reflects on its own design, of 
museology that reflects on its own museality. In each case 
what breaks down, with the attention to the terms of its 
own expression, is the certainty of the a priori in the 
discourse and, as a consequence, the acceptability of the 
given in practice.7
Immediately one enters the marketplace of ideas with 
an exposition on the idea that theory, organization, design 
and museum as processes may all have not merely parallel 
attributes and meanings but may be interpretable as held in 
some recognizable pattern of being, as facets of a mercurial 
metatypic process, and as each other’s best model and 
thus, unavoidably, as each other’s best elaboration and 
commentary, reference and source, then the process of 
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writing and that of reading are made highly problematic.8 
Strict linearity is a poor option and yet one is constrained 
by the sequential implications of any grammar: the initial 
sequencing of material on the page is both a temporal 
analogue – a notation for the musical in speech – and a 
spatial analogue – a graphic display. 
The episodic character of this paper, therefore, is not, 
as it might first appear, a straightforward chain of events: 
it is a drystone-walling rather than a brick-laying exercise. 
In the structure, each partial, unequal and tenuous course, 
each ‘dis-course’, touches others to form a progressively 
broader interlocked pattern of spaces, a network that is 
criss-crossed by interacting diagonal lines of force each 
delineating a meaningful tension between distant material, 
each relying on counteracting lines for its place and 
purpose (Figure 1.3.1). Such a construction is an 
assemblage. The drystone wall does not become uniform 
and concrete in the way that the brick wall does: incom-
Figure 1.3.1 
  
The partial, unequal and tenuous courses of the drystone wall. 
  
8. ADORNO, Theodor. [1966] 
Negative Dialectics. Trans. E. B. 
Ashton. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1973. 
No theory today escapes the 
marketplace. Each one is offered as 
a possibility among competing 
opinions. [p.4.] 
Adorno's comment on the 
problem of accumulated conc-
eptual capital in science applies 
as much to organization, design 
and museum praxis: 
What resembles writing in such 
constellations is the conversion 
into objectivity, by way of 
language, of what has been 
subjectively thought and 
assembled. [p.185.] 
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mensurable discourses may not be enmeshed in a meta-
discourse. Each retains a narrative identity even when put 
to allegorical use. 
The question of what sort of foundations, if any, 
should be established before beginning the ‘drystone wall’ 
is addressed in section 2 and follows this introduction. It 
takes the form of an exegesis of spatial theory. The conclu-
sion I have come to is not quite as extreme as that of the 
author’s character in The Naked Lunch (William 
Burroughs) when he advises his young writer friends to 
‘exterminate all rational thought!’ However, something of 
the existential spirit behind it occurs to me: drystone walls 
require no special foundations: the ‘ground work’ is very 
basic. What matters most is a supply of choice material and 
a dedicated openness to its possibilities as the building of 
the wall proceeds. Getting a feel for such a selection of 
material forms the substance of the tract. It explores the 
discursive construction and visual modelling of the 
conceptions of physical, social, documentary and 
paradigmatic space. 
Section 3 opens up the three discursive locations – 
organization, design and museum. Section 4 makes a series 
of excursions between various pairs of these locations – 
organization of design, design of museum design, 
museality of organization. And section 5 travels further 
afield, crossing earlier traces and exploring the edifice as a 
whole. 
If some pattern emerges in this arrangement of 
disparate elements in time it may become familiar in the 
same sense as is a constellation in the night sky.9 The 
imaginary lines of force threading back and forth through 
such a structure are orchestrated to form a memorable 
complex. But, there is nothing obvious or automatic about 
such ‘force fields’.10 They are invisible and impermanent: 
9. JAY, Martin. Adorno. 
Fontana, 1984. p.14-15. 
10. ibid.  
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they may be easily disturbed with potentially catastrophic 
consequences for the visible and tangible artifices in which 
we choose to live. 
Voice 
The artificiality of the disinterested academic style of 
writing is clear enough. The origins of this project include, 
among their moments, a period of rage, which was 
expressed above in a more committed personal style of 
writing than one might reasonably expect to find in a 
doctoral thesis. I hope the point was made that, although 
not about to engage the sympathies or committed support 
of those in society at large who are subject to oppressive 
and marginalizing powers, in a small way, the experience of 
an exclusion and distortion of my identity-defining 
competence in a specific institutional context deserves 
some recognition. Beyond the autobiographical statement 
above, I have tried to resist the temptation to adopt the 
kind of ‘personal’ voice that Spivak was able to justify in 
the context of a debate on marginalization.11 The ‘centre’ 
from which power so definitively emanates and yet which 
always remains so hard to pin down is reflected for me, as 
it is for Spivak, in the absence of certain voices – the 
committed voices that are able to celebrate, and through 
celebration to define, cultural difference. Spivak needed to 
respond with a refusal of the supposedly neutral and 
‘objective’ discourse of academia. I knowingly refuse such 
a refusal: it would not serve the project at hand to 
dominate its reading with a ‘marginal’ matter. It is 
sufficient to set out the new ground in a more or less 
conventional academic style: the fact that it is ‘new 
ground’ is celebration enough. 
11. SPIVAK, Gayatri Chakra-
vorty. "Explanation and Culture: 
Marginalia" in FERGUSON, 
Russell. et al (eds.) Out There: 
Marginalization and Contem-
porary Cultures. New York: The 
New Museum of Contemporary 
Art & Cambridge Mass: MIT 
Press, 1990. pp.377-93.  
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2.0 Space and Theory 
Introduction 
In relation to spatial theory it is necessary to distinguish 
between the functions of ‘metaphor’ and of ‘model’. In the 
discourses of organization and of design one may observe 
a rich metaphorical content which borrows its terms from 
the language of spatial relations. 
People take up or hold positions in an organization which 
may be above or below others. They either fit in or are out 
of place. They may have many or few contacts work 
alongside others or in isolation, cover little or a lot of 
ground, have a large or small area of responsibility, lead 
or lag behind the field, feel small or be too big for their 
boots, be too concerned with internal or external matters, 
fear being squeezed or over-stretched, etc. 
In narrative descriptions of a social situation we often rely 
on a sustained spatial metaphor that draws our attention to 
the structural and relational aspects of the situation. This 
is not the only common type of metaphor: we also 
regularly encounter militaristic language - the language of 
strategy, tactics, forces, attack and retreat, weapons, cut 
and thrust, no-man’s-land, entrenchment, canon fodder, 
rank and file, etc. - which draws our attention to the 
competitive nature of a situation. Neither is it necessarily 
always the most useful: in some quarters physiological, 
familial and horticultural metaphors hold much greater 
sway because their various emphases - on , for example, 
health, obligation, and nurture - point to very different 
sets of applied values.1 But, it does put forward an 
important set of ideas to which we are drawn for other 
reasons. The spatial metaphor invites us to imagine ‘places’ 
filled with ‘things’. It proposes a concrete, and therefore 
physical, conception of abstract relations which is not 
bound to a particular representational image. It is not 
1. See: MORGAN, Gareth. 
Images of Organization. Sage 
Publications, 1988. Morgan has 
explored a wide range of such 
ruling metaphors as images of 
organization and has identified 
eight that clearly represent 
different ways of thinking and 
seeing. They are organization 
as: mechanism, organism, brain, 
culture, politics, psychic prison, 
evolution and domination. 
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iconic in the way that the image of the army, the body, the 
family or the garden are iconic - loaded with a specific 
representational history. Metaphor is bound to the 
differential rational nature of language. It concerns, is the 
very material of, persuasive description. Each borrowed 
term enriches meaning and furthers understanding by 
abstracting qualities from the more familiar phenomena of 
the world and, by analogy, applying them to the less 
familiar. Such a discursive process of abstraction is, by 
definition, selective, rhetorical, and political. Therefore it 
is unavoidably a value-laden (theory-laden) activity - a 
form of Praxis. Metaphor, of this iconic, sort invites us to 
recall the image upon which it is based. Spatial metaphor is 
fundamentally different in the sense that it invites us to 
construct a new image, a spatial model. 
Spatial Models 
A spatial model attempts to use a physical entity as the 
frame for a system of signs. This system of signs 
comprises a conventional graphic language of points, lines 
and planes in which can be ‘written’ a variety of spatial 
messages. In modelling, therefore, one must distinguish 
between the absolute space, out of which the model carves 
its place, and the ideal space that we wish to model which 
is constructed through a process of semiosis. A spatial 
model may be defined as: an ideal conception of space 
constructed in the geometry and possibility of absolute 
space. What is gained in moving from the linguistic realm 
of metaphor to the visual realm of the model, is 
simultaneity, a focus on the holistic, on structure, spatial 
relations, pattern, form, etc, on an enfolding moment. 
What is lost is rationality, a focus on the sequential, on 
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description, explication, history, ethnography, biography, 
etc, on the unfolding process of narrative.  
2. See: glossary, and 4.1 below. 
3. Although I use the terms 
‘difference’, ‘distance’ and 
‘speed of action’ in their more 
generic senses they correspond 
with the three aspects of any 
social account of action and 
space to which Benno 
WERLEN draws attention: 
• the production and preserva-
tion of meaning; 
• spatial arrangements; and 
• the relative importance of the 
mobile and the immobile. 
 WERLEN, Benno. [1988] 
Society, Action and Space: An 
Alternative Human Geography. 
Trans. Gayna WALLS. 
Routledge, 1993. 
4. See 3.2 below. Typical of 
design process models based on 
industrial or professional prac-
tice are: RIBA Architect’s Plan of 
Work; the Philips Design Track; 
and the project management-
oriented visualization by Alan 
TOPALIAN. And typical of 
those developed by academics 
are: J C JONES’ “Model for a 
Method of Systematic Design”; 
Jane DARKE’s “Primary 
Generator Model”; George 
RZEVSKI’s Popperian model; 
and Allen HICKLING’s 
“Extended Whirling Process”. 
5. The best known are those of 
the Royal Ontario Museum 
[ROYAL ONTARIO MUSEUM. 
Communicating with the Museum 
Visitor. Guidelines for Planning. 
ROM, 1976.] and the Natural 
History Museum (London) 
[MILES, R S. et al. The Design of 
Educational Exhibits. Unwin 
Hyman, 1982. and MILES, R S. 
“Exhibitions: Management for a 
Change” in COSSONS, Neil. 
(ed.) The Management of Change 
in Museums. National Maritime 
Museum, 1985.] 
In this paper ‘design’ is considered to have four 
constitutive aspects: the designed object, the object of 
design, the design process, and design rationale. The 
designed object generally refers to the end product of the 
design process, the thing, place, message, system that 
results from implementation of the design. The ‘object of 
design’ generally refers to the ‘brief’ or ‘programme’, the 
practical situation and the ‘idea’ or ‘problem’ 
circumscribed by a system of documentary actions. The 
design process generally refers to the designer’s way of 
doing design, either the particular process of designing as 
experienced or the ideal or generic process of design as a 
conceptual tool. And the design rationale normally refers 
to the designer’s (or researcher’s) way of explaining the 
what? when? how? and, most importantly, the why? of 
designing. I refer to these four aspects of design as the 
four ‘Ps’ - Product, Programme, Process and Philosophy2 - 
and they form an irreducible cluster. It is their collocation 
which is the object of this project in modelling. 
In developing a spatial schema to model any particular 
phenomenon the question one must ask of its dimensions 
is how well they cope with the visualizing of that 
phenomenon’s possible presences, absences, substitutes 
and simulations, that is, with the dynamics of spatial 
relations which are constituted through difference, 
distance and speed of action.3
Although many attempts have been made to provide 
an adequate model of design,4 and a few specifically of 
museum design,5 not all aspects of design have been 
treated equally. In the discourses of design the designed 
object is the most common focus of attention.6 On 
occasion this is accommodated in the same view as the 
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design process.7 More often, however, the focus on design 
process is the subject of differently sited and produced 
discourses.8 Over and above these, design programme and 
design philosophy commonly play a subservient role and 
are either subsumed in a consideration of designed object9 
or design process10 or discounted from the discourse 
entirely. One can put the first of these strategies down to 
what Lefebvre has called “the perfect paralogism” by 
which he means the crossing from one conception of space 
to another without regard for “logical links.” The 
implication here is that different types of space - physical, 
mental, social - may not be collapsed into each other, but 
equally they may not be accommodated via some ‘vague 
justification’ by the invoking of “some such notion as 
coupure or rupture or break”.11
6. Design histories based on 
the academic tradition of art 
history arid connoisseurship. 
7. For example: DORMER, 
Peter. Design Since 1945. 
Thames & Hudson, 1993; and 
SPARKE, Penny. Design in 
Context. Quarto Publishing, 
1987. 
8. For example: JONES, J. 
Christopher. Design Methods: 
Seeds of Human Futures. 
Revised Ed. John Wiley & Sons, 
1981; EVANS, Barrie., James 
Powell & Reg Talbot (eds.) 
Changing Design. John Wiley & 
Sons, 1982; and CROSS, Nigel. 
(ed.) Developments in Design 
Methodology. John Wiley & 
Sons, 1984. 
9. For example: PYE, David. 
The Nature and Aesthetics of 
Design. Barrie and Jenkins, 1978 
and POTTER, Norman. Models 
and Constructs: Margin Notes to 
a Design Culture. Hyphen 
Press, 1990. 
10. For example: ALEXANDER, 
Christopher. Notes on the 
Synthesis of Form. Cambridge 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1984; JONES, J. Christopher. 
Designing Designing. Architec-
ture Design and Technology 
Press, 1991 (previously 
published as Essays in Design. 
John Wiley & Sons, 1984.); and 
MITCHELL, C Thomas. 
Redefining Designing: From 
Form to Experience. New York: 
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1993. 
11. LEFEBVRE, Henri. [1974] 
The Production of Space. Trans. 
Donald Nicholson-Smith. Basil 
BlackweIl, 1991, p.5. 
In Cartographies a different proposition arises: that the 
mapping process is more than a description. “Mapping, as 
representation, is inextricably caught up in the material 
production of what it represents”.12 This is the light in 
which the current project should be seen. In the various 
spaces that are represented by the modelling of 
museum•design•organization ‘objects’ are fabricated and 
located in the same moment as space itself is defined. This 
represents a process of differentiation analogous to the 
semiotic notion of meaning as ‘difference’ and to the birth 
of the universe in the ‘Big Bang’ theory. 
The latter may suggest a passing cosmological parallel, 
however, cosmology as such has a broader theoretical 
range than its use in astronomy. 
Cosmologies 
Whether or not there is an order to things is irrelevant to a 
successful theory of design. Science is founded on the 
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belief that there is an order to things and that through 
systematic study this order can be revealed. Design, on the 
hand, is founded on the belief that, whether or not there is 
a definitive order to things, the perceived world can be 
purposefully changed. As a radically pragmatic activity 
then design does not need to resort to a positivist notion 
of order. However, regardless of contingent ontologies of 
the positivist and idealist sort, it does require some resort 
to a faith in human experience, to the role of an intelligent 
application of perception, memory and skill. What place 
does this create for the idea of cosmology? 
12. DIPR0SE, Rosalyn & Robyn 
Ferrell. (eds.) Cartographies: 
Poststructuralism and the 
Mapping of Bodies and Spaces. 
Allen & Unwin Australia, 1991. 
I draw here on the cosmologies proposed by two 
theorists whose thinking has direct impact on the way 
design theory has been visualized in the past.13 Karl Popper 
supported his theory of scientific progress with a three-
world view that brought into play an evolutionary 
metaphysics under which the actual, the experiential and 
the linguistic could be made commensurate. 
Popper’s cosmology 14
  
World I the world of things, physical objects 
World II the world of subjective experience 
World III the world of statements 
  
John Warfield also proposes a three-part ‘cosmology’ 
which, although it apparently parallels the Popperian 
structure, does not necessarily entail commensurability. 
Warfield’s Cosmology15
13. See 3.2 below. 
14. POPPER, Karl R. [1972] 
Objective Knowledge: an 
Evolutionary Approach. 6th edn. 
rev. and expanded. Oxford 
University Press, 1981. 
15. WARFIELD, John N. 
(George Mason University) 
1986? 
  
Residue  everything except the Phaneron and the Library  
Phaneron  everything present to the mind, thoughts and ideas 
Library  everything recorded in some media form  
  
Popper defines World I as a straightforward matter of 
‘physics’, material reality. Warfield defines the parallel 
realm of the Residue in negative terms: one must refer to 
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the definitions of the other two realms in order to mentally 
construct what else there may be to the world. Popper's 
realism is thus matched by Warfield's indeterminacy which 
is at least a deferment, a pragmatic gesture, but may also 
represent a radically subjectivist/relativist manoeuvre. 
World II Popper defines in straightforward existential 
terms, which presuppose a direct relation between the 
physical world and the existent: experience is subjective 
but dependent upon the existence of an objective material 
reality. Warfield defines the Phaneron in more open terms, 
ones which do not exclude the phantasm and the phantom 
from the realm of the ‘visible’. 
In World III Popper makes the act of speech the 
definitive condition of knowledge. Warfield, with the idea 
of the Library, privileges the written, the recorded. A 
contradictory tension is set up here. One might have 
expected Popper, with his practical orientation, to be most 
likely to settle on an externalized notion of language as the 
semiological, the sign system, and Warfield to be inclined 
to an internalized nation of the semantic, the meaningful. I 
interpret the apparent mismatch of emphases not as 
aberrations on the part of either Popper or Warfield, but in 
each case as attempts to square their respective circles of 
thought. Popper in emphasizing speech attaches an 
immediately social dimension to the material of language: 
the intersubjective dimension of World III thereby adds 
weight to the experiential subjectivity of World II. 
Warfield in emphasizing the recorded language presup-
poses the communicable message but insists on a form that 
is clearly separable from the realm of ‘thoughts and ideas’. 
If one addresses the question of what relations to the 
idea of order are represented in science and in design in the 
light of these two parallel formulations an illuminating 
pattern emerges. The scientist believes that there is an 
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order in World I / Residue and that this will be evidenced 
in World II / Phaneron and that, as a result, this will be 
reflected /created in World III / Library. External reality, 
whether conceived in purely materialistic or more 
ambiguous terms, has a structure, a pattern to it that may 
be experienced, directly or indirectly, through a mental 
capacity for cognition, ideation and imagination, and may 
be represented, however imperfectly, in language and 
communicated. 
The designer believes that World I /Residue is open to 
change by deliberate intervention in practical situations 
and that the required action can be planned in World II / 
Phaneron and the plan developed and recorded in World 
III / Library. A practical situation, whether conceived of 
as primarily socio-technical or as socio-cultural or as both, 
is an incompletely understood object that may be freely 
acted upon. The designer structures such action by 
responding to the immanent qualities of current and past 
experience and by exercising practical thought, and makes 
communicable and effective the prescription for change 
through dialogue (negotiation and persuasion) and docu-
mentation (description, instruction and specification). 
Whether or not an order-of-things exists throughout 
World I /Residue, the designer believes that local order can 
be created, however temporarily. The contingency of this 
belief affects the object of design, the practical situation 
which is open to designerly intervention, but equally it 
affects the subjective aspects of design process (creative 
and analytical design thinking) and its intersubjective 
aspects (design representation and creative dialogue), and 
it affects the ideological dimension of design, the applica-
tion of values and beliefs of both rational (conscious, 
theoretical) and irrational (unconscious, cultural) origin. 
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Entropy and Relativity 
The designer’s position may seem to be set in opposition 
to the law of entropy which states that in a system in 
which there is no exchange of matter or energy with its 
environment there is an irreversible long-term tendency 
for energy (and, therefore, matter) to become randomly 
and evenly distributed and, therefore, for an ultimate state 
of inert uniformity, an absence of form, pattern and 
differentiation, a telos of meaninglessness, a heat death. 
However, such an opposition is based on a proposition in 
classical thermodynamics that fails at the first hurdle: in 
the practical situations in which the designer operates 
matter and energy are readily exchanged with the 
environment and the time frame is relatively short. In 
design, for this reason if for no other, the biological 
metaphor of open organic systems provides a better 
starting point than does the physical metaphor of closed 
mechanical systems, and it tends to develop into the 
ecological metaphor of interdependent complex systems. 
In the world of human experience biological and 
socio-cultural/socio-technical systems tend to exhibit 
negative entropy: they tend to project towards life in ever 
richer forms and towards integration.16 This proposition is 
supported in schemes as widely divergent as psycho-
analytic theory, Richard Dawkins’ revision of evolutionary 
theory, and the mathematics of complexity and chaos. 
16. Hassard connects this thesis 
with the exemplary “generic 
social systems approach to 
organizational analysis” of 
KATZ and KHAN whose 
management textbook The Social 
Psychology of Organizations 
(New York: John Wiley, 1966.) 
was “the most influential” during 
the 1960s and 70s. 
[HASSARD, John. Sociology and 
Organization Theory. Cambridge 
University Press, 1993. pp.45-6.] 
I suggest, therefore, that the designer’s position is 
opposed to hard systems and mechanistic views, tends to 
be ambivalent towards soft systems and organismic views 
and, ultimately, is only consistent with ecological and 
holistic views of reality in which physical, social, psychical, 
documentary and conceptual phenomena inhabit the 
parallel, interdependent spaces that constitute complex 
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systems.17 Even small-scale design, whose objects may be 
relatively uncomplicated, deals with complexity in the 
sense that those objects inhabit a multidimensional 
constellation of spaces. To re-differentiate this multi-
dimensionality is to define the complexity of design qua 
design. It is to (re)construct the spaces of design phenom-
ena. Therefore, in the modelling process, spatial concepts 
become the central object of the visualizing activity. 
Visualizing Space 
There is no straightforward correlation between a 
perceived reality and a constructed representation, at least 
not in absolute spatial terms. The model, as much as the 
pictorial or sculptural representation of iconographic art, is 
the realization of a particular topological transformation 
and through this the abstraction of particular qualities and 
relations from the differentiating field of perception. 
Pictorial perspective, for example, fixes in a two-
dimensional plane an image that preserves selected three-
dimensional spatial relations between the monocular 
observer and the observed (perspective is immediately 
relativistic). The topological transformation, to follow a 
Renaissance model, involves compressing points in three-
dimensional space onto a two-dimensional plane (Figure. 
2.0.1). The plane lies at right-angles to the line of sight 
and points in three-dimensional space are located on the 
plane by projecting a line through the point to the 
observer’s eye and recording the intersection of the line 
and the picture plane. 
17. One area of systems theory 
which attracts attention here 
because of its transitional or 
translational position between 
notions of the biological and 
social, is Living Systems Theory 
(LST) Its applications are 
increasingly in the field of com-
plex systems, systems that com-
bine different levels of living 
and non-living complexes. See: 
Systems Practice, 8:1, Plenum 
Press, 1996.] 
The problem that needs to be addressed, in relation to 
a multifaceted phenomenon such as design, is that the 
kinds of ‘perception’ involved in constructing its spatiality  
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Figure 2.0.1 
 
The artist projecting lines from an object onto the picture plane to 
render a perspective drawing. From Albrecht Durer’s textbook on 
perspective and proportion, 1525 edition. 
 
are radically different to each other.18 They have no 
obvious commensurability. For example, the intellect plays 
a different role in constructing perspectival space than it 
does in constructing any social space. 
18. I am using the term ‘percep-
tion’ here in a way that admits a 
large overlap with the tradition-
al psychological notions of ‘sen-
sation’ at one extreme and ‘con-
ceptual recognition’ and ‘comp-
rehension’ at the other. It has 
been admitted for a long time 
that “these distinctions are 
unclear and arbitrary”. 
[WILDING, J M. Perception: 
from Sense to Object. 
Hutchinson, 1982. p.26.] 
19. The Special Theory of 
Relativity was published as four 
papers in the Annalen der 
Physik, 1905. The General 
Theory was published in 1916. 
[BERNSTEIN, Jeremy. Einstein. 
Fontana, 1973.] 
20. HAWKING, S. A Brief 
History of Time From the Big 
Bang to Black Holes. Bantam, 
1988. pp.179-81. 
Relative Dimensionality of Physical Space 
The move from absolute to relative conceptions of 
physical space was originally spurred by Einstein’s theory 
of relativity.19 It now seems that the dimensionality of 
physical space is itself a question of relativity. If I wish to 
explain the interactions of snooker balls the classical frame 
of 3-dimensional space plus linear time are adequate. If, 
however, I wish to explain distance effects at the 
subatomic level it seems I may need as many as 10 
dimensions.20 Attempts to account for relativity in 
philosophical terms were immediately inspired by 
Einstein’s work, for example, the work of the Vienna 
Circle whose members included Moritz Schlick, Otto 
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Neurath and Rudolph Carnap.21 The consequence of 
Carnap’s ‘methodological solipsism’ 22 was to admit the 
possibility of a more radically relative conception of 
physical space: the dimensionality of physical space 
becomes a question of what is necessary to confirm the 
principle of ‘remembered similarity’ as a sufficient basis for 
the construction of a world description. Carnap chose the 
notion of ‘remembered similarity’ because it accorded with 
the most primitive level of the process of ‘perception’ (in 
the broader sense referred to above: see note 18.) Although 
Carnap’s formulation may have been flawed, subsequent 
work in the philosophy of science has strengthened rather 
than weakened this particular aspect of ‘perceptual’ 
relativity. Popper’s elevation of the principle of 
‘falsifiability’ as the criterion for scientific discovery also 
opened up a future for conceptions of physical space other 
than the Einsteinian space-time continuum. The Popperian 
account admits not only ‘observable objects’ in the 
construction of physical space but any conceivable object 
embedded in a series of propositions that has withstood the 
scientific process of attempted falsification long enough to 
gain consensual acceptance.23 More recently the proposition 
of a radical relativity of spatiality has begun to receive 
consensual acceptance. What started as an esoteric concern 
amongst physicists has become a widespread ‘feeling’ for a 
multidimensional reality that connects the products of 
popular culture, Eastern mysticism, globalization in 
economics, and ecological environmentalism. 
21. Carnap, who became the 
best-known representative of the 
Vienna Circle, studied physics 
and in 1921 completed a doctoral 
thesis on ‘space’ subtitled “a 
contribution to the philosophy 
of science”. [AYER, A. J. 
Philosophy in the Twentieth 
Century. Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1982. p.125.] 
22. The standpoint of ‘Method-
ological Solipsism’ formed the 
basis of Der Logische Aufbau der 
Welt [1928] (The logical Con-
struction of the World.) in which: 
…he took as his starting point the 
series of elements each consti-
tuting the whole of a person's 
current experiences at a given 
moment, and attempted to show 
how the entire set of concepts 
needed to describe the world could 
be constructed stage by stage. 
Carnap's inclusion of the word 
‘methodological’ 
was somewhat disingenuous: it 
was intended to forestall discus-
sion of the epistemological which 
the choice of a solipsistic basis 
might be thought to raise. 
ibid. p.126. 
23. ibid. 
24. CAPRA, Fritjof. The Tao of 
Physics. Wildwood House, 1975. 
p.175 ff. 
Modern physics has confirmed most dramatically one of the 
basic ideas of Eastern mysticism; that all the concepts we use 
to describe nature are limited, that they are not features of 
reality, as we tend to believe, but creations of the mind; parts 
of the map, not of the territory.24
What are we to make of the counter-intuitive dimensional- 
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ities invoked by such constructions as virtual reality, 
acintya,25 ... and the Gaia hypothesis?28 Such dimensional-
ities do not construct the visible in the same sense that 
spatio-temporal dimensionality constructs the visual 
appearance of material objects. Each dimensionality is 
mediated by something additional to the apparatus of 
looking and seeing. Each is mediated by graphic, three-
dimensional and/or electronic-digital means and in this 
mediation a visualizing process is necessarily entailed, a 
conscious process of making something visible. It is then 
upon the graphic, three-dimensional, televisual, etc. 
products that the visual apparatus operates. And in the 
process one moves into a realm of spatial exotica. 
When looking for what validity visualizations of exotic 
spaces may have as signifiers one may contrast purely 
representational interpretations of visual imagery, which 
would tend to invalidate them, to broader interpretations 
that allow denotation and analogical reconstruction, as 
well as visual similarity, a place in art, in visual commun-
ication in general. In this sense the model is a simplified, 
though adequate, analogue that may be visualized. Saint-
Martin refers to a  
...new form of iconicity, if the term is used in the Piercian 
sense of similarity between structural relations and not 
between superficial attributes.27
25. ...beyond the world of intel - 
lectual distinctions and opposites 
...where reality appears as undi - 
vided and undifferentiated 'such - 
ness'. ibid. p.106. 
26. LOVELOCK, James. GAIA. 
Oxford University Press, 1979. 
27. CUPCHIK, Gerald C. & 
János LÁSZLÓ (eds.) Emerging 
Visions of the Aesthetic Process: 
Psychology, Semiology and 
Philosophy. Cambridge Univers-
ity Press, 1992. p.61. 
Visual appearances only count as superficial attributes: 
whereas the structural relations underlying visual 
appearances, such as those studied by cubists, economists 
and cosmologists, count as deeper attributes that may not 
be captured in a ‘representational’ image but may be 
denoted or analogically reconstructed in graphic, three-
dimensional or ‘digital’ form. 
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In exotic spaces dimensionality is abstracted by the 
means of mediation. The analogic qualities of the visual-
ization are determined by the number and type of the 
dimensions used to construct the total space. And, in 
terms of dimensionality, the difference or equivalence 
between one exotic space and another can be determined 
with reference to a scheme enumerating the dimensional 
permutations that are possible.28
In the modelling of museum design organization three 
apparently quite different exotic spaces are of immediate 
interest: social space, documentary space, and paradigmatic 
space. With the physical space they form a constellation of 
spaces that holds its pattern only by dint of the tensions 
between them. The construction of museum•design 
•organization is embodied in the tensions between 
particular contents in these spaces, the specifics of 
‘location’ and ‘discourse’. The spaces themselves begin as 
empty possibilities: differentiation of Being constructed in 
the knowledge and action of social space; visual thinking 
and communicative activity constructed in the semiotics 
and graphics of documentary space; normativity and 
pragmatism constructed in the philosophies and ideologies 
of paradigmatic space. 28. See Appendix A: Notation.
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2.1 Physical Space  
Mediation and Construction 
In Design the dimensionality of physical space is not an 
absolute: it becomes a question of what is adequate to the 
process of changing designed objects. Adequacy here is 
determined by the criteria of a conceptual-perceptual 
scheme informed by experience. The experience underpin-
ning design is of successfully projecting the imaginary into 
physical space and this engages an idea of perception 
which is mediating and constructive at least in the sense of 
informing those products of the design process that make 
designs visible. As such, design drawings and design 
models embody a contingent knowledge of the designed 
object and a contingent model of physical space. In these 
terms content and form are interdependent and open to 
radical re-conceptualization. 
Mediation: Geometry and Possibility 
The validity of the graphic visualization is analogous to 
that of Cartesian geometry with one crucial difference: it 
does not rely on a strict commensuration of numerical 
values and geometric loci. Rather it depends upon a 
relativistic identification of ‘value’ with ‘place’. Descartes 
put all of his eggs in the mathematical basket and with the 
mathematics of his day:  
... could demonstrate how geometry and algebra dovetail each 
other, how an interchange of ideas is possible by the 
identification of algebraic correlation with geometrical locus. 
Numerical relationship can be expressed as a spatial one - 
lines are changed into numbers and numbers into lines.1
1. DESCARTES, René. Dis-
course on Method and the Medi-
tations. Trans. F E Sutcliffe. 
Penguin, 1968. p.16 (translator's 
introduction). The value of Cartesianism is not that it provides a method 
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of arriving at the truth nor that it facilitates progress 
towards the unification and control of nature. Its value is 
that of a useful tool, that is, of a limited correlative system 
of knowledge that we may set in the context of broader 
possibilities of communicative, dialogic, freely negotiated 
understandings of the world. The key concept in 
Cartesianism is that of the attribute of ‘extension’. It is 
this attribute that all things have in common and therefore 
that constructs an homogeneous view of the physical world.2
This drive towards a singular, universal, absolute 
conception of the physical world, arrived at by deductive 
reasoning, has clearly failed. Even in Descartes own expla- 
nation of the scientific method, the ‘self-evident’ existence 
of the sovereign rational subject and a theological argument 
are necessary to support the exercise of ‘intuition’. The 
whole edifice sits on the shakiest of foundations: an 
idealism rather inconsistent with the method’s realist aims. 
However, in a relativistic framework, Cartesianism is 
undoubtedly powerful and productive: from it we have 
developed the widest range of techniques for making the 
conceptual and the phenomenal visible. 
If the system of Descartes was a failure, Cartesianism as an 
attitude o f mind was both fruitful and enduring.3
In relation to the modelling of the material objects in 
design their ‘ontic’ reality is available to us only in the 
Cartesian sense of a ‘body’ external to the thinking 
subject. Such objects actually occupy the absolute space 
that they appear to the mind to occupy. The effect - visual 
perception of an object in physical space - being as real as 
its cause - an actual object ‘out there’. Kant's account of 
the noumenon as the ‘thing it itself’ which is not directly 
knowable and the phenomenon as the sense data that lead 
us to believe in the existence of such things, offers an 
2. ibid. p.22. 
3. ibid. p.23 
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idealist parallel to the realist account. In theoretical terms 
these views are poles apart, however, the consequences for 
visualization are straightforward and not incompatible. In 
design, Cartesian coordinate systems underpin the two-
dimensional orthographic projection and the three-dimen-
sional   constructed   model   (Figures 2.1.1 & 2),   and,  by 
 
Figure 2.1.1 (above) 
 
Orthographic drawing: a 
three-dimensional object 
described with a combination 
of two-dimensional plan and 
elevation views. 
 
 
Figure 2.12 (right) 
 
Three-dimensional 
constructed model 
 
 
 
 35 
various geometrical transformations of the three-dimen-
sional, generate the two-dimensional oblique, axonometric, 
isometric   and   perspective  projections  (Figures 2.1.3-6.) 
 
Figure 2.1.3 
  
Oblique projection 
  
 
Figure 2.1.4 
  
Axonometric projection 
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Figure 2.1.5 
  
Isometric projection 
  
 
 
Figure 2.1.6 
  
Perspective projection 
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When one comes to consider the relation between the 
projected object in any visualization and the visualization 
itself as a physical object one must resort to a reflexive 
moment. The temporal position of the visualizing process 
changes the meaning of the image. In a radical sense, the 
visualized object is a fiction but one which attempts to 
prefigure an existence or an experience - an ‘existence’ if one 
accepts the realist position, an ‘experience’ if the position 
one defers to is idealist. In either case a process of project-
ion is engaged that is crucial to the act of visual perception. 
There may seem to be a paradox here. Consider two 
drawings that, to all intents and purposes, appear identical. 
One may depict a physical object that already exists and 
the other an object which, as a design, does not yet exist. 
Are the drawings the same? Is the process of projection in 
each case the same? The first is a question of ontological 
significance the second of epistemological significance. 
To the first question it seems to me that one must 
answer a qualified ‘yes’. To explain, imagine that one 
engages a third party to judge on the evidence of the 
drawings alone. I contend that they would be able to 
perceive no substantive difference between the drawings as 
physical objects nor between the marks on the paper that 
comprise the drawn image nor, given that they are 
competent to decipher the images, between the objects 
depicted. Without supplementary evidence as to the circum-
stance of their production, the two drawings will appear 
identical. One may also play a trick to prove a point. If the 
two drawings are actually the same drawing seen at different 
times and in the interval between the two viewings the 
projected design in the ‘first’ drawing is realized as a 
physical object, then if there is anything different about the 
drawing it is clearly nothing intrinsic to the drawing as a 
physical object nor with the marks one reads as an image 
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nor with the depicted object. Any difference there may be 
can only be within ourselves or within the larger 
environment and the result of changed relations therein. 
One can say, then, that the quality of analogic 
reconstruction in any visualization is at least as important 
as its quality of visual similarity even if the superficial 
attribute of visual appearance is ostensibly its focus. In the 
design drawing this is manifestly the case because the 
process of projection and the working through of a 
drawing system such as orthographic projection must 
interactively construct the image through a consideration 
of structural relations. Although a drawing may make 
visible only superficial attributes, to accomplish its 
production a grasp of deeper attributes, whether by 
analytic or holistic means, is necessary. Ultimately, for any 
model of physical space embodied in a design drawing to 
make sense it must be able to account for changing 
relations in the perceptual process: the projection of a 
physical reality is not a singular phenomenon. 
To the second question: is the process of projection in 
each case the same? I am, therefore, more certain that the 
answer is ‘no’. In depicting a physical object that already 
exists, the geometrical transformations of the three-dimen-
sional that one accomplishes are rational.4 They depend 
upon an approximation of a mechanical process. Once 
certain parameters are set concerning the drawing system 
to be used - orthographic, isometric, perspective, etc. - and 
the orientation of the object to be depicted, the projection 
involved is one which is essentially predetermined and 
mechanical in character, that is, it is reproductive. 
However, in ‘depicting’ a design, as if it were a physical 
object that exists, there is no three-dimensional original to 
which one can apply geometrical transformations. The first 
systematized drawing one produces of a design, therefore, 
4. I refer here to the narrower 
sense of ‘rational’ suggested by 
the latin root Ratio (to compute, 
reckon, account) which implies a 
quantitative operation to which 
there is a correct outcome. 
[The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 
Sixth edn. 1976.] 
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strictly speaking is the result of irrational procedures: it is 
dependent upon a sustained act of inventive imagination.5 
The projection involved is one that is essentially creative 
and perceptual in character, that is, it is productive rather 
than reproductive. 
The concept of ‘projection’ is clearly central. Max 
Velmans has summarized accumulating evidence that: 
what we think of as everyday `physical reality' is, in part, a 
mental construction arising from an interaction of energies 
and events with human perceptual processing. One aspect of 
this processing is the 'perceptual projection' of experienced 
events to their judged location in three-dimensional space.6
He describes the relations between the external event of 
the physical object, the perceptual process and the process 
of projection as cyclical or `reflexive' (Figure 2.1.7.) 
 
5. I refer here to the specifical-
ly visual sense of the word 
'imagination': "the mental facul-
ty of forming images ...of exter-
nal objects not present to the 
senses", and qualify it with the 
word `inventive' to explicitly 
imply an object "created by 
thought" that does not yet exist 
as a physical object. [ibid.] 
6. VELMANS, Max. ‘Physical, 
Psychological and Virtual 
Realities’, from the preprinted 
abstract for the Embodied 
knowledge and Virtual Space 
conference, Goldsmiths College, 
London, 1995. 
Figure 2.1.7 
  
A model of perception based on Velmans. (A) the initiating physical 
object/event stimulates (B) perceptual processing and (C) perceptual 
projection and the latter achieves initial closure of the perceptual cycle. 
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However, if an external physical object/event is posited as 
that which initiates the perceptual cycle and a process of 
‘perceptual projection’ as that which achieves its initial 
‘closure’, one must question whether or not inventive 
imaginative projection, as identified above, is really better 
understood as qualitatively different. Even if, in measurable 
neurological terms, it turns out to be the same type of 
process, I believe that the difference is worth preserving. 
This is not because I think science will come to the conclu-
sion that there are different types of ‘perceptual projection’, 
though it would be neat if it did, but, because in the 
construction of a theory of design it facilitates an account 
of its ideological basis. Where the initiating moment in the 
perceptual cycle is an act of inventive imaginative projection 
the possibility of things being other than they are, in the 
most radical sense, is admitted (Figure 2.1.8.) 
 
Figure 2.1.8 
  
A development of Velmans’ model of perception (see Figure 2.1.7 
above) in which M) the initiating event of inventive imaginative 
projection parallels (D) motor coordination of the drawing hand to 
produce (Y) the externalized image which stimulates {Z) perceptual 
processing as an initial closure of the perceptual cycle. The externalized 
construction of the design drawing holds out the possibility of design 
realization (!) 
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And this belief is foundational in design: in general, the 
designer believes that whether or not there is an order to 
things, whether or not we have an adequate construction of 
the world, we can change things for the better.7 There is, 
therefore, a very concrete sense in which the possibility of 
inventive imaginative projection initiates the social and 
philosophical construction of design. And it is no accident 
that, as part of an explanation of the creative moment in 
design, it seems to accord with experience. 
If one maintains that the only form of projection that is 
legitimate is perceptual projection one is left with a paradox. 
Unless suffering severe delusions one does not mistake 
things inventively imagined for things that one perceives to 
exist in physical space. If, as is the argument for perceptual 
projection, a physical object/event is necessary to initiate 
the perceptual cycle, then one is left to conclude that, 
without its own type of projection (one that is able to 
initiate a perceptual cycle) inventive imagination is itself a 
delusion. If it is a memory trick, then truly there is nothing 
new under the sun and we are doomed to endlessly reinvent 
the wheel - determinism of a prehistoric kind re-emerges. 
And if some strangely displaced dream, then we delude 
ourselves to believe that it is possible to distinguish between 
the perception of physical reality and the dreams we have in 
the land of Nod - solipsism of the purest self-contradictory 
kind re-emerges. My conclusion is that we are able to 
inventively imagine things and to consciously project their 
presences into the world - artists and designers make a 
living out of such an ability (in a sense we all do). 
The status of the design drawing can now be clarified. 
As a physical object the design drawing occupies a boundary 
position. The dimensionality of its physical presence is 
constructed  in  much the same way as that of any perceived  7. See above: 2.0 Cosmologies. 
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object in physical space. The perceptual process is closed by 
the projection accomplished as an outcome of perceptual 
processing and the drawing occupies its judged location in 
three-dimensional space. It takes its place in the world 
continually confirmed by the perceptual cycle as it repeats. 
Underpinning the success of this procedure is the 
contingent model of physical space that binds together the 
learned experience of seeing things as they are and the 
intelligent operation of seeing things as we think they ought 
to be. It is the stability of the model and the mechanics of 
its transformations that ensure that we retain a grasp on the 
difference between reality and illusion. 
As a depiction or representation of a projected physical 
reality, the drawing embodies an illusion that one is able to 
keep separate from the drawing’s physical reality. At the 
same time it is one that one is able to focus on by choice. 
One can consciously suppress the perception of a drawing, 
in its physicality, as a piece of paper with a pattern of marks 
inscribed on its surface, and instead bring to the fare the 
perception of the pattern of marks and to engage in a 
‘reading’ of the illusion they construct as a projected reality. 
The design drawing thus establishes a presence for itself in 
the instant in which it is transformed from a piece of 
marked paper into an interpretable illusion. The design 
drawing constructs a virtual object in a virtual space by 
engaging the learned experience of seeing things as they are. 
Through a mechanical transformation of our model of 
physical space it extends the intelligent operation of seeing 
things as we think they ought to be into the realm of a 
‘documentary' space.8
As a physical object the design drawing is ‘useful’ in 
the sense of accomplishing an externalization of the 
inventive imagination, making the visualization an object 
which is then itself open to interpretation, transformation 8. See 2.3 below. 
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and, most importantly, realization. It is ‘communicative’ in 
the sense that it may be passed from one to another, it may 
become the object of collaborative interpretation, transfor-
mation and realization - it is the material of a communica-
tive action.9 And it is ‘symbolic’ in the sense of embodying in 
a material code, not only values and beliefs, but, an explicit 
information content. In the latter we see the rationale of a 
boundary position between physical and documentary space. 9. Habermas has expounded a 
whole theory around this idea 
([1981] The Theory of 
Communicative Action, Trans 
Thomas McCarthy, Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1987.) summed 
up, according to Bernstein, in 
an intuition he believed linked 
himself to Rorty: 
the conviction that a humane col-
lective life depends on the vulner-
able forms of innovation bear-
ing, reciprocal and unforcedly 
egalitarian everyday communi-
cation. [my emphasis] 
Jurgen Habermas "A 
Philosophico-Political Profile", 
New Left Review, May/June 
1985, p.12. quoted in BERN-
STEIN, Richard J. The New 
Constellation. Polity Press, 
1991. p.45. 
10. HAWKES, Terence. 
Structuralism and Semiotics. 
Methuen, 1977. 
Language ...inheres not in `the 
material substance of words' but 
in the larger and abstract ‘sys - 
tem of signs’. [p.245, my 
emphasis] 
In the symbol the relationship 
between signifier and signified 
is arbitrary; it requires the active 
presence of the interpretant to 
make the signifying connection. 
And of course, following 
Saussure, we can say that the 
major systematic manifestation 
of signs in this mode occurs in 
language. [p.129.] 
At this point one can see a symmetrical relation in the 
model of physical space that depends upon the state of 
perceptual attention to the design drawing. Attention to 
the drawing as a physical object constructs a three-dimen-
sional physical space into which is enfolded an 
essential/defining documentary space. In each specific case 
it is the content of that documentary space that makes the 
design drawing into more than just a piece of cleverly 
marked paper, that makes it a harbinger. Attention to the 
‘design’ in a design drawing, to the virtual object, 
constructs a two-dimensional documentary space into 
which is enfolded a defining three-dimensional physical 
space. It is the physical form of the drawing that makes it 
more than mere information, more than just the abstract 
terms of a language communicated by arbitrary signs.10 It 
connects the `image' with the sheer physicality of the 
exercise of practical artistic skills in the process of exter-
nalizing and constructing an inventive imaginative project-
tion. In this there is a sense in which design is designed. 
One must remember that the design drawing is a ‘conven-
tional’ embodiment of a contingent knowledge and of a 
contingent model of physical space. Conventions may be 
superseded: both the physical form of the design drawing 
and the deep structures underpinning the image may be 
changed. However, even if nothing so radical as, say, the 
virtual reality studio supplants the traditional drawing, the 
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relevance of the connection with the physical achievement 
of the design process remains. Which ever ways are found 
of redesigning the form and deep structures of the 
products of the design process, the crucial quality required 
of them remains the same: the capacity to ‘embody’, 
literally to physically contain and express, knowledges. 
Construction: Absolute and Ideal Conceptions 
Any account of the notion of `physical space' is liable to 
take on positivist overtones. Whether one sides with the 
out and out realist viewpoint or with those such as 
Cartesianism, which adopts an idealist element in its 
genesis, the very notion of ‘physical space’ posits a realm 
of observable phenomena. The different theoretical 
orientations then tend not to disturb a fundamental belief 
in the perceivable but to disagree about the process of 
perception. All may be reduced to interactions between 
differently structured material - molecules, photons, 
neurones, etc.; a mind-body dualism may be invoked that 
separates concept from percept, experience from actuality; 
solipsism may be used, as a pragmatic device, to affirm the 
primacy of the thinking self - the conception of physical 
space then entails the thought that the existence of an 
external world is a reasonable or at least useful assumption 
even if its reality is unprovable. 
For better or for worse the designer is concerned with 
a realm of observable phenomena and with the idea that 
‘things’, whether in actuality or in some conceptual space, 
can be changed. The spatiality of the designed object - the 
design product - becomes immediately multidimensional. 
The realist formulation posits an actual physical space in 
the form of a space-time continuum into which various 
exotic spaces may be admitted as chimera only as long as  
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their complex structures resist reduction to simpler 
physical material relations (Figure 2.1.9.) 
 
Figure 2.1.9 
  
Realist formulation of physical space - ultimately everything is reducible to the spatio-temporai 
terms of material, physical reality. 
  
The Cartesian - neo-Hegelian range of dualisms posits an 
actuality in symmetrical opposition to a psycho-social 
space of one complexion or another (Figure 2.1.10.) 
 
Figure 2.1.10 
  
Dualist formulation of physical space- spatiality is always a question of shifting between 
transformable but incommensurable and irreducible opposites. 
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When rationalism is blended with idealism, as in the case of 
Hegel and his followers, reality is identified with a coherent 
system of judgements rather than with anything outside the system 
to which its constituents might be supposed to refer. ... the neo-
Hegelians Bradley and McTaggart were not afraid to maintain 
that neither space nor time nor matter were ultimately real.11
And the solipsistic turn allows the conception of an 
inhabited physical space but permanently defers any 
positing of its actuality (Figure 2.1.11.) 
11. AYER, A. J. Philosophy in 
the Twentieth Century. Weiden-
feld & Nicolson,1982. p.5. 
 
Figure 2.1.11 
  
Idealist formulation of physical space- the solipsistic turn places the spatio-temporal terms of 
material reality in the realm of the conceptual. 
  
By ‘extension’ dualist accounts of physical space may 
be turned into a pluralist one: 
pluralism may take the form of denying that there is a single 
world, which is waiting there to be captured, with a greater or 
lesser degree of truth by our narratives, our scientific theories 
or even our artistic representations.12
Construction: Pluralist Conception 
If one regards each spatial construct as the realm of a 
different ‘possible’ world then one may visualize not 12. ibid. p.13. 
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merely ‘shifts’ between the two incommensurable and 
opposed spaces of the physical world and the psycho-
social world but movements between the many worlds: 
... we are able to construct by the use of different systems of 
concepts, different standards of measurement, different forms 
of expression and exemplification. 13
The importance of the pluralist account of spatiality is in 
its immediate utility in discourse. Within any given 
discourse the criteria for legitimating any particular 
statement are radically different to those of other 
discourses. We may agree with Carnap that to answer 
questions of existence, for example, as long as we use 
appropriate conceptual frameworks we may answer ‘yes’ 
every time: physical objects exist, as do numbers and 
fictional characters. However, if we limit ourselves to: 
a universe of discourse where the criterion for existence is 
actual location in space and time, then there are no fictional 
characters and, for that matter, no numbers either.14 
Eco's consideration of the designed object isolates three 
qualities each of which would imply an opposed attitude to 
spatiality should they be taken in isolation. Of the 
designed product he says: 
a) First of all the object is meant to be useful ... 
a condition which speaks of the necessity of a formal 
presence in a physical world of material interactions - the 
realist notion of physical space operates here. 
b) ... an object should show what its purpose is and how it 
should be used. In a word, the object has a communicative 
aspect ... 
13. ibid. 
14. ibid. p.160.  A symmetry  is  implied  between  the linguistic interpreta- 
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tion of physical attributes and the material realization of 
socially determined practical purposes - the dualist notion 
of physical space in a reflexive relation to social space 
comes into play. 
c) ... design has symbolic functions: ... a host of further 
meanings that allow the object to be used as a mark of social 
status, power, and so on.15
Physical attributes are seen as signs of cultural meaning 
that operate independently of any mechanistic notion of 
functionality - the underlying assumption here is that any 
notion of physical space is purely conceptual, that is, it is 
embedded and interpreted in, comes out of a reading of 
relations in, a conceptual psycho-social space. 
Eco, of course, does not propose that we choose between 
these three ‘qualities’ of the designed object, nor even that 
we rank their importance. Rather he suggests that: 
• together they represent the necessary dimensions of the 
‘design’ phenomenon, 
• "objects that serve their purpose, that declare and 
communicate their functions and at the same time 
communicate symbolic meanings" 16 are the embodiment 
of a certain kind of discourse - design discourse, and 
• such correlative qualities are normative in design. 
He implies that the betrayal of any of these would consti-
tute a "crisis of the design utopia". Therefore, I suggest, 
that the pluralist conception of spatiality is inherent in 
design philosophy, and Eco’s interpretation of spatiality in 
design may be construed, at least in the case of ‘Identified 
Design’ - design which is 
15. ECO, Umberto. "Phenomena 
of This Sort Must Also be 
Included in Any Panorama of 
Italian Design", in ECO, 
Umberto. Apocalypse Postponed. 
Indiana University Press/British 
Film Institute, 1994. pp.186-7. 
16. ibid. p.188. 
17. ibid. p.186.  
the outcome of an expressed theory and of a practice in which 
the object aims to exemplify explicitly its author's theory 17
- as its ‘ideology’. 
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This pluralist conceptual scheme for physical space appears 
to embrace satisfactorily the constellation of qualities of 
the designed object. The scheme centres on the 
construction of a conventional space-time continuum in 
which, in relativistic fashion, one is able to orientate three 
mutually perpendicular dimensions of space in relation to 
an `abstract' observer. The position of this imaginary 
spectator is implicit in the space's initial conceptualization 
but, when a content is visualized in graphic form, is made 
more or less explicit depending upon the drawing system 
used. This conceptualization of a three-dimensional 
physical space projecting along a time line then has 
enfolded into it or is enfolded into a variety of social and 
psycho-social spaces of more or less exotic conception that 
connect the physical object directly with the arenas of life, 
and with the documentary and paradigmatic spaces that 
connect with perceptual processes (particularly inventive 
imaginative projection) and with epistemological and 
ideological positions respectively (Figure 2.1.12.) 
 
Figure 2.1.12 
  
Pluralist formulation of physical space: physical space and many other incommensurable and more or 
less exotic spaces coexist as the possibilities we may construct, utilize and explore. 
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2.2 Social Space  
Social Topology 
The Greek idea that nature comprises one vast living 
organism1 connects with the post-industrial, ecological 
notions of nature and with social constructionist nations 
of system. In both cases the human is not privileged above, 
not separated from, nature. All ‘actors’ have equal 
potential in a system and all interactions are of equal value. 
The human is de-centred. The peripheral notion of 
‘boundary’ or ‘interface’ becomes the centre. Interfaces 
depend upon difference and speed of action for meaning. 
In describing the relations between people and 
between people and things, which together comprise the 
‘actors’ in a system, distance in absolute terms is irrelevant 
for all distances are transformable without in any way 
affecting spatial relations: 
3. In cosmological terms the 
notion of ‘absolute’ distance has 
been rendered redundant. The 
relativistic conception of a space-
time continuum in physics, the 
differential conception of lingui-
stic space in semiology and de-
construction, and the organ-
ismic, ecological and open sys-
tems conceptions of social space, 
ensure that position and sequ-
ence of perceived events are only 
comprehensible in the context of 
a posited process of construction 
and reconstruction which by 
implication determines the values 
of perceived distance and speed 
amongst other qualities. 
 
2. CUPCHIK, Gerald C. & 
János LÁSZLÓ (eds.) Emerging 
Visions of the Aesthetic Process: 
Psychology, Semiology and 
Philosophy. Cambridge 
University Press, 1992. pp.56-7. 
 
1. AYER, A. J. Philosophy in the 
Twentieth Century. Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 1982. p.207. 
The genetic epistemology of Piaget (1948] has established that 
in the evolution of human beings topological relations are the 
primary and constant matrix o f spatial constructs.2
What does matter is the type and relative force of any 
interaction across the space of the system and, in any 
system of multiple interactions, the pattern of forces or 
‘force field’ that may hold a group of actors in a perceived 
set of spatial relations. One should remember that what 
matters is the spatial relations as a perceptual construct 
and not as an independent ‘ontic’ structure describable in 
terms of absolute distances between elements, the terms of 
a Cartesian geometry.3
If we consider the nature of various interactions in any 
organizational context it is possible to determine in 
relativistic, though not absolute, terms speed, force and 
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rapidity of interaction, and, given these notions, to picture 
the kind of space in which to visualize these perceived 
qualities. 
In the anthropological view the ‘act’ holds a central 
position in defining culture. According to R H Mead, a 
favourite philosopher of the `pragmatic' anthropologist, 
“the unit of existence is the act ...” 4 Nature acts on us and 
we act on nature. Between living organisms this equates to 
a conversation of gestures in which “animals respond to 
each other's responses.” The peculiarly human response, at 
least in so far as its complexity and subtlety are concerned, 
is the vocal gesture of speech. Thus exteriorized and 
objectified in language, the gesture becomes subject to 
reflection and interpretation, and becomes reflexive: we 
may meaningfully gesture to ourselves and make the object 
of such reflection the understanding of and construction 
of a self, and by extension of the Other. 
The material cultural object has been described as a 
“collapsed act”: an artefact once 
embedded and indistinguished from the rest of nature, fixed 
first by sight and then by the magic of the hand ...5
5. ibid. [RICHARDSON] p.172. 
 
6. [The Id] ...is the area from 
which internal feelings and 
desires emerge from the instincts. 
BOCOCK, Robert. Sigmund 
Freud. Ellis Horwood, 1983. 
p.77. 
 
4. MEAD, R H. The Philosophy 
of the Act. C W Morris (ed.). 
Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1972. p.65. quoted in 
RICHARDS0N, Miles. "The 
artefact as abbreviated act: a 
social interpretation of material 
culture" in HODDER, Ian. 
(ed.) The Meanings of Things: 
Material Culture and Symbolic 
Expression. Harper Collins, 
1989. p.173. 
is brought into play as the medium of deferred and 
distanced gesture, and therefore as the carrier of meaning.  
In social terms the act is definitively communicative, it 
is a response and it elicits responses. The most direct 
relation between actors is one in which the body confronts 
the body unmediated by the distancing gestures of either 
language or material culture. Through the interplay of 
unselfconscious physical responses the carnal realms of 
existence serve our most basic physical and emotional 
needs. In Freudian terms such action is at the instinctive 
level of the Id.6 However, even the most 'physical' of social 
interactions are normally overlaid and structured by ritual 
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codes and the rules of ‘normal’ behaviour, a reality 
principle, that governing value system that imposes 
delayed satisfaction, restraint of pleasure, toil (work), 
productiveness and security7 which we adhere to with or 
without engaging a conscious (rational) process of making 
decisions. Increasing the formality of rituals and rules 
narrows the range of responses that may legitimately 
constitute the communicative process and increases the 
propriety of employing a practical rationality.8 Rituals and 
rules are symbolically mediated. For example, by the 
presence of an ash tray or the absence of a door lock 
certain acts are suggested or even definitively legislated for 
or against: we may choose to smoke - to be, perhaps 
unwittingly, antisocial - we may choose to breakdown a 
door and enter a private place - to engage in a premeditated 
criminal activity. In either case the signs we choose to 
follow or to ignore are clear enough to we who are party to 
the culture and to its material presences and absences. 
...with the progress of civilization 
and with the growth of the indi - 
vidual, the memory traces of the 
unity between freedom and 
necessity become submerged in 
the acceptance of the necessity of 
unfreedom; rational and ratio - 
nalized, memory itself bows to 
the reality principle. 
[ibid. pp.33-4.] 
 
9. The ‘reality principle’ defines 
a contingently boundaried region 
of ‘sets’ of possibilities between 
which are constructed spatial 
relations, hence a 'topology. 
8. Marcuse educes the social 
dimension of this `reality 
principle': 
The reality principle sustains the 
organism in the external world. 
In the case of the human organ - 
ism, this is an historical world. 
The external world faced by the 
growing ego is at any stage a spe - 
cific socio-historical organization 
of reality, affecting the mental 
structure through specific soci - 
etal agencies or agents. 
[ibid. p.34 emphasis in the 
original.] 
And on the fate of the rational 
saps: 
7. MARCUSE, Herbert. Eros 
and Civilisation. Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1966. p.12. 
 
The topology here is one of opportunity and 
constraint, of the actors’ freedom to act, to communicate, to 
exchange information, patterned energy, with other actors.9 
In a communicative environment, therefore, one can 
imagine the in(di)visible conductors and resistors, capaci-
tors and discharge points, transformers and rheostats, that 
create the complex forcefields that comprise the aura of a 
given system: in nature, the aura that is ‘life’ itself. 
In the social sphere the range of communicative acts, 
from the most immediate to the most complexly mediated, 
describe the topological possibilities of social construction. 
Touch, gesture, tool and symbolic object, speech and 
writing and their intermediate (hybrid) forms comprise 
the semiotic panoply that internally differentiates social 
space, and their speed, force, and rapidity imbue any social 
system with peculiar dynamic characteristics. 
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‘Speed’ implies the duration and therefore the 
complexity of any communicative act in terms of its differ-
entiated content - if you will, the amount of ‘ground’ 
covered during the ‘contact’, the quantity of information 
exchanged in the transaction.10
...speech as a means of persua- 
sion rather than the specifically 
human way of answering, talk- 
ing back and measuring up to 
whatever happened or was done. 
[ARENDT, Hannah. The 
Human Condition. University 
of Chicago Press, 1958. p.26.] 
What I mean is a quality of 
persuasiveness to a greater or 
lesser extent suffusing all forms 
of communicative action. 
 
12. GEERTZ, Clifford. The 
Interpretation of Cultures. New 
York: Basic Books, 1973. p.145. 
10. Virilio has related this 
notion of speed to the quality of 
information flow in unaided and 
aided visual perception: 
...as with all movement, each dis 
placement (human, ocular, optic, 
opto-electronic) engages a specific 
speed, and this speed affects the 
representation under considera - 
tion and provokes a kind of rup - 
ture or severance which, while it 
may not be dimensional in the 
strict, archaic sense of the word, 
certainly has an impact on the 
resultant scientific observation. 
VIRILIO, Paul. [1984] Lost 
Dimension. Trans. Daniel 
Moshenberg. New York: 
Semiotext(e), 1991. p.54. 
 
11. I am deliberately using the 
term 'force' in a pseudo-physical 
sense. I do not mean to connote 
the associated political and anti-
political terms 'power' and ‘vio-
lence’ which Hannah Arendt 
has so eloquently explicated. 
The idea that comes closest in 
Arendt's writing it is that of 
‘rhetoric’: 
‘Force’ implies the intensity and ‘mass’ of any 
communicative act in terms of its directionality and 
potency, its influence on subsequent, concurrent or 
contiguous interactions.11
‘Rapidity’ implies the relative spacing of a number of 
communicative acts in terms of a cumulative effect, the 
construction of an ‘event’. 
In any visualization of a differentiated social space, 
therefore, its dimensions should represent (re-present) a 
variety of topological possibilities, a variety of relational 
patterns and qualities that produce a particular system, and 
should make visible its transformations. 
Social Cosmology: 
Hofstede, Bourdieu, Lefebvre, Freud and Jung 
Parson’s three levels of analysis in social science - culture 
system, social system and personality system - suggest not 
merely a differentiated social space but rather a kind of 
limited cosmology. 
Each of the three must be considered to be an independent 
focus of the organization of the elements of the action system 
in the sense that no one of them is theoretically reducible to 
terms of one or a combination of the other two. Each is 
indispensable to the other two in the sense that without 
personalities and culture there would be no social system and 
so on around the roster of logical possibilities. 12
In structure this is not dissimilar to Popper’s three worlds. 
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The first [World 1] is the physical world or the world of 
physical states [and objects]; the second [World 2] is the 
mental world of the world of mental states [world of states of 
consciousness, dispositions to act]; and the third (World 3] is 
the world of intel - ligibles, or of ideas in the objective sense, 
it is the world of possible objects of thought: the world of 
theories in themselves, and their logical relations; of 
arguments in themselves; and of problem situations in 
themselves.13
 
15. This is a closer parallel: 
World 3, then, is the world of 
ideas, art, science, language, 
ethics, institutions - the whole 
cultural heritage, in short...  
[MAGEE, Bryan. Popper. 
Fontana, 1973. p.61.] 
 
16. HOFSTEDE, Geert. 
Cultures and Organizations: 
Intercultural Cooperation and its 
Importance for Survival; Soft-
ware of the Mind. McGraw-Hill, 
1991. 
 
17. BOURDIEU, Pierre. [1979] 
Distinction: A Social Critique of 
the Judgement of Taste. Trans. 
Richard Nice. Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1984. 
I include it simply to signify 
that amongst social phenomena 
there are those that are neither 
subjective nor just ideas (shared 
or otherwise). [POPPER, K R. 
The Open Society and its 
Enemies, Vol. II. Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1962. p.98 quoted 
in BHASKAR, Roy. Reclaiming 
Reality. Verso, 1989. p.70.] 
...all social phenomena, and 
especially the functioning of social 
institutions, should be understood 
as resulting from the decisions etc. 
of human individuals ...we should 
never be satisfied by explanations 
in terms of so-called “collectives”. 
14. Popper would have had 
serious reservations about this 
particular parallel: 
 
13. POPPER, K R. Objective 
Knowledge: An Evolutionary 
Approach. rev. edn. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979. p.154. 
quoted in WERLEN, Benno. 
[1988] Society, Action and 
Space: An Alternative Human 
Geography. Trans. Gayna 
WALLS. Routledge,1993. p.27. 
World 1, the objective world of physical reality, parallels the 
social system, the system of roles and positions;14 World 2, 
the subjective world of minds, parallels the personality 
system of individual actors; and World 3, the objective 
world of independent constructs, parallels the culture 
system, the system of values and beliefs.15 The parallels are 
not ‘close’ in the sense of constructing or occupying wholly 
commensurate dimensions, however, in each ‘cosmology’ 
the pattern of dimensionally discreet conjunctions is similar 
in one sense, that of generating productive tensions bet-
ween realms of description or construction and, therefore, 
of realizing the potential in each pairing for embedding and 
zeroing (enfolding) one space within the other. 
To elucidate this potential, I will draw on works which 
approach the problem of social space with purposes that 
broadly reflect the cultural (Hofstede), the social 
/structural (Bourdieu and Lefebvre), and the personal 
(Freud and Jung). 
In Cultures and Organizations Hofstede relates 
dimensions of cultural difference, defined through the 
interpretation of a mass of empirical data, to social 
structure in organizations.16
In Distinction Bourdieu describes a range of 
‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ social variables that may be 
used to generate various social systems of roles, positions 
and relations.17
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Lefebvre, in The Production of Space, shows that in the 
attempt to reduce to a common measure (that of money) a 
wealth of social phenomena in the modern industrial 
world, those phenomena cannot “speak the truth about 
themselves”. But they may still ‘speak’ in a limited 
‘dissimulating’ language of : 
the amount of social labour they contain, not only the prod-
uctive labour they embody, but also the social relationships of 
the exploitation and domination on which they are founded. 18
Freud redifferentiates concepts of the conscious and 
the unconscious. In the unconscious, the aspect largely 
ignored in other theoretical expositions, he describes a 
space of the instinctual, emotional, and sexual drives that 
underpin our behaviours. In this view, dimensions relating 
the personal to the social are given depth. They escape the 
bounds of the rational - the (self)conscious - and take on 
new degrees of freedom in the non-rational and irrational - 
the (collective) unconscious - and in their emergent possi-
bility - the preconscious.19
Jung animates the depth that Freudian ideas add to 
social space by reference to libido - natural psychic energy 
- which flows back and forth between the inner and the 
outer, the personal and the social.20
These approaches do not exhibit common aims and 
are pursued within rather different methodological tradi-
tions. However, their contrasts rather than invalidating 
their conjunction provide exactly the kind of productive 
tensions that I wish to project as constitutive of social 
space: I focus on them not for the consistency of their 
respective internal logics but rather for the generative 
potential of playing their contents off against each other. 
This initial procedure owes more to poetics and rhetoric, 
than to analysis and rationale - a choice justified by the 
18. LEFEBVRE, Henri. (1974] 
The Production of Space. Trans. 
Donald Nicholson-Smith. Basil 
Blackwell, 1991. pp.80-1. 
 
19. BOCOCK, Robert. Sigmund 
Freud. Ellis Horwood,1983. 
 
20. JUNG, C G. Psychological 
Types. Trans. H Godwin Baynes. 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 
1926. pp.571-2. 
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essentially creative, ‘designerly’ nature of this modelling 
project which requires the appropriation of rich source 
materials in advance of their reconfiguration and rational-
ization: rather, as when constructing a map, one first 
travels and documents the mass of heterogeneous features 
constituting a landscape before attempting to find an order 
in them. Lefebvre also points to the open-ended nature of 
the problem of modelling social space, and this may also be 
cited as a weak rationale for the ‘designerly’ approach. 
Ultimately, social reality is “dual, multiple, plural” and the 
dimensions, of which its various visualizations may be 
constructed, imply some 
...terribly concrete abstractions ...(money, commodities, 
material exchange) as well as 'pure' forms: exchange, language, 
signs, equivalences, reciprocities, contracts, and so on.21
What any dimensionally simple subspace gains in clarity it 
necessarily loses in its exclusivity and its dissembling 
language. “Any determinate and hence demarcated space 
necessarily embraces some things and excludes others...” 22 
However, in as much as all language relies upon difference 
and metaphor in the generation of meaningful exchanges, 
the problem of subspace dimensionality versus clarity of 
visualization is relative in any case. There is no teleology of 
social spatiality, no comprehensive multidimensional space 
in which the ‘truth’ about social phenomena may actually 
be spoken. The relationship between space and language is 
a question that Lefebvre addresses as a straightforward 
‘communicative’ issue: what space does is what it says. 
Between the moves of Hofstede, Bourdieu, Lefebvre, 
Freud and Jung what one may discern, therefore, is the 
necessity of choosing ground within which to operate, of 
constructing spaces which, in their constitutive dimension-
ality, bring visible things into being and tend to make them 
21. LEFEBVRE, [1974] p.81. 
 
22. ibid p.99. 
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‘absolute’. This crystallization of phenomena depends 
upon a setting up of systems of relations that are enclosed, 
even if by ‘soft’ boundaries, and energized by the dynamics 
they may display in a particular ‘language’ of visualiz-
ation/description. However, as Lefebvre observes: 
...the Thing ...never quite becomes absolute, never quite 
emancipates itself from activity, from use, from need, from 
‘social being’.23
And it is in this deferred presence, therefore, that one 
retains the scope for interpretation and avoids an 
ultimately nihilistic reductionism. Any object (Lefebvre 
cites the peasant dwelling as an example) remains 
“...intermediate between work and product, between 
nature and labour, between the realm of symbols and the 
realm of signs”.24 And it engenders a space which is both 
“natural and cultural”, both “immediate and mediated”, 
both “given and artificial”. ‘Mapping’, as a particular 
inscription and encryption of spatial events (places), is 
thus reinforced as the most potent metaphor for the 
process of modelling. 
Mapping Social Space 
The crucial question is: what ground is it best to choose to 
make visible an adequate social mapping of a particular 
programme of events? The dimensions enumerated and 
qualified by Hofstede, Bourdieu, Lefebvre, Freud and Jung 
offer a bewildering range of possibilities. (1) Hofstede's 
‘ethnographic’ cultural dimensions, which are used to place 
sets of values and beliefs, include: power distance - a 
measure of dependence relationships; individualism-
collectivism - a measure of the importance of personal and 
group identity; masculinity-femininity - a measure of the 
 
24. ibid. 
23. ibid. p.83. 
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distinctness of gender roles; and uncertainty avoidance - a 
measure of the tolerance of ambiguity. (2) Bourdieu’s 
‘Marxist’ economic and social dimensions which are used 
to place practices and preferences include such dependent 
variables as ‘political opinion’ and so called independent 
variables such as sex, age, religion, educational level, 
income, and occupation. (3) Lefebvre’s ‘post-Marxist’ 
analysis proposes we make visible “encounter, assembly, 
simultaneity” 25 via the abstractions of exchange, language, 
signs, equivalences, reciprocities, contracts, etc. though 
without any clear indication of what such visualizations 
might look like. (4) Freud immediately transforms the 
dimensions of any Marxist/structuralist model or ethno-
graphic/interpretive model by layering into it non-
rational/irrational aspects which tend to radically recon-
struct patterns of relations. Dimensions of gender/ 
sexuality, power relations, ideology/religion, and language 
each become two-dimensional spaces stretching beyond 
the conscious into the realms of the preconscious and the 
unconscious. And (5) Jung's animation of these subspaces 
is achieved by constructing polarities between which libido 
flows. These ‘opposites’ include: unconscious-conscious; 
introversion-extraversion; feeling-thinking; intuition-
sensation; individual-collective; instinct-will; introjection-
projection and; abstract-concrete. In one constellation, 
Jung generates a two-dimensional field of basic psycholog-
ical functions (Figure 2.2.1) which transforms any given 
social dimension into a three-dimensional space. 
The scheme that Hofstede develops has a breadth to it that 
is remarkable. It touches on emotional, political, behave-
ioural, perceptual and cognitive aspects of the place of the 
person in social terms. However, it privileges the larger 
collective (for 'Person' read `national type') over other sizes  25. ibid. p.101. 
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feeling 
sensation 
intuition 
thinking 
Figure 2.2.1 
  
Jung's four basic psychological functions defined by the intersection 
of two pairs of opposites: feeling-thinking and intuition-sensation.26
  
and types of collective. I am aware, for instance, that the 
idea of ‘virtual community’ is of increasing importance not 
only in the international (transnational) working 
environment and in the academic world but in popular 
leisure. This is the result of a coming together of laser disk, 
personal computer, and telecommunications technologies 
to make generally available real-time access to the internet. 
Hofstede's scheme also marginalizes the material aspects 
of social relations, which, although they may not be as 
central as they were once thought to be, still have a 
pressing relevance. Even the ‘wired up’ wiz kid has a ‘real’ 
body that may be subjected to control and positioned by 
the power relations, both economic and ideological, that 
fix the conditions for physical survival. For the poor man 
or woman of the ‘developing’ world the immediate 
prospect is an all too ‘real’ environment of deprivation 
maintained by material as much as cultural relations. 
26. On the basis of “many years 
experience” rather than any a 
priori reason, Jung distin-
guished four basic functions: 
two rational and two irrational - 
viz. thinking and feeling, sensa-
tion and intuition. 
[JUNG, 1926, p.547.] 
...we use [these functions] to ori - 
entate ourselves in the world 
(and also to our own inner 
world): sensation, ...is perception 
through our senses; thinking, 
...gives meaning and under- 
standing; feeling'...weighs and 
values; and intuition ... tells us of 
future possibilities and gives us 
information of the atmosphere 
which surrounds all experience. 
FORDHAM, Frieda. An Intro-
duction to Jung's Psychology. 
Penguin, 1953. p.35.] 
In contrast, outright acceptance of the scheme of 
Bourdieu would privilege description of material relations 
as expressed in Marxist analyses. This is not easy to accept, 
given the notions of non-hierarchical social organization 
that have been invoked in the critique of modern 
industrialization and in the investigation of ‘alternative’ 
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and ‘appropriate’ technologies. In the 1960s and 1970s the 
Marxist analysis of capitalist production, which had estab-
lished the links between the process of fragmenting and 
hierarchically structuring labour to facilitate mass produc-
tion and massive economic development, technological 
innovation, and social control, was turned on its head. It 
achieved this largely through consideration of: the damage 
done to the physical and social environment; the 
(non)sustainability of economic growth; the decline in 
traditional moral values such as cooperation and mutual 
respect; and the disintegration of community life and the 
attendant problems of alienation, disempowerment, and 
the commodification of relations.27
27. The following represents a 
tiny selection of the literature 
of the period: 
CALDER, Nigel. Technopolis: 
Social control of the uses of sci - 
ence. MacGibbon & Bee, 1969.  
COUNCIL on ENVIRONM-
ENTAL QUALITY and the 
DEPARTMENT of STATE, 
The Global 2000 Report to the 
President: Entering the Twenty-
First Century. Allen Lane, 1982.  
ECOLOGIST, The. A Blueprint 
for Survival. Revised edn. 
Penguin, 1972. 
MEADOWS, Donella H. et al. 
The Limits to Growth. New 
York- Universe Books, 1972. 
28. LASH, Scott. & John URRY. 
Economies of Signs & Space. 
Sage, 1994. pp.111-44. 
29. For example this was 
thoroughly reflected at the 1993 
International Design Congress 
in Glasgow. A whole section was 
devoted to ‘the ethical dilemma’: 
Victor PAPANEK who developed 
the original green design mani-
festo Design for the Real World 
between 1963 and 1972 spoke on 
“The coming of a new aesthetic: 
eco-logic, etho-logic, bio-logic” 
and Ezio MANZINI reinforced 
the necessary connection bet-
ween "Design, environment and 
social quality". Significant cont-
ributions to other sections incl-
uded: John WORTHINGTON 
“Balancing public conscience and 
private initiatives”; Katherine 
McCOY "Countering the trad-
ition of the apolitical designer"; 
Bill MOGGRIDGE “Paradoxes of 
the future” and; Derrick de 
KERCKHOVE "Design, inter-
acttivity and the production of 
meaning". MYERSON, Jeremy. 
Design Renaissance Selected 
papers from the International 
Design Congress, Glasgow, 
1993. Open Eye/CSD, 1994. 
Whilst such analyses have had considerable impact on 
political thought, particularly in the socialist and liberal 
movements, and in the recent flowering of neo romantic, 
neo-anarchistic tendencies as exemplified in the Green 
movement, their impact on industry and the institutions 
has been limited. In the UK those directly involved in or 
supporting manufacturing industry have generally made 
only superficial gestures in the direction of decentralized 
organization and worker participation in development. 
Two areas where greater signs of a radical shift in 
principles can be seen are in the ‘software’ sectors of the 
information technology and culture industries. In both, 
most companies are relatively small and significant 
attempts have been made to integrate the autonomous 
creative individual into a network of productive and 
decision-making relations, and the ‘flat’ organization has 
become the norm.28 Models for this have included 
‘community’, ‘college’, 'family’, and ‘collective’. 
There is an increasing demand for design to embrace a 
new, ethical, cooperative, eco-conscious position in the post-
industrial setting.29 This, similarly, can be traced back to an 
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origin in the 60s and 70s critique of industrialism. This is 
no neo-romantic backlash but rather a pragmatic response 
to perceived changes in the global industrial complex and 
the impact this is having on questions of economic survival 
and cultural identity. It has been spurred on, more 
recently, by: (1) an invasion of what were formerly, 
securely solid and actual realms in the built environment 
by the electronic media and their (new) virtual spaces;30 
and (2) the demand for a more flexible, responsive, reliable 
and accountable design process, one that draws on the end 
user’s experience, knowledge and skill in the sense of 
admitting a far broader and more finely tuned under-
standing of human factors and in the sense of entailing 
forms of participation throughout the product cycle.31
Lefebvre's scheme seems underdeveloped for the 
current purposes and to be in need of a certain ‘concretiza-
tion’. However, it does have a promising quality: that of 
openness. The idea of ‘exchange’, for example: “...does not 
determine what is exchanged: it merely stipulates that 
something, which has a use, is also an object of exchange”.32 
This openness enables Lefebvre to include material and 
non-material possibilities in his idea of ‘exchange’ and also 
in those of communication, encounter, assembly and simul-
taneity, and to contrast definitively natural space and social 
space. The former “...juxtaposes - and thus disperses.” The 
latter “...implies actual or potential assembly at a single 
point, or around that point.” This perhaps suggests that 
whichever dimensions are proper to the visualization of 
social (sub)spaces, they should at least operate/read as 
continua of values rather than as ratios of quanta. 
32. LEFEBVRE, [1974] p.101. 
 
31. MITCHELL, C Thomas. 
Redefining Designing: From 
Form to Experience. New York: 
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1993. 
 
30. MATTHEWS, Geoff. 
"Invasion of the Body Snatchers: 
Architecture and Virtual Space", 
Culture Theory Criticism 
Occasional Papers, University of 
Humberside, 1994. 
In the present context, at least, Freudian and Jungian 
notions appear to modify the dimensions suggested by 
others rather than offering any new and independent 
scheme. However, the modifying properties that they have 
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are radical ones. They connect the social and the personal 
spheres by crystallizing the qualities that define individ-
uality and commonality. 
Social Dimensions 
To characterize the dimensions of social space in one way 
rather than another is to choose a particular starting paint, 
no more than that. Where one may end up, in mapping the 
various territories these dimensions reveal, is an open 
question. Potentially, one may spend a lifetime discovering 
their possibilities. A designerly approach to the specific 
problem of the social context of museum•design• 
organization suggests that between them Hofstede, 
Bourdieu, Lefebvre, Freud and Jung provide an adequate 
range of variables from which to select or distil dimensions 
describing appropriate subspaces. 
At first glance, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions seem 
to offer a very useful perspective. However, it is important 
to note that the context in which these dimensions were 
constructed was immediately global and concerned with an 
overtly commercial rather than cultural object. The IBM 
corporation and the UK museum design community do 
not necessarily reflect the same cultural dimensions and, 
even if they do, they are unlikely to exhibit the same range 
of differences within each one. I will consider each 
dimension in turn with these provisos in mind. 
• ‘Power distance’ potentially provides a scale along 
which to position the dependence relations of different 
groups/individuals in a museum project and to compare 
variations in dependence relations for a particular 
group/individual as they participate in projects in 
different museums. Where, through shear weight of 
statistical evidence, Hofstede was able to characterize 
 63 
the dependence relations typical of different national 
cultures using this dimension, this is neither possible in 
the museum•design•organization context nor is it what 
is required. Rather a ‘placing’ of individuals or of more 
or less coherent groups is suggested. I believe the 
notion of ‘power distance’ remains perfectly valid, 
however, the cultural context in which it must function 
is much more local and specific than that of the 
national. The proposition is that a relative measure of 
dependence relations between different ‘culturally’ 
defined groups/individuals in a local context may still 
tend to reveal characteristics common to those types of 
group/individual. Given the tendency for the members 
of each functional group in a museum to achieve 
broadly the same educational level at each particular 
stage in the career development characteristic of that 
museum function, and therefore for there to be a more 
or less characteristic cultural capital for that group, it 
does not seem unreasonable to suggest that a qualified 
use may be made of the dimension of power-distance in 
a model of museum•design•organization. 
• ‘Individualism-collectivism’ potentially represents a 
measure of the importance of group and individual 
identity amongst various functional groupings - of both 
the more coherent professional type and of the more 
heterogeneous multidisciplinary type - in the context of 
a museum design project and in the wider museum/ 
museum-related community. Similar arguments pertain 
here as above for power-distance. Although no 
definitive research into the issue of individualism-
collectivism amongst the various museum functional 
groups seems to have been undertaken, there is 
nevertheless some anecdotal evidence from such studies 
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as those undertaken by Kavanagh that measurable 
differences do indeed exist.33 The curatorial group, in 
pursuing the profession v professionalism debate, is 
developing a collectivist stance over and above the 
factional academic allegiances one has noted in the past 
from exchanges in the Museums Journal and at the 
various Museums Association conferences. The 
conservatorial group already has a strong collectivist 
stance developed during thirty years consistent battle to 
establish specialist credentials in the museum context. 
One could argue that the adoption of an empirical 
scientific methodology and discourse has played a 
significant part in this. In contrast, the design function 
in museums is marked by inconsistencies in job 
descriptions and titles, and in organizational position. A 
culture of individualism, which characterizes most 
independent design practice, is promoted in art and 
design education and tends to carry over into the 
institutional context of the museum in spite of the 
strong pulls often exerted by multidisciplinary project 
teams in the direction of collectivism. 
• ‘Masculinity-femininity’ provides a means of identifying 
more and less distinct gender roles in the wider museum 
and museum-related community and perhaps of dissect-
ing complex functions performed by particular groups/ 
individuals in a particular museum. However, in some 
respects the notion of gender role entailed in this con-
ceptualization of a cultural dimension seems out of 
keeping with the radically decentred position of the 
subject in postmodernity. One can argue that there is a 
creative aspect to gender role, a symbolic dimension, 
which is increasingly explored and exploited by individ-
uals and by social groups in the expression of ‘lifestyle’ 
preferences. Examples of this expression include: camp 
33. KAVANAGH, Gaynor. 
"The museums profession and 
the articulation of professional 
selfconsciousness". in 
KAVANAGH, Gaynor. (ed.) 
The Museums Profession. 
Leicester University Press, 
1991. 
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and macho behaviourisms, overt celibacy, power-
dressing, the ‘we’ and the ‘one’, new man, and male 
feminism. In general, ambivalence to gender role is no 
longer a problematic attitude and gender role 
transformations do not necessarily constitute 
unacceptable behaviour. 
Gender is self-selected. This freedom opens up a wealth of 
possibilities. ...The imagination of each user creates the 
context in which all others can act. The more willing each 
person is to invest his or her imagination in creating 
objects and descriptions, the richer and more successfully 
dramaturgical the environment will be.34
Although written about the virtual spaces created by 
and for the users of multi-user dimensions (MUDs) on 
the internet, many of the same dynamics and 
opportunities are available to the creator-users of 
interactive exhibits and, if we project forward to the 
fully collaborative design process (project cycle), of 
whole exhibitions and entire communicative environ-
ments. Potentially the temporal separation of partici-
pants in the interactive exhibit or in the collaborative 
design process offers the same opportunity as that for 
MUD users. They may assign to themselves behavioural 
and personal attributes that are functional but 
‘fictional’. Interactive software and radically partici-
pative design protocols have in common the purpose of 
facilitating “the sharing of imagined realities”.35 The 
difference between them is that only design is looking 
to such imagined realities as proposals for change in the 
creator-users’ actualities. What we are already witness-
ing is that the more these actualities are shaped by the 
presence of virtual spaces the less the traditional rules 
governing gender roles matter and the more they are 
reformulated as one of the creative variables of 
‘lifestyle’ and ‘workstyle’. 35. ibid. 
 
34. REID, Elizabeth. "Virtual 
Worlds: Culture and Imagin-
ation". in JONES, Steven G. 
(Ed.) CyberSociety: Computer-
Mediated Communication and 
Community. Sage Publications, 
1995. pp.181 & 183. 
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• The ‘uncertainty avoidance’ dimension potentially 
provides a measure of the individual/group's tolerance 
of ambiguity and its ability to cope with uncertainty and 
necessary risk. Those that tolerate ambiguity, cope with 
uncertainty and take risks successfully acquire status in 
some roles (designer or manager) whilst in others 
become identified as unreliable (security guard or 
conservator). This duplicity can be an important factor 
in the breakdown of relations between creative and 
technical members of a project team especially in the 
more traditional collection-based/-oriented museum. 
Several of the ‘independent’ variables used by Bourdieu 
may be useful. For example, given the scope of designers’ 
practical interests, which range from the technical to the 
stylistic, from the economic to the aesthetic, from the 
formal and communicative to the symbolic and ‘semantic’, 
the potential of conjoining economic and cultural dimen-
sions to open up social spaces tuned to the design context 
would appear to be high. 
• ‘Income’ and ‘educational level’, which refer to levels of 
acquired economic and cultural capital respectively, are 
dimensions of this sort. 
• ‘Sex’, as a variable has already been updated and 
contextualized in Hofstede’s cultural view of ‘gender 
roles’. However, the latter could be opened up further 
by consideration of alternative gender constructions - 
those found, for example, in the various MUDs (Multi-
User Dimensions) on the internet. Taking the broader 
view five gender assignments are possible: male, female, 
plural, neuter, and hermaphrodite.36 
• ‘Age’ interrelates in complex ways both with ‘educa-
tional level’ and with ‘income’ and is potentially useful 
even if as a ‘secondary’ variable. It also interrelates with 36. ibid. 
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‘occupation’ or, given the limited context of museum• 
design•organization with what is perhaps better 
thought of as ‘functional role’. 
The problematic terminology of Lefebvre's `pure' abstract-
tions - exchange, language, signs, equivalences, etc. - 
points to the need for a contextualizing interpretation. 
Lefebvre, it may be argued, intends no such latitude. 
However, I take the criticism he levels at some theorists, 
that recourse to such concepts as rupture, coupure, or 
break is no substitute for an account of the move in 
discourse from one kind of spatiality to another, to mean 
that some ‘accommodation’, at very least, is effectively 
entailed by any project that models particular possibilities 
in radically open (dual, multiple, plural) social space. 
Of the terms Lefebvre mentions by name I start with 
the following fairly ‘concrete’ interpretations: 
• ‘Exchange’ I take to imply material exchange between 
participants in the museum design process as a measure 
of level of involvement – ‘involvement’ here is meant in 
its most practical sense of implicated in and concerned 
with a significant range of the complexity of the 
museum design context. 
• ‘Language’ I interpret as meaning a measure of the 
commonality or difference in what Rorty terms ‘final 
vocabulary’ between the various individuals involved in 
a particular museum design project or within specific 
heterogeneous functional groupings in the wider 
museum design context.37 
37. All human beings carry about
a set of words which they employ
to justify their actions, their
beliefs, and their lives. ...I shall
call these words a person's “final
vocabulary”. 
[RORTY, Richard. Contingency,
Irony, and Solidarity. Cam-
bridge University Press, 1989.
p.73.] 
• ‘Signs’ I interpret as referring to the level of meaningful 
products associated with individual roles or with 
specific functional groups and, therefore, as a measure 
of documentary visibility. Meaningful products, in the 
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museum design context, include all recorded forms of 
communication (written, drawn, taped, digitized, etc.) 
and the designed end products that carry the mark of 
their originators’ identities (the material culture of 
museum design: buildings, exhibitions, publications, 
education programmes, collection management 
systems, etc.) 
• ‘Equivalencies’ and ‘reciprocities’, I take to refer to the 
qualities of specific functional roles. I interpret them as 
a measure of complementarity of function - functions of 
low complementarity have a high degree of equivalence 
and a low degree of reciprocity and individuals or 
groupings encompassing such functions tend to experi-
ence duplications of effort, direct conflicts of interest, 
underemployment, internal redundancy, devaluation of 
the individual, etc. 
• ‘Contracts’ I interpret as referring to the structure of 
working relationships and to be a measure of their 
formality or informality. Formal contracts tend to be 
highly structured, rule bound, rigid and carry predeter-
mined levels of reward for compliance and penalties for 
non-compliance. Informal contracts, on the other hand, 
tend to be loosely structured, built on trust, flexible and 
represent opportunities for reward and risks of penalty 
whose levels are initially indeterminate. 
Freud introduces a thickening agent to any discourse of 
social spatiality in the form of a reflection: everything that 
is in consciousness is merely the visible tip of the social 
iceberg. The surface self, the ego, covers over the depth of 
the whole self. We are cultural beings and the superego is 
most clearly a cultural construct. The ideal self we project 
for ourselves is at once a celebration of the perfect embodi-
ment of a system of values and beliefs, and the means by 
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which we mask our faults and our imperfect lives: we are 
often irrational, driven by our desires, obsessions, 
sexuality, guilt, fears and hate. 
• ‘Sexuality’, as interpreted in Freudian analysis, connects 
with ‘Sex’ in Bourdieu's scheme and with `Masculinity-
Femininity' in that of Hofstede. However, it goes 
beyond the biologic given and the conscious play of 
self-image. One is reminded that: 
Sexual action is action which gives erotic pleasure ...Sexual 
objects ...may be either a man or a woman for either gender 
...sexual objects may be chosen of any age ...Some people 
may even choose animals ...pet dogs, cats, horses, fish, or 
birds. Sexual aims vary from stroking, kissing, looking at or 
being seen by the sexual object, to genital intercourse, anal 
inter-course, and sadistic or masochistic practices.38
Freud delves beneath overt social display, to reveal 
unconscious drives that affect the character of the 
productive/communicative activities and roles we 
construct through our social relations - i.e. the creative, 
the manipulative, the controlling, the caring, etc. 
(MARCUSE, Herbert. Eros and 
Civilisation. Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1956. p.13.) 
The reality principle having 
struck, the human being 
represses desire and anger to 
allow reason to surface and 
action to be directed towards 
moderated future goals. 
38. BOCOCK,1983, p.38. 
 
39. Freud’s hypothesis is that in 
the distant past the human ani-
mal at some point experienced 
some resistance in the human 
and natural environment to 
his/her achievement of immed-
iate satisfaction. He/she, there-
fore, learned to 
give up, momentary, uncertain, 
and destructive pleasure for 
delayed, restrained but ‘assured’ 
pleasure. 
• ‘Imagination-Reason’ connects with Hofstede's notion of 
‘uncertainty avoidance’. The two basic mental processes 
split in the transition from human-animal to human-
being, from a condition determined by the ‘pleasure 
principle’ to one determined by the ‘reality principle’.39 
The alternate exercise of imagination and reason 
produces the greater ability to tolerate ambiguity and 
cope with uncertainty and necessary risk. Confusing or 
inadequate information when addressed by reason alone, 
which is limited to ‘reality testing’, tends to produce 
inappropriate responses or lead to a catastrophic switch 
to extreme irrational behaviour. Equally, when 
addressed by the imagination alone which is limited to 
uninhibited surfacing of preconscious images and ideas, 
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tends to produce ‘generic’ and therefore inadequately 
focussed responses or lead to a catastrophic switch to 
excessively rational, rigid and mechanistic behaviour. 
• ‘Language’ connects with the same term in Lefebvre's 
scheme. Lefebvre identifies language with two contra-
dictory views – ‘a pure formalism’ and ‘a power of 
abstraction’. These neither stand alone nor hang 
together. In the former view “the forbidden fruit of 
lived experience flees or disappears under the assault of 
reductionism”.40 And in the latter the logics of 
metaphor and metonymy rule and “a terrible power of 
negativity” 41 is admitted: the mesmerizing difference 
between signified and sign creates the power to destroy 
and to create “a new world different from nature’s 
initial one". 42 Freud's centralizing of ‘marginal’ aspects 
of language opens up the rational and conscious views 
of language and social relations to the irrational and 
unconscious aspects that hold them in productive 
tension in an interpretive space. Applying the interpret-
tive notions of dream analysis to the analysis of 
slips of the tongue and of the pen (Freudian slips); bungled 
actions ...(parapraxes); forgetting words and names; 
...misreading words [and] ...wit, jokes and plays on words43
concerned itself with revealing the unconscious. But: 
It is clear now [that] ...these early texts ...are concerned with 
language and meaning. Even in dream interpretation, the 
picture of the dream must first be put into a verbal form 
before the interpretation can begin.44
Freud thus provides depth to the communicative 
process that Rorty, Habermas and others have invoked 
as central to cultural and political action in general and 
(I extrapolate) to design in particular. 
42. ibid. p.135. 
 
43. BOCOCK, 1983, p.34-5. 
 
44. ibid. p.35. 
40. LEFEBVRE, [1974] p.134. 
 
41 ibid. Attributed to Hegel. 
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On the question of the ‘ideology/religion’ dimension Freud 
argues carefully for the conjunction or equivalence between 
ideology and religion. I would not take issue with the 
argument that this dimension is relevant to the development 
of the individual, that it is represented as collective belief 
and therefore that it is manifest in the social realm. 
However, for reasons that will become apparent, I wish to 
exempt ideology from the visualization of social space. 
Although there is a sense in which all of the ‘depth’ that 
Freudian ideas add to prospective social dimensions is of an 
embedded or enfolded nature, that is to say, in social terms 
it is below the surface and ‘distanced’ - to some extent taken 
out of time and operating by ‘distance effects’ - ideology is 
perhaps the one dimension which most clearly departs from 
the simple notion of social dimensionality. I will argue that it 
is better conceived as an independent space of quite distinc-
tive character - a paradigmatic space which is metasocial as 
much as metaphysical and, for that matter, metacritical. 
Jung develops a wide range of what he terms ‘opposites’ 
and these may be construed as potential dimensions or 
modifiers of dimensions in social space. Crucial to under-
standing the Jungian scheme are the concepts ‘libido’, 
‘progression’ and ‘regression’. Libido is general psychic 
energy. It does not imply a ‘force’ as such, “it is simply a 
convenient way of describing ...observed phenomena”.45 
Progression and regression are complementary concepts 
relating to the flow of libido. ‘Progression’ is the forward 
movement “which satisfies the demands of the conscious” 
and “is concerned with the active adaptation to one’s 
environment”.46 ‘Regression’ is the backward movement 
which satisfies “the demands of the unconscious” and is 
concerned with “adaptation to one’s inner needs”.47 For 
Jung an important aspect of libido is that it may flow to an 
45. FORDHAM,1953. p.17.  
 
46. ibid. p.18. 
 
47. ibid. 
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extreme and instantaneously pass over into its opposite. 
The possibility of such a switch of polarity is an important 
feature of a balanced individual and may be so also of a 
group or larger collective. The opposites between which 
libido flows in turns by progression and regression form 
the central thread of Jung’s most important work 
Psychological Types: the following dualities are all 
developed from the definitions included in that work. 
48. This is taken from a 1993 
The Late Show broadcast. It 
immediately followed the series 
Culture Clash (BBC 2, 1993) 
which investigated the persist-
ence of the `two cultures' debate 
initiated by C P Snow in the 
1959 Rede Lecture at the 
University of Cambridge. The 
Late Show participants were: 
Professor Lewis Wolpert, biolo-
gist; Jonathan Miller, polymath; 
Mary Midgley, philosopher; and 
Robert Young, academic and 
editor of Science as Culture. 
Lewis Wolpert put an 
uncompromising reductionist 
argument about the primacy of 
Science. Jonathan Miller coun-
tered the implication that: 
...there is no difference in kind 
between the complexities of 
human affairs and the complexi - 
ties of bio-chemical affairs and 
that ultimately the one will 
reduce to the other... 
by drawing attention to the fact 
that the reductionist pro-
gramme: 
...takes so little account of what in 
fact is distinctive about the 
complexity of human affairs ...we 
are not complex merely by virtue 
of the fact that there are more 
factors involved which we can't 
as yet introduce sufficiently soph-
isticated mathematics to deal with, 
but ...by virtue of something which 
doesn't occur in the rest of nature, 
which is the fact that “there is 
something it is like to be us”... 
[quote attributed to the 
philosopher Thomas Nagel.] 
• ‘unconscious-conscious’, by introducing the opposing 
concept of the unconscious as what is not conscious, 
admits a whole realm of hitherto unrevealed possibili- 
ties. In design, the play of both rational and irrational 
processes, in addressing complex practical situations, is 
a methodological prerequisite. And in museographical 
practices, certainly since the postmodern deconstruct-
tion of traditional curatorship, the play of both analytic-
cal and narrative, broadly deconstructive and recon-
structive processes, is similarly definitive. The character 
of these processes can be given much greater clarity by 
reference to the part the unconscious plays in surfacing 
cultural, instinctual and personal material in the 
(re)creative process: In Jonathan Miller's words: “there 
is something that it is like to be” of which science - 
analytical, conscious thought in general - can tell us 
little.48 However, in poetry (poiesis) one is ‘in touch’ 
with the collective unconscious, the emotional and 
experiential inheritance, and has the chance, if one is 
finely tuned, to produce something, because of its 
powerfully deep resonances, of lasting value. 
• ‘introversion-extraversion’ focusses on the directionality 
of libido as the determining characteristic. Introversion 
is broadly associated with regression and extraversion 
with  progression.  These  movements may be related to 
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the phases of complex functions in the museum context. 
The predominantly regressive movement of introver-
sion is ‘dis-played’ in the subjective interest towards the 
subject in, for example, the designer's focus on personal 
satisfaction and with aesthetic integrity in the process 
of designing when it is experienced primarily as welling 
up out of the self, or the parallel focus of the curator as 
a narrative scheme develops from conceptual outline to 
‘final’ text. In each case, what matters to the subject is 
the satisfaction of psychic needs through an essentially 
erotic (rather than sexual) dynamic, that is, one charac-
terized as primarily emotional rather than sensual. 
The predominantly progressive movement of extra-
version, on the other hand, is ‘dis-closed’ in the subjec-
tive investment in the object. For example, the 
designer's focus on the object of design or the curator’s 
on the object of a museum project entails a shaping of 
events as well as a shaping of the material content of a 
practical situation. All of which aims at a conscious 
identification with the world, an involvement that seeks 
not merely accommodation but union. Here the 
dynamic projects beyond fantasy into a physical 
consummation, beyond emotion into the sensual. 
• ‘feeling-thinking’ and ‘intuition-sensation’, as the 
rational and irrational dualities, construct the subspace 
of psychological functions. This has potential as a way 
of visualizing the dynamics of certain behaviours in the 
museum design process. The ‘moments’ in a creative or 
decision-making process can be associated with 
movement between psychological functions. This could 
be as an adjunct or possibly an alternative to the 
characterization of such moments in terms of the 
psychological types, i.e. introverted and extraverted. 
The movement from sensation to thinking for example 
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describes a rational thought process informed by direct 
sense experience: the reverse movement of a directed 
physical action informed by prior ‘abstract’ thought. 
• The description of the dualities as straightforwardly 
‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ is a simplification which, in 
considering the combination, Jung qualifies on several 
counts. For example, although feeling is the psychologi-
cal function that ‘weighs and values’ and is therefore, in 
that sense, ‘rational’, undirected passive feeling, which 
Jung calls ‘feeling-intuition’, is, he says, definitely 
irrational.49 I interpret the space of psychological 
functions as being divided by the feeling-thinking axis 
with the ‘passive’ intuition-dominated regions being 
irrational in character and the more strongly so the 
further one moves away from the axis. The other 
regions have sensation at their base and are more 
strongly rational in character as one moves away from 
this base towards the axis (Figure 2.2.2.) 
feeling 
sensation 
intuition 
thinking 
strong 
IRRATIONAL 
weak 
strong 
RATIONAL 
weak 
Figure 2.2. 2 
  
The 'rational' duality feeling-thinking and the ‘irrational’ duality 
intuition-sensation construct a sub-space of psychological functions in 
which the irrational quality dominates the feeling-intuition and 
thinking-intuition regions and the rational dominates the feeling-
sensation and the thinking-sensation regions. 
  
 
• ‘individual-collective’ links with the similarly named 
dimension in Hofstede's scheme. The psychological 49. JUNG, 1926, p.546 
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individual only comes into being in consciousness and 
then it is the complex formations of psychic elements 
peculiar to the individual, and not the elements 
themselves, which are common to many, that character-
rize individuality. The collective has both conscious and 
unconscious contents. In Hofstede’s cultural scheme 
the individual-collective dimension is employed as a 
measure of personal and group identity: Jung’s psycho-
logical scheme offers another twist to this by suggesting 
that, unless set off against the unconscious-conscious 
dimension, it is immediately ambiguous.50 Although 
individual unconscious as a region has no real ‘place’, in 
that, before conscious development of a self, identi-
fication entirely with the object represents an immature 
condition one would not expect to find ‘involved’ in a 
social context, collective unconscious plays as significant 
a role as does the collective conscious. Hofstede's 
category of the collective is really only a measure of 
conscious group identification: the unconscious remains 
hidden or, more properly, ‘unrecovered’ (Figure 2.2.3.) 
[MACQUARRIE, John.
Existentialism. New York: World
Publishing, 1972. pp.75-7.] 
50. It should be noted also that
existential thinking has a prob-
lem with these notions of the
‘individual’ and the ‘collective’.
They may seem to imply a
bridgeable dichotomy. If ‘collec-
tivism’ is taken to imply the col-
lection of separate individuals 
then it “really misses the
meaning of community” that is
intended. And although there is
an essentially lonely aspect to
individual existence, there is no
real alone-ness. The self is not
“pre-existent and self-sufficient”
but emerges from and is always 
with a world of others. For this
reason an alternative psycho-
social formulation would be
‘privacy-community’. 
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The Jungian individual-collective and unconscious-conscious 
dimensions construct a sub-space in which the region of the 
`collective unconscious' is made visible. In Hofstede's cultural scheme 
the collective aspect only constructs a space for conscious group 
identity (See this section, above). 
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In the museum design context the collective uncon-
scious clearly plays an important part in the construc-
tion of narrative. The playing out of the creative and 
administrative groups’ mythic relations and the deep 
structures of the products of the planning and design 
processes both draw on an archaic psychic heritage 
which is ‘cultural’ in a far broader sense than is the 
conscious contents intentionally projected by specific 
individuals and groups in the ‘limited’ local context of 
the museum organization. 
• The ‘instinct-will’ dimension embraces forms of psychic 
energy: ‘instinct’ that of the unconscious, what we experi-
ence as primitive impulses, and ‘will’ that of the consc-
ious, what we develop as conscious motivations which 
“owe [their] ...existence to culture and moral education”.51 
In museum design the role of conscious motivations 
is a very large one: the broader aspects derive from the 
importance of material culture as a vehicle for projecting 
values and beliefs. The continuum of material culture is 
broken only by the will of differentiated individuals and 
groups. The more ‘conservative’ element attempts to 
preserve or to re-embody values consistent with an 
actual (or imagined) past state of things whereas the 
more ‘innovative’ element attempts to establish or to 
transfer values that reflect the actual (or desired) 
present condition in the light of current interests and 
concerns. Neither element can be exclusively identified 
with the designer or with the curator, but, in the context 
of the particular museum community, one has the oppor-
tunity to place successful individuals and groups 
according to the wilfulness of their activities. 
I suggest that there is a tendency for the experienced 
and more coherent group to `automate' its conscious 
motivations, to adopt familiar patterns of collective will, 51. ibid. p.617. 
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to become unquestioning: this process should not be 
confused with a coincidence of instinctual motivations. 
The group dynamic that is hard-won by a collective 
conscious effort and a bringing together of the will is 
thereafter vulnerable to a decadent complacency, a 
decline into unthinking routine, a progressive collective 
blindness to changing circumstance, and ultimately to a 
potentially catastrophic dysfunctionality. On the other 
hand, I suggest that the happy accident of coincident 
instincts in a group tends to engender a collective 
creativity, an openness to the changing world and 
growth into coherent conscious motivations. Of course, 
the former dynamic may trigger a radical switch into the 
latter and the latter dynamic may be carried over into 
the former: in this sense the ‘dynamic’ that heads 
towards automated motivations and potential catastro-
phe is the social expression of a ‘collective regression’ 
and that which heads towards group creativity and 
‘growth’ is one of ‘collective progression’. 
• ‘introjection-projection’, the complementary flows of 
psychic contents between subject and object, relates 
closely to introversion-extraversion. 
Introjection is an extraverting process, since for this adjust-
ment to the object a feeling into, or possession of, the object 
is necessary. 52
The object is assimilated by the self and an identity with 
the object is formed. Projection, however, is an 
introverting process. It animates and separates the 
object through the transfer to it of psychic contents. 
This dimension has the potential to illuminate those 
moments in the museum design process when identi-
fication with the object of design changes. A prerequisite 
for successful evaluation of a design is the ability to 52. ibid. p.567. 
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‘step back’ from one’s immersion in the work and to 
take a broader conscious view of what has been going 
on and what state of things has been reached. This 
movement from an introjecting to a projecting flow of 
conscious and unconscious contents is the achievement 
of the individual, in terms of psychological functions, in 
gravitating towards the feeling-thinking axis: as one 
leaves the realm of pure sensation the rational quality 
becomes stronger and as one leaves that of the 
intuitions the irrational quality becomes weaker. 
• ‘abstract-concrete’ relates to the individual treatment of 
the meaning or general character of psychological 
contents. ‘Abstraction’ literally means ‘differentiating 
out’ or ‘separating from’. Abstract thinking draws out a 
particular content for its intellectual or logical qualities 
and, therefore, suppresses other elements as irrelevant. 
‘Concrete’ literally means ‘grown together’. Concrete 
thinking sees a more or less undifferentiated whole in 
which thought, feeling and sensation are mixed up 
together and it is, therefore, wedded to the primacy of 
‘facts’ as witnessed by sense-perception. 
In the museum design context, the orientation of 
particular participants in a project tends to make use of 
a pattern of abstract and concrete psychological 
functions peculiar to a specific practice or museum 
function. Concretism emerges in moments that rely on 
what one thinks of as ‘common sense’. And in environ-
ments as thoroughly infused with intellectual and 
aesthetic concerns as is the museum it can be a ‘rare’ 
and, therefore, a very valuable commodity. It represents 
that ability to ignore complex disputes and conflicts of 
interest and to get to the heart of the practical situation, 
to be decisive and to act with mind, body and soul 
together. Jung puts a less positive tone on this: 
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With civilized man, concretism of thought consists in the 
inability to conceive of anything which differs from the 
immediately obvious external facts, or in the inability to 
discriminate subjective feeling from the sense-given object.53
Abstraction, as abstract thinking, sensation and feeling, 
surfaces wherever intellectual aesthetic or moral 
concerns are focussed. It allows different concerns and 
interests to be differentiated and articulated and creates 
the arena in which contradiction and counteraction can 
be consciously worked on by the intellect, the 
imagination and the higher emotions. 
? 
The range of variables used by Hofstede, Bourdieu, 
Lefebvre, Freud and Jung in the construction of social and 
psycho-social dimensions immediately suggests overlaps, 
interactions and graphic juxtapositions potentially produc-
tive of significant subspaces - indeed, some are unavoid-
ably entailed in the original material and have already been 
illustrated. It is now possible to consider whether some 
distillation of these ingredients may generate a ‘root’ 
scheme of just a few dimensions - ideally no more than 
three - that is both clear in its visualization and yet suitable 
for recovering specific distinctions uncovered in the larger 
heterogeneous ‘scheme’ outlined above. I believe that 
existentialist ideas offer a method of accommodating the 
broad sweep and the recoverable depth required. 
Involvement and Location 
The range of dimensions explored above suggests a complex 
differentiation of Being and an emphasis on being-in-the-
world. Heidegger's approach to resolving such confusion 
was through the adoption of the Da-sein (the 'being-there'). 53. ibid. p.534. 
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It is in the world, but not in the way that physical objects are 
in the world. What puts it in the world is the complex o f its 
interests and attitudes.54
Given the object of the current project, this insight 
suggests an approach to the visualization of psycho-social 
dimensions which is both simple and appropriate. To 
account for “interests and attitudes” and related ideas of 
‘concerns’ and ‘demeanour’ is both to embrace the dynamic 
and static qualities that signal involvement and position 
(or posture) and to indicate recoverable depths of the social 
and the psychological. Featherstone draws attention to the 
behavioural interpretation of this requirement: 
...if one ‘descends’ to the everyday practices of embodied persons 
held together in webs of interdependencies and power balances 
with other people, it can be argued that the need to glean clues and 
information about the other's power potential, status and social 
standing by reading the other person's demeanour will continue.55
and makes the connection with the notion of a society at 
once stratified by differences in ‘lifestyle’ and to some 
extent freed of the rigid rules that reinforce social 
hierarchy: what is sometimes called the ‘no rules only 
choices’ view: 
(...the acknowledgement of the right of individuals to enjoy 
whatever popular pleasures they desire without encountering 
prudery or moral censure) does not signify anything as 
dramatic as the implosion of the social space but should be 
regarded merely as a new move within it.56
54. AYER, A. J. Philosophy in
the Twentieth Century. Weiden-
feld & Nicolson, 1982. p.227. 
 
55. FEATHERSTONE, Mike.
Consumer Culture & Post-
modernism. Sage, 1991. p.20. 
 
56. ibid. p.84. 
One may ask to what extent the conception of ‘lifestyle’, 
as constructed by an “expanding class fraction centrally 
concerned with the production and dissemination of 
consumer imagery and information” carries over into the 
limited field of museum organization and design where 
this ‘new petite bourgeoisie's’ views are resisted and 
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contested in ways which may parallel or counteract those 
operating in the larger social space. 
The leisured academic ‘elite’, which formerly held a 
controlling interest and position in museums, has been, to 
a large extent, supplanted by a section of the new adminis- 
trative class of ‘middle managers’ and ‘information 
workers’. Concomitant with this move from academic to 
administrative values is that the aspirations and demeanour 
of the visiting public now more closely coincide with those 
of senior museum staff. One may suggest then that in 
social space the boundary between the museum organi-
zation and its immediate social context has been softened. 
On the other side of this coin is the spread of the culture 
of consumerism to embrace leisure, education, and cultural 
products. In the museum these are clearly visible as mani-
festations of a larger process of symbolic production and 
material consumerism, which has been largely constructed 
in the post-War, post-industrial period. This process may 
be seen in part as a reconstruction or extension of the 
capitalist logic of mass production and in part as a 
simulation of material exchange or as its substitution by 
symbolic exchange. 
If one accepts the notion that a complex of interests 
and attitudes is what puts the individual in the world, what 
we are presented with is the requirement for an existential 
dimension to social space which facilitates the mapping of 
personal investments and concerns in the world that range 
from the symbolic to the material (Figure 2.2.4.) 
symbolic material 
interests interests 
Figure 2.2.4 
  
Symbolic-material dimension of social interests. 
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In this dimension we can visualize the tensions involved in 
the museum activities of acquisition, documentation, 
conservation, research, exhibition, and interpretation. In 
general, traditional museographic practices tend to focus on 
the ‘material’ whilst the ‘new museology’ tends to set these 
off against interests focussed on the symbolic (Figure 2.2.5.) 
 
 symbolic interests material interests 
ACQUISITION 
•  authenticity 
•  cultural value 
•  position in narrative 
•  uniqueness 
•  monetary value 
•  position in taxonomy 
DOCUMENTATION •  associations: events, persons, places •  iconicity 
•  provenance 
•  material composition & condition 
•  physical size, location and appearance 
CONSERVATION •  preserving function and meaning •  preventing physical deterioration 
RESEARCH •  narrative potential •  factual certainty 
EXHIBITION •  subject communication •  object display 
INTERPRETATION •  narrative exposition •  cultural exploitation 
•  identification 
•  taxonomic placement 
 
Figure 2.2.5 
  
Symbolic-material interests dimension of museum practices. 
  
 
The parallel with design emphasizes the former 
predominance of material interests, in both the larger 
industrial sphere and in the museum, and in the post-
industrial context the more openly and continuously 
contested material and symbolic interests. In relation to 
the modernism/postmodernism debate, therefore, the 
theoretical proposition to which I am inclined is that 
whereas modernism entails choosing between opposing 
terms, between counteracting demands on our attention, 
and is therefore concerned with questions of Either/Or, 
the postmodern condition is characterized by the need to 
 83 
cope with the tensions between the contradictory and the 
counteracting which are themselves shifting and changing, 
by the need to deal with questions of accommodation, of 
Both /And. 
The process of resolving questions of conflicting 
social interests, which once involved a search for truth and 
for stability, can be pictured as a to and fro response to the 
pull of the material and of the symbolic, as a sequence of 
defined positions along a scale of possibilities that edge 
towards some acceptable common ground, as a convers-
ation of gestures (Figure 2.2.6.) 
symbolic 
interests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
material 
interests 
time
Figure 2.2.6 
  
The contest of symbolic and material interests played out as a search 
for common ground. 
  
This dialogic or dialectical process has been radically 
altered by postmodern conditions. The contingency of our 
knowledges and interests is now instantaneously recogniz-
able as the mutual accommodation of contradictory and 
counteracting positions which subtly shift in response to 
each other’s movements creating a pattern of dynamic 
tensions (Figure 2.2.7.) The trajectory of ‘action’ has been 
replaced by the web of interaction and, for your average 
organized worker, excitement by stress. 
 
 84 symbolic 
interests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
material 
interests 
time
Figure 2.2.7 
  
The mutual accommodation of symbolic and material interests played 
out as a pattern of shifting tensions. 
  
Interests and Concerns in Social Space 
The terms ‘demeanour’, ‘attitudes’, ‘interests’ and 
‘concerns’ tend to be used as generalizations and to some 
extent interchangeably. However, in constructing models 
of social space, their dimensional implications may be 
subtly different and therefore, for heuristic reasons at 
least, perhaps they should be differentiated. 
‘Demeanour’ implies a manner of conducting oneself 
in social situations, a typical behaviour that is itself the 
outward sign of status, position, power. It relies not on 
conscious thought for its expression nor even on conscious 
action but rather on habit and routine - on posture rather 
than position and reflex rather than response. We best 
observe a person's demeanour through the conversation of 
gesture entailed in unselfconscious social interaction. 
Through demeanour one constructs the ‘other’ as a social 
entity and one possible scale of demeanour would be 
cooperative-competitive (Figure 2.2.8)57
57. Featherstone also draws
attention to the postmodern con-
fusion of this idea. Where the
culture of consumption invites
the individual to “regard their
dress and consumer goods as
communicators”. [FEATHER-
STONE, 1991, p.26-7.] In this
the question of ‘demeanour’ is
brought into the realm of self-
conscious conduct. These ges-
tures may be orchestrated to 
alternately communicate both a
‘regard for others’ and a ‘pleas-
ing of oneself’. The latter may be
regarded by others as an unco-
operative and, therefore, compet-
itive display. 
 
cooperative competitive 
demeanour demeanour 
Figure 2.2.8 
  
Cooperative-competitive social dimension of demeanour. 
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‘Attitudes’ implies expressed predisposition, an 
ideology (rather than conversation) of gesture that reveals 
itself in the style, as much as in the content, of our trans-
missions. Through readings of our demeanour attitudes 
‘represent’ (pre-present) the positions we will assume in 
acting out any part in social processes. Such expressed pre-
dis-positions need not be reasonable, rational nor even 
serendipitous, though there is a recent strain in the myth of 
the anti-hero, which posits ‘bad attitude’ as a saving quality. 
There is a clue in this as to why the concept of attitude is 
ultimately the least productive of the variables under 
consideration for a root scheme. Sartre explores the two 
`attitudes' constitutive of the ‘private’ and contrasts these 
with the ‘communal’. The individual can either seek confir-
mation of its existence by being predisposed to the other’s 
attentions - the attitude of love-language-masochism - or 
it can do so by subjecting the other to its own attentions - 
the attitude of indifference-desire-hate-sadism. No choice 
between these attitudes is possible because in practice each 
eventually fails and motivates the adoption of the other: 
through attitude one constructs oneself as a social entity, 
but, as a personal gambit it is circular (Figure 2.2.9.)58
 
community 
(value-network) 
 privacy 
 (attitudes) 
58. SARTRE, Jean-Paul. [1943] 
Being and Nothingness. Trans. 
Hazel E. Barnes. Methuen, 
1958. pp.364-412. 
Undoubtedly I have not done 
justice to the detailed and subtle 
exposition of the original. How-
ever, I believe the central point 
to be unequivocal: ‘attitude’ forms 
a closed circuit in the personal 
realm and, there-fore, although 
it may offer a certain clarity, is 
not really open to further 
differentiation in spatial terms. 
Figure 2.2.9 
  
Community-privacy social dimension. 
  
Having characterized the personal sphere as a 
construction of conflict with the other, Sartre goes on to 
discuss the communal sphere as a construction of being (in 
community) with the other, a construction always 
dependent upon the appearance of an external other. The 
experience of community is that of being the object of 
someone else’s attentions.  
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...what I experience is a being-outside in which I am organized 
with the Other in an indissoluble objective whole, a whole in 
which I am fundamentally no longer distinct from the Other 
but which 1 agree in solidarity with the Other to constitute.59
In the museum context the very fact that the products of 
the design process are worked on by oneself with others 
and that they are apprehended by third parties constitutes 
the community at work as an objective entity, as an Us. It 
is a fact of organizational life, even at its most cooperative, 
therefore, that what is felt to be ‘outside’ the practical 
situation is what constructs the experience of solidarity. 
At the same time it reinforces the individual alienation, 
which is objectification by others, entailed in the `internal' 
conflict of working with others. 
...the one who experiences himself as constituting an Us with 
other men feels himself trapped among an infinity of strange 
existences; he is alienated radically and without recourse.60
The efficacy of material and symbolic interests and 
concerns is always related to this dynamic of communal 
experience. In those moments when one attempts to 
reclaim the object (the design as object) from its embedded-
ness in symbolic structures in order to work on it in its 
materiality what one is also doing is breaking that experi-
ence of solidarity and reinstating the primacy of the 
subjectivity, of the private realm. Conversely, to the extent 
that the object is released to communal visibility, its 
materiality is submerged in order to construct its meaning 
for others (Figure 2.2.10.) And when one engages such 
symbolic interests and concerns one is also admitting 
oneself to the organizational objectivity that the attentions 
of others construct. 
Just as a community is objectified by the attentions of 
others outside, it constitutes itself as a ‘subject’ the moment  
59. ibid. p.418. 
 
60. ibid p.419. 
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B
A 
community
symbolic 
interests 
material 
interests 
privacy 
Figure 2.2.10 
  
The movement to recapture the materiality of the object (A) entails a 
resort to attitudinal play wherein the subject arrests the Other's 
(shared) symbolic interest in the object by alternately seeking 
attention from and giving it to the Other. The movement to release 
the object to communal visibility (B) reverses the flow of interests and 
promotes the (re)construction of meaning. 
  
a cooperative action is engaged. Such action is acquisitive, 
subsuming, attention-giving in which one unselfconsciously 
participates and it immediately objectifies what is ‘outside’, 
that is, other than the We in which one is participating. In 
so far as the We is against what is outside the community it 
only admits the objectified and digested body of the world 
into its work: the We is imperialistic. The Us responds to the 
attentions of the world as an object of what is outside itself. 
Its work, therefore, is subsumed by the world: whether 
compliantly or defiantly the Us is bound into slavery. 
Moving on from the circularity of attitudes in the 
personal sphere, it seems that in the communal sphere 
`attitude' is no longer the appropriate question: it is simply 
not possible for the collectivity to adopt an attitude in the 
sense in which the individuality must. From amongst an 
unlimited range of possible interests, a particular configur-
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ation defines the community's objective boundary. 
Nothing in the experience of community melds this 
together into a static predisposition, rather it comes into 
being contingently and is dynamic. 
The social world is constituted by a network of 
interests that places us in relation to others. 
The everyday world, then, is already a world that implies an 
indefinite number of people engaged in interlocking and 
mutually supportive tasks.61
‘Interests’ implies a normative condition of values: within 
a group, common interests and the interests of the 
individual may be defined and may coincide or may 
conflict to a greater or lesser degree. Interests are a reflec-
tion of possible direct influence on status, performance, 
confidence, reward, etc. as in statements of the type: “this 
is not in your interests: your interests would be better 
served by ...” Involvement in a practical situation implies 
‘interests’ in the ‘concrete’ sense of a binding set of assign-
ments and references to others which is embodied in the 
work that we do. 
In our ‘description’ of that environment which is closest to us - 
the work-world of the craftsman, for example - the outcome was 
that along with the equipment to be found when one is at work 
[in Arbeit], these Others far whom the ‘work’ [“Werk”] is 
destined are encountered too.62
Through the embodied quality of interests the aesthetic 
enters our works. 
Involvement also implies ‘concerns’ in the ‘abstract’ 
sense of particular conscious objects which are the product 
of ‘concrete relations with others’ and that one is bound to 
pursue in respect of the contingent experiences of being-for 
and being-with others. Unlike interests, concerns tend to 
be contingently driven by ideological or by practical 
61. MACQUARRIE, 1972, p.77. 
 
62. HEIDEGGER, Martin. 
Being and Time. Trans. John 
Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962. 
p.153. 
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rational thought. They are a reflection of what occupies 
thought, what motivates, what one consciously pursues or 
avoids in life, what one cares about for whatever reason, as 
in expressions such as: “but I am very concerned about 
this: I am involved whether you like it or not!” The 
everyday world of the community: “is an a priori condition 
of all my practical concerns”. 63
If ‘interests’ are assigned to the individual or collective 
as object then ‘concerns’ are expressed by them as subject. 
They are the two sides of the coin of social dynamics. In 
the same sense demeanour and attitude are the object and 
subject sides of the social status (statics/stasis) coin. To 
visually cue the notion that it is in interests and concerns 
that the real ‘freedom’ of movement is realized, I shall use 
the graphic short-hand of a triangle on a wide base to 
indicate generic social space of this type of construction 
(Figure 2.2. 11.) 
social dynamics 
so
ci
al
 s
ta
tu
s 
time 
Figure 2.2.11 
  
The generic social space constructed by a dimension of social 
dynamics and one of social status (`status' here is used to denote 
outward signs or expressions of power, position, condition, etc.) The 
space becomes activated on addition of a linear dimension of time. 
63. MACQUARRIE, 1972, p.99.   
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? 
It may be possible to generalize that certain types of 
symbolic structure are typical of the phases of conserva-
tive, cosmetic and radical change in an organization such as 
a museum - one may expect that the demands made upon 
participants in design in these different change contexts 
will be such as to favour certain individuals and particular 
groupings (heterogeneous and/or homogenous in character). 
These individuals/groupings will, by definition, exhibit 
specific combinations of interests and concerns, which may 
be mapped in various socio-cultural/-technical/-economic 
subspaces of the social space. In Gasparski’s terms, the 
requirements for ‘prophylactic’, ‘therapeutic’, and ‘innova-
tional’ design approaches to complex socio-technical systems 
may be predictable to some degree.64 Whether or not this 
is the case for a ‘system’ such as a museum remains to be 
seen. I would argue that cultural and economic content is 
inherent and inextricable in the large-scale socio-technical 
system, that museums collectively embody socio-technical 
as much as socio-economic and socio-cultural processes, 
and therefore that equations of process and structure are 
as likely to be found in museums as they are in any other 
‘complex’ socio-cultural/-economic/-technical system. 
64. GASPARSKI, w. “On the 
General Theory (Praxiology) of 
Design”, Department of 
Praxiology, Polish Academy of 
Sciences, 1985? 
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2.3 Documentary Space  
Physics and Physiology  
The physical quality of the written word and of the 
drawing is identical: it is material inscription, a mark on 
paper, a substantial object which, as icon, is the analogue 
of an image. It is able to reflect light in such a way as to 
cause a pattern of variations in light intensity to be 
focussed on the retina. The image so created always 
remains in a simple relation to the original: it may undergo 
only a limited number of types of two-dimensional 
distortion - trapezoidal (e.g. perspective), elastic/stretch-
ing, magnifying, and reflection (e.g. via a mirror). To main-
tain readability, visual accessibility of information content, 
these distortions and their combination may not be extreme. 
The eye is intelligent, part of the being, part of the 
brain.1 In physical terms, the visual process is continuous 
with cognitive, neurological and physiological processes in 
general. A seamless organic whole of such complexity is, 
and probably will remain, beyond the scope of an atomistic 
analytical understanding. Therefore one cannot elaborate 
profitably an organismic space of the document, a physical 
space of energetics that encompasses reader and read in a 
single physio-logical (natural and rational) system. Such a 
space appears to be closed to perception, a ‘black box’, a 
‘Chinese room’, an impenetrable realm of indeterminate 
internal structure and dimensionality that operates in the 
unfathomable interstices between phenomena. 
...eyes require intelligence to iden-
tify and locate objects in space, 
but intelligent brains could hard-
ly have developed without eyes. 
GREGORY, Richard L. The 
Intelligent Eye. Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1970. p.13.  
GREGORY, Richard L. Eye 
and Brain. Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1966. p.45-6. 
1. The retina ... is a specialized 
part of the surface of the brain ... 
it retains typical brain cells lying 
between the receptors and the 
optic nerve ... Some of the data 
processing for perception takes 
place in the eye which is thus an 
integral part of the brain. 
What one may understand of the physics of the 
seeing/hearing - thinking/remembering - writing/drawing 
process is of no immediate practical use: it does not help 
one to see/hear - think/remember - write/draw any differ-
ently or any better. 
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Subjunctive Constructs 
Certain of the products of the design process are referred to 
by Potter as ‘design constructs’.2 When considering the space 
in which they are situated, we must make a careful distinc-
tion between the putative three-dimensionality of the 
designed object, which ‘exists’ in the physical space of its 
practical use - the Breuer Chair in the executive lounge - and 
the subjunctive space in which the object of design as 
metaphor may stand in for any of a wide range of possible 
relations in the world. “A subjunctive space is a qualified 
region within which certain rules hold - the space, say, of play 
or ritual”.3 The design construct is not being put to ‘end use’: 
the chair is used to sit on, the chair design to allow the chair 
to be created. Rather it plays a part in a specific ritualized 
process - industrial production - which has been characterized 
as the realm of `socially constructed technological systems’.4 
In such systems social space meets geography and ‘physics’ 
head on: we enter a world defined multidimensionally. 
In this sense the space of the museum collection is a 
model for the space of the design construct. This is the 
subjunctive space in which one Roman vase may stand in 
for many, in which the variety of relations between collec-
tion items stands in for the world as a whole. What is 
more, physical spatial relations in the museum exhibition 
may stand in for a variety of types of space in the world at 
large - taxonomic, social, cultural, economic, temporal, etc. 
5.  BRYSON, 1991. p.246-7. 
 
4. BIJKER, Weibe E., Thomas 
P. Hughes & Trevor Pinch. 
(eds.) The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems. MIT 
Press, 1987. 
 
3, BRYSON, Norman., Michael 
Ann Holly & Keith Moxey 
(eds.) Visual Theory. Polity 
Press, 1991. p246 ? 
 
2. POTTER, Norman. Models 
and Constructs: Margin Notes to 
a Design Culture. Hyphen 
Press, 1990. 
‘Subjunctive space’ is the space in which real things may be 
substituted for the absent. It is the space of 'real metaphor. 
Where the hobbyhorse stands in for the horse, the 
reproduction for the artefact and "Substitutes are effective in 
the space in which they are put because they are only 'real' in 
that space"... In most of the traditions of world art (only 
Western modernism seems to offer an alternative) images 
have served to correct the `defect of distance'... to transform 
the present in such a way as to make the absent present.5
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Whereas in this ‘traditional’ formulation what is absent is 
in the past - either something or someone is lost in the 
past or is known to be physically at a distance and, 
therefore, to have been experienced in another place/time - 
in the current context, that of design, what is absent is that 
which may come to be. The design is a thing/message/ 
place/system that is projected into an as yet undecided 
future. In this, the notion of physical distance is rendered 
ambiguous and the experience of a substitution rendered 
only in a virtual sense. This is the simulation of substitu-
tion, the creation of virtual subjunctive space, the space of 
the design as a proposition. This refers, therefore, to the 
products of the design process, to design documents, 
drawings and models, to design constructs. 
In the subjunctive space of traditional art, the space of 
‘real’ metaphor, what is enfolded in the act of substitution, 
the process of replacement, is that distant, past thing that 
is absent, that is, the object of our nostalgic desires. In 
illusionistic art we imagine, visualize and invoke the absent 
thing, that which used to be. In the equivalent virtual 
subjunctive space of the design construct in contrast, 
though it may also have an artistic ‘mortal’ content, what 
is enfolded is that imagined future thing which is virtually 
present, that deferred presence which creates the possi-
bility of meaning in the material of the world. In the 
design construct we imagine, visualize and invoke the 
possible, the thing that has yet to be. 
Semiosis: Substitution, Simulation, Simulacrum 
When one talks of a ‘semiosis’ in relation to the design 
construct one has to qualify what is meant by terms such 
as ‘substitution’, ‘simulation’, and the ‘simulacrum’. 
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In the documentary space of the design construct the 
substitution is for a thing virtually present as a negotiable 
project and therefore not yet present. The substitution is 
far a mere possibility, not for an absent actuality. 
We tend to think of ‘simulation’, as conceived by 
Baudrillard, as a realized model that stands in for the real, 
as one reality, a hyperreality, standing in for another, a lost 
actuality. “It is the generation by models of a real without 
origin or reality: a hyperreal”.6 This lost actuality is the 
‘home’ for which the term ‘nostalgia’ implies we long. “When 
the real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes 
its full meaning”.7 Simulation implies not merely substitu-
tion, that one thing may stand in for another thing, but an 
identification, at an emotional level, at the level of the self, 
with a world known or imagined as a place to which we 
ideally belong. In the design construct nostalgia is itself a 
simulation. It is not an ideal world for which we long but 
rather a metaphysical reality, the hyperreality of the 
cultural. In the documentary space the designer does not 
engage a semioses of physical form, of the monumental or of 
the ephemeral for that matter, the artist does. In documen-
tary space the art object may be an object of linguistic and 
visual speculation, but it is primarily a physical object. 
Rather, the designer engages a semiosis of the metaphysical 
form, the imaginal which is at one remove from the physical 
and, therefore, only an object of linguistic and visual specu-
lation. The physicality of the documentary form in design 
gives rise to a trivial semiotics in comparison to that of its 
content. In the design process it is the design that matters 
not the design drawing as a work of art. The design is first 
a mental construct, a perceptual and cognitive construct, 
rather than a physical, a material and sensual one. 
 
7. ibid. p.171. 
6. BAUDRILLARD, Jean. 
“Simulacra and Simulations”, in 
Selected Writings. introduced 
and edited by Mark POSTER 
Polity Press, 1988. p.166. The simulacrum, as image, representation and 
semblance is the object of this latter notion of design as a 
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mental construct, a perceptual and cognitive construct. 
What is created in the simulacrum is pure image which 
may embody the fulfilment of wishes and dreams, fantasy 
and desire, rather more certainly than it may the quality of 
the absent (or present) material of the world. The 
simulacrum is not merely a substitution it transcends 
substitution, becomes a parallel reality literally ‘in the 
image of’ that which we desire. Neither is the simulacrum 
concerned with simulation in the primary sense of 
realizing a virtual object that is constructed in the 
spatiality of an ‘original’ object. It maintains its own 
spatiality, proclaims its separate identity and holds forth 
the possibility of an equality of status in the material 
culture. Where the substitution is a taking-the-place-of the 
absent; its ‘dis-placement’, and the simulation is its 
reproduction, its ‘re-placement’, the simulacrum is the 
doubling of the place of the object (present or absent), its 
‘re-presentation’: 
...an operation to deter every real process by its operational 
double, a metastable, programmatic, perfect descriptive machine 
which provides all the signs of the real and short-circuits all 
its vicissitudes.8
The simulacra of design are the products of the design 
process, the documents, drawings and records that consti-
tute the design as a projected reality. They re-present what 
is cognitively projected in the design process by making it 
visible. They construct their own spatiality - a documentary 
spatiality - and proclaim their identity in the material 
culture. Documentary space is subjunctive to the physical 
space of the designed object but also to the social/psycho-
social space of the design programme. The content of the 
documentary space is only ‘real’ in that space: to call it a 
‘substitution’ for or a ‘simulation’ of another reality is, as 
we have seen, only possible in carefully qualified senses. 8. ibid. p.167.  
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Semiosis: Content and Form 
 
11. LEFEBVRE, Henri. [1974] 
The Production of Space. Trans. 
Donald Nicholson-Smith. Basil 
Blackwell, 1991. pp.27-30. 
Eco starts with the Peircian 
notion of semiosis: 
By semiosis I mean an action, an 
influence, which is, or involves, a 
cooperation of three subjects, such 
as a sign, its object and its 
interpretant, this tri-relative influ-
ence not being in any way resolv-
able into actions between pairs. 
[PEIRCE, C S. Collected 
Papers. Harvard University 
Press, 1931-58. vol 5, p.484. 
quoted on p.15. ] 
The connectedness of every-
thing within the system of signs 
which semiosis as action entails 
is made clear in a later expla-
nation of the term ‘interpretant’ 
(Peirce was apparently incon-
sistent in its use): 
The interpretant is not the inter-
preter... The interpretant is that 
which guarantees the validity of 
the sign, even in the absence of 
the interpreter... in order to estab-
lish what the interpretant of a sign 
is, it is necessary to name it by 
means of another sign which in 
turn has another interpretant to be 
named by another sign and so on. 
At this point there begins a pro-
cess of unlimited semiosis ...[p.68.] 
 
10. All media of representation 
can rely on isomorphic and on 
non-isomorphic references. They 
are partly analogues, partly signs. 
In principle, there is no difference 
in this respect between verbal and 
non-verbal languages. 
ARNHEIM, Rudolf. Visual 
Thinking. Faber & Faber, 1969. 
p.251. 
9. ECO, Umberto. A Theory 
of Semiotics. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1979. The social or psychosocial space of language may 
encompass the verbal and the imaginal. A visual language 
of signs and symbols, howsoever formed, is developed and 
operates within some framework of a grammar, a syntax, a 
semantics, a vocabulary, that is, it entails a semiosis.9 The 
construct of abstract graphic elements (point, line, square, 
circle, triangle, etc.), that of alphabetic, numeric or picto-
graphic characters, the diagrammatic analogue (pie chart, 
graph, histogram, bubble diagram, etc.), the iconography, 
and the systems of impressionistic, expressionistic and 
naturalistic pictorial representation all construct/present a 
range of ‘documentary’ forms that is continuous with the 
linguistic/communicative possibilities of material culture, 
ritual, gesture and speech.10
The dimensions that these documentary forms may 
have in common are of interest here. In design one can see 
the issue clearly. The products of the design process, 
including documentary evidence of the design programme 
and design ideology, are diverse in physical form - 
computer disks, technical drawings, manuscript and 
printed texts, 3-dimensional (and virtual) models. What 
they have in common is their relation to the object of 
design. This connection is cognitive and perceptual in that 
the relation between the document and the object of design 
may vary in cognitive style and in perceptual compass. 
This suggests that in the documentary space of design 
one constructs the interface between a naturalist simplic-
ity, a belief in the ‘substantial reality’ of the elements of 
signification and evocation, an argument about document-
tary form, and an ‘idealist transparency’, a belief that what 
is present to the mind is indeed present, an argument 
about documentary content.11 Therefore, as a minimum, 
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the dimensions of documentary space should allow a 
mapping of form and content (Figure 2.3.1.) 
content
form 
Figure 2.3.1 
  
Documentary space constructed by a generic dimension of form and 
one of content. 
  
In each dimension this mapping may either involve a 
‘taxonomy’, a differentiated range of possibilities, or a 
‘measure’, a scale, a differentiable continuum of values. 
In the case of documentary form, an approach 
concerned with the ‘measure’ of forms seems inappropri-
ate: it suggests a value system of marginal interest - 
literally, the size or scale of the documentary form - how 
many pages in a report, the area of drawings in a technical 
package, the amount of ink/pencil used, etc.! A taxonomy, 
on the other hand, can differentiate between the products 
of different kinds of skilled/communicative activity in the 
design context, i.e. the various types of written, drawn, 
three-dimensionally modelled, and electronically and 
audio-visually recorded products of the design process 
(Figure 2.3.2.) 
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Figure 2.3.2 
  
Differentiated range of possible generic outputs of skilled/ 
communicative activity. 
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In the case of documentary content, either approach 
seems possible. One might construct a taxonomy of content 
by making reference to broad categories of information in a 
design project, i.e. the conceptual, the programmatic, the 
contextual, the ideological and the contractual (Figure 2.3.3.) 
 
 
 
 
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
 
pr
og
ra
m
m
at
ic
 
co
nt
ex
tu
al
 
id
eo
lo
gi
ca
l 
co
nt
ra
ct
ua
l 
Figure 2.3.3 
  
Differentiated range of possible generic information categories. 
  
Equally one might construct a measure of the scope of the 
documentary content in relation to the maximum and 
minimum that may be ‘acquired’ in a given practical 
situation.12 At one extreme a document may refer to the 
design holistically and therefore have a global scope, and at 
the other extreme to the most specific aspect or the 
smallest detail that remains relevant, and therefore have a 
local scope (Figure 2.3.4.) 
12. ‘Acquired’ is used here in 
the ergonomic sense of ‘what 
may be located and attended to 
in a single act of perception.' 
There are no watertight compart- 
ments of detection, recognition 
and identification, but rather a 
continuum. 
 
 
detail global 
 
[OVERINGTON, Ian. Vision 
and Acquisition, Pentech Press, 
1976, p.2.]  
Figure 2.3.4 
  
Differentiable scale of possible scopes of documentary content. 
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2.4 Paradigmatic Space: ideology and philosophy 
Design Theory and Theory in Design  
As a design researcher the author takes on the role of theorist. 
This is a very different kind of statement to that which the 
designer as a reflective practitioner might make: as an agent 
of change the designer takes on the role o f auteur. 
In the former statement the implications are that some 
systematic study of or through design is involved with the 
intention of knowledge creation, that writing is an 
important productive activity and therefore that the possi-
bilities and limitations of language are of central concern, 
and perhaps that one literary genre or another is to be 
mastered, that in creating and forwarding knowledge the 
work must deal with epistemological issues and that this 
ultimately entails a philosophical position. 
In the latter statement the immediate implications are 
rather different: that some preparation for the productive 
actions of others is involved with the intention of changing 
a practical situation, that the subject is associated with a 
particular class of practitioners whose skills, knowledge, 
experience and standards of conduct conventionally match 
certain expectations in relation to a type of practical 
situation, that a central, nodal, in some sense, ‘crucial’ 
creative and communicative role is being claimed that 
involves the production of realizable plans. 
In the case of the researcher, theory is ultimately made 
explicit. In the case of the designer, theory tends to remain 
implicit. These conclusions may appear straightforward: 
their significance, however, is pivotal. The designer qua 
designer is not primarily involved with the language of 
sovereign  rationality,  the  language  of  theoretical  exposi- 
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tion, with a philosophical language. The language of which 
the designer makes most powerful use is an everyday 
language in the sense of exploiting the common narrative 
properties of the news story, biography, history, and 
fiction, the language of engaged experience, with an 
ideological language. What must be remembered, however, 
is that this linguistic performance is not in itself the most 
important aspect of the designer's communicative practice: 
it is merely the necessary supplement to a larger realm of 
visual communication and material culture. 
Feyerabend’s argument concerning the historical 
separability of the way a ‘scientific’ result is arrived at, 
which is “idiosyncratic and culture dependent”, from the 
result itself, which reflects an actuality that exists, always 
did exist and always will exist, he calls the ‘separability 
assumption’. Given that our methods of arriving at 
scientific results are not infallible, as evidenced by the 
constant improvement, revision and substitution of older 
findings by new ones, we constantly layer more reasonable 
beliefs over those that are less so. This idea, that only 
“entities postulated by reasonable beliefs can be separated 
from their history” he calls the ‘modified separability 
assumption’. However, what it is ‘reasonable’ to believe 
clearly changes. Given the various accounts of the pattern 
of scientific development/change,1 it seems reasonable to 
assume that what seems reasonable in 1996 will not so 
seem in 2996. Feyerabend’s conclusion is that: 
2. FEYERABEND, Paul. 
[1975] Against Method. Revised 
Ed. London: Verso, 1988. p.265.
 
POPPER, Karl R. [1963] 
Conjectures and Refutations: The 
Growth of Scientific Knowledge. 
Fifth edn. Routledge,1989. 
KUHN, Thomas S. The 
Structure of Scientific Revolut-
ions. 2nd Ed. (enlarged) Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1970. 
1. FOUCAULT, Michel. 
[1966] The Order of Things: An 
Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences. Tavistock, 1970. 
FOUCAULT, Michel. [1969] 
The Archaeology of Knowledge 
Trans. A M Sheridan Smith. 
Tavistock, 1972. 
Scientific entities (and for that matter, all entities) are projec- 
- tions and thus tied to the theory, the ideology, the culture 
that postulates and projects them.2
In effect he is arguing that ‘theory’ is not independent of 
its history either, that in any articulated position there is 
an ideological dimension that is culturally embedded. The 
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consequences of this ‘reasonable’ proposition are, of 
course, paradoxical and infinitely regressive if treated 
reflexively.3 However, at ‘face value’ the implications for 
the modelling of museum•design•organization (or any other 
formulation of Praxis for that matter) are that the social 
space (how-so-ever delineated) and the paradigmatic space 
may only be visualized as actively enfolded in each other. 
Reflexivity then simply implies a looping succession of 
enfoldings that progressively spiral the existent away from 
a simply mediated sense of ‘Being’ towards the distantly 
and multiply mediated ideas, possessions, memories, 
values, etc. of synthetic or inauthentic experience. 
Social and cultural activity 
which is underpinned by contingent values and beliefs 
is itself dependent upon 
social and cultural activity 
which is underpinned by contingent values and beliefs 
that are dependent upon 
social and cultural activity  
which ... 
Accepting the possibility of articulating successive layers 
of discourse upon discourse, a theory of ideologies in 
design philosophy would constitute an ‘opening up’ of the 
ideological space embedded in the ideological space of 
design. Be that as it may, what concerns us more immedi-
ately, in developing a model of museum design organiza-
tion, is the possibility of a study that visualizes the 
radically different spaces of ‘design’ that may be enfolded 
in each other to generate not only first and second level 
(descriptive and discursive) accounts of design philosophy 
(design ideology) but also of mediated (second level) 
accounts of the designed object, design programme (the 
object of design), and design process. 
3. LAWS0N, Hilary. Reflexiv-
ity: The Postmodern Predicament. 
London: Hutchinson, 1985. 
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Ideology 
In his introduction to ideology, Terry Eagleton points up 
some crucial questions about the nature of grounded action 
and of affective beliefs. Although, as he shows early in his 
discussion, there is no definition of ‘ideology’ to which all 
others may be reduced, the various notions of ideology 
nevertheless share certain attributes. With respect to the 
ontological and epistemological views of Althusser, for 
instance, there is no question that ideology is based on 
some kind of knowledge. What is ironic is that this 
knowledge is pragmatic, that is, subjective and experiential, 
rather than primarily cognitive and ideal.4 So far as 
questions of truth or falsity are concerned the basis of this 
knowledge is an ontological one. Certain events, condi-
tions, objects are ‘real’, that is, they have an ‘ontic’ truth 
which is realized in the subject's experience. To say that 
theory underpins every action, including every speech act, 
is therefore not strictly speaking a question of ideology. 
The implied rationality, or practical reason, of theory may 
be missing from the ideological stance. This insight then is 
of central interest in areas of human activity in which the 
subject pushes beyond the limits of practical rationality. 
The creative practitioner, in the present context specifi-
cally the designer, is engaged in practical situations in 
which the absence of adequate information precludes 
strictly analytical approaches to decision making and 
problem solving. An epistemological complexity precludes 
coherent practical reasoning in that the subject must act to 
change situations that are characterized by incompatible 
interests, understandings and qualities, and, even if these 
two factors could be overcome (which in the design context, 
by definition, they cannot), the shortage of time and/or the 
impossibility of comprehensive instrumental means forces 
4. Strictly speaking, for 
Althusser, theoretical knowledge 
is the only kind there is. See: 
EAGLETON, Terry. Ideology: an 
introduction. Verso, 1991, p.21. 
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the subject to act and to intervene without the comfort of 
a calculable probability of success and in the ‘knowledge’ 
that the actions/interventions undertaken will constitute a 
test of the subject's claim to be a designer. It is often said 
that ‘a designer is only as good as his or her last job’. 
Where cognitively based knowledge is the prime 
characteristic of a principled stance one may argue that 
‘theory’, of an essentially epistemological (philosophical) 
kind, is the product. Whether or not the subject makes 
explicit all or any of this philosophy in practice (in praxis) 
is not the central point. What is the point is that the 
working out of a coherent theoretical position is not 
‘implied’ in those kinds of practice that deal with radical 
indeterminacy and radical complexity. Neither is ‘theoreti-
cal’ underpinning ruled out: it is merely made contingent, 
that is, it becomes able to make only weak claims to truth. 
One may say then that when the creative practitioner, the 
designer, speaks what comes out may be ‘philosophical’ but 
must be ‘ideological’. 
and the development of interpre-
tive approaches in the work of 
Jerome BRUNER (cognitive psy-
chology); Donald McCLOSKEY 
(economics); Clifford GEERTZ 
(anthropology); and Richard H 
BROWN, Bruno LATOUR, 
Michael MULKAY, and Sharon 
TRAVEEK (sociology). 
LYOTARD, Jean-François. 
[1979] The Postmodern Con-
dition: A Report on Knowledge. 
Trans. Geoff Bennington & 
Brian Massumi. Manchester 
University Press, 1984. 
Czarniawska-Joerges has sum-
marized the case for researchers 
to adopt narrative forms in 
transmitting knowledge by argu-
ing that, in the humanities and 
the social sciences in particular, 
an adequate legitimizing move 
has already been made. The 
evidence for this includes: 
5. CZARNIAWSKA-JOERGES, 
B. “Narration or Science? 
Collapsing the Division in 
Organization Studies”, Organiz-
ation, 2:1, Sage, 1995, pp.11-33. 
Irony and space 
Such statements as designers make may be characterised as 
(1) making ontological propositions, both through the design 
itself in the form of drawings, models, specifications, etc., 
which are presented together to communicate the realiz-
ability of a product, and through forms of speech which 
seek to make coherent, reinforce and add ‘invisible’ 
dimensions of psycho-social and physical actuality to the 
design, and (2) representing a ‘world view’, an embodied 
set of values and beliefs about the nature of physical, social 
and mental ‘reality’.  The ironic quality of such world 
views  is  that they  invariably take  a  narrative  form.5  The 
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narrative form of design presentation, of the design 
programme, of designers’ discourse in general, is ‘ironic’ in 
the sense that the values and beliefs embedded in what is 
said may often be contrary to those implicit in the norma-
tivity of the narrative transmission of knowledge. There-
fore one must be clear about the source of this ironic 
potential: it is spatial. 
In design the ideological/philosophical space of values 
and beliefs, however it is constructed or visualized, may be 
deferred, distorted and distanced and thereby enfolded 
into other quite distinctive and incommensurable spaces. 
The design product, as a physical entity, has extension in 
the dimensions of physical space and in time. In the space-
time continuum its changing position, relative to other 
objects and to the observer, is its ‘ontic’ track - the 
actuality of the product. The design programme, as an 
heterogeneous body of documentary information, a mass 
of verbal, visual and material ‘texts’, a complex of ‘signs’ in 
the semiological sense, has both semantic and symbolic 
scope in a generic space of language. In this semiotic space 
the processes of signification and interpretation to which 
the ‘document’ is subjected constitute the ontological trace 
of the design. The design process, as a nexus of cognitive, 
practical and communicative activities, occupies a complex 
psycho-social space in which states of consciousness, 
affective behaviours, and social and material relations 
combine to construct a socially mediated view of design. In 
this psycho-social space complex patterns of interactivity 
constitute the design. 
In the case of a documentary design product, such as a 
set of technical drawings and written specifications, the 
form and the content are physical and linguistic respec-
tively, that is, they are logically unconnected. The space-
time continuum in which the physical object is constructed 
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and the semiotic or narrative space in which the 
‘document’ is constructed are incommensurable: they have 
no common dimensionality in which commensuration could 
be effected. This lack of logical connection is what permits 
irony - stable contradiction where we might reasonably 
expect coherent relation. Contradiction, however, implies 
speech and a range of opposing terms within a coherent 
language. This possibility of uncovering the irony is 
created in the process of reflecting on features and events 
in each of the other characteristic spaces of design in a 
common space of values and beliefs, of philosophy. A 
symmetrical relation thus emerges between the ideological 
and the philosophical. Theorising, an overtly epistemologi-
cal and philosophical activity, engages in a process of 
abstracting the general from the particular, rules about 
what counts as knowledge from the myriad specific cases 
that are known. This is the process of deferring, distorting 
and distancing particular physical, social, or mental 
instances and of assimilating such qualities as emerge from 
them in a single ‘place’ within the reflective space of 
philosophy. This describes the effect of ‘enfolding’ one 
space in another. In theoretical work a variety of physical, 
social, mental and more exotic spaces are enfolded in philo-
sophical space. In design the effect is reversed: any partic-
ular set of values and beliefs are deferred, distorted and 
distanced in the process of constructing the products, 
programme and process of a design. In physical space the 
track of the designed object is likely to make concrete 
different values and beliefs, than those that are embedded 
in the narrative, the semiotic trace, of a design document. 
And the values and beliefs implicit in a design process are 
likely to be different again as the dynamics of social inter-
activity, with all of the implications this has for emotional, 
practical, and rational effects on behaviour, construct the 
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cultural and political connotations of each specific act. The 
space of ideology, therefore, is enfolded in the physical, 
social and mental spaces in which design is constructed. 
The proposition is that an active space of values and 
beliefs, one in which work is being done, can be labelled 
the space of philosophy. But an enfolded space of values 
and beliefs, one which is thus inactive, can be labelled the 
space of ideology. The difference between the two spatial 
conditions ‘active’ and ‘inactive’ is one which can be 
accounted for by the constant dimension required for the 
activation of space: linear time. 
Mapping ideology/philosophy 
A number of different schemes for mapping the space of 
ideology/philosophy have been proposed in recent times 
by social and organization theorists. Each of these schemes 
has attempted to identify a set of paradigms, each para-
digm amounting to an exclusive realm of methodology, a 
realm of applied values and beliefs incommensurable with 
all others. Wearing distinctly pluralist shades Hassard sum-
marizes these 
 
8. HASSARD,1993. p.50. 
COHEN, P. Modern Social 
Theory. Heinemann, 1968.  
GOULDNER, A W. “Reciprocity 
and Autonomy in Functional 
Theory”, in GROSS, L. (Ed.) 
Symposium on Social Theory, 
New York: Row Peterson, 1959. 
ALLEN, V L. Social Analysis: a 
Marxist Critique and Alternative. 
Longmans, 1975. 
BUCKLEY, W. “Social 
Stratification and the Functional 
Theory of Differentiation”, 
American Sociological Review, 
23: pp.369-75. 
7. PARSONS, T. The Social 
System, Chicago: Free Press, 
1951. and “An Outline of the 
Social System”, in PARSONS, T. 
Theories of Society, New York: 
Free Press, 1965. 
 
6. HASSARD, John Sociology 
and Organization Theory. 
Cambridge University Press, 
1993. p.49. 
...attempts to define the theory communities of social and 
organi - zation theory as paradigm structures.6
The development of paradigm models was stimulated by 
the criticism of ‘orthodox’ functionalism particularly in the 
work of Parsons, Buckley, Cohen, Gouldner and Allen.7
The main substantive criticism is that, in emphasizing equilib-
rium, integration and interdependence, functionalism fails to 
take account of two basic elements of social action - change 
and conflict.8
Parsons argues that ‘change’ is the dynamics of response to  
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external and internal factors – “movements in the central 
value system” of the system's environment and “tensions 
or strains in the system itself” respectively.9 Parsons 
therefore modifies the older ‘static’ notion of equilibrium 
into a ‘dynamic’ one, but equilibrium remains the goal. He 
does not account for the idea that "change may be driven 
by conflict and contradiction rather than by the incorpora-
tion of expressions of dissent".10 He does not tell us 
why particular organizations, directed as they are towards 
certain goals, arise at particular times and in particular 
places.11
or why “deviant organizations emerge and develop”.12 And 
in his structural functionalism there is a failure to realize 
that “organizations can survive and even flourish without a 
common value-orientation among their members”.13 The 
inevitability of stratification and the emphasis on “harmo-
nious relations between system parts” have also been criti-
cized by Buckley and Cohen as ignoring the operation of 
privilege and equal importance of “the superordinate and 
subordinate” in complex productive systems.14
The criticism of generic social systems theory continu-
ous with that of functionalism extends the theme. Gouldner 
17. HASSARD attributes this 
to ALLEN, 1975. 
 
16. ibid. p.54. 
 
14. ibid. pp.52-3. 
 
15. ibid. p.53. 
 
13. ibid. 
 
12. ibid. p.52. 
 
 
11. ibid. 
10. ibid. 
not only highlights variations in degrees of interdependence 
[between subsystems], but also the fact that some ... can 
survive even if separated from others.15
Autonomy thus becomes a live issue as does the process of 
generating and reproducing an organization's goal.16 And 
one conclusion of this line of thought is that neither an 
organization’s goals nor its boundaries may be taken as 
given - that the generic systems approach fails to recognize 
that “there is no logic in [the] ...arbitrary division” of 
problem areas into independent systems.17
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Implicit in these criticisms of functionalism and generic 
social systems theory is the possibility of alternative models 
and methodologies that approach the whole problem of 
social organization from radically different perspectives. 
Kuhn has suggested that science does not ‘progress’ as 
such but rather it suffers periodic intellectual upheavals in 
which one conceptual world view is replaced by another - 
the so-called ‘paradigm shift’. The mapping of conceptual 
world views in terms of an abstract paradigmatic space is 
therefore something those social/organization theorists 
taking up Kuhn's idea have had to address. 
Paradigm Models 
20. GOULDNER, A W. The 
Coming Crisis of Western 
Sociology. Heinemann, 1970. 
(See: HASSARD, 1993, p.57.) 
 
19. See Appendix A.1 Type A. 
 
See: JACKSON, N. & P. 
CARTER “In Defence of 
Paradigm Incommensurability”, 
School of Management 
Working Paper HUSM/PC/2, 
University of Hull. 
18. Jackson and Carter have 
suggested that arguably the 
Kuhnian ‘normal’ and ‘revolu-
tionary’ sciences are both func-
tional. I am not sure that this is 
the case, rather, I suggest that 
there is a kind of paramnesis 
involved in the Kuhnian scheme: 
in the new paradigm a substi-
tute for the old is invented, one 
which gives the passing comfort 
of apparent continuity as well as 
an apparent confirmation of the 
superiority of the new, but, the 
original remains unrecovered: in 
the terms of the new paradigm 
it remains unrecoverable. 
Implicit in the nation of ‘paradigm’ is that the upheaval 
overturns and replaces a prior world view, that the 
outgoing and incoming world views are, at root, different 
in kind and in construction and that the new cannot be 
reduced to the old by any means - narrative or analytic.18 
Radical incommensurability immediately gives a clue as to 
the expected character of a paradigmatic space of 
ideology/philosophy: every dimension constructive of 
paradigmatic space must present a limited and differenti-
ated range of possibilities.19 Any other type of dimension 
will not add any defining possibility of paradigms, it will 
simply add depth to existing paradigmatic regions. 
Gouldner, like most other contemporaries, focussed 
on methodologies.20 As a defining dimension, however, the 
problem is that, although differentiated, the range of possi-
bilities is not limited and some possibilities may be divided 
or merged almost at will. Although ‘methodology’ implies 
a theoretical base, the difference between one practice and 
another may be in its preferences as to technique, 
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procedure, or exposition rather than in their underlying 
conceptual world view. 
Atkinson suggested ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ approaches to 
sociology as a defining dimension.21 Unfortunately this 
leads to a false dichotomy particularly in modernism where 
the tensions between the individual and the collective, the 
private and the communal, generate its defining dialectic 
character - the ‘movement’. Modernism is not the conflict 
of paradigms, rather it is the paradigm of conflict and as 
such it holds a specific if rather special place in any meta-
physical scheme. 
Friedrichs attempted a more adequate Kuhnian model 
in terms of producing a differentiated space.' He used two 
orders of two paradigms each. 
First-order paradigms referred to the images sociologists held 
of themselves ... Second-order paradigms concerned the image 
they held of the subject matter.23
In first-order paradigms an opposed pair (or mutually 
opposed set) of defining characters is posited. To describe 
pre- and post-World War II sociologists he defined two 
paradigms: sociologist-as-priest “...committed to value-free 
analysis of social phenomena” and sociologist-as-prophet 
“...social critic and agent of social change.” The problem 
with Friedrichs' scheme is that it only works as a continu-
ous unfolding of second-order paradigms from within those 
of the first order. As it becomes clear that any scheme of 
`orders' implies the possibility of commensuration, at least 
in the limited sense of a differentiation within, this is a 
structural fault that leads to the breakdown or corruption 
of the paradigm concept. 
 
26. HASSARD. 1993. p..59 
25. DENISOFF, R. et al 
Theories and Paradigms in 
Contemporary Sociology. New 
York: Peacock, 1974. (See: 
HAS-SARD, 1993, p.59.) 
 
22. FRIEDRICHS, R. A 
Sociology of Sociology. New 
York: Free Press, 1970. (See: 
HASSARD; 1993, pp.57-8.) 
 
23. HASSARD, 1993, p.58 
 
24. ibid. 
21. ATKINSON, D. Orthodox 
Consensus and Radical 
Alternative. Heinemann, 1972. 
(see: HASSARD, 1993, p.57.) 
 
Denisoff et al 25 suggested 
five main paradigm rivals in sociology ...functionalism, 
conflict theory, micro-sociology, nominalism-voluntarism 
and social evolutionism.26
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Whilst unequivocal this scheme is reached via the ‘trick’ of 
re(de)fining the notion of paradigm in such a way as to 
upset its holistic character. As a “belief matrix” it becomes 
synthetic and, therefore, by implication composed of 
“paradigmatic assumptions” of a prior order: we return to 
the problem of Friedrichs' scheme. 28. BURRELL, Gibson. & 
Gareth MORGAN. Sociological 
Paradigms and Organisational 
Analysis. Heinemann Educa-
tional Books, 1979.  The 
purpose in this book is broader 
than the title suggests. It pro-
vides a “way of seeing” the philo-
sophical space associated with 
the various social theories and 
practices. And although I am 
not suggesting that “social 
theory/practice” is necessarily 
an adequate way of referring to 
design, there is certainly a large 
overlap and it seems reasonable 
to start with a view that at least 
promises to connect design with 
other theories and practices. 
 
29. PINDER, C. & V BOUR-
GEOIS. “Borrowing and the 
Effectiveness of Administrative 
Science”. Working paper No. 
848, University of British 
Columbia, 1982. quoted in 
HASSARD, 1993, pp.68. 
 
30. Hassard misrepresents at 
least one of the criticisms level-
led at Burrell and Morgan. 
Silverman's work on the action 
frame of reference could be better 
located within the interpretive 
paradigm, despite the arguments 
Burrell and Morgan make for the 
metatheoretical assumptions 
being characteristic of the subjec - 
tivist region of the functionalist 
paradigm. [p.68. my emphasis] 
In Burrell and Morgan's scheme 
27. EFFRAT, A. “Power to the 
Paradigms” in EFFRAT, A. 
(ed.) Perspectives in Political 
Sociology. New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1973. (See: HASSARD, 
1993, pp.59-60.) 
 
Ultimately, if the problem of ‘orders’ is to be circum-
vented, an approach must be taken that plots ‘philosophi-
cal’ indices that are constitutive of a possibility and that 
resist further reduction. Even Effrat's resort to the two-
dimensional, based on level of analysis (micro-macro) and 
substantive-component-emphasized (material, affective, 
interactional, and ideal/symbolic), breaks down at the 
point at which defined paradigmatic regions are seen to 
overlap and to be inexhaustive.27
The best attempt, that starts from what I would call a 
notion of ‘irreducible philosophical indices’, appears to be 
that of Burrell and Morgan.28 Although criticized for 
misappropriating the philosophical question of ontology 
by taking it to imply beliefs about the nature of the 
existence of an external social world rather than “the study 
of existence in general, independent of any particular 
existing things”,29 Burrell and Morgan define a clear-cut 
scheme based on independent pairs of indices in which the 
value of paradigm as location is maximized.30
The Burrell and Morgan scheme is a two-dimensional 
‘map’ of sociological paradigms. Each dimension derives 
from a set of metatheoretical assumptions. The first, the 
subjectivism-objectivism dimension, concerns assumptions 
about the nature of social science (Figure 2.4.1), the 
second, the regulation-radical change dimension, concerns 
assumptions about the nature of society (Figure 2.4.2.) 
 
 111 
Nominalism 
Anti-positivism 
Voluntarism 
Ideographic 
ontology 
epistemology 
human nature 
methodology 
Realism 
Positivism 
Determinism 
Nomothetic 
The SUBJECTIVIST 
approach to social 
science 
The OBJECTIVIST 
approach to social 
science 
31. Notes 
* By ‘consensus’ we mean 
voluntary and ‘spontaneous’ 
agreement of opinion. 
† The term ‘need satisfaction’ is 
used to refer to the focus upon satis-
faction of individual or system 
needs. The sociology of regulat-
ion tends to presume that various 
social characteristics can be expl-
ained in relation to these needs... 
BURRELL & MORGAN, 
1979, p.18. 
the functionalist paradigm is 
defined by an objectivist stance 
in the subjectivism-objectivism 
dimension. Although in their 
analysis Silverman's work, and 
the use of the action frame of 
reference in general, may 
address questions of the subjec-
tive they do so in a way that 
seeks objective knowledge about 
such things. The belief underly-
ing the approach is that subjec-
tive orientations exist and can 
be studied, described, explained 
by an objective researcher. 
Burrell and Morgan actually 
place Silverman and the action 
frame of reference at the “subjec-
tive boundary of the paradigm” 
[p.122.] for the above reasons. 
The position of the Hermeneutic 
tradition at the objective bound-
ary of the interpretive paradigm 
and that of the action frame of 
reference at the subjective 
boundary of the functionalist 
paradigm doss not in any way 
conflate the two perspectives: 
they remain subjectivist and 
objectivist respectively and, 
therefore, part of incommensu-
rable paradigms whose only 
commonality is that of a regula-
tory orientation. 
 
 
Figure 2.4.1 
  
“A scheme far analysing assumptions about the nature of social 
science.” From Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.3. 
  
The sociology of REGULATION The sociology of RADICAL CHANGE  
is concerned with  is concerned with 
 
(a) The status quo (a) Radical change  
(b) Social order (b) Structural conflict  
(c)  Consensus* (c) Modes of domination  
(d) Social integration and cohesion (d) Contradiction  
(e)  Solidarity (e) Emancipation  
(f) Need satisfaction+ (f) Deprivation  
(g)  Actuality (g) Potentiality 
  
Figure 2.4.2 
  
Table showing the seven elements that construct “ideal-typical 
formulations” of the notions of ‘regulation’ and ‘radical change’. From 
Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.18. ( * † Both of these elements have 
qualifying notes in the original.)31
  
In so far as museum•design•organization is the object and 
the arena of a praxis which is socially defined - it is socially 
constructed, it forms a system which is in large part social, 
it relates a particular experience to the social, its 
motivation is visionary in respect of social change - such a 
paradigmatic scheme applies directly. However, there is 
the broader implication that any form of praxis reveals its 
location in such a space simply by expressing its 
underlying metatheoretical assumptions.  Furthermore,  
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there is the implication that any form of praxis that is open 
to the variety of metatheoretical assumptions constructs 
an identical paradigmatic space. In the museum design 
organization context specific practices, such as collection 
documentation and conservation, tend to follow a con-
ventional set of theoretical beliefs and, therefore, to occ-
upy relatively stable locations in paradigmatic space. All 
museum practice used to be of this sort - a museography 
bound into a classically functionalist paradigm - and to 
develop largely on the basis of this received wisdom. 
Received Wisdoms 
Once upon a time it would have been relatively straightfor-
ward to frame a theoretical project of this sort by rational-
izing in the area of philosophical discourse by which the 
discipline was contingently defined. This possibility has 
been effectively eliminated by a combination of (1) the 
development of post-philosophical discourses, (2) the 
ambiguous nature of the design discipline, and (3) the late 
development of design discourses and the new museology 
which are both immediately conditioned by postmodern 
thought. Most practices - design amongst them - shift their 
theoretical ground depending upon the individual practi-
tioner, the specific organizational context, the influence of 
the wider environment and/or on the dynamics of specific 
projects and social interactions. 
32. RORTY, Richard. [1982] 
Consequences of Pragmatism. 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991. 
p.xiv-xv. 
... “philosophy” can mean simply 
what Sellars calls “an attempt to 
see how things, in the broadest 
possible sense of the term, hang 
together, in the broadest possible 
sense of the term”... But the word 
can also denote something more 
specialized, and very dubious 
indeed ... it can mean following 
Plato’s and Kant’s lead, asking 
questions about the nature of cer-
tain normative notions (e.g., 
“truth,” “rationality,” “goodness”) 
in the hope of better obeying such 
norms. I shall capitalize the term 
“philosophy” when used in this 
second sense. 
 
33. BURRELL & MORGAN, 
1979. pp.1-37. 
In the absence of any safe-haven “Philosophy” this 
project thus becomes substantially philosophical.32 This is 
not to say that there is nothing to be learned by a study of 
Philosophy: knowing where one is coming from is part of 
knowing that one is going somewhere. So a map is useful 
and, for the reasons outlined above, the one I have used is 
that developed by Burrell and Morgan.33 (Figure 2.4.3.) 
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Figure 2.4.3 
  
BURRELL & MORGAN's map of sociological paradigms. 
  
However, having found ones way around, a map becomes 
essentially redundant unless one’s purpose is, not simply 
to explore Philosophy but, to build something - to do some 
philosophy - then what one needs is a tool box.34 Before 
looking at the contents of the tool box I intend to use, it is 
necessary first to comment on how a multiplication of 
discourses reflects a postmodern condition in design, in 
science and, in general, in knowledge. 
A Plurality of Discourses 
Since the earliest Greek philosophers, the philosophical 
enterprise has concerned itself with determining the truth 
of beliefs about the nature of the universe and of the world 
of human affairs.35 This has generated the various 
discourses of ethics, politics, metaphysics, epistemology, 
ontology, and logic, and latterly of language itself. For each 
discourse  there  is  a [speech] context  in  which  it  makes  
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Radical Humanism RADICAL CHANGE Radical Structruralism
Interpretive Theory REGULATION Functionalist Theory
Anarchic Individualism 
Existentialism 
Critical Theory 
Phenomenology 
Hermeneutics 
Ethnography 
Social Ecology 
Marxist Praxiology 
Social Construction Theory 34. RORTY, Richard. 
Contingency, Irony, and Solid-
arity. Cambridge University 
Press, 1989. In considering the 
contingency of language Rorty 
suggests, in good pragmatist 
form, that philosophy should 
involve asking questions of the 
type: 
“Does our use of these words 
get in the way of our use of 
those other words?” This is a 
question about whether our use 
of tools is inefficient, not a 
question about whether our 
beliefs are contradictory. 
 
35. Thales of Miletus (alive in 
585BC) is credited as “The first 
Greek enquirer into the nature 
of things as a whole.” FLEW, 
Antony. (Consultant ed.) A 
Dictionary of Philosophy. Pan 
Books, 1979. p.351. Although, 
in the Theogony (written about 
700BC) Hesiod prefigures 
Thales efforts in one respect at 
least, “the gods and the universe 
were described by him as a mat-
ter of private interest.” FRANK-
FORT, Henri. et al. Before 
Philosophy. (First published as 
The Intellectual Adventure of 
Ancient Man. University of 
Chicago, 1946.) Pelican, 1949. 
pp.249-50. 
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some sense, and by implication, other [speech] contexts in 
which it makes little sense. For example, we can use a 
Newtonian understanding of physics to help us cope with 
almost all everyday occurrences of material interactions. 
The local human scale of observable phenomena - the ones 
that we are able, or feel able, to mechanically interfere with 
or control - all appear to coincide with the predictions of 
Newtonian physics. However, phenomena related to the 
subatomic and the near-light-speed, which are beyond our 
powers of direct observation, fail to follow the predictions 
of Newtonian mechanics. To help us to cope with these we 
must use a different understanding - Einsteinian relativity. 
To any snooker player, who cares to study the matter, 
Newton provides good explanation of how the balls will 
react and Einstein, with his completely counter-intuitive 
explanations, just confuses the issues. Equally, to any 
astronomer Einstein provides good predictions for time-
space phenomena which Newton, with his mechanical view 
of the universe, makes look impossible. 
There are many forms of received wisdom. Just as 
within Science there are distinct discourses that appear to 
be at variance with, or operate on different levels to, each 
other, in Philosophy also there is a multiplicity of contra-
dictory discourses that nevertheless help us to cope in 
different ways and in different contexts. It is uncommon 
to make use of more than a few such discourses which, in 
Philosophy, are normally worked through to achieve, as far 
as is possible, consistency and coherence. However, we are 
all prone to making strong claims to truth for some 
bundles of these discourses, and as we have seen, this can 
be a big mistake. Not only can contradictory discourses be 
equally effective in different contexts, but some (some 
would say, ultimately all) discourses contain within them 
irreducible contradictions or paradoxes that make their use 
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in any context ironic, contingent and most likely 
collusive.36 In the case of linguistic philosophy, which is at 
the level of a discourse on discourses, the problem of 
reflexivity - having to apply its own methods or rules of 
investigation to itself - quickly results in a disintegration 
of all universal foundations. Put most simply, statements 
of the form “all generalizations are false” abound.37 For 
example: 
Previous arguments asserting the context-dependent character 
of our beliefs or our observations are no longer so threatening 
since the theory of that context-dependence turns out to be 
context-free. And if that theory is context-free then others can 
be also.38
But, it turns out that our beliefs and our observations are 
context dependent after all. And we can also see that, in 
pronouncing on different discourses, the difference between 
“it works because it’s true” and “it's true because it works” 
is purely conventional.39 The rule seems to be: the weaker 
the claim to truth, the less problem we have in accepting 
each of these studies as viable and valuable - the stronger 
the claim to truth the greater our difficulties become, and 
of course, the question of whether this statement is itself 
making a strong or a weak claim to truth stands as further 
evidence of unavoidable reflexivity. 
Every systematic knowledge has been built-up only to 
be partially, sometimes largely, demolished by subsequent 
and often incommensurable systematic knowledges. 
Although Newton’s laws may not be the latest word in 
physics, they are, as we have seen, still useful. We live 
amongst the ruins of the past and the half-built edifices of 
the future, and not contentedly within the houses of the 
present. Our reality is a landscape full of variety and 
change. We do not, never have and almost certainly never 
will, live in one single and perfect house. Which is the 
same as saying that we are not, never have been and 
 
38. LAWSON, Hilary. Reflexiv-
ity: The Post-modern Predicament. 
London: Hutchinson, 1985. p.20. 
 
39. RORTY, [1982) p.xxix. 
36. RORTY,1989, op cit. 
 
37. LONGMAN DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE, Longman, 1984. 
p.1064. See: Paradox 2b. 
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probably never will be, one single and perfect kind of 
‘Being in the world’.40 The rationalist-empiricist and the 
relativist-idealist worlds turn together, recalling the 
Heraclitian thesis that the universe is an intelligible whole 
which is a perpetual flux of change marked by the continu-
ous transition of everything into its opposite.41
Take, for example, Jonathan Miller’s conclusion from 
the end of his television series Madness, where he seems to 
concur with the view that though there have been, and 
should continue to be, attempts to understand and deal 
with the human condition, the world we live in is a many 
faceted place with no certain true reflection of our own, or 
of any other, nature in any of its mirror-surfaces whether 
they be called philosophy, science, art, religion, morals or 
intuition. He also entreats us to act as though this multi-
valent uncertainty is likely to remain the way things are; 
we should act with as full a knowledge as we can but also 
always in the knowledge that we have no fundamental 
knowledge at all. 
41. FRANKFORT, Henri. op. 
cit. pp.257-8. 
 
42. MILLER, Jonathan. Madness, 
final part. BBC Television, 1991. 
 
43. POPKIN. Richard H. & 
Avrum Stroll. Philosophy Made 
Simple. W. H. Allan, 1969. p.xiv. 
40. HEIDEGGER, Martin. 
Being and Time. Trans. John 
Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962. 
According to Heidegger exis-
tence is a matter which can only 
be understood through pheno-
menological investigation of our 
participation and involvement in 
the world, and the goal of such 
understanding is the realization 
of an ‘authentic’ self, a self char-
acterized by identity, autonomy, 
care and openness to future 
possibility. 
 
Meanwhile, and by meanwhile I mean forever, being human, 
what ever that is, is something we have to survive, as there is 
no prospect of rescue, and since madness and misery seem to 
be an inescapable 'risk' of having our particular sort of 
constitution, the measures which we take to deal with it had 
better take account o f the fact that we don't, and perhaps 
never will, know exactly what sort of thing we are.42
Given the 2500-year time span of the philosophical enter-
prise and the vast space of knowledges about “the nature 
of the universe and of the world of human affairs” it has 
opened up,43 it may be surprising to find that certain rather 
important human traits have not been much of a concern 
to philosophers and therefore that certain practices have a 
poor theoretical literature. 
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The Absence of a Discourse 
Few philosophers have mentioned design.44 Creative 
engagement with the material of the world in the pursuit 
of desirable change is a topic which has not interested 
many, other than in respect of an account of practical 
rationality and value judgement.45 Philosophical interest in 
art has a history which is as long as that of philosophy 
itself. But even here the aspects deemed to be proper to 
philosophical investigation, with rare exceptions, have not 
included all of those known in practice. Philosophers have 
devoted great efforts to the aesthetic dimension of artistic 
endeavour, and to that of practical reasoning, but little or 
none to the crucial dimension of practical creative activity. 
In considering the subject's thinking about creative 
activity, philosophers have tended, thereby, to limit them-
selves to fields in which language dominates. This has 
been, if you like, the criterion by which Philosophy has 
always judged itself; Philosophy uses the spoken and 
written word exclusively, even if the abstract symbolic 
language of logic is imposed upon some kinds of analytic 
philosophizing, and therefore can only effectively deal 
with what falls within the scope of such language.46 It is no 
surprise, therefore, that, in not being obviously dominated 
by linguistic operations, practical creative activity has been 
neglected by Philosophy. To be aggressive about this, one 
could suggest that the ideology of Philosophy is to sub-
sume all understanding under linguistic formulations. And 
therefore that Philosophy presumes that what is not so 
formulated cannot be understood. 
44. Clearly I am not including 
that quite different idea of 
Design invoked in the teleologi-
cal argument for the existence of 
God, an idea which does a dis-
service to the study of design by 
focussing our attention on the 
evidence appearances and end 
products provide of “contriv-
ance” and fixed patterns of order. 
 
45. A great number of defini-
tions of design have been pro-
posed. The more encompassing 
ones are generally process ori-
ented and refer to a fundamen-
tal human capability, e.g.: 
Everyone designs who devises 
courses of action aimed at chang-
ing existing situations into pre-
ferred ones. [Herbert Simon 
quoted in MARGOLIN, Victor. 
Design Discourse: History – 
Theory – Criticism. University 
of Chicago Press, 1989. p.3.] 
 
46. The exceptions are works 
such as: HARRIS0N, Andrew. 
Making & Thinking: A Study of 
Intelligent Activities. Harvester 
Press, 1978. And; EHREN-
ZWEIG, Anton. The Hidden 
Order of Art. Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1967. 
This negativity might seem to be the worst possible 
finding in a thesis that is itself borne out of a substantially 
philosophical project. However, the limitations of the past 
are as much to do with historical contingencies - social 
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norms and professional taboos or incapacities - as with any 
presupposed boundaries in philosophy per se. And it is one 
of my contentions that the current condition - historically, 
socially and professionally - of the milieu in which individ-
uals, such as myself, find themselves is one in which 
philosophy is suitably transformed.47
The philosophy which comes after Philosophy has its 
roots in the work of those philosophers who in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries had the most thoroughgoing 
doubts and engaged most earnestly with the nihilistic 
tendency towards Philosophy - Neitzsche and Wittgenstein.  
In the sense that Neitzsche “conceives reality as a kind 
of ineffable flux that can be trapped within the categorical 
net of language only at the expense of fatal distortion” he 
points to the nagging doubts about the functional aspects 
of human communicativity with which Wittgenstein so 
perilously struggled.48 Wittgenstein admits in the Tractatus, 
the major work of his early career, that the propositions 
upon which it is based have him 
...trying to say what can only be shown, to stand outside 
language and the world and describe the relationship between 
them ... Hence what he says is strictly 'nonsensical' ...49
Where interdisciplinary academics and practitioners, 
amongst whom I must include myself, now find themselves 
is thus in the midst of an intellectual upheaval, a burgeon-
ing field of world views, a plurality of engaged ventures in 
which theory and practice are deliberately and variously 
mixed, fused, or collapsed into each other. As such we find 
ourselves competing, or struggling not to compete, in a 
consumerist environment in which information and know-
ledges are the most volatile and valuable of commodities. 
In Theodor Adorno's words: “No theory today escapes the 
marketplace”.50 We must also reconsider what has been 
47. BAYNES, Kenneth., James 
Bohman & Thomas McCarthy. 
(eds.) After Philosophy: End or 
Transformation? MIT Press, 
1987. 
 
48. FLEW, Antony. (Consultant 
ed.) A Dictionary of Philosophy. 
Pan Books, 1979. p.249. 
 
49 ibid. pp.375-6. 
 
50. ADORNO, Theodor. [1966] 
Negative Dialectics. Trans. E. B. 
Ashton. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1973. p.4. 
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52. For example: 
AGNEW, Kenneth. “The 
Spitfire: Legend or History? An 
Argument for a New Research 
Culture in Design”. Journal of 
Design History, 6:2, pp.121-30. 
FRAYLING, C. “Artefacts 
Rather than Arty Facts”. The 
Times Higher Education 
Supplement, 10 May 1994. 
and papers by BILLETT, E H., 
CLIPSON, C., DAVIES 
COOPER, R., and PRESS, M. 
in Co-Design, 01-02-03:95. 
 
53. In Fine Art, a subject repre-
sented also in a few of the older 
universities, the principle had 
been  long  established  that  the 
51. The pattern of art and 
design education in Britain had 
been dominated by the indepen-
dent Regional Colleges of Art 
originally founded during the 
late-19th and early-20th cen-
turies. In the 1960s these had 
tended to amalgamate with 
independent regional colleges, 
associated with other areas of 
vocational training, to form 
Colleges of Higher Education or, 
if broad enough in their result-
ing curricula and large enough 
in student numbers, Polytech-
nics. Until the Higher Educa-
tion Act of 1992 Polytechnics 
and Colleges of Higher 
Education remained the respon-
sibility of Local Education 
Authorities. After incorporation 
they found themselves on the 
same legal and financial footing 
as the Universities and the 
Government soon agreed, sub-
ject to their meeting certain cri-
teria including proportion of 
degree-level work and full-time 
student numbers, to allow those 
institutions that wished to do so 
to change their names to include 
the University title. 
 
said about language both in philosophy and in practical 
arenas to see how some, previously unperceived, opportu-
nity has arisen to account for practices such as design. 
In Britain, the former Polytechnics adopted the univer-
sity title in 1993 and, as a result, a largely separate 
academic tradition in the field of art and design was 
suddenly brought into the mainstream of higher 
education.51 This has had immediate consequences, partic-
ularly in the area of research. Some research outcomes in 
art and design are similar in format and purpose to those 
of other areas of academic endeavour. However, most 
practitioners would argue that the most important ones are 
quite distinctive.52 It comes down to this question of 
language - the domination of academic endeavour by the 
requirement for exposition, discourse, and critical thought 
to be expressed in words. In the past, in research-oriented 
art and design practice exposition, discourse, and critical 
thought have been expressed primarily in practical works, 
that is, the substance of the research has been embodied in 
the products of the creative process, even if supported by 
spoken and/or written adthesis.53 In the postmodern 
doubts and deconstructivist tendencies that have found 
expression in recent art and design, we have evidence that 
broader interdisciplinary approaches to practice are 
emerging.54 They borrow ideas from an ever wider range of 
disciplines in the quest to develop effective design and to 
advance persuasive rationale. 
Whereas in high modernism it was sufficient to 
express the relatively coherent ideas of minimal form, pure 
function, economy of materials, absence of decoration, 
technical innovation, universal appeal, etc. in postmod-
ernism expression involves layering some or all of these 
with incommensurable ideas such as complexity, opacity, 
contradiction, historical reference, fashion image, surplus 
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54. There are a few examples of 
practicing designers and archi-
tects who have always had an 
ambivalent relationship to pro-
fessional norms in respect of 
the place of research in practice. 
Ettore Sottsass has made a 
career out of departing from the 
requirement for normatively 
grounded rationale. Instead, he 
offers his work as a designer as 
‘a series of efforts in research’ 
which, with the help of his 
writer partner, Barbara 
Raddicci, generate their own 
peculiarly innovative and per-
suasive text. 
Frank Duffy, in contrast, 
stepped out of his professional 
milieu as an architect to com-
plete a social science doctorate 
only to assimilate and subsume 
a continuing research practice 
wholly within the frame of pro- 
work of staff displayed and cata-
logued in public exhibitions, par-
ticularly if accompanied by an 
exposition of the artist's ideas in 
essay form, counted as a legiti-
mate forwarding of knowledge. 
Architecture also has a long tra-
dition of ‘paper architecture’ - 
projects executed primarily to 
explore problems of philosophy, 
technique or visual language, 
and published or exhibited 
rather than built. In other areas 
of design neither precedent was 
well established. Instead, imple-
mented designs, properly docu-
mented, were deemed to count 
as research This seems accept-
able as long as the product 
demonstrably communicates 
something original. However, 
the worry, particularly amongst 
those academic researchers that 
‘publish’, is that many designed 
objects, like most museum 
objects, communicate very little 
without expert interpretation. 
narrative, individuality and whim.55 As a consequence 
rationale has become idiosyncratic, layered and multiple - 
tribal babble, marketing ploy, cultural play, political 
critique, material psycho-narrative, etc. - and is therefore 
as likely to involve a vocabulary drawn from anthropology 
as one drawn from economics, aesthetics, critical theory, 
ecology, or psychotherapy. Design discourse therefore finds 
itself not much further on than a beginning just at the time 
when more established discourses have reached a crisis of 
identity, foundations, and purpose. It is at this point that 
the design theorist enters the “market place” - a moment 
which is both opportune and inauspicious. 
Entering the Market Place 
Within the project of philosophy certain paradigmatic 
dimensions are outlined by Burrell and Morgan and 
summarised in their map of sociological paradigms. This 
study begins with certain inclinations - nominalist, anti-
positivist, voluntarist and ideographic - which need expla-
nation. Later, the debate will be opened up and the need 
for clear cut paradigmatic posturing questioned; a process 
which reflects the end-of-philosophy debates represented by 
post-modernist thought and is pointed towards resolution 
by efforts to rebuild the project of knowledge by, for 
example, reconstituting Science and elaborating ecological 
norms.56 The precedents to which the study turns for 
critical reference and to borrow can be seen, using a 
developed version of Burrell & Morgan’s map, to subjoin 
the space of postmodernism. Although one should note 
that, in effect, this ‘zone’ only exists in the sense that, as 
the classical dualities - objectivism-v-relativism and radical-
change-v-regulation - are transcended, its internal divisions 
are dissolved. The theoretical standpoint developed in this 
 121 
thesis, if it has to be named, is Ironic Activism which 
works within the reconstituted paradigm of Design 
(Figure 2.4.4.) 
fessional architectural knowl-
edge and practice. 
The Centre for Research in 
Art and Design (CRiAD) at the 
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Figure 2.4.4 
  
The space of Ironic Activism unfolded from BURRELL & MORGAN's map of sociological paradigms. 
  
In the ontological debate (as framed by Burrell and 
Morgan) I am naturally inclined towards the nominalist 
position. The structuring of reality is essentially a human 
process, dependent upon language in the broad sense.57 
The nominalist position within Philosophy is ultimately 
inadequate, not because the idea of nominalism is weak but 
because the philosophical tradition privileges the ‘word’ 
above other modes in any analysis. The argument is 
therefore elaborated that the useful concepts in language 
are those that encompass aspects normally differentiated 
from philosophy. In short, to the categories of ‘name’, 
‘concept’ and ‘label’ must be added ‘artefact’ and ‘act’ if a 
workable theory of reality construction is to be generated, 
and the question of whether or not to continue to refer to 
the position as a nominalist one must be addressed. 
Anarchic Individualism 
Existentialism 
Critical Theory 
Social Ecology 
Marxist Praxiology 
IRONIC ACTIVISM 
Postmodernism 
Liberal Pragmatism 
Phenomenology 
Hermeneutics 
Ethnography 
Social Construction Theory 
Interpretive Theory REGULATION Functionalist Theory
 
55. Charles Jencks is respons-
ible for the idea that postmod-
ernism in architecture can be 
recognized by its: 
double coding: the combination 
of Modern techniques and some-
thing else (usually traditional 
building) in order for architec-
ture to communicate with the 
public and a concerned minority, 
usually other architects. 
[JENCKS, Charles. What is 
Post-Modernism? Academy 
Editions, 1986. p.14.] 
Grays School of Art (The Robert 
Gordon University) in 1996 
boasts a sizable research com-
munity which includes graphic 
designers lain Burt and Heather 
Delday both of whom conduct 
and present their research as 
design practitioners. 
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My natural inclination in the epistemological debate is 
towards an anti-positivist position. The idea of needing to 
occupy “the frame of reference of the participant in action” 
in order to “understand”, represents the basic tenet.58 
However, the objective-subjective dichotomy with which 
this and the contrapuntal positivist notion of seeking the 
power to “explain and predict ... regularities and causal 
relationships” in a differentiated world, are normally 
associated, is ultimately flawed and throws a bad light on 
the anti-positivist position within philosophy.59 The reflex-
ivity of the human condition most clearly illustrates the 
weakness of the linguistic division of the objective from 
the subjective. Such reliance on language represents an 
anxiety that ought to be, and can be, countered. By 
admitting “actions” and “productions” into the argument 
there is an opportunity to reverse the withdrawal from 
material involvement, that an overemphasis on the power 
of language often represents, with a reaffirmation of the 
larger human potential for becoming knowledgeable and 
campetent.60 Whether or not, after this, one should 
continue to call the position “anti-positivist” again is a 
question to be addressed. 
"Layering" is specifically men-
tioned by Nigel Coates in his 
explanation of Narrative 
Architecture. 
The practice of architecture needs 
to drop its production-line think-
ing - to adopt layering and 
random access. ... Narrative 
architecture never obliterates the 
existing world, but exploits and 
overlays it. [COATES, Nigel. 
“Street Signs” in THACKARA, 
John. (ed.) Design After 
Modernism. Thames & Hudson, 
1988. p.99 & 103.] 
 
56. The notion of reconstituting 
Science is a venture which has 
been under way since Einstein’s 
theory of relativity effectively 
erased the objective view point 
in physical systems: Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty principle and 
the proposition of distance 
effects incorporated into recent 
multidimensional theories are 
specific examples of the fallout 
from this exploding of the sover-
eign subject in classical science. 
...the scientist cannot play the rote 
of a detached objective observer, 
but becomes involved in the 
world he observes to the extent 
that he influences the properties of 
the observed objects. [CAPRA, 
Fritjof. [1975] The Tao of 
Physics. revised edition, Fontana 
Paperbacks, 1983. p.153.] 
Minimally, therefore, we must 
expect a reconstituted Science 
to be participatory and to make 
only weak claims to truth. And, 
accepting the deep level of inter-
relation and interactivity bet-
ween micro- and macro- worlds, 
we must expect that we will be 
able to propose useful ecologi-
ical principles, at least as useful 
as those explaining the uncert-
ainty of subatomic events. Bohr 
expressed it thus: Physics 
Almost thematic in the notion of design is that the 
individual is free to counteract environmental signs and 
motions.61 In the human nature debate, therefore, I have a 
natural inclination towards the voluntarist position. 
However, the separation of subject and environment, 
figure and ground, upon which the voluntarist-determinist 
dichotomy is founded must be seriously questioned in the 
radically decentred and therefore de-differentiated 
condition postmodern theory describes.62 In the ecological 
sense no particular type of actor in an open system can be 
be privileged above any other.63 Global behaviour displays 
its image-form, if at all, in a syncretism and betrays its 
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is not about how the world is, it 
is about what we can say about 
the world. [DAVIES, Paul & 
John Gribbin. [1991] The 
Matter Myth: Beyond Chaos and 
Complexity. Penguin, 1992. 
p.21.] 
 
57. If language can be thought 
of as the defining human trait, 
this implies an underlying hum-
anism. The endlessly renewable 
language games can only serve 
human ends. Even a concern for 
the radically ‘other’ or the ‘un-
differentiated whole’ or the 
‘disembodied essence’ is none-
theless a concern expressed in 
language and therefore, in gen-
eral terms, humanistic. Clearly, 
in this formulation, humanism 
is being somewhat dissociated 
from its past, but this can be 
justified, though only weakly, in 
the sense that postmodern 
doubts throw us back on our-
selves - if there are no universal 
foundations to which we can 
appeal, we only have the option 
of continuing conversations. 
Bernstein's defence of his notion 
of a “non-foundational pragmatic 
humanism” is important here, as 
are Rorty's notions of “projects 
of self creation”, “imaginative 
identification”, and “free and 
open encounters”. All that is 
said by postmodernist critics 
against this humanism, that is 
the life blood of modernism, is 
worthy stuff, but, in the end, it 
does not clear the world of hum-
anism per se only of a chimera. 
To be human is the only found-
ation upon which we can build. 
Whatever razor edges we use to 
separate off a previous way of 
thinking, of talking, of being, 
from what we believe the next 
stage will be, it cannot separate 
off the "being" itself even though 
it  may  change  its  ways.  What 
possibilities in a synergy. The irony of the situation is that, 
even in the partial systems we may care to visualize, we can 
never escape our own inclusion in the pattern of things. As 
participant the dimension of speed becomes crucial.64 
Change exerts a reciprocal effect which increases with 
time. Design is the acceleration of change and therefore 
the multiplication of perceived effects. Every intervention 
creates the opportunities for, perhaps the necessity of, 
increasingly widespread and intensive interventions. 
Furthermore, this multiplication takes effect at the instant 
of intervention not at its forever-deferred ending, and 
therefore there is no recognizable chain reaction, no 
predictable pattern of event explosion, but rather a inter-
penetrative force field in which the world (including the 
designer) is forming.65 The reflexivity of praxis, which 
implies a determining force of relations in the dimension of 
speed, is thus as inescapable as is the undecidable nature of 
the system and whether or not one can continue to refer 
to the position as voluntarist is questionable. 
The methodological debate presents problems peculiar 
to design. Although, to accept Burrell and Morgan’s terms, 
I am naturally inclined towards an ideographic approach. 
In design this hardly does justice to the divergent possi-
bilities this represents. Generally there is an interventionist 
conception of methodology in design, the goal of the design 
process being, not merely to study and to understand a 
situation, but, even when these remain incomplete (they 
normally do), to change things for the better by replacing 
or modifying specific objects/elements/subsystems within 
the practical context to which the designer has been intro-
duced.66 However, this instrumental description, although 
common, is not universal, and furthermore, almost every 
clause in its composition is, in practice, open to modifying, 
even counteracting, qualification. The design process only 
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makes sense within the context of a notion of ‘professional 
practice’, a set of recognized protocols and techniques 
which although not ‘scientific’, in the sense of according 
with the procedures of testing hypotheses by quantitative 
techniques and data analysis, are rigorous in terms of 
procedure, administration, and documentary production, 
and comply with the notion of set rules as the guarantor of 
success. At the same time, the professional practice of 
design only makes sense in the context of a design process 
which is contingent, variable, unpredictable in its detailed 
content and dynamics, and therefore highly idiosyncratic. 
The ability to work with an incomplete understanding of 
the situation and too little time for the exercise of practical 
rationality alone, are fundamental characteristics of the 
design process. It is its moments of irrationality that make 
it reasonable. If design were not a social activity one could 
propose to reconcile this apparent division by recourse to 
Rorty’s notion that between the personal and social, the 
ethical and the political, one does not require a “synthesis” 
merely an “accommodation”.67 However, it is not that 
simple. In the vast proportion of situations, the design 
process encompasses a collaborative creativity, and profes-
sional practice includes the dimension of existential 
experience - the moment about which action depends upon 
inalienable individual conscience and responsibility. Given 
the necessity to be both involved in the materiality of the 
practical situation and its social context, and to be 
independent of its thought-world and professionally 
detached, whether or not one can continue to refer to the 
theoretical position on methodology as ideographic is 
questionable. The possibility of clear-cut allegiance, as in 
all of the key debates that define the subjective-objective 
dimension, is at least compromised, but I believe the 
problem is deeper than that. 
61. See: JONES, J. Christopher. 
Design Methods: Seeds of 
Human Futures. Revised Ed. 
John Wiley & Sons, 1981. p.3-4. 
MAYALL, W. H. Principles in 
Design. Design Council, 1979. 
p.9. 
POTTER, Norman. What is a 
Designer: things.places.messages. 
Revised Ed. Hyphen Press, 
1980. p.13. 
Jones quotes many of the better 
known definitions of design 
proposed in the 1960s including: 
•Finding the right physical com-
ponents of a physical system. 
•A goal-directed problem-solving 
activity. 
 
59. ibid. 
 
60. See: BERNSTEIN, 1991. 
The ethical-political horizons 
that are of concern to Bernstein 
mark the reentry of praxis into 
discourse via the Stimmung of 
“modernity/postmodernity”. In 
their later writings he sees 
Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault 
and Rorty beginning to 
...gravitate more and more to con 
- fronting the ethical political con 
- sequences of their own thinking. 
[p.11.] 
 
postmodernism really signifies 
is a radical humanism. No world 
that we can think, say or be in 
can be anything other than a 
humanistic one for the act of 
thinking-saying-being creates the 
only world we can know, and, 
no matter how we try to change 
our ways, the new will always be 
human at heart. BERNSTEIN, 
Richard J. The New Constell-
ation. Polity Press, 1991. and 
RORTY, 1989, pp.118, 93 & 68. 
 
58. BURRELL & MORGAN, 
1979, p.5. 
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By starting with the Burrell and Morgan model the 
problems posed by recent philosophical debate can be 
clearly visualized. The boundaries of such opposed terms 
as: ‘nominalism’ and ‘realism’; ‘anti-positivism’ and 
‘positivism’; ‘voluntarism’ and ‘determinism’; and 
‘ideographic’ and ‘nomothetic’, have become blurred in a 
metaphysics of the incommensurable and fragmentary, a 
meta-relativism which is self-reflexive, self-contradictory, 
irreducibly paradoxical, at least in Philosophical terms, and 
is the real substance of post-Philosophical philosophy. 
  
 
•Decision making, in the face of 
uncertainty, with high penalties 
for error. 
•The imaginative jump from pre-
sent facts to future possibilities. 
•A creative activity - it involves 
bringing into being something 
new and useful that has not 
existed previously. 
Jones offered his own “simple 
but universal definition” of 
design: 
•to initiate change in man-made 
things 
Although, several years earlier, 
he had offered a definition 
which openly questioned the 
need to have a closed definition: 
•The performing of a very compli-
cated act of faith 
The first sentence of Mayall's 
chapter 1 reads: 
•Design conceives and defines all 
the means we employ to satisfy 
our many and increasingly intri-
cate needs. 
In explaining the focus of his 
book, Potter contributes: 
•to give form and order to the 
amenities of life, whether in the 
context of manufacture, or of 
place and occasion. 
 
62. BANNET, Eve Tavor. 
Structural-ism and the Logic of 
Dissent. Macmillan, 1989. 
Barthes idea of the systéma-
tiques, which are “open, infinite, 
uncentred, disseminated, perfor-
mative and capable of endless 
permutations”, is useful here, 
with it he suggests that 
society and human life could be 
like his books ...which fragment 
the subject into decentred ele-
ments which can be contrasted, 
combined and varied in innumer-
able ways. [pp.82-3.] 
The contradiction with which 
this deals is between Foucault's 
suggestion that the only way out 
of the division between subject 
and environment, which is 
...a result of man making his 
cogito the condition and himself 
the centre of all things ... is to 
erase man, to turn the page and to 
start thinking from somewhere 
else, [p.160.] 
and the insight that there is a 
radical humanism from which 
we cannot escape - the non-foun-
dational pragmatic in Bernstein 
and the engaged liberal ironist 
in Rorty. 
 
63. The idea of the “actor net-
work” is useful here, 
... it is composed o f a series of het 
erogeneous elements, animate 
and inanimate, that have been 
linked one to another for a cer-
tain period of time ... But the 
actor network should not ... be 
confused with a network linking 
in some predictable fashion ele-
ments that are perfectly well 
defined and stable, for the enti-
ties it is composed of, whether 
natural or social, could at any 
moment redefine their identity 
and mutual relationships in some 
new way and bring new ele-
ments into the network. 
CALLON, Michel. “Society in 
The crisis of physical dimensions, 
just as the crisis of measurement, 
is tied up with the crisis of 
determinism and affects today the 
whole ensemble of representations 
of the world [pp.50-1.] not only 
at the micro-level of the 
subatomic but at every macro-
level. He uses Mandelbrot's 
explanation of the problem of 
measuring the coast of Brittany 
to illustrate the point: 
a dimension is a matter of the 
degree of resolution, and ... the 
numerical result depends on the 
relations between the object and 
the observer, [p.55.] 
but more than this, what is 
missing in this is 
the temporal aspect of all acts of. 
the   Making:   The   Study   of
Technology as a Tool for Socio-
logical Analysis” in BIJKER, 
Weibe E., Thomas P. Hughes & 
Trevor Pinch. (eds.) The Social 
Construction of Technological 
Systems. MIT Press, 1987. p.93. 
 
64. VIRILIO, Paul. (1984] Lost 
Dimension. Trans. Daniel 
Moshenberg. New York: 
Semiotext(e), 1991. 
Virilio proposes that: 
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measuring and all acts of sight-
ing ... The figures of the man, the 
mouse, and the fly who survey the 
Breton coastline are only the 
anthropomorphic and zoomor-
phic aspects of a specific speed of 
displacement. [p.57.] 
Slow down the act of measuring 
and the distance tends to infini-
ty, speed it up and it tends to 
zero. 
66. See 29. above. The third 
definition of design quoted 
from Jones (1981), and also the 
second quoted of Jones’ own 
definitions. 
 
67. RORTY, 1989, p.68.. 
65. “Force-field”: Bernstein 
(1991, p.9.) appropriates 
Adorno’s metaphor which 
Martin Jay defines as a  
relational interplay of attractions 
and aversions that constitute the 
dynamic transmutational structure 
of a complex phenomenon. 
JAY, Martin. Adorno. Fontana, 
1984. p.14. 
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3.0 Locations and Discourse 
Ephemeral Presences 
Four generic spatialities have been explored in the previous 
chapter - physical, social, documentary and paradigmatic. 
The possibilities for modelling the space of museum• 
design•organization have been indicated in critical pers-
pective and it is now the task of the project to move from 
the generic notion of space to the generated notions of 
location and discourse. Each of the engaged elements that 
make up the museum•design•organization complex has a 
history, an ethnography, and a genealogy or archaeology. 
In this chapter an attempt will be made to uncover each 
element taking the last first, the broad before the narrow, 
the abstract before the concrete, in the hope that their loci 
in the physical, social, documentary and paradigmatic may 
be recovered. The seeds of despair in this little venture are 
sown at the beginning: the organizational question itself is 
one of doubt about the independence of any ‘component’ 
element constitutive of the multidimensional and, there-
fore, interminably interactive, complex. As none of the 
elements exists alone, the objects of location and discourse 
immediately point to their interrelations, but, and this is 
important, consideration of the differences or interfaces, 
the boundaries between, must be deferred long enough for 
some presence to be generated however unstable and 
ephemeral it may later prove to be.  
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3.1 Organization 
Models in Analysis and Design 
In Images of Organization Gareth Morgan presents a series 
of metaphors upon which can be built powerful mythic 
explanations of organization. The model which Morgan 
proposes takes the form of a series of abstract images 
which have a dual purpose - as tools in analysis and as 
heuristic devices or templates in design. The model is not 
arrived at from any general theoretical approach to the idea 
of organization, rather, it starts from the specific connect-
ion between organization and the kinds of work situations 
in which “business executives, public administrators, organ-
izational consultants, politicians or trade unionists” find 
themselves.1 The central (privileged) role of the human 
actor in such a view of organization is explicit: throughout, 
Morgan uses the language of human action and relations, 
even commenting that when gripped by the machine meta-
phor of organizations “we often attempt to organize and 
manage them in a mechanistic way, forcing their human 
qualities into a background role”.2 The philosophical 
problems that this centred subject gives rise to are now 
well known and cannot be ignored. In the section above on 
Philosophy, I have argued that although to be human, in 
all that we do and say, is existentially inescapable, the 
position that the human occupies in the world can no 
longer be regarded as privileged. So that, although we may 
speak of socially constructed reality, what is constructed 
encompasses more than the social.3 It extends to the whole 
of perception, both the rational and the natural. It is 
necessary, therefore, to take a step back from Morgan's 
constellation of metaphors and the powerful mythic 
explanations that they are able to generate and look to 
3. BERGER, Peter. & Thomas 
Luckmann. The Social 
Construction of Reality. Penguin, 
1967. 
 
In this the social spatiality and 
the ‘humanistic’ motivation are 
paramount even when realized 
through a fragmentation of the 
‘man’, a suppression of freedom, 
and a glorification of process 
and function. 
2. ibid. p.13. 
 
1. MORGAN, Gareth. Images 
of Organization. Sage, 1986. p.11. 
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other more general notions of organization. We must 
dispense with the idea that organization is limited to a 
particular realm, as determined by a past or present 
discourse, whether of Philosophy, museology, anthro-
pology, history, or natural science, and instead we must 
look to generic concepts in organization and systems such 
as ‘boundary’, ‘difference’ and ‘space’. 
Boundary 
Cooper notes that the concept of ‘boundary’ receives scant 
attention even in General Systems Theory, “a discipline 
reputed to have laid bare the lineaments of a general theory 
of systems of any and every kind” 4 and proceeds, with 
reference to the work of theorists such as Parsons and 
Blau who, in common with the “dominant mode of 
perception among system theorists”, place “emphasis on 
the two separate terms” of any binary divide and fail to 
focus “on division or boundary between terms”, and 
Gouldner, Bateson, Saussure and Derrida who make the 
crucial move in this direction, to develop the idea that 
division itself is “of fundamental significance in under-
standing the nature of information or structure”.5 He uses 
Rubin’s double profiles, an old favourite with theorists of 
art and of perception, to graphically illustrate the funda-
mental undecidability of figure and ground (Figure 3.1.1.) 
In differentiating modes of perception, one side of the 
dividing line must be suppressed in order to see the other 
as the figure. To see the opposite side as figure we must 
switch to suppressing the first side of the line. In a non-
differentiating mode of perception we may focus on the 
boundary itself but only by suppressing the normal 
tendency to seek a Gestalt, an order that precedes meaning 
Figure 3.1.1. 
 
Rubin’s double profiles 
 
4. COOPER, Robert. “Organ-
ization/Disorganization” Social 
Science Information. SAGE,
25:2, 1986, pp.299-335 (p.332). 
 
5. ibid p.306. 
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in the image. Ehrenzweig, in constructing an account of 
Cezanne’s and Klee’s visual achievement, proposes that 
there is also the possibility of a de-differentiating mode of 
perception through which one can, perhaps only fleetingly, 
see Rubies double profiles as two figures kissing.6 Although 
Cooper makes the observation that “it is the act of separa-
tion which, paradoxically, creates the perception of some-
thing that is also whole and unitary” he is not proposing 
this last, and I will argue necessary, step of de-different-
iation, a point to which I will return later in this thesis. 
Even though Cooper’s analysis may not go far enough 
there are still a number of useful points to pick up in relation 
to the approach to organization in the current study. 
Difference 
Initially, the figure is seen as a positive sign and it is 
possible to conceive of it, in a commonsensical way, as the 
“carrier of meaning”. But, because later the figure can only 
be understood as a positive figure if it is also seen as the 
negative of that which surrounds it, we have a formulation 
for the idea of meaning which depends upon the sign as 
the “effect of difference”. Saussure makes the first of these 
moves when considering the individual sign in language 
and the second when considering the language as a system. 
Cooper interprets this duality in a way which suggests that 
“action is prompted by a negation”, that “the action of differ-
ence” is motivated by “the lack or absence of the ‘preferred’ 
state”.7 However, for reasons which relate to the possibility 
of a de-differentiating mode of perception, I find it difficult 
to agree with this argument as the general case. The notion 
of  ‘choice’  between states - and  we  should  perhaps  recall 7. op cit. p.310. 
6. EHRENZWEIG, Anton. The 
Hidden Order of Art. Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 1967. p.36. 
To illustrate the point 
Ehrenzweig paraphrases KIee: 
 ...the artist can either emphasize 
the boundary contrast produced 
by the bisection of the picture 
plane; in which case he will keep 
his attention on one (endotopic 
or exotopic) aide of the line he 
draws; or else he can scatter his 
attention and watch the simulta-
neous shaping of inside and out-
side areas on either side of the 
line, a feat which the gestalt psy-
chologists would consider impos-
sible. ... Somehow - as Paul Klee 
postulates - a good artist must be 
able to hold the entire picture 
plane in a single undivided focus. 
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8. See section 2.4 note 60. 
 
9. COOPER, Robert. “Inform-
ation, Communication and 
Organization: A Post-Structural 
Revision” The Journal of Mind 
and Behaviour. The Institute of 
Mind and Behaviour, summer 
1987, Vol.8, No.3. pp.395-416. 
Cooper uses Freud’s analysis of 
the unconscious [Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle], which is 
“characterised by a ‘compulsion 
to repeat’ itself”, to argue that 
information can be thought of 
as “a reversible whole that 
vacillates between two terms”. 
He then defines two forms of 
action: (1) a primary process 
which is a conflation and neg-
ation of the individual terms ... 
and (2) a secondary process which 
suppresses primary activity by 
accenting the individual terms. 
This is still potentially ambig-
uous, the difference between 
the undifferentiated and the de-
differentiated is important, as is 
the difference between differ-
entiation and re-differentiation. 
To the ancient Greeks the 
undifferentiated pharmakon had 
a single, if broad, meaning. To 
us the word’s direct descendant 
“pharmacy” has a more specific 
meaning from which have 
become differentiated, by other 
terms, the meanings “poison”, 
“drug”, “cure”, and “magic spell”. 
Although we cannot recapture 
the original pharmakon we can, 
with the help of Derrida and 
others, de-differentiate this 
cluster to glimpse, even if only 
fleetingly, a multivalence which 
a current reading of pharmakon 
requires in interpretation. The 
re-differentiation of pharmakon, 
if we were to find this a useful 
action, holds the potential for 
altogether different terms and 
those definitions which propose that design is about 
intiating change towards a more desirable state of things8 - 
even if not taken to imply some form of practical 
reasoning, nevertheless implies a form of determinism or 
givenness, whereas, in most cases, possibilities are numer-
ous and precise future states impossible to predict.9 They 
come into being, that is, become real, only in the process 
of action. Difference, therefore, is not necessarily a 
question of what is between the commensurate, in the 
sense that the “a priori for the subject” are commensurate, 
it is rather a question of potential and therefore of energy, 
which may be released only through action, through 
movement, and the speed of that release and its patterning 
are what the process brings into being.10 Hence, to bring 
the notion of ‘creativity’ into the argument, creativity is 
the automatic non-rational quality of realizing difference. 
Derrida’s contribution is to point out that the problem of 
choice between given terms disappears. In these terms, 
creativity is the play of differance, the continual movement 
that chases after the always deferred presence. In this 
formulation we can see the importance of Ehrenzweig’s 
ideographic standpoint, in design the argument is not 
primarily about interpreting a given system of signs but 
rather it is about participating in its transformation (or, in 
some presupposed past, its formation). Foucault makes a 
parallel point in respect of historical analyses: 
the problem is no longer one of tradition, of tracing a line, but 
one of division, of limits; it is no longer one of lasting founda-
tions, but one of transformations that serve as new foundations.11
Space 
The value of the metaphor of space needs to be made 
explicit. When talking of ‘possibility’, the ‘play’ of 
………… 
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differance, and ‘presence’, even if perpetually deferred, we 
invoke a visualization of space which is primevally a point, 
the zero dimension or zero degree,12 undifferentiated and 
infinite in potential, and which, as an inevitable response 
to that potential, succumbs to an endless and unpre-
dictable process of differentiation and expansion without a 
centre. ‘Possibility’ thus crystallizes out of potential. ‘Play’ 
is thus two-sided, both free variation and room for 
manoeuvre - the micro-space of indeterminacy. And 
`presence', or identity, is that which is realized only at the 
expense of perceiving movement, or difference. We need 
look no further than theoretical physics to see the same 
invocation at work: from the big-bang theory to the in-
folded multi-dimensionality of the ultra-microscopic and 
the sub-atomic uncertainties of position and speed.13 Space 
provides the generic organizational metaphor. 
 
12. The zero dimension or zero 
degree arises out of two related 
differential factors, (1) the oscil-
lation of dimensional value 
involved in observation at differ-
ent degrees of resolution. This is 
a phenomenon Virilio illustrates 
by describing a ball of thread at 
the 10-meter degree of resolu-
tion (DoR) where it appears as 
a point and is thus zero-dimen-
sional, through, 10-centimetre 
DoR where it is a ball and thus 
three-dimensional, 10-millimetre 
DoR where it is a construction of 
threads and thus one-dimension-
al, 0.1 millimetre DoR where 
each thread is a column and 
thus three-dimensional again, 
and 0.01mm DoR where each 
column dissolves into a construc-
tion of fibres and thus again one-
dimensional. In any system 
there is a certain degree of reso-
lution above which everything 
becomes zero-dimensional, and 
at and below the degree of reso-
lution associated with sub-atomic 
distances the same zero-dimen-
sionality pervades. And (2) the 
levels of order and detail in any 
organization. Simple division 
associated meanings, why not 
the neologisms: “pharmatech” 
for medicine based on western 
science and technology, and 
“pharmagic” for that based on 
faith and ritual? See: BROGAN, 
Walter. “Plato’s Pharmakon: 
between two repetitions”, in 
SILVERMAN, H J. (ed.) 
Derrida and Deconstruction. 
Routledge, 1989. pp.7-23. 
 
10. See: 2.1, note 32. 
 
11. FOUCAULT, Michel. 
[1969] The Archaeology of 
Knowledge Trans. A M Sheridan 
Smith. Tavistock, 1972. p.5. 
As space becomes differentiated into zones, spatial 
relationships are created. These relationships are defined 
by boundaries or, as any boundary is inevitably a defining 
aspect of two zones, by interfaces.14 The interval which an 
interface occupies is not fixed, rather, it is dependent upon 
speed of interaction,15 information, the play of différance. 
In the term ‘interval’ is expressed that uncertainty which is 
temporal at the expense of spatial and vice versa.16 
Complexity of organization is a function of interactivity, 
the greater the interactivity the greater the number of 
interfaces between actors and therefore the finer the 
differentiation of detail within the space. Cooper makes an 
important point here about the perception of interactional 
structure: 
a conception of ‘social system’... must dispense with the percep-
tion of an interactional structure that is fully given to us in 
the present; social structure can only become ‘present’ to us 
through différance.17
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14. COOPER, 1986, p.300. The 
problem with the implication of 
Gouldner's idea that organiza-
tional activity is focused on the 
boundaries between system 
parts is that it suggests too hard 
a notion of system – “system 
parts” suggests fixed elements, 
like the parts of a machine, in the 
same way “boundaries” suggests 
into two represents the first 
degree of order, the one-dimen-
sionality of opposing polarity, 
division into three either contin-
ues the first degree of order by 
creating an intermediate 
between poles or creates a sec-
ond degree of order, the two-
dimensionality of a choice of 
choices, and so on into the multi-
dimensionality of complex possi-
bility. Within complexity there 
always exists a micro-level of 
lower degrees of order and, at 
the lowest level, an absolute 
limit, the zero degree of order, 
the zero-dimensionality of undif-
ferentiated space, non-direction-
ality, disorganization, infinite 
potential, which becomes the 
site of action, differance, 
creativity. 
See: VIRILIO, Paul. [1984] 
Lost Dimension. Trans. Daniel 
Moshenberg. New York: 
Autonomedia (Semiotext(e)), 
1991. pp.53-4. and COOPER, 
1986, pp.316ff. 
 
13. DAVIES, Paul & John 
GRIBBIN. The Matter Myth: 
Beyond Chaos and Complexity. 
(first published by Viking, 
i991.) Penguin, 1992. 
Big bang, pp. 114-18. Micro-
scopic virtual wormholes, 
pp.269-73 & 276-6. Heisen-
berg's uncertainty principle 
p.213. and also CAPRA, Fritjof. 
The Tao of Physics. Wildwood 
House, 1975. pp.171-3. 
And this applies not only to social system but to any 
socially constructed system or space. The generic idea of 
space privileges neither the human nor the non-human 
actor. An interface may be between any pairing of types of 
actor, and, in principle, an actor may have interfaces with 
an unlimited number of other actors. In this view of 
organization, the actor is not the generator, indeed, the 
actor is not even a fixed entity. The actor will tend to 
change in role, type and/or position as the pattern of inter-
activity within the space continues. The concept of ‘actor 
network’ captures some of this dynamism quite clearly.18 
Information, and different classes of actor - human and 
non-human, natural and artificial, etc. - have equal status. 
Indeed, precisely what one sees depends upon what one 
sets out to find. If one looks for the fixed structure it will be 
at the expense of finding the interactive dynamics, and vice 
versa. Foucault raises this point in relation to the history 
of science at the microscopic and macroscopic scales: 
...events and their consequences are not arranged in the same way: 
thus a discovery, the development o f a method, the achievements, 
and the failures, of a particular scientist, do not have the same 
incidence, and cannot be described in the same way at both levels.19
A particular class of phenomena, ‘distance effects’, rad-
ically affects both interactive dynamics and the perception 
of structure. Distance effects, which have been predicted 
in physics to effect the micro-level of organization,20 are 
already very real at the macro-level of social organization. 
They are the telematic effects of the global net and the 
telemedia. Within these is a multi-dimensional virtual space 
able to instantaneously connect distant places and times: 
an invasive virtual space that provides an ever denser and 
more mutable fabric to organization.21
In organization, therefore, we find ourselves in a 
space which is without definite boundary and subject to 
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An interval must separate the 
present from what it is not in 
order for the present to be itself ... 
[ibid. quotation from DERRI-
DA] Through the play of 
différance, the interval is thus 
also that which divides the 
present in and of itself, and 
leads to a dynamic concept of 
spacing, intervals upon and 
within intervals. 
 
17. COOPER, 1986, p.313. 
 
18. See: 2.1, note 31. 
 
19. FOUCAULT [1969], pp.4-5. 
 
20. The “microscopic virtual 
wormholes” referred to above 
(13). 
 
21. MATTHEWS, Geoff. 
“Invasion of the Body Snatchers: 
Architecture and Virtual Space” 
Culture Theory Criticism 
Occasional Papers, University of 
Humberside, 1994. 
 
22. FOUCAULT [1969], p.11. 
 
23. In deconstructing the works 
of great thinkers and writers 
fixed edges. I want to suggest 
something altogether more fluid 
and dynamic. 
 
15. What is meant by “interact-
tion” here is the mutual 
exchange of information, 
material, energy. There are 
some senses in which every-
thing reduces to energy. Matter 
is just a particularly dense form 
of energy and information is 
simply patterns of energy. 
 
16. What Derrida posits is “a 
world that is continually defer-
red, postponed in space and 
time” [COOPER, 1986, p.313.], 
that is, a world of intervals. 
unpredictable processes of differentiation in which the 
interface is a volatile element; we are never simply 
observers but always, to some degree, participants in 
transformations which are without centre; and we are 
faced with the uncertainty of structure and change - one 
can only be focused at the expense of blurring the other - 
not simply as a limitation of observation but because 
organization possesses neither certain structure nor certain 
change, the interval is bivalently indeterminate. What we 
face, to paraphrase Foucault, is an epistemological 
mutation of organization which is not yet complete.22
Interstitial Knowledges 
Although, in these terms, the possibility of a general 
theory reduces to a paradox, this does not mean the end of 
organization, far from it, as Foucault suggests in relation 
to history the situation has entered a phase of (apparently 
continual) transformations. In this we are liberated from 
the prospect of a totalizing closure: the only big idea left is 
that there are no big ideas left. This is the message of 
deconstruction,23 of post-structuralism,24 of postmod-
ernism,25 and of the interpretive theory (hermeneutics) 
revitalized by such as Gadamer and Ricoeur.26 Although, in 
the negative, global knowledge may be irredeemably 
fractured, in the positive, there is a growing necessity of 
what Geertz calls ‘local knowledge’.27 This is the necessity 
of working within the irruptive field of discontinuous 
knowledges – Bernstein’s ‘new constellation’ - or more 
properly, the interstices that are, in our generic spatial 
terms, ‘intervals’. 
... rather than face an array of natural kinds, fixed types divided 
by sharp qualitative differences, we more and more see ourselves 
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Of course, to go along with this, 
one has to regard the idea that 
there is a “right to difference” as 
the only ‘big’ idea left. 
 
26. Simplifying to the extreme, I 
define postmodern as incredulity 
towards metanarratives. 
LYOTARD, Jean-Francois. 
[1979] The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge. Trans. Geoff 
Bennington & Brian Massumi. 
Manchester University Press, 
1984. p.xxiv. 
 
26. Tradition, part of whose 
nature is the handing-on of tradi-
tional material, must have 
become questionable for an 
explicit consciousness of the 
hermeneutic task of appropriat-
ing tradition to have been formed. 
GADAMER, Hans-Georg. Truth 
and Method. Sheed & Ward, 
1975. p.xxi. 
Derrida aimed: 
... to refute the author with argu-
ments derived from the latter's 
own writings, to demonstrate - 
successfully in many cases - that 
the very premisses on which the 
author bases his case wilt if pur-
sued to their logical conclusions, 
defeat the original arguments. 
GLUSBERG, Jorge. (ed.) 
Deconstruction: A Student 
Guide. Journal of Architectural 
Theory and Criticism, 1:2:91. 
Academy Editions, 1991. p.31. 
 
24. For post-structuralists, unity 
and universality are inherently 
oppressive and any move which 
promotes their disintegration is to 
be approved. 
SARUP, Madan. Post-Struct-
uralism and Postmodernism. 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988. 
surrounded by a vast, almost continuous field of variously 
intended and diversely constructed works we can order only 
practically, relationally, and as our purposes prompt us. It is 
not that we no longer have conventions of interpretation; we 
have more than ever, built ... to accommodate a situation at 
once fluid, plural, uncentred, and ineradicably untidy.28
The composition of intervals, which this idea of praxis 
promotes, is a pragmatic, ironic, creative business, and 
follows on from the philosophical standpoint outlined above. 
Not only are knowledges discontinuous, they are also 
contingent and incommensurable, that is, their proximity 
is visible in a model but not measurable in actuality. 
Model space 
As an example of the composition of intervals in modelling, 
Hofstede’s use of the map series to present a picture of 
cultural differences in attitudes to social organization - 
each map defined by pairs of dimensions: four dimensions 
in all - neatly raises the question of what kind of space it is 
that is being created in an organizational model of this 
type.29 The four dimensions of his model, each derived from 
the analysis of a vast quantity of data collected through 
questionnaire-based surveys, are shown in figure 3.1.2. 
Label Scale 
  
1. Power distance small ............….............................................large 
2. Uncertainty avoidance weak ......….................................................strong 
3. Individualism collectivist ...................................... individualist 
4. Masculinity feminine ...........….............................. masculine 
  
Figure 3.1.2 
  
Hofstede’s four dimensions of national culture 
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There is no doubt that the same principles of series 
mapping can be used to make visible any organized 
comparative space. And one could suggest a dozen 
empirical studies that could be initiated in the area of 
museums and design.30 However, it is not the specific 
pattern that might result from such studies that interests 
us here, but rather the legitimate scope for such mapping 
projects in the context of this project. What are the appro-
priate dimensions of such mapping models? And how does 
the mapping model per se relate to the generic spatiality of 
organization and, in particular, to its indeterminacy at the 
level of the interval? 
28. ibid. pp.20-1. 
 
29. HOFSTEDE, G "Motivation, 
Leadership and Organization: 
Do American Theories Apply 
Abroad" in PUGH, D S. (ed) 
Organization Theory. Penguin, 
1971. pp.473-99. 
 
30. Work such as that carried 
out by Judith Blau (1984) and 
Dana Cuff (1991) on the nature 
of architectural practice in the 
USA is rare, and work such as 
Maria Brunelli's on design and 
museum management is unique. 
The kinds of questions which 
need to be asked of exhibition 
planners, designers, developers 
and managers for example, are: 
Where does the design process 
begin and end? How does an 
In Gadamer’s notion of the 
hermeneutic, one has to accept 
that the only big idea is that one 
has to take things for what they 
are: if the competition between 
big ideas is dead then they all 
become rather small. 
 
27. GEERTZ, Clifford. Local 
Knowledge. New York: Basic 
Books, 1983. p.16. To conclude 
his introduction Geertz offers 
this thought on what he means 
by the importance of local 
knowledge: 
To see ourselves as others see us 
can be eye-opening. To see others 
as sharing a nature with our-
selves is the merest decency. But 
it is from the far more difficult 
achievement of seeing ourselves 
amongst others, as a local example 
of the forms human life has 
locally taken, a case amongst cases, 
a world among worlds, that the 
largeness of mind, without which 
objectivity is self-congratulation 
and tolerance a sham, comes. 
 
In series mapping presentations such as Hofstede’s, 
there is no easy process of commensuration - such as the 
process of scaling and Mollweide Equal Area Projection we 
find in popular world atlases - between the two-dimen-
sional maps and a physical space in the geographical 
sense.31 Yet, at the same time, the maps describe a four-
dimensional space in which national cultures are precisely 
placed in relation to each other, and in which, through 
visual interpretation, cultural regions can be seen rather in 
the same way that constellations of stars can be seen in the 
night sky. Geographical or, in the physical sense, spatial 
proximity is irrelevant to this notion of retinal proximity. 
The linguistic formulation of concepts, such as ‘power 
distance’, ‘uncertainty avoidance’, ‘individualism’, and 
‘masculinity’, and their quantification in statistical and 
probabilistic terms, defines them as qualitatively different 
to concepts such as ‘geographical distance’, ‘Cartesian 
plane’, and ‘Euclidean space’ which are quantified in 
physical comparative terms.32 In a spatial model of the 
latter we compare like with like - distance with distance, 
area with area, etc. - whereas in the former a systematic 
process of abstracting, transforming, interpreting and 
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32. I am aware that quantum 
effects can only be described in 
probabilistic terms. However, at 
macroscopic levels, the incalcu-
lably large ratios involved in the 
probability of mechanical events 
may be reasonably interpreted 
as either certainty (∞:1) or 
impossibility (1:∞). 
 
33. Map-graph-matrix. I am 
suggesting here a particular com-
posite which is not fully present 
in any of the separate terms: 
Map: a representation on a 
reduced scale and usu a flat sur-
face of (part op the earth's sur-
face, showing geographical fea-
tures, political divisions, popula-
tion distribution, etc. ...a repre-
exhibition team organize? Are 
there defining characteristics of 
the ‘good’ curator, designer, 
conservator, etc. 
BLAU, Judith R. Architects and 
Firms: A Sociological Perspective 
on Architectural Practice. MIT 
Press, 1984. 
BRUNELLI, Maria Teresa. 
“The Role of Design in the 
Management of Museums” 
(PhD thesis, Institute of 
Advanced Studies, Manchester 
Metropolitan University, 1993. 
CUFF, Dana. Architecture: The 
Story of Practice. MIT Press, 
1991. 
 
31. For example, maps showing 
the whole surface of the globe 
in “Section Three: The world as 
we Know it” The Reader’s Digest 
Great World Atlas, Reader’s 
Digest Association, 1962. 
Mollweide's Equal Area Proj-
ection translates the spherical 
surface onto an ellipse whose 
major axis is twice the length of 
the minor axis and, although it 
distorts shape, preserves area 
relationships. 
visualizing must take place to turn the linguistic 
formulation of the original concept into the visual 
formulation of the map-graph-matrix.33
The space of such models is used to render visible 
rather exotic, and otherwise invisible, virtual spaces. Such 
virtual spaces encompass all of the possible connecting and 
dislocating spaces of the multidimensionality that lies 
behind the socially constructed actual space of architec-
ture, society, the body and geography - the worldly realm.34 
But, paradoxically, they also encompass an ambivalence 
towards the virtual spaces of the global net and the 
telemedia - the virtual spaces that have already invaded 
actual space - which, via computer and televisual screen, 
are vital to the construction, storage, transmission and 
presentation of the most complex models. The space 
created by a model is thus multidimensional and virtual. It 
invokes this through limited means - the two-dimensional 
graphic image and the three-dimensional construct - which, 
in phenomenological terms, put a limit on the complexity 
of objects that may be rendered visible and sensible. 
Simplification and adequacy 
In this sense - of encompassing both connecting and dislo-
cating virtual spaces - organizational modelling always 
operates at a distance, across an interval in organization 
(this describes the ideographic, reflexive condition of the 
embedded subject), and is always associated with the 
attenuation of information in making the process 
amenable to intervention. Between the linguistic and visual 
fields there is both an interval and a parallel. “The 
attenuating function of myth” is a mirror of, and an accom-
paniment to, the attenuating function of the model - where 
myth makes legible/readable, the model makes visible/ 
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34. The parallel here is that dis-
cussed above “Space” para 1, for 
references see note 13. 
 
35. JACKSON, N V & P 
CARTER. “The Attenuating 
Function of Myth in Human 
Understanding”, Human 
Relations, Vol. 37, No. 7, 1984, 
pp.515-33. 
The simplicity or complexity of 
the required explanation ... relates 
to the state of complexity of the 
environment existent at a given 
time. ... the low-variety individ-
ual can only cope with the high-
variety external world via an 
attenuating device which reg-
ulates the complexity to an extent 
that it can be comprehended by 
the individual ... the description 
and function ... ascribed to myth 
is precisely that of an attenuat - 
ing device. [pp.523 & 528.] 
 
36. Saussure tends to focus on 
the relationship between the 
signifier and the signified and to 
underplay the dynamics of the 
semiotic process, Eco admits a 
sentation of something in map-
like form. 
Graph: a diagram ...expressing a 
relation between quantities or 
variables, usu having two (or 
more) straight lines (AXES) with 
reference to which points or lines 
are located on the diagram. 
Matrix. a substance, environ-
ment, etc. within which some-
thing else originates or develops 
...a rectangular array of numbers 
or other mathematical elements 
that can be manipulated and 
transformed according to special 
mathematical rules ...something 
resembling a mathematical 
matrix... 
LONGMAN DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANG-
UAGE, Longman, 1984. 
 
tangible - and each performs a constructive cognitive rôle 
in understanding which is narrative and spatial respec-
tively.35 Clearly I am not suggesting that myth and model 
are, in a mathematical sense, similar - the relationship 
between them is poetic - and that translation is a mechani-
cal process - it is a poesis. Neither am I suggesting that 
“socially constructed actual space” provides a definitive 
reality beyond which lie unreal supplements necessary for 
meaning - socially constructed reality is immanently 
multidimensional. In structuralist terms the signified is a 
fuzzy edged, shifting zone of possibility, and the signifier a 
designed object which is visible, contingent, conventional, 
and mutable. Between them, therefore, they constitute a 
sign which is profoundly undecidable. Our concern with 
the interval and the dynamics of organization, justified by 
the profound uncertainties of objective and subjective 
presence, makes the play of différance - information - 
central to the creative activity of modelling, and the 
partiality and plurality of metaphor crucial to the poesis 
this represents. A semiotic schema would imply clearly 
boundaried realms for the form of notation, the objective 
denotation, and the subjective connotation (Figure 3.1.3).36
NOTATION DENOTATION CONNOTATION 
graphic or 
material 
construct 
organizational 
object 
metaphorical 
image 
Fig. 3.1.3 
  
Semiotic schemata for organizational modelling (after EC0,1979.) 
  
Even though, in Saussurian terms, the arbitrary nature of 
“a particular combination of signifier and signified” is the 
central problematic, the status of the sign as an entity 
implies  a  singularity  which  is  equally  problematic.37  By 
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notion of ‘unlimited semiosis’ 
in which 
the interpretant may turn out to 
be of no use at all and, since it is 
able to define any semiotic act, 
may in the last analysis become 
purely tautological. Yet its 
vagueness is at the same time its 
force ... 
ECO, Umberto. A Theory of 
Semiotics. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1979. p.71. 
The unresolvable tension bet-
ween the coherence of the inter-
pretant in the instant of a single 
semiotic act and its tendency to 
evaporate in any longer retro-
spective view is crucial. 
 
37. CULLER, Jonathan. 
Saussure. Fontana, 1976. p.19. 
insisting, in clear-cut either-or terms, that the synchronic 
must be privileged over the diachronic in analysis Saussure 
perhaps, his interpreters certainly, conveniently skirt 
around some of the more paradoxical aspects of the system 
of language. The notions of the purely synchronic and the 
purely diachronic are in fact both “methodological 
fictions”.38 The linguistic system of English, even more so 
than that of French, is not a definite reality. Definitive 
English is a myth, we need only think for a moment about 
the variety of speech groups, native speakers all, who do 
not understand each other. This is not merely a question of 
regional accents - a problem of parole - which admittedly 
can be quite extreme in their differences, it also involves 
dialect, substantial areas of vocabulary and variations in 
syntax and grammar, particularly in more complex struc-
tures - all problems of la langue. Some areas of vocabulary 
travel in time from one speech community to another, and 
from the small community to the larger. For example, the 
first users of neologisms related to information technology 
in the 1960s were systems designers and scientists: the 
general population today would understand much more of 
what they said to each other than did the wider 
community at the time.39
Taking into account this temporal blur in any idea of 
the synchronic state, to be methodologically sound, any 
slice through the continuum of a language system’s devel-
opment should not be strictly synchronic - not the system 
frozen in a moment of time (Figure 3.1.4) - but rather 
should be an oblique and fuzzy edged section cut across a 
diachronically viewed system (Figure 3.1.5.) The former 
may be a conceptual possibility, perhaps, but not only 
would it involve a distortion of existential and social reality, 
which are deemed by Saussure to be irrelevant ‘diachronic’ 
concerns, it would prove a practical impossibility. 
38. ibid. pp.37-8. 
 
39. It should be noted that 
although Saussure concentrated 
on the synchronic perspective in 
relation to signifiers, in principle 
his argument applies also to 
signifieds and Culler does argue 
this proposition through. 
ibid. pp.44-5.… 
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time continuum 
language system frozen 
in one moment of time 
Figure 3.1.4 
  
The impossible synchronic moment 
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time continuum 
Figure 3.1.5 
  
The pseudo-synchronic slice 
  
This excursion into Saussure’s ideas on the language 
system has highlighted the point of departure from struc-
turalism with which the notions of system and model must 
deal in this project. The arbitrariness of signifier + 
signified, of notation + denotation + connotation, in a 
dynamic pseudo-synchronic view is overtaken by the uncer-
tainty of the sign which is a function of speed. The language 
has no real existence outside of our participation in its 
transformation. The slower the process the more multi-
dimensional and dynamic it will appear, too slow and its 
apparent complexity will overwhelm our ability to perceive 
or construct order, the faster the process the closer it will 
approach the zero dimensionality and invisibility of stasis. 
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The museum•design•organization complex, which is 
the focus of this modelling exercise, presents the possibil-
ity of bringing into view exotic life in the strange space 
that is defined by dimensions that are extraordinarily 
divergent in their properties. 
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3.2 Design 
The différance of ‘design’ 
‘Design’ is a most ambiguous term. 
The complexity of living organisms is matched by the elegant 
efficiency of their apparent design ... this amount of complex 
design cries out for explanation ...1  
The word ‘design’ can be used to explain anything that 
appears to have some organized structure and purpose. But 
this is not very helpful. Clearly there is a difference 
between the human agent planning and participating in the 
process of organizing and structuring things and ratio-
nalizing their purposes, and the ‘blind processes’ which we 
either unconsciously try to mimic or reconstruct, or which 
we believe parallel, in some ill-understood way, a particular 
and distinctive form of human behaviour. To see a 
connection between ‘nature’ and ‘human nature’ in one of 
these ways is unremarkable enough. But this is not to say 
that the phenomena are one and the same. 
This view is a contemporary 
humanist counter to the theolog-
ical Argument to Design and, in 
Papanek’s case, an entirely com-
patible, indeed unavoidable, 
complement to his main thesis: 
that industrial design as the 
slave of run-away free-market 
capitalism is despicable and that 
designers should turn away from 
its reliance on gimmickry and 
greed and turn instead towards 
the imaginative understanding 
and satisfaction of genuine 
human needs. 
2. PAPANEK, Victor. [1972] 
Design for the Real World. 
Paladin, 1974. p.18. 
 
1. DAWKINS, Richard. The 
Blind Watchmaker. Longman, 
1986. p.xiii. 
The reason we enjoy things in nature is that we see an economy 
of means, simplicity, elegance and an essential rightness in them. 
But they are not design. Though they have pattern, order, and 
beauty, they lack conscious intention. If we call them design, we 
artificially ascribe our own values to an accidental side issue.2 
Human organization can be framed as a questioning of the 
design impulse. If, on the one hand, the best organizations, 
‘ideal’ organizations, develop as self-regulating and 
spontaneously metamorphosing systems perhaps the 
notion of ‘organizational design’ is anathema. If, on the 
other hand, it is only when the values and intentions of the 
human element in any system are consciously projected 
through its internal relations and workings (almost 
inevitably they must be) that we realize ‘organization’ at 
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all, then human organizations are, by definition, designed. 
It takes vision and skill at working the material of any 
design object to realize complex goals. If those goals 
include, as they might in an organizational design context, 
the goal of ‘evolutionary form’, of the ability of the end 
product to survive through self-adjustment to a changing 
environment, does success mean the end of ‘design’? I 
mean the question not in the trivial sense of the rational 
production of the final design, the design to end all 
designs, but, in the ethical and aesthetic senses of ending 
the dominion of the human, of finally dissolving the object-
subject dichotomy, of returning the consciousness and the 
being to ‘nature’. Perhaps it would if design were not 
infinitely regressive. But it is. Design is not about the 
closure of practical situations - their ‘resolution’ - it is 
about their projection towards a desired future. The 
complexity with which design deals is such that only a 
limited period of success is possible before the myriad 
forces entailed generate further practical situations in 
which direction is desirable. Even evolutionary form is 
susceptible to disadvantageous mutations and possible 
extinction. Design merely nudges such forms in the 
direction of beneficial ‘genetic’ change, towards the next 
‘moment’ in its evolution as though loading the material 
cultural dice before they are next thrown into our future. 
However, the ‘material’ of the design object in organiza-
tional design is, or at least begins as, human. 
What kind of design is it that abstracts the individual 
from its being, fashions the collective in the image some 
constructed object of knowledge – machine, organism, 
brain ...3 body, family, garden – that treats the living, 
thinking, feeling ‘us’ as a transmutable material, a ‘them’, 
at the service of an ‘Other’? What kind of design is it that 
only exists on the borderline between the un-organized 
3. MORGAN, Gareth. Images 
of Organization. Sage, 1986. 
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and the dis-organized, between the natural ‘order’ and our 
changing projections of ourselves, between the ends of 
science and the process of culture? 
In the end, the design of organizations is no different 
to any other ‘design’. Whatever objects are differentiated 
out of the material reality by design are, by the very 
process of that differentiation, implicated in the human 
understanding of the world, in its shaping and in the 
human relations which are its matrix. Perhaps we should 
say that no organizational design should ignore the impli-
cated material culture. Material culture precipitates human 
organization which forever hangs above a sedimented past 
continuously settling out as the chemistry of design does 
its work. This is not evolution so long as material culture 
is implicated, although it may be a design that mimics 
evolution. In nature evolution does not mimic design: we 
simply see some of our values reflected back at us: it is in 
our nature to desire meaning and, therefore, to perceive 
pattern and to construct order in things. 
The idea of explaining things in terms of design is 
different to the idea of designing things. Although, in 
order to initiate and progress the process of designing, 
there is clearly a need to engage in a parallel and interacting 
process of analysis which uses the language of design in 
generating understandings. 
The scope of analysis may take in the widest range of 
phenomena that appear to have some organised structure 
and purpose. Our ability to recognise pattern in things, to 
impose, by linguistic and visual means, an order on things, 
tells us something about a relationship between subject and 
object. It does not necessarily tell us much either about the 
object or the subject in themselves. In analysis, therefore, 
‘design’ is a question of differences, differences which are 
not merely open to reinterpretation but different in each 
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moment of perception. Any resolution of pattern, any defini-
tive form and meaning, is thus perpetually deferred. Design 
is also the play of différance, an undecidable state, a state of 
becoming. Design only exists in the interval between the 
subject and the object. In design the relationship between 
subject and object is the interval structure of a matrix 
which is its space, its reality; the subject no more has an 
independent reality than does the object. 
We can talk of the ‘subjective world’ and the ‘objective 
world’ only in the sense that design is experienced in 
certain ways, for, although we cannot step outside of the 
matrix without losing an aspect that generates its space, we 
work within that space with a feeling for the potential, the 
possibility, which the aspects of subject and object 
together create. 
The beauty of the word ‘design’ is that it refers to two 
completely different sets of meanings which are neverthe-
less inseparable: the epitome of a conceptual constellation. 
The philosophical faces of this duality are ontological and 
epistemological. Design ontology regards design as the 
things of order, and from this we get the dominant theme in 
design history – a material culture, a system of real things 
that embodies and carries forward complex meanings, 
beliefs and values. Design epistemology, on the other hand, 
regards design as knowledge in practice, which defines the 
dominant theme in the design studies tradition of humanis-
tic and methodological investigation, by turns a functional, 
psychoanalytical, existential and praxiological project.4 
4. ARCHER, Bruce. ‘A View of 
the Nature of Design Research’ 
in JACQUES, Robin. & James 
A. POWELL. (Eds.) Design: 
Science: Method. Westbury 
House, 1981. pp.30-47. 
‘design’ and ‘Design’ 
It will be useful here to make a distinction between uses of 
the word ‘design’. This device will serve a similar purpose 
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to that which Rorty achieved by his distinction between 
‘philosophy’ with a small ‘p’ and ‘Philosophy’ with a capital 
‘P’.5 There is a sense in which design is a central human 
trait, related to the idea of understanding, but primarily 
concerned with our being in the world, which involves the 
perception and imposition of pattern in things. 
All that we do, almost all the time, is design, for design is 
basic to all human activity. The planning and patterning of 
any act towards a desired, foreseeable end constitutes the 
design process. ... Design is the conscious effort to impose 
meaningful order.6 
In as much as we all shape the world around us to serve 
our needs, we all design and from this point on I will refer 
to this as ‘design’. But there is an altogether different, and 
to some a quite dubious, realm of design which is under-
taken on our behalf by trained specialists. Professional 
designers plan, devise, specify and supervise changes in the 
socially constructed world and they do so by working on 
the less stable fringes of some of the most stable institu-
tions. Professional designers are involved in a perpetuation 
of the capitalist consumerist enterprise – this is the idea 
that many sceptics so distrust. 
... humanity all over the globe, ever more artificially supplied 
and thus often victimized, appears now at the mercy of a 
rampant, over-advertised industrial technology which is 
flooding us off our physiological bearings ...7 
9. MARGOLIN, Victor (ed.) 
Design Discourse: History Theory 
Criticism. University of Chicago, 
1989. p.8. 
 
8. PAPANEK,1972, p.9. 
 
7. NEUTRA, Richard. Survival 
Through Design. Oxford 
University Press, 1954. pp.vi-vii. 
 
6. PAPANEK,1972, p.17. 
 
5. See above: 2.4 Paradigmatic 
Space, note 31. 
There are professions more harmful than industrial design, 
but only a very few of them. And possibly only one profession 
is phonier. Advertising design, in persuading people to buy 
things they don't need, with money they don't have, in order 
to impress others who don’t care, is probably the phoniest field 
in existence today. Industrial design, by concocting the 
tawdry idiocies hawked by advertisers, comes a close second. 8 
Equally, they are involved in a ‘distinct sphere of cultural 
transformation’,9 an interpretation put forward, for 
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example, by Margolin, Buchanan, Vitta, Sparke, and 
others: ‘...design involves the vivid expression of 
competing ideas about social life’,10 the problem of the 
symbolic identity of designed objects ‘requires that it be 
continually transformed while it remains faithful in 
substance to its original function’,11 and, in general, this 
transformation involves the shaping and transmission of 
meaning, beliefs and values through the socially 
constructed material culture of designed objects, such that, 
at the end of the day, ‘designed artefacts act as cultural 
ciphers’ and ‘design simply becomes one of the forms of 
mass communication in modern society...’.12 
What I will refer to by ‘Design’ then will be that insti-
tutionalized human activity which defines and solves 
complex problems by visual and other cognitive means; 
exercises a range of mental and physical skills in the 
organisation, interpretation and communication of infor-
mation related to the content as well as the process; and 
develops formal and technical understandings appropriate 
to each context. 
The importance of the general term ‘design’ lies in the 
essential, central place given to the practical use of human 
faculties in approaching complex, that is, epistemologically 
inconsistent, practical situations. Design treats objects that 
do not satisfactorily succumb to a purely technical treat-
ment. So that, in so far as engineering design suppresses or 
delegates ideological issues, it is on the fringes of Design. 
Design treats objects that pose a problem beyond the purely 
personal - whose outcomes must additionally satisfy social 
and technical criteria. So that, in so far as art and craft-
based design delegate sociotechnical issues to managers and 
engineers or simply suppress them, they are also on the 
periphery of Design. 
12. SPARKE, Penny. An Intro-
duction to Design & Culture in 
the Twentieth Century. Unwin 
Hyman, 1986. pp.xix & xxi. 
 
11. VITTA in MARGOLIN, 
1989, p.11. 
 
10. BUCHANAN in MAR-
GOLIN, 1989, p.17. 
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Ontological Object 
Arguments about the proper subject matter of design 
history tend to put the greatest emphasis on the evidence 
of the designed artefact. In empirical research the rationale 
for such activities as consulting archives and interviewing 
designers and clients is that such sources may help to 
reveal the wealth of connections between the design, 
production and consumption of artefacts which constitute 
design's historical and social importance. This is the view 
emphasized by Walker: 
Theoretical work: design historians categorize, classify, compare, 
interpret and evaluate designed artefacts. ... Normally, empirical 
research is undertaken in respect of a predefined body or corpus 
of material, usually artefacts of some kind. 13 
Even though later in his book ‘the conventional wisdom 
that the designed object is the main focus of design 
history’ is questioned, first, by dismantling the myth of 
the designer as ‘auteur’. Much, perhaps most, designing is 
carried out as a group activity in which the influence of the 
individual on the resulting product is not clearly differen-
tiable. But, according to Walker, even ‘when designing is 
undertaken by a single person alone in a studio it can be 
regarded as social’ for five good reasons: (1) education/ 
training, (2) the influence of peer group, trends and fashion, 
(3) tradition and precedent (4) the social character of design 
‘languages’, codes and styles, and (5) dependence on client 
and consumer ‘without whom any large-scale production 
would be impossible’.14 
Secondly this focus is challenged by pointing up the 
fetishistic fallacy which tends to isolate the artefact and 
suppress the wider object of design.15 In practice, there are 
four counters to narrow artefactual obsession: (1) study that 
extends beyond the artefact itself ‘to the design process of 
14. ibid. pp.50-1. 
 
15. ibid. p.58. 
 
13. WALKER, John A. Design 
History and the History of Design. 
Pluto Press, 1989. pp.4-7. 
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which the object is the end result’, (2) phenomena such as 
styles which ‘cut across the autonomy of individual items’, 
(3) types and series of objects that reveal ‘the relations 
between those objects and the people who make, use and 
profit from them’, and (4) the idea of change in particular 
periods or social contexts: the moments of invention, the 
varying ‘populations’ of objects, their dispersal, gradual 
improvement, variation in form or periodic revision or 
combination with other types which may give rise to a new 
type, are all important in diminishing the relevance of the 
‘classic’ artefact as the object of study.16 
Yet despite these powerful arguments against an idea 
of design history that owes much to the art history of 
creative individuals and autonomous works, its drive 
remains towards connecting the all-important material 
culture of designed artefacts with the broad sweep of social 
understandings as exemplified by the social sciences – 
sociology, economics, anthropology, etc. The connection 
which arguably remains peripheral in all of this is that 
between the social understandings and what designers 
actually produce as they design. This suggests that too 
great an emphasis has been placed on design as ‘a quality of 
designed objects’, not just in the simple sense of referring to 
‘the look of things’ but in the broader sense of what the 
artefact represents as an articulation of and solution to a 
problem, as part of an economic system, and as a transmit-
ter of ideas, a cultural object. And that not enough 
emphasis has been placed on design as ‘what designers do’, 
again, not just in the simple ‘mechanistic’ sense of 
preparing ‘instructions for the production of manufactured 
goods’ but in the broader sense of what designing repre-
sents in terms of problem shaping and solving, economic 
(and political) activity, and the everyday discourses of 
various social, cultural and technical practices.17 
16. ibid. pp.58-60. 
 
17. FORTY, Adrian. Objects of 
Desire: Design and Society Since 
1750. Thames & Hudson, 1986. 
pp.6-7. 
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Epistemological Object 
There are many models of the industrial/architectural 
design process in which an essentially linear progression 
through various stages from inception to evaluation is 
proposed, usually with the proviso that the ends of the 
process can be joined to imply a cycle of activity.18 These 
models have originated both from professional and indus-
trial contexts as a result of the accumulated traditions of 
practice and management, and from various theorists who 
have focussed on the problem of explicit methodology. 
For example, the former category includes the RIBA 
Architect’s ‘Plan of Work’ (Figure 3.2.1),19 the Philips 
Design Track (Figure 3.2.2),20 and Alan Topalian’s 1979 
version of the design process (Figure 3.2.3),21 and the latter 
category includes J Christopher Jones’ 1963 model for a 
method of systematic design (Figure 3.2.4),22 Jane Darke’s 
1979 Kuhnian model (adapted from Hillier, W. 1972.) 
(Figure 3.2.5),23 and George Rzevski's 1981 Popperian 
‘Evolutionary Design Methodology’ (Figure 3.2.6.)24 
INCEPTION 
TENDER ACTION 
FEASIBILITY 
PROJECT PLANNING 
OUTLINE PROPOSALS 
OPERATIONS ON SITE 
SCHEME DESIGN 
COMPLETION 
DETAIL DESIGN 
PRODUCTION INFORMATION 
BILLS OF QUANTITIES 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
H 
G 
I 
J 
K F 
Figure 3.2.1 
  
The RIBA Architect's `Plan of Work' (adapted from BEAVAN & 
DRY, 1983.) 
  
 
23. DARKE, Jane. ‘The Primary 
Generator and the Design 
Process’ Design Studies Vol 1, 
No 1, 1979. pp.36-44. 
 
24. RZEVSKI, George. ‘On the 
Design of a Design Method-
ology’ in JACQUES & 
POWELL, 1981, pp.6-17. 
20. DORMER, Peter. Design 
Since 1945. Thames & Hudson, 
1993. p.21. (Quoted directly 
from Philips Corporate Indust-
rial Design.) 
 
21. TOPALIAN, Alan. The 
Management of Design Projects. 
Associated Business Press, 
1980. from Fig. 1.1, p.7. 
 
22. JONES, J C. ‘A Method of 
Systematic Design’ in JONES, 
J C. & D THORNLEY. (eds.) 
Conference on Design Methods 
Pergamon, 1963. 
 
18. The attempt to modify the 
essentially linear model of 
design process with ever more 
comprehensive ‘feedback’ loops 
was taken to extremes by some. 
For example, see: 
HICKLING, Allen. ‘Beyond a 
linear iterative process?’ in 
EVANS, Barrie., James Powell 
& Reg Talbot (Eds.) Changing 
Design. John Wiley & sons, 
1982. pp.275-293. 
 
19. BEAVEN, L and D. DRY, 
The Architect's Job Book 4th 
edition, London: RIBA 
Publications, 1983. 
Also explored in ALLINSON, 
Kenneth. The Wild Card of 
Design: a perspective on architec-
ture in a project management 
environment. Butterworth 
Architecture, 1993. pp.372-88. 
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Figure 3.2.2 
  
The Phillips Design Track 
  
 
Figure 3.2.4 
  
Design process for a method of systematic design, J Christopher Jones (1963) 
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Figure 3.2.3 (right) 
  
Design process: Alan 
Topalian, Design and 
Project Management 
Consultant (1979) 
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 Listing of all design require-
ments and the reduction o
2. Synthesis 
 Finding possible solutions for
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f each individual performance which alternative designs fulfil
performance requirements forthese to a complete set of logi-
cally related performance speci-
fications. 
 
 
1.1 Random list of factors 
1.2 Classifciation of factors 
1.3 Sources of information 
1.4 Interactions between factors 
1.5 Performance specifications 
1.6 Obtaining agreement 
specification and building up  
complete designs from these operation, manufacture and 
with least possible compromise. sales before the final design is 
 
 
2.1 Creative thinking 
2.2 Partial solutions 
2.3 Limits 
2.4 Combined solutions 
2.5 Solution plotting 
selected. 
 
3.1 Methods of evaluation 
3.2 Evaluation for operation 
 for manufacture 
 for sales 
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Generator Analysis Conjecture 
1. Generator 
 ‘The concept or objective that gener-
ates a solution is here called the pri-
mary generator. It can in fact be a
group of related concepts rather than
a single idea. These objectives form a
starting point for the architect, a way
in to the problem; he does not start
by listing all the constraints. Any
particular primary generator may be
capable of justification on rational
grounds, but at the point when it
enters the design process it is usually
more of an article of faith on the part
of the architect.’ 
2. Conjecture 
 The first conceptualizing image, 
the conjecture is put forward 
from the designer's fund of 
experience and knowledge. She 
has been aware all along that there 
are several detailed requirements 
to be met by the design, but 
performance on these parameters 
is not specified in advance. The 
conjecture is put forward without 
the need to separate out different 
factors; process and product are 
seen in a holistic way. 
3. Analysis 
 Requirements are now made 
explicit and the conjecture 
evaluated against them, the 
design concept modified and 
worked up in detail by ever 
deeper analysis of and evalu-
ation against detailed require-
ments, constraints and other 
factors. 
Figure 3.2.5 
  
Design process: Jane Darke (1979) Kuhnian model 
  
P1 EE TS 
P1 is a current problem, that is, an
aspect of the world assumed by a
problem solver to be deficient in
some way. A ‘problem solver’, in
this context, may be an individ-
ual, a social group, or even a
species. 
 
TS is a tentative solution to the
problem P1. It may take the
form of a random mutation, a
new scientific theory, an inven-
tion, a conspiracy, etc. 
EE is the process of error elimina-
tion from the proposed solution 
TS by means of repeated testing 
and modifications. Error elimin-
ation may be carried out, for 
example, by exposure to the real 
world where only a ‘correct’ sol-
ution survives (survival of the 
fittest), by experimentation with 
real or abstract models, or by 
analysis. 
P2 is a solution to the current problem P1
which inevitably represents a new pro-
blem. This new problem is in general, 
not created intentionally. It emerges, 
rather, as a result of new relationships 
which are brought into existence with 
every change. The real world is so 
complex that it is practically impossible 
to foresee all changes in relationships 
and all consequences of these changes, 
which are found to be generated by any 
problem solving activity. 
P2 
Figure 3.2.6 
  
Design process: George Rzevski (1981) Popperian model. 
  
Even in Design history there tends to be an implicit accep-
tance of the linearity of the socio-economic space of which 
Design is a part. In describing a Production-consumption 
model of design history’s field of research, which owes its 
conceptual base to the Grundrisse of Marx, Walker depicts 
a two-dimensional space defined by a horizontal time 
continuum divided into repeated cycles, and a vertical 
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range of social phenomena. The space of the design process 
is placed before that of the manufacturing process which 
itself is succeeded by processes of circulation/distribution 
and then consuming/customizing (Figure 3.2.7).25 Accept-
ing for the moment the succession of synchronies implied 
in the vertical bands of the model, this highly simplified 
schema indicates the products of each process (apart from 
the last) as coinciding with, or marking the boundary 
between, one process and the next. The manufacturing and 
subsequent circulation/distribution processes include in 
their products ‘designed goods’, however, the design 
process itself does not normally result, in any immediate 
sense, in designed goods. Its products are ‘designs and 
prototypes’: the former I would take to include visualiz-
ations of various types, from concept sketches, mood 
boards and development drawings to rendered persp-
ectives, design specifications and computer animations; 
and the latter, scale models as well as full-size mock-ups.26 
In practice, as is admitted in Walker’s exposition, the 
linearity of the model is a myth. The heuristic purpose it 
serves here is to point up the conceptual difference 
between the designed artefact as an embodiment of design 
concerns, or a centre around which they may be organized, 
and several other possible objects of design study. The 
design process may be construed as an organizational 
centre and its products as primary evidence. However, to 
complete the cycle some transformation must occur 
between the notion that the final process ‘consumes’ the 
end products of the sequence of earlier ones and that the 
chain of processes begins without material inputs from 
past cycles. Consumption, rather than being a ‘using up’ of 
things is, to an increasing extent, their accumulation and 
transfer. And the design process, rather than expecting in 
large part to process fresh material and information, and to 
25. WALKER, 1989, pp.68-73. 
 
26. See: Glossary. 
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Figure 3.2.7 
  
Design History’s Field of Research: Production-consumption model (from Walker, 1989) 
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develop and specify new techniques, is more and more 
commonly largely concerned with recycling material and 
ideas, and with integrating and transforming the increasing 
complexity of the obsolete. 
A parallel to this linearity may be found in the devel-
opment of hard systems methods. Checkland compares 
Jenkins (1969) methodology and the RAND Corporation 
methodology, both of which are of the ‘hard’ systems 
variety, with the ‘soft’ systems methodology developed 
during the 1970s at Lancaster University.27 Starting with ‘a 
relatively well-defined problem which the analyst may, to a 
large extent, take as ‘given’, once the client requiring help 
is identified’ the two example ‘hard’ systems method-
ologies are able to proceed in an ideally linear fashion. 
Progress is through: analysis of decision-makers’ objectives, 
placing of the system in a hierarchy of systems and its 
performance specification; the identification and compari-
son of alternative systems and then the selection of the one 
which best meets the need and is feasible, or, following 
analysis, design of the system by quantitative methods, 
simulation, and optimization; and finally implementation 
of the designed system. We can see direct parallels with the 
implied linear rationality of the design process models 
noted above (Figures 3.2.1-6.) In every case but one the 
design process follows a general pattern. To summarise, it 
is deemed to start with a process of identifying a more or 
less definitive ‘brief’ which describes specific problems, sets 
out specific objectives, and/or defines specific performance 
criteria. This brief, once documented, is in principle the 
‘given’ definition of the design project and is followed 
through in: the development of design concepts; their 
visualization, transformation and formative evaluation; the 
synthesis or selection of an outline solution; its aesthetic 
and technical development and detailed design and specifi-
27. CHECKLAND, Peter. 
Systems Thinking, Systems 
Practice. John Wiley, 1981. 
pp.190-1. 
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cation to meet an array of resource constraints and regula-
tions; and its implementation through production, installa-
tion/distribution, maintenance and summative evaluation. 
The parallel is summarised in Figure 3.2.8. 
Simple linear model of the 
design process 
 
a. Start with a client defined 
problem which the 
designer accepts largely 
as given. 
 
b. Identify definitive brief, 
specific problems, object-
tives, and/or performance 
criteria. 
 
 
 
c. Develop design concepts, 
visualize, transform, and 
evaluate. 
 
 
d. Synthesize or select 
outline solution, develop, 
detail and specify for 
production. 
 
Figure 3.2.8 
  
The parallel between linear models of the design process, and ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ systems 
methodologies. (Adapted from CHECKLAND, 1981.) 
  
Jane Darke’s Kuhnian model of the design process (Figure 
3.2.5) exhibits an interesting variation in which the 
elements of a definitive brief are not made explicit until 
after a design ‘conjecture’ has been visualized at which 
point an iterative process of increasingly detailed evalua-
tion and modification is engaged which ‘develops’ the 
initial concept to a satisfactory conclusion. The reversal of 
logic, represented by replacing the problem-solution formu-
lation with one of conjecture-refutation, parallels the ‘soft’ 
systems reversal of ‘hard’ systems strategy in which 
 e. Design process of the linear systematic type and hard systems approaches know from the 
start what change is needed.  
 
f. Implement design and 
evaluate product. 
Jenkins (1969) example of 
`hard' systems methodology 
 
Checkland (1981) 'soft' systems 
methodology 
 
Start: an urge to bring about 
improvement in a social system 
in which there is felt to be an 
IIIdefined problem situation. 
 
Express by examining elements 
of 'structure' and 'pro-cess' and 
their mutual relation-ship. 
Tentative definition of systems 
relevant to improving the 
problem situation. 
 
Formulate root definitions of 
relevant systems and build 
conceptual models of those 
systems. 
 
Improve the conceptual models 
using the formal system model 
and other system thinking. 
 
 
Compare the conceptual models
RAND Corporation (1950s) 
`hard' systems methodology 
 
with 'what is' in the real situa-
tion, and use the comparison to 
define desirable, feasible 
changes in the real world. 
 
Implement the agreed changes. 
Start: an urge to solve a relatively well-defined problem which 
the analyst may, to a large extent, take as 'given', one for which 
the client requiring help is identified.  
 
Analysis by naming the 
system, its objectives, etc., 
and its place in a hierarchy of 
systems. 
 
 
 
Design the system by 
quantitative model building 
and simulation. 
 
 
Optimize the design, using the 
defined (economic) 
performance criterion. 
Analysis by examining the 
decision-maker's objectives as 
expressed in the stated need 
for the required system with 
specified performance. 
 
 
Identify alternative systems for 
meeting the defined need and 
compare them by modelling 
using the performance criteria. 
 
Select the alternative which 
best meets the need and is 
feasible. 
Implement the designed system. 
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tentative system definition is followed by comparison with 
the real world and a cycle of better and better ‘expressions’ 
and ‘improvements’. 
Soft systems methodology came about through an 
attempt to extend, what has come to be known as ‘hard’, 
systems analysis, that had proved ‘demonstrably success-
ful within its own field’ of engineering, to social systems 
and civilian problems. The methodology very quickly 
departed from earlier forms, initially for one crucial reason, 
‘ “Hard” systems thinking is goal-directed’ and in social 
systems ‘goals are often obscure’.28 In the context of a 
‘rationalized’ explanation, soft systems methodology was 
described in a ‘chronological ...logical sequence ...most 
suitable for describing it but which does not have to be 
followed in using it!’ and later it is also described as a 
methodology which embraces the principle of ‘iteration’, in 
the sense of a repeated refining or revising procedure. This, 
along with the principle of including a dialogical procedure 
of comparison between conceptual model and actual 
situation, allows the process to begin with a problematic 
situation in which there are ill-defined problems, if there 
are ‘problems’ at all, rather than with a well-defined 
problem, and to proceed towards a ‘change’ in the situation 
rather than towards a well-understood solution type. 
I have already argued that design is characterized by its 
relevance to epistemologically complex situations in the 
social construction of material culture, situations in which 
neither purely technical nor purely artistic treatments are 
adequate to the production of ‘material’ objects whether 
they be things, places, messages or systems. We may 
expect therefore that Design, as actually practiced, will 
bear comparison with soft systems methodology rather 
better than with either hard systems methodology or insti-
tutionally prescribed models of the design process. 28. ibid. p. 149. 
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The now somewhat discredited ‘design methods 
movement’ of the 1960s arrived at this watershed just at a 
time when hard systems was becoming established and 
proving its power. With nowhere to go but into the ghettos 
of engineering and architecture, where it was still possible 
to contemplate the reduction of design to essentially 
technical issues, it floundered. This history is well 
documented through a well-known series of early design 
methods conferences and symposia - ‘Imperial College 
London in 1962 (Jones and Thornley, 1963) ...Birmingham 
in 1966 (Gregory, 1966)’ and Portsmouth in 1967. Thirteen 
years after the critical 1967 symposium Geoffrey 
Broadbent, in his review of progress in design methods 
study, recounted that it: 
...had been set up by Tony Ward to include a specific confronta-
tion between those whom he saw as Behaviourists, representing 
a mechanised, quantified view of design and those (including 
himself) he saw as Existentialist /Phenomenologists (Former 
Marxists) concerned, above all, with the ‘human-ness’ of 
human beings.29 
An inevitable split occurred which effectively ruled out the 
kind of development that, according to Checkland, 
occurred in systems analysis in the early 1970s. 
Consequently a broader view of design process, within a 
unified discipline of design studies, has not developed out 
of earlier generalized design methods. The engineering and 
architecture ghettos still persist, represented by the journal 
Design Studies (UK) and Design Methods and Theories 
(USA), and interest in design modelling has all but 
disappeared in relation to the broader (and softer) areas of 
design. The only significant departures from the ‘hard’ 
core of design methods, occurred in the mid-1970s when 
an attempt to ‘reduce’ design to a principle of universal 
participation succeeded only in alienating a significant 
29. BROADBENT, Geoffrey. 
‘The Morality of Designing’ in 
JACQUES & POWELL, 1981, 
p.309. 
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portion of the ‘professional’ design audience,30 and J 
Christopher Jones, one of the founding fathers of design 
methods and author of a seminal collection of design 
methods organized into a working manual for designers,31 
switched his interests and approach to one of speculating 
on and playing with the irrational and chance aspects of 
design;32 a move which has brought considerable criticism 
from those who admired his earlier academic seriousness 
and sense of responsibility.33 
32. JONES, J. Christopher. 
Designing Designing. Architec-
ture Design and Technology 
Press, 1991 (previously pub-
lished as Essays in Design. John 
Wiley & Sons, 1984.) 
 
33. Interesting though these 
developments were - Design 
Participation reflected the fash-
-ionable politics of the time but 
also seriously investigated 
opportunities and methods for 
participative planning and 
design processes some of which 
have influenced the work of 
leading practitioners. However, 
the ideal of the designer as ‘facil-
itator’ has not succeeded in any 
but the most limited circum-
stances. Broadbent's criticism of 
J C Jones’ more recent work is 
thoroughgoing, accusing him 
also of attempting to ‘reduce’ 
design to a game of chance oper-
ations, a procedure which is nei-
ther original nor adequate. He 
cites the work of both artists and 
musicians in the first half of this 
century - Stravinsky Poetics of 
Music (1942), Han Arp's paper 
collage Rectangles arranged 
according to the laws of chance 
(1916), and Marcel Duchamp's 
Large Glass The Bride and the 
Bachelors (1915-23) - and con-
cludes that although the artist 
may experiment and please him-
self in this way, in design ‘This 
whole resort to the random 
seems to me a profound denial 
of man's creative spirit..’ 
[ibid. pp.311-12 & 313-25.] 
30. CROSS, Nigel. (Ed.) Design 
Participation. Academy Editions, 
1972. 
 
31. JONES, J. Christopher. 
Design Methods: Seeds of Human 
Futures. Revised Ed. John Wiley 
& Sons, 1981. 
 
Cross (1984) has suggested that the emergence of a 
mature discipline of design methodology has followed a 
thematic movement from the 1960s preoccupation with 
‘prescription of an ideal process’ through subsequent 
concern with ‘description of the intrinsic nature of design 
problems’ and ‘observation of the reality of design activity’ 
to more recent ‘reflection on the fundamental concepts of 
design’.34 Rittel considers the interest in methodology to 
be a sign of crisis in the design field. In his analysis: 
Important design problems have changed their character from 
almost professional problems to the type of problem where this 
approach does not seem satisfactory any more, and therefore 
they have begun to talk about methodology. The main purpose 
of design methodology seems to be to clarify the nature of the 
design activity and of the structure of its problems. This role of 
design methodology seems to me to be much more important 
than its practical use in dealing with concrete problems. 35 
The crisis we can see here is in the sharp division that has 
developed between design practice and design methodo-
logy. The kind of venture in which Checkland has been a 
leading figure, of progressing two fronts through action 
research, on the one hand, advancing theoretical 
knowledge in systems analysis, and on the other, success-
fully intervening in complex real-world situations, is one 
which has not happened in quite the same way in design 
methodology. In architecture and engineering the sites of 
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35. RITTEL, Horst W J. 
‘Second-generation Design 
Methods’, interviewed by 
Donald P GRANT & Jean-
Pierre PROTZEN, in CROSS, 
1984, pp.317-27. 
36. About 10% of articles in 
Design Studies are of pedagogi-
cal research, for example, see: 
 
37. CROSS, 1984, op cit. 
CROSS, Nigel. ‘The nature and 
nurture of design ability.’ 
Design Studies Vol 11 No 3 
(July 1990) PP. 127-40. 
LEE, T. Y. & D. F. Radcliffe, 
‘Innate design abilities of first 
year engineering and industrial 
design students.’ Design Studies 
Vol 11 No 2 (April 1990) pp. 
96-106. 
KENDALL, Stephen. ‘On 
design reasoning: lessons from 
teaching architectural technolo-
gy.’ pp. 89-95, Design Studies 
Vol 10 No 2 (April 1989) 
DINHAM, s. M. ‘Teaching as 
design: theory, research and 
implications for design 
teaching.’ pp. 80-8 and, 
34. CROSS, Nigel. (ed.) 
Developments in Design 
Methodology, Wiley, 1984. p.x. 
 
methodological research of this type have almost exclu-
sively concerned the student designer, and have had 
overtly pedagogical aims.36 It may be that design, if it can 
be methodologically circumscribed, ultimately involves 
softer than the softest systems thinking, that no amount 
of subtle reversal in logics will ever be enough, and that the 
very notion of the path through a design activity as the 
proper focus of methodological study is mistaken. In 1984 
design methodology seemed to Nigel Cross, to be, ‘in a 
much stronger condition to return to its origins, to the 
prescription of realistic ideals’.37 Yet this appears to have 
been over-optimistic. It has its own specialists, few of 
whom are designers, who follow their researches wherever 
they may lead which is often a long way from the practices 
of design. Whilst the practice of Design has arguably 
shifted its contextual understanding from the socio-cultural 
and socio-technical towards one at once more pluralistic 
and accepting of the incommensurable nature of the 
personal and the social, and more dynamic and holistic - 
the psycho-ecological, if you will – design methodology lags 
behind in only recently shifting its epistemological ground 
from the pseudo-scientific to the socio-cultural and pseudo-
linguistic in which notions of social construction (cultural 
and technological) and communicative practice (phenome-
nological/hermeneutic praxis) have come to the fore. 
Design, Post-Design 
These ‘paradigmatic’ shifts have been interpreted by some 
as paralleling the post-War onset of post-industrialism and 
postmodernism, at least across the so-called ‘developed’ 
nations of the world. But whether or not we accept such 
labels, radical shifts in the scope and practice of design 
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have certainly taken place. As Dormer has noted, designers 
have proved remarkably adaptable to the roles demanded 
of them in the changing economic and cultural 
environment. 
SPARKE, 1986, pp.94 & 98. 
 
40. James Gardner (1907-95) 
first set up in independent prac-
tice in 1947; until the outbreak 
of war he had worked as a com-
mercial artist with the London-
based Carlton Studios. During 
World War II he was the Chief 
Deception Officer responsible for 
the Invasion Deception Plan. A 
versatile and prolific indepen-
dent designer, he is universally 
regarded as the father of 
‘modern’ exhibition design. 
[MacCARTHY, Fiona & Patrick 
NUTTGENS. Eye for Industry: 
Royal Designers for Industry 
1936-1986. Lund Humphries & 
the Royal Society of Arts, 1986. 
Penny Sparks notes that during 
the intense competition of the 
Depression years ‘manufactur-
ers with the aid of advertising 
agencies’ located individuals, 
who ‘although visually trained, 
also had first-hand knowledge of 
the commercial world’. A ‘fully 
fledged industrial design profes-
sion’ emerged within a decade. 
In addition to Loewy, she lists 
Walter Dorwin Teague, Norman 
Bel Geddes, Henry Dreyfuss, 
Donald Deskey, Russel Wright, 
John Vassos, Egmont Arens, 
Lurelle Guild, Joseph Sinel and 
George Sakier as examples of 
the new ‘consultant’ industrial 
designer. 
The first generation of designers 
who came to maturity in the late 
1930s in the USA [and] saw 
themselves as capable of turning a 
hand to anything, irrespective of 
whether it was a casing for a 
locomotive or a box for an iced 
cake. 
39. ibid. p.12. Dormer cites 
Raymond Loewy (1893-1986) 
as a fine example of: 
38. DORMER, 1993, p.7. 
 
Whenever the market place changes - as it has in Europe, for 
example, from black austerity to green concern - then the 
designer changes with it. The designer is a chameleon: he or 
she can, as needed, be a stylist, a corporate image strategist, an 
ergonomist or an environmentalist. 38 
Having regard for the pseudo-synchrony, which is necessar-
ily created by (or is the subject of) any modelling project, it 
is as well to point out that what we now regard as the post-
War, and also as the post-industrial/postmodern, period 
coincides with Dormer’s dating of the beginnings of 
‘professionalized’ Design in 1945. He makes the general 
point that, US precursors notwithstanding, it was in the 
immediate post-War period that the design ‘consultant’ - 
initially a generalist – became established.39 To this we can 
add that disciplines such as exhibition design and graphic 
design can identify their separation from the general area 
of commercial art and their formalization with the same 
period.40 Certain aspects of these origins are still with us 
even if accompanied by more recent and more powerful 
elements in the constellation of contemporary design. For 
example, it was James Gardner who transformed the trad-
itional focus, in exhibition design, on display technique 
into a concern for the visitor’s experience. This process was 
visible even in his first post-War commission, the Britain 
Can Make It exhibition, organized by the Council of 
Industrial Design (CoID) and held in the still empty 
galleries of the Victoria and Albert Museum in 1946.41 
Although, at that time, an intuitive response to practical 
difficulties, the concern has since become a foundational 
principle supported by systematized methods of research, 
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43. see (8) above. 
 
44. WALKER, 1989, p.81. cites 
Michael Farr’s Design in British 
Industry. a Mid-Century Survey. 
Cambridge University Press, 
1955. as a rare example of a 
synchronic design study. 
In, BERGER, Peter. & Thomas 
Luckmann. The Social Const-
ruction of Reality. Penguin, 
1967, a sociological perspective 
on the notion of social construc-
tion is established. 
BIJKER, Weibe E., Thomas P. 
Hughes & Trevor Pinch. The 
Social Construction of 
Technological Systems. MIT 
Press, 1987, reports a number of 
studies which show the impor-
tance of accounting for change 
phenomena without resorting to 
teleological devices in historical 
narrative, and without privilege-
ing the human actor in any 
process of change. 
VIRILIO, Paul. [1984] Lost 
Dimension. Trans. Daniel 
Moshenberg. New York: 
Semiotext(e), 1991, in talking 
about the new sense of dimen-
p.80. and GARDNER, James. 
The Artful Designer: Ideas off the 
Drawing Board, 1993, pp.59.ff:] 
 
41. Instead of presenting goods to 
the eye, as one would in an open 
market - and that is how 
exhibitions have evolved - I 
tucked them round corners, 
behind screens and in little 
enclaves, so at first the visitor 
would see lots of ‘décor’ but no 
goods - wouldn't even notice if 
there were no goods at all. This 
introduced a surprise element. 
[GARDNER, 1993, pp. 129-30.] 
 
42. DORMER, Peter. The 
Meanings of Modern Design. 
Thames & Hudson, 1990. p.10. 
 
planning and design evaluation. And the grounding of 
these methods in education, communication and market-
ing theory (ideology) now far outweighs any moral or 
pragmatic stance the designer may profess as a question of 
‘professional’ approach. 
Dormer has suggested that the designer can be seen as: 
a broker of ideas and values, a middle personage between 
manufacturers, engineers and applied scientists on the one 
hand and the consumer on the other.42 
(The former group should also include, in a usually less 
direct relation, artists, curators, critics and educators.) If 
taken in broader terms, terms which do not privilege the 
individual ‘stylist’ in the way that Dormer implies in the 
thesis of his book, such a proposition can be reflected in a 
recasting of the Production-consumption model discussed 
by Walker.43 In this revision the relatively hard boundaries 
between the design and manufacturing processes and 
between the manufacturing and circulation/distribution 
processes can be softened to account for the smearing of 
design activity across the three processes. Looser bound-
aries also more easily accommodate the interpenetration of  
other elements which set up both the dynamic space of 
intervals and the different speeds of action which the 
broader spectrum of, what might be called, the social 
construction of material culture entails. Following the 
example of such as Michael Farr, Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann, Weibe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, and Trevor 
Pinch, and Paul Virilio, amongst others,44 the differ-
entiation of a variety of ‘actors’ in the system of socially 
constructed material culture is an analytical phase which 
should present us with a pseudo-synchronic picture that 
arbitrarily shifts its frame to keep Design at its centre. In 
this picture, society, consumer society specifically, 
becomes the surrounding context to which Design relates 
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through its diverse manifestations - architecture, systems 
design, engineering, product design, graphic design, media 
and advertising, etc. Each site is an interval, a range of 
possibility, which gains its specific character, form and 
meaning, from its contingent elements and the speeds of 
their interactions. 
sionality brought to the experi-
ence of architectural/urban space 
via the televisual media, demon-
strates the pseudo-synchronicity 
which must characterize such 
thick description if explanation 
is not to reduce to the banality 
of journalistic surface - the zero 
degree of narrative. 
? 
As the next section argues, the museum presents the 
widest range of phenomena in microcosm and, therefore, 
represents a site which is ideally suited to the exploration 
of socially constructed material culture and the problem-
atic of multidimensionality, of complexity, in organiza-
tional and design modelling. 
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3.3 Museum  
Ideology  
There is a sense in which the entire history of museum 
forms and ideologies is present to us in the 1990s. The 
temple of the muses, the cabinet of curiosities, the freak 
show, the gallery, the archive, the depository, the research 
establishment, and the cultural and educational institution 
all exist today in forms reminiscent of those of the past even 
if the social forces that now sustain them are quite different. 
6. PEARCE, S M. Museums, 
Objects and Collections: A 
Cultural Study. Leicester Univ-
ersity Press, 1992. p.49. 
5. Alexander, 1979, p.8. 
 
 
4. For example, the treasury of 
St Paul's Cathedral in London, 
the monuments of the Hoby 
family chapel Bisham (Berk-
shire), and paintings and decora-
tive art of the Vatican collections. 
3. Like the original Greek mou-
seion many of these are collec-
tions of material used only in 
teaching and research, and the 
emphasis is on the scholarly 
activity of the community not on 
the collection, care and display 
of artefacts. See: LEWIS, 
Geoffrey. “Museums and their 
precursors: a brief world sur-
vey”, p.6, and WARHURST, 
Alan. “University Museums”, 
p.93, in THOMPSON, John. M. 
A. (ed.) Manual of Curatorship. 
Butterworth/Museums Associa-
tion, 2nd edn. 1992. pp.5-21. & 
93-100. 
 
 
 
2. See: RIPLEY, Dillon. The 
Sacred Grove. Simon & 
Schuster, 1969. pp.24-7, and 
ALEXANDER, Edward P. 
Museums in Motion. Nashville: 
American Association for State 
and Local History, 1979, pp.6-7. 
1. HOOPER-GREENHILL, 
Eilean. Museums and the Shaping 
of Knowledge. London: Rout-
ledge, 1992. p.1. 
...it is a mistake to assume that there is only one form of 
reality for museums, only one fixed mode of operating 
...Museums, in common with all other social institutions, 
serve many masters, and must play many tunes accordingly. 1
Philosophical and religious collections, which were charac-
teristic of the first recorded museums,2 have their latter 
day equivalents in University departments3 and in a wide 
variety of religious buildings, including cathedrals, monas-
teries, and temples.4
The gentleman’s cabinet of curiosities, a small room or 
specially constructed piece of furniture in which “stuffed 
animals, botanical rarities, small works of art ... artefacts, 
and curios” were assembled into dense mixed displays, is 
often regarded as the precursor of the modern museum.5 
However, the modern equivalent is the most common of all 
types of ‘museum’, the personal collection related to family, 
travels, hobby or obsession. Most people collect something; 
many collect particular kinds of things with a passion and 
curiosity that makes the result different in kind to aimless 
accumulation or utilitarian but excessive hoarding and 
more than mere assemblages of ornaments.6
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Collections lend themselves to make-believe and the construction 
of fantasies. adults who collect teddy bears (and many do) are 
presumably playing out a dream of golden Edwardian 
childhood, while those who collect Japanese swords are preoccu-
pied with rather different images.7
...owing to their association with 
riot, carnival, and, in their side-
shows, the display of monstrosi-
ties and curiosities which, no 
longer enjoying elite patronage, 
were now perceived as impedi-
ments to the rationalizing influ-
ence of the restructured exhibi-
tionary complex. 
8. BENNETT, Tony. “The 
Exhibitionary Complex.” New 
Formations. 1988/4, pp. 73-102. 
In the earlier 19th century, fol-
lowing the lesson of the British 
Museum, the opening of public 
museums was being encouraged 
and traditional popular fairs 
discouraged:  
 
In this notion of collection as 
“artist’s play”, essentially an 
existential and psychological 
insight, we have the basis of a 
view of museum process as a crea-
tive activity. See below 4.3 for a 
discussion of this ‘museality’ in 
organizations in general. 
The kind of object collected is not 
important: what matters is the 
reframing of the object within the 
collection, as an act of formal 
admission from one state to 
another. In a certain sense, 
objects have rites of passage as do 
we, and for them this comes when 
they enter the classification 
system, the dividing, comparing 
and contrasting of whatever kind 
which for each collection consti-
tute the rules of the game. The 
nature of the rules are [sic] 
equally unimportant - they can be 
rational or idiosyncratic - for all 
of them truly contribute a trans-
formation, and the resulting 
collection runs beside the world 
of everyday life but does not 
reflect it in a direct way. [p.52.] 
7. ibid. p.51. Pearce goes on to 
say that: 
The freak show and the collection of natural curiosities, 
once familiar features of the fairground, and popular 
spectacles amongst the commercial entertainments that 
assembled outside the official sites of international exposi-
tions or world fairs, remind us that we are drawn to the 
shocking and the alien and all too easily entertained by our 
own discomfort and fear.8 Although the freak show as 
such is rightly very much out of favour, the modern 
waxworks, in its more gory and mythical moments, plays 
on similar responses and remains as popular as ever.9
The public gallery (from the Italian galleria) persists in 
two principal forms: the modern art gallery or art museum, 
and the shopping mall and its antecedents - the 
department store and the shopping arcade.10 The spatial 
archetypes of the art museum owe their origins to the 
galleria (1) the long side-lit room hung with paintings and 
(2) the enfilade of rooms arranged off a central space which 
was often top-lit (a feature later extended to all rooms to 
maximise hanging wall space).11
The archive remains an essential modern form that 
differs from its original only in the technology that has 
become integral to the process of documentation and 
retrieval. It also exists in a radically new form, the 
computer database, a virtual form that relies wholly on the 
electronic reality of cyberspace and the interface provided 
by the computer screen and keyboard and the modem.12
The depository, as treasury, cellar, granary and 
warehouse, is perhaps the most ancient of all forms. It 
provides the model for the great reference and resource 
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11. See BRAWNE, M. The 
Museum Interior. Thames and 
Hudson, 1982 And the discussion 
of the ideal form of a museum in 
the development of the National 
Archaeological Museum, Amman, 
Jordan in BRAWNE, M. From 
Idea to Building. Butterworth 
Architecture, 1992, pp.174-90. 
 
10. MacKEITH, Margaret. The 
History and Conservation of 
Shopping Arcades. Mansell 
Publishing, 1986. The renais-
sance model for the arcade was 
probably provided by Brun-
elleschi's Foundling Hospital of 
1419 in Florence. The central 
court with galleried upper floors 
was a later development of the 
Italian and French form of 
apartments above arcaded 
shops. The original Royal Exch-
ange of 1568 in London and its 
competitor to the west, the 
New Exchange of 1609, provided 
a model for a wide variety of 
merchant's exchanges in Britain 
for the next 300 years. 
9. For example, London shows 
such as the London Dungeon, 
Royal Britain, and the Tower 
Pageant, 
 
 
Yet, by the end of the century, 
fairs were to be actively promoted 
as an aid rather than a threat to 
public order. ... The primary site 
for this transformation of fairs 
and the conduct of their publics ... 
was supplied by the fair zones of 
the late-nineteenth-century expos-
itions. ... The product of the 
initiative of popular showmen 
and private traders eager to 
exploit the market the expositions 
supplied, they consisted largely of 
an ad hoc melange of both new 
(mechanical rides) and tradition 
- al popular entertainments 
(freak shows, etc.) ... [p.86] 
collections.13 Today the bulk of most museum collections 
remains in storage, a fact which is not entirely accounted 
for by lack of exhibition space.14 Many collections contain 
material which, though unsuitable for display, is deliber-
ately acquired to further an encyclopaedic purpose. Such 
ambitions characterize the museum as depository and 
survive enshrined in collecting policies of institutions such 
as the British Museum, and the Natural History 
Museum.15 The largest proportion of these vast ‘hidden’ 
collections receive only the minimum attention required to 
ensure their survival - documentation, secure storage, 
stable environment and periodic inspection.16
As in the case of the Royal Institution, systematic 
study based on the collection of comprehensive material 
evidence provided a central object to many of the museums 
that were founded in response to the Enlightenment 
revision of knowledge.17 Amongst more recently estab-
lished museums it is often those whose collections are the 
most representative of the encyclopaedic ambition that are 
also the most committedly engaged in or most active in 
supporting research.18 Since the 1980s emphasis has shifted 
from the former to the latter method of pursuing research 
in British national museums but the image of the museum 
as research establishment remains a powerful one partic-
ularly to the academic community.19
The explicitly educational purpose of many museums 
founded in the 19th century was often combined with aims 
focussed on national identity and improvement.20 In many 
European countries museums of national culture were 
created whilst in the UK the larger regional museums 
already housed the collections able to support such a 
mission and collectively served a similar purpose.21 The 
museum as cultural and educational institution now rarely 
seeks to serve such an explicit nationalistic purpose as 
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Representation of the empirical 
world was to be effected by lan-
guage which bore a transparent 
relationship to things, At this 
time, words, rather than repre-
senting thought, were understood 
to represent material things. Thus 
it was thought that it would be 
possible to form a ‘universal’ 
Comparison, a methodical order-
ing observation and measure-
ment of phenomena, was to 
provide the basis for a reform of 
knowledge: 
13. HOOPER-GREENHILL, 
1992. In Ch.6. “The Repository 
of the Royal Society” Hooper-
Greenhill discusses the 
Foucauldian notion of the class-
ical episteme in relation to the 
collecting activities of the Royal 
Society (founded in 1660). 
Resemblance as a primary func-
tion of empirical knowledge was 
now perceived to be muddled, 
confused and disordered. [p.134] 
 
The technologies used to achieve 
these aims are invariably com-
puter-based, and the possibili-
ties they introduce for facilitate-
ing direct public access to collec-
tion information in exhibitions 
are being explored, for example: 
the Micro Gallery in the new 
Sainsbury wing of the National 
Gallery in London. 
Museums Association, Muse-
ums Yearbook, 1993-94, p.279. 
to promote excellence in all 
aspects of documentation by: the 
development of documentation 
standards; the provision of 
encouragement and advice, to 
increase the pool of documenta-
tion knowledge, expertise and 
resources within the museum 
community as a whole: and to 
facilitate best practice, especially 
in small museums ... 
12. The Museum Documentation 
Association aims: 
industrial improvement. It is more likely to pursue a 
popular cultural object, such as the media, 22 or a broader 
educational mission such as the public understanding of 
science,23 or simply to serve as a focus for cultural events.24
 
If we focus on the institution that we now formally identify 
as the museum, and if each form persists in some more or 
less expected place, we may also recognize a collectivity of 
qualities drawn from these forms and also the tensions 
between them that arise out of their contradictory 
discourses. We should then be wary of any proposition that 
appears to synthesize the museum in systemic terms. 
Whenever we look at a social institution as complex 
and as difficult to pin down as the museum perhaps we 
should recall the arguments Mumford used in The Conduct 
of Life to expose the fallacy of ‘systems’ - by which he 
meant primarily philosophical and political systems that 
are characterized by their prescription of ideology that 
artificially reduces the complexities and uncertainties of 
life - and expound the need for “organic syncretism”.25 
Alexander described the museum pluralistically: 
...we may think of the museum as collection, the museum as 
conservation, the museum as research, the museum as exhibi-
tion, the museum as interpretation, the museum as cultural 
centre, and the museum as social instrument.26
and captured in the title of his seminal work - Museums in 
Motion - their purposeful, responsive, and changing 
nature. Following the developments of the 1980s, both in 
the field of museum planning, organization and design, 
and of museology, Alexander’s attempt at an encom-
passing statement may now seem too narrow and 
orthodox. We may now also think of the museum as 
enterprise,27 the museum as development,28 the museum as 
media,29 the museum as event,30 the museum as disciplinary  
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mechanism,31 the museum as virtual realities32 and, as if to 
reflexively invalidate the whole notion of a museum, the 
museum as ideology.33 Many of these typifications can be 
traced back to particular institutions, projects or 
movements some of which predate Alexander’s observa-
tions. It is simply that we look at them with eyes condi-
tioned by our changed understandings of the world. If the 
notion of pluralism seemed quite novel in relation to such 
institutions as museums in 1979 when the bulk of the 
museums professional community were still desperately 
seeking a unifying definition of “museum”,34 and a coordi-
nating national (in some quarters, supranational) cultural 
policy,35 fifteen years on, it seems unavoidable. After as 
many years administration in the UK under a single 
political party, after economic boom followed by the most 
severe recession since the 1930s, after the effective removal 
of philosophical foundations and the working through of 
many of the implications for praxis (including museum 
practice), after the general crisis of identity in many of the 
ex-communist countries of eastern Europe, ex-colonial 
countries of Africa and East Asia, and the war torn 
Middle-East... after the possibility of complacency has 
been replaced by the alternatives of cultural anaesthesia or 
psychosis, and that of ideological certainty by a profound 
sense of uncertainty and difference, the need to develop a 
radical pluralism and to accommodate the incommen-
surable through open and continuing conversation has 
become a priority.36
Clearly collection items are on 
average about 15 times more 
densely packed into storage 
spaces than into exhibition 
spaces. The size of this different-
tial is a recent phenomenon. 
Since the 1960s the proportion of 
exhibition space devoted to inter-
pretive material and supporting 
structure has dramatically 
increased and as a consequence 
the density of collection material 
diminished. The change has been 
most marked in natural history 
museums where many systematic 
specimen displays have been 
However, on average only about 
20% of collections are on perma-
nent display with 80% in store. 
See: Figure 2 in LORD, Barry., 
Gail Dexter LORD & John 
NICKS. The Cost of Collecting. 
HMSO, 1989. pp.18-20. 
See: Figure 2.18 in PRINCE, 
David R. & Bernadette Higgins-
McLoughlin. Museums UK: The 
Findings of the Museums Data-
Base Project. Museums Associ-
ation, 1987. pp.43-4. 
14. On average a little over 65% 
of space in museums is devoted 
to permanent and temporary 
exhibitions, whilst a little less 
than 15% is devoted to storage. 
 
The Royal Society became a pub-
lic institution and its Repository 
the object of experimental sci-
ence conceived as a communal 
pursuit of knowledge following 
Baconian ideals, and a collection 
that was to become “a complete 
system of solid philosophy” 
ORNSTEIN, M. The Role of 
Scientific Societies in the 
Seventeenth Century Chicago, 
1938, p.109. quoted by Hooper-
Greenhill, p.147. 
collection of material things that 
would be identical in classification 
to the ‘universal’ language. [p.145] 
Museums have responded to this need. They have 
changed by moving simultaneously in a variety of direc-
tions, without losing their sense of ‘community’ and, ironi-
cally perhaps, without losing the ability to voice common 
purposes when politically and socially necessary. If there is 
an ideology of museum it is one that operates on a meta-
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17. In the UK the British 
Museum, founded in 1753, is the 
most famous example. During 
the 19th century it was split to 
form separate departments, one 
of which has since gained some 
autonomy - the Museum of 
Mankind (Department of 
 
16. It should be noted however 
that the first of these require-
ments, documentation, by which 
a museum may know (minimal-
ly) what it has, where it is, and 
who owns it, is not fulfilled by 
every museum. In 1987 the pro-
portion of museums with docu-
mentation for over 90% of their 
collections was relatively small: 
about half of museums had 
accession records; about a third 
had adequate catalogue records; 
and about a quarter had indexes 
or some other information 
retrieval facility. See: Figures: 
3.12, 3.13, & 3.14. in PRINCE 
& HIGGINS-McLOUGHLIN, 
1987. pp.70-3. 
 
WILSON, David M. The British 
Museum: Purpose and Politics. 
Trustees of the British Museum, 
1989. p.24. 
In most museums there is an 
assumption that no parts of the 
collections can be disposed of in 
the British Museum this 
assumption is backed by Act of 
Parliament. 
15. The British Museum's collec-
tions have a world-wide scope 
and once acquired an item is 
held in perpetuity. 
 
replaced by multi-media educa-
tional environments in which a 
combination of models, diorama, 
graphic communications, audio-
visual presentations, and inter-
active information technology, 
are the norm and ‘real’ collection 
items a rarity. 
level, able to survive in the liberal capitalist as easily as in 
the social democratic, the nationalist or the plutocratic 
environment. It is an ideology that doesn’t appear “closed, 
dogmatic and inflexible” or as “teleological, ‘totalitarian’ 
and metaphysically grounded”.37 It has responded to 
postmodern critique and been strengthened by it in a 
surprising way. It has allowed the museum to (re)discover 
its basic creativity. 
Meanings are not constant, the construction of meaning can 
always be undertaken again, in new contexts and with new 
functions. The radical potential of museums lies in precisely this. 
As long as museums and galleries remain the repositories of 
artefacts and specimens, new relationships can always be built, 
new meanings can always be discovered, new interpretations 
with new relevances can be found, new codes and new rules 
can be written.38
Institution 
If the designer has been a ‘chameleon’ in post-War times so 
too has the museum and specifically the museum curator. 
The creativity that each has shown in responding to 
political, economic, cultural and technological change shows 
certain parallels. Demand for consolidation creates the 
archivist and connoisseur, for expansion and collection, the 
planner and entrepreneur, for economic stringency and 
consumer satisfaction, the business manager and mark-
eting executive, for cultural divergence and democrati-
zation, the artist, educator and facilitator. The proposition 
is that the museum is a model creative organization with as 
much in common with the design company, the systems 
consultancy, the university, and the film production 
company as with the warehouse, the shop, the library, and 
the cinema. Every output of a museum is the result of 
creative communicative processes and not merely those of 
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18. For example, the National 
Maritime Museum, founded in 
1934, is a designated repository 
for many forms of maritime 
archival material such as ships 
plans. It has an excellent library, 
extensive archives, a large collec-
tion of prints and historic pho-
tographs and considerable reserve 
collections, [it is] an inter-
national centre for historical 
research, and is the largest and 
finest institution of its kind any-
where in the world. 
DANIEL, C St J H. “Introduc-
tion” in GREENHILL, Basil 
(Ed.) The National Maritime 
Museum. Philip Wilson, 1982, 
pp.5-10.] 
However, in respect of research 
other than for exhibition projects 
and collection management pur-
poses, the museum’s staff now 
concentrates its efforts on pro-
viding access to and facilitating 
the research of visiting scholars, 
independent programme makers 
and researchers from industry 
and government departments 
rather than on conducting 
research programmes of their 
own. (This had already become 
policy in the year I left the 
Museum, 1986.) 
 
19. PARR, A. E. Mostly About 
Museums. The American 
Museum of Natural History, 
1959. Parr discusses the 
 
Ethnography, 1970) - and two 
others independence - the 
Natural History Museum (1881) 
which includes the Geological 
Museum, and the British 
Library (of which the British 
Museum Library was only one of 
several contributing national 
libraries, 1973). See: MILLER, 
Edward. That Noble- Cabinet: a 
history of the British Museum. 
Ohio University Press, 1974. 
ordering and display. In the dynamic situation in which the 
museum finds itself, it must continually change, in social 
and physical terms, in relation to its ‘environment’, and this 
defines a wide range of possible organizational arrange-
ments and images whilst requiring that these adapt easily 
without jeopardizing longer term or central purposes. 
Given Checkland’s rationale for soft systems method-
ology, the museum would seem to be an ideal subject for 
this approach to organizational design - it is a social 
system that has purposes, a perceived need for change, and 
represents a problem situation in which many different 
ways of defining ‘problems’ coexist and precise outputs are 
difficult to prescribe.39 However, it is also true that the 
procedure of developing a root definition, one that appears 
relevant in some representational or analogical sense for 
any specific museum, and of treating this as an hypothesis 
concerning improvement of the problem situation, raises 
the issue of what kind of simplification of the situation is 
acceptable in practice. The myth and the model each have 
an attenuating function in understanding and praxis.40 The 
metaphorical role of any image in initiating the creative 
process is, in theory, arbitrary and temporary, a jumping 
off point which does not necessarily need to serve as a 
reference point, but then there need not be a formal 
(fixed) reference point at all. The proposition, in soft 
systems methodology, that a coherent and functional 
conceptual model should develop with reference to the 
formal system concept and/or with admired examples, 
constrains the entire process to one of reinterpretation and 
simulation, and I doubt that this can be adequate to the 
situation of multifaceted change, of plural image, such as 
we find in ‘chameleon’ organizations such as the museum, 
the design company and the film production company. 
Perhaps Mumford’s organic syncretism interpreted as 
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contemporary source quoted in 
DAVIES, Stuart, By the Gains of 
Industry. Birmingham Museums 
and Art Gallery 1885-1985 
Birmingham Museums and Art 
Gallery, 1985, p.15. 
Following the opening of the 
gallery the Purchase committee 
continued to use the limited 
funds at its disposal: 
to secure such works and Art 
research function of natural his-
tory museums before any other. 
In relation to research the muse-
um of natural history has a dual 
set of functions to perform. It 
serves as an archive for the 
preservation of the evidence of 
conclusions already arrived at. It 
is also expected to form the center 
of active research towards new 
conclusions. These dual purposes 
are not in harmony but in com-
petition, each being a burden 
upon the other. [p.10] 
At the Natural History Museum 
in London, long established pri-
marily as a research institution, 
the public services department, 
uniquely amongst Britain’s 
national museums, is wholly 
responsible for the planning and 
development of exhibitions and 
the provision of education ser-
vices. In a quite separate opera-
tion ...behind the scenes scien-
tists work on the 67 million spec-
imens which make up the nation's 
natural history collections. 
Museums Association, Museums 
Yearbook, 1993-94, pp.152-3. 
 
20. For example, even before 
Birmingham City Museums and 
Art Galleries came into exis-
tence collections were being 
assembled to: 
... be the means of educating the 
tastes of those upon whom the 
reputation of Birmingham man-
ufactures chiefly depends.  
process would come closer to the mark. The problem we 
might foresee with an iterative process that works at first 
at high speed and low resolution and later, after 
comparisons with the real world situation and, in the case 
of a museum, with institutional expectations, at slower 
speed and higher resolution, is that the site of the slowing 
action would inevitably find itself diverging from the 
dynamic museum/design interval and, therefore, intro-
ducing ‘adequate’ detail to a model no longer based on an 
appropriate root definition. 
Milieux 
When we talk of museum organization it is as well to 
remember that one third of all museums in the UK have no 
full-time staff, that the average number of staff (full-time, 
part-time and volunteer) in a museum is just 20, and that 
the average number of full-time curatorial staff can be 
estimated at about 1.25 (6.23% of all museum workers).41 A 
very large number (possibly the majority) of museums run 
with only one qualified curator and in a significant number 
of these museums that person may be employed and paid by 
a museum service to which the museum subscribes rather 
than by the museum itself. The role of enthusiasts and 
volunteers is therefore of crucial interest in very many 
museums. The tenuousness of funding arrangements and 
institutional status are also major concerns. And the 
looseness and lack of formal power relations in the structure 
of the workforce, and the impact this may have on the devel-
opment and use of collections and their subsequent formal 
organization and care, are by no means unproblematic. 
It would be a mistake to believe that museum profes-
sionals, even those not involved on a consultancy basis 
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21. The Hungarian National 
Museum is: 
...one of the most remarkable 
examples... ‘founded ... as part of 
the movement to preserve 
Hungarian historic traditions 
and to instil greater appreciation 
of the Hungarian language and 
culture’. The architectural style of 
the National Museum in Helsinki 
served to emphasize Finish cul-
tural autonomy during the period 
of Russian control. The National 
Museum of Ireland is one 
amongst a few that celebrates the 
‘struggle to freedom with the dis-
play of personal effects of heros of 
revolutions, risings or rebellions’. 
WILSON, Sir David M. 
“National Museums” in 
THOMPSON, 1992, pp.82-3. 
It is no accident that England 
contains no national museum of 
antiquities, history or natural 
history in the continental 
European style: rather, attention 
was paid to an Empire and fur-
ther afield The result is a lack of 
nationalistic expression in the 
national museums. It is this, 
however, that provides such 
strength to the predominantly 
regional museums centred on 
such major centres as Bristol, Lei-
cester and Sheffield. Much of the 
country’s national heritage is in 
the provinces and this accounts 
for the richness of many of the 
provincial collections.  
LEWIS, Geoffrey. “Introduct-
ion”, ibid, p.1. 
 
22. For example, The Museum 
of the Moving Image, in London 
and the National Museum of 
Collections as they considered 
likely to prove valuable for edu-
cational purposes and which they 
were able to obtain at reasonable 
cost. 
contemporary source, ibid, p.29. 
 
through a museum service, but employed part or full time by 
the museum, are automatically able to exercise the expert 
curatorial skills for which they are ostensibly employed.42 A 
hands-on intimacy with large parts of a collection over an 
extended period of time, intensive and detailed research and 
documentation activity, the writing of exhibition planning 
proposals, scripts and outline design briefs/programmes, and 
the selection of collection material, organization of loans and 
transport and handling of items for display, these are activi-
ties in which the curator will be rarely, if ever, engaged. The 
curator in such situations is largely involved in a creative 
organizational function, which involves information broking, 
training, liaison with governing and funding bodies and 
statutory authorities, and the direction of technical 
programmes. What is true in the majority, small, indepen-
dent, museums is, for a variety of reasons, also true in many 
larger, publicly run museums. The curator is no longer the 
privileged, leisurely, connoisseur that many once were but 
rather has become an administrator, an advocate, and a 
coordinator, and is increasingly in competition with a 
variety of others from specialist backgrounds for this 
executive role in any museum organization. 
As a direct result of the Hale Report on training and 
career structure in museums an independent body, the 
Museum Training Institute (MTI), was set up in 1989 to 
develop training standards for all museum workers. Until 
this point the Museums Diploma, run by the Museums 
Association, and the Master of Arts degrees offered by the 
Universities of Leicester and Manchester were the only 
recognised professional qualifications and were specifically 
aimed at curators.43 A number of specialist courses were 
also available in conservation, and one course at 
Humberside offered an undergraduate museum design 
qualification.44 The first director of the MTI, Simon 
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Roodhouse, made it clear that the ambition of the new 
training framework was to facilitate the development of an 
integrated museum career structure - he saw no reason 
why, in the future, a museum attendant should not be able 
to rise to the post of museum director.45
 
23. COPUS (the Committee 
for the Public Understanding of 
Science) is associated with a 
wide variety of museum-based 
programmes, and particularly 
with initiatives taken by the 
Science Museum in London 
which include the joint funding 
with Imperial College London 
of a Professorship in the public 
understanding of science, and 
the running of all-night science 
events for school parties at the 
Science Museum. Several inde-
pendent museums put education 
at the centre of all that they do, 
for example, Eureka!, the chil-
dren’s museum in Halifax, 
Catalyst, the museum of the 
Chemical Industry in Widnes, 
and ARC, the Archaeological 
Resource Centre in York. 
 
24. Although it is quite common 
for museums to run lecture, con-
cert, and film series as an 
adjunct to the ‘central’ public 
activity of exhibition, some pro-
mote a broader cultural prog-
ramme as their raison d'etre. 
Probably the best example of 
this approach is the Pompidou 
Centre in Paris. On one of his 
earliest drawings the architect 
Richard Rogers called it: 
‘a building for culture, informa-
tion and entertainment’ ...By 
keeping this transparent, flexible, 
and welcoming space open late 
into the evening and filling it 
with life, food, and drink, as well 
as books, art, film, and lectures, 
the museum's leaders ...were indeed 
providing ‘entertainment’ that mat-
ched anything currently available 
in Paris or perhaps in the world. 
DAVIS, Douglas. The Museum 
Transformed. New York: 
Abbeville Press, 1990. p.41 
Photography, Film and Tele-
vision in Bradford. 
The diversification of specialists involved in museum 
work has changed the nature of museum organization in 
one particular sense. The reflection of collection structure 
in functional structure, a one-dimensional construct that 
previously almost guaranteed the curator a leadership role, 
has begun to disappear. The Bains Report of 1972 observed 
that Local Authority museum structure in the 1960s “con-
sisted essentially of a ‘vertical’ structure of separate prof-
essional departments” in this arrangement the majority of 
collection-based disciplines effectively ran their own show 
with “no horizontal co-ordination of policymaking or imple-
mentation; no ‘corporate identity’ ” (Figure 3.3.1.) Much 
the same was true in the National Museums (Figure 3.3.2). 
Director 
Local History 
Fine Art 
Applied Art 
Natural History Exhibition Administration 
Technology Education Publicity 
Archaeology 
Figure 3.3.1 
  
Local Authority Museum staff structure (adapted from Diamond in 
THOMPSON, 1992.) 
  
Director 
Pictures 
Ships 
Archaeological 
Research 
Weapons & 
Antiquities 
Conservation Administration 
(incl. Security & 
museum shops) 
Printed Books 
& Manuscripts 
Museum Services 
(incl. Education  
& Design) 
Public 
Relations 
Navigation & 
Astronomy 
Deputy Director 
Figure 3.3.2 
  
National Maritime Museum staff structure c1980. 
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Actual historic institutions, for-
tunately, have been modified by 
anomalies, discrepancies, contra-
dictions, compromises: the older 
they are, the richer the organic 
compost ...it is their weakness that 
is their saving strength. [p.176-7] 
The organic syncretism he pro-
motes requires a balance to be 
achieved between the scope for 
human initiative and the princi-
ples of ‘natural’ organization 
which allow for growth, dynamic 
responsiveness, and solidarity. 
This view is based on a reassess-
ment of Romanticism which 
“sought to undermine the whole 
mechanical conception of human 
improvement”. [p.233] 
 
26. ALEXANDER, 1979, p.14-5. 
 
27. The Jorvik Viking Centre in 
York opened in 1984 having 
organized the archaeological pro-
ject centred on Coppergate in 
such a way as make the original 
excavation a public spectacle. 
The success of this approach 
resulted in a purpose-built muse-
um completely enclosing the site 
and incorporating it as a perma-
nent feature of the exhibition. 
The exhibition itself pioneered 
the ‘dark ride’ concept (an up-
market version of the traditional 
ghost-ride or tunnel-of-love fair-
ground attractions) - a method of 
attracting a large audience, of 
managing a rapid throughput of 
visitors, and of providing a high 
quality, entertaining and educa-
tional experience. Through 
25. MUMFORD, Lewis. The 
Conduct o f Life. Martin Secker & 
Warburg, 1952. p.175-180 & 232-
235. Mumford warns against  
the fallacy of over-simplification 
that is involved in the very conce-
ption and application of a system 
[p.176] And notes that: 
During the 1980s some authorities adopted the Bains 
model which created a coordinating head for all ‘academic’ 
services (the collection-based departments) and another for 
‘museum’ services (administration, exhibitions, education, 
security) (Figure 3.3.3.) 
Director 
Folk Life 
Archaeology Natural History 
Technology 
Administration  Exhibition 
Education  Publicity 
Fine Art 
Applied Art 
Security 
Public Services Academic Services 
Figure 3.3.3 
  
Post-Bains museum staff structure (adapted from Diamond in 
THOMPSON,1992.) 
  
Independent museums meanwhile provided another model 
which has since been adapted by some national museums 
to suit their size and trustee status. Independent charitable 
trusts usually associated administration with the director's 
office and created a single curatorial department on the 
same level as commercial, finance, and volunteer/project 
departments each with a head who was part of the policy-
making and coordinating team (Figure 3.3.4.) 
Director 
Commercial Activities Finance & 
Sponsorship 
Government Agency Schemes 
& Volunteer co-ordination 
Curatorial Services 
Administration 
Figure 3.3.4 
  
Charitable trust museum staff structure (adapted from Diamond in 
THOMPSON, 1992.) 
  
The National Maritime Museum in Greenwich first began 
radical reorganization in 1984 and by 1987 had developed a 
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structure in which there was a single collections depart-
ment, a museum-wide technical services department, a 
marketing department responsible for all commercial 
activities, fund-raising and public relations, and an admin-
istration department. Added to this was the facility for a 
special projects group to which staff from anywhere in the 
museum could be seconded and whose head reported 
directly to the museum director (Figure 3.3.5.)46
‘enterprise’, (an example of 
Thatcherite jargon) a combin-
ation of business orientation and 
innovation, the unpromising 
subject of rescue archaeology 
was turned into a high-profile 
and profitable (almost unheard 
of before the mid-1980s) inde-
pendent museum. 
 
28. The Manchester Museum of 
Science and Industry (founded 
1983) developed on the site of 
five semi-derelict buildings, 
including the world's oldest rail-
way station, near central 
Manchester - an area in which 
property and land values were 
depressed, infrastructure decay-
ing, and businesses long moved 
to other areas of the city. The 
museum development has 
become an attractor for more 
widespread regeneration. 
 
29. In 1993 the Liverpool 
Museum became the focus of an 
international media event: the 
Jason IV Project involved live 
satellite link up with an under-
water exploration project in the 
Sea of Cortes off Baja California, 
Mexico. A succession of school, 
college and invited audiences 
were able to talk directly to 
divers and workers on the project 
and to see live television pictures 
of the work. The project was also 
featured on broadcast television. 
In the museum exhibitions visi-
tors can also use two-way closed 
circuit television to observe and 
quiz conservators and techni-
cians working in the museum’s 
laboratories and studios. 
 
30. The Museum of the Moving 
Image (1988) introduced into its 
exhibitions actors whose brief 
included involving the visitor in 
Director 
Conservation & 
Technical Services 
Marketing 
(commercial 
activities, 
sponsorship, 
public relations
Figure 3.3.5 
  
National Maritime Museum staff structure c1986. 
  
The past 25 years has seen a development and profession-
alization not only of curatorship, but also of management, 
education, public relations, marketing, conservation and 
design. This means that in effect we must consider 
museum organization as increasingly multidimensional. It 
is as if ‘curator’ no longer denotes the job title of a partic-
ular kind of qualified individual, but rather denotes a 
professional nexus, one which embraces a specific range of 
specialist functions at the same time as implying their 
coordinated expression in praxis. This raises the possibility 
of structures that are more contingent upon the stage of an 
institution’s development, the nature of its projects, the 
dominant cultural and political influences, and the different 
communicative processes that are necessarily emphasized 
in changing circumstances. 
 
& education 
Administration 
(personnel, 
finance & 
security 
Special Projects 
(Information 
Project Group) 
Collections 
(management, 
research & 
exhibitions) 
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31. The Foucauldian analysis of 
the “exhibitionary complex” 
(Bennett, 1988) and of the mus-
eum (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992) 
both expose the senses in which 
the exhibition can be understood 
as a complex of disciplinary tech-
nologies that “survey, classify, 
and control time, space, bodies, 
and things” (Hooper-Greenhill, 
p.170.] and as systems that in the 
same moment allow the public: 
to see and be seen, to survey yet 
always be under surveillance, the 
object of an unknown but con-
trolling look: in these ways, as 
micro-worlds rendered constant-
ly visible to themselves, exposi-
tions [and museums and depart-
ment stores] realized some of the 
ideals of panopticism in transform-
ing the crowd into a constantly 
surveyed, self-watching, self-regu-
lating ...consistently orderly public 
- a society watching over itself. 
[Bennett, p.81.] 
dramatic set pieces. Although 
the notion of the docent (an edu-
cational guide), the costumed 
interpreter, and other versions 
of the `human label' have been 
used in museums since their 
beginnings - the British Museum 
first used guides on its opening 
to the public in 1759: 
No more than ten tickets were ever 
to be delivered for each hour of 
admittance, and parties, limited to 
five in number, were conducted 
round each department in turn ... 
MILLER, Edward. That Noble 
Cabinet: A History of the British 
Museum. Ohio University Press, 
1974. p.63. 
“The first true outdoor museum,” 
Skansen (Stockholm) used “cost-
umed craftsmen, musicians, dan-
cers and interpreters” from 1891. 
ALEXANDER, 1979, pp.10-11. 
Manifestations 
In the museum, at one and the same site, we encounter 
designed objects (socially constructed material culture) at 
all stages of the production-consumption process. 
Museums are not just where selected objects end up at the 
end of the process. They are responsible for the design and 
production of certain kinds of products - buildings, exhibi-
tions, systems (documentation, conservation, loans admin-
istration, etc.), information (databases, books, reports, 
articles and letters), and institutional organization. They 
are the site of distribution-consumption of. ‘experiences’ - 
exhibition visits, audiovisual shows, lectures, events and 
activities; publicity and promotional material; educational 
packages and programmes; and souvenirs, reproductions, 
books, pamphlets, videos, records and posters. And they 
are involved in selecting, preserving and recycling certain 
kinds of material culture and associated information in the 
form of museum collections and archives. This latter 
process justifies the position given to the museum institu-
tion in the Production-consumption model of the design 
history field but clearly,47 if our focus rather than being on 
the object of design history (the ontological focus) was to be 
on the institution itself as a site of design-based activity 
(an epistemological focus), the museum would serve as a 
model of the whole process in microcosm (Figure 3.3.6.) 
Discourses 
The Rortian idea of ‘conversation’ is what might be 
regarded as a liberal, academic ideal that comes close to 
realization only in those kinds of practical situations in 
which practitioners of epistemologically diverse disciplines 
….. 
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Figure 3.3.6 
  
The field of museum design (developed from the Production-consumption model in Walker, 1989) 
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but which failed. Museologists 
such as Pearce and Hooper-
Greenhill, who engaged with 
structuralism and Foucauldian 
genealogy, replaced the ‘neutral 
conception’ of ideology implicit 
in earlier thinking with a ‘crit-
ical conception’ that: 
sees ideology as acting to main-
tain domination through asym-
metrical power relations, by rep-
resenting sectional interests as 
universal, by denying contradic-
tions, and by naturalising the 
present. [P.14] 
Museums, through their produc-
tions of knowledge and presenta-
tions - exhibitions in particular, 
“select certain material” and 
structure particular messages 
32. The theatre of the Blitz 
Experience and the simulation of 
Operation Jerico at the Imperial 
War Museum, the virtual collec-
tion of the Micro Gallery at the 
National Gallery, and Carrier at 
the Fleet Air Arm Museum 
which incorporates a simulated 
helicopter flight to the deck of 
an aircraft carrier. 
 
33. See: MERRIMAN, Nick. 
Beyond the Glass Case. Leicester 
University Press, 1991. pp.13-
16. The value-laden nature of 
interpretation is a recent redis-
covery in museology. Since the 
1920s, when the discipline of 
historiography was first intro-
duced, historians and archaeolo-
gists had broadly accepted that 
interpretation reflects the social 
conditions in which it is pro-
duced. However, the archaeology 
which so definitively influenced 
other areas of material cultural 
study in the 1960s and 70s was 
one which attempted: 
to formulate a general cultural 
science and an objective, value-
free approach to the writing of the 
past [P.13] 
are required to accommodate each other’s views and 
projects in the process of achieving a common (group or 
social) project. In the museum the exhibition project repre-
sents a good example of the requirement for radical multi-
disciplinarity. To simplify and give an artificially hard edge 
to the description of the project team, the conservator (as 
project technician), the designer (as project interpreter), 
and the curator (as project director) each begin with a 
professional object - a mode of understanding, specific 
skills and a strategy for intervening in practical situations - 
that differs in kind from the those of other two. 
The conservator’s allegiance is to empirical scientific 
method coupled with precise manual technique. Museum 
conservation is like a modern surgical practice in ‘treating’ 
its object and progressing technique through: the careful 
testing of procedures and materials; the development of 
technologies; and the publication of findings in specialist 
journals dealing with conservation science and practice. 
The designer’s allegiance is to creative visual practice 
in the context of project management and wide ranging 
communication skills. Design combines, at different 
moments in the process, the imaginative and expressive 
dimensions of artistic endeavour and the methodical, 
analytical and diplomatic dimensions of business practice, 
treating its object by turns as an exercise in visionary 
conjecture and as a problem-defining and problem-solving 
process associated with analyses of a problem situation. 
Design develops, largely as an incommunicable personal 
achievement, through the accommodation of contradictory 
stimuli and experiences, and the repeated risk of trusting 
to untested responses and the unpredictable procedure of 
resolving their implications. Traditionally design know-
ledge is largely tacit and embedded in its visual documents 
and the evidence of designed objects.  
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35. In 1977 most British muse-
um curators watched enviously 
the development of SAMDOK, 
the Swedish national policy on 
national heritage, which set an 
explicit agenda and resolved a 
wide range of issues concerning 
the collecting, documentation, 
and preservation responsibilities 
of a wide range of institutions 
including museums. It was only 
in 1993 that the Department for 
National Heritage was formed 
and in 1994 that the intention 
to review the need for cultural 
policy was announced. This has 
been necessitated by the launch 
of a National Lottery rather 
than by any transformation in 
the political climate. 
 
36. The achievement of “solidar-
ity” through the mutual “accom-
modation” of difference is the 
meta-ideology of both Bern-
stein’s “new constellation” and 
Rorty’s “liberal ironism”. 
BERNSTEIN, R. J. The New 
Constellation. Polity Press, 1991. 
which, in their attenuation of 
undifferentiated detail and 
focussing of dominant mytholo-
gies, tend to perpetuate the 
values and power of the estab-
lished institutions, of industrial 
culture and politics. 
 
34. Although the rather cumber-
some (in English translation) 
International Council of 
Museums’ definition was pro-
mulgated in 1974, the Museums 
Association in the UK did not 
agree its universal definition of 
a museum until ten years later: 
A museum is an institution which 
collects, documents, preserves, 
exhibits and interprets material 
evidence and associated inform-
ation for the public benefit. 
Museums Association, 1984. 
 
The curator’s allegiances are two-fold: (1) to an 
academic discipline such as anthropology, history, archae-
ology, biology, engineering, art history, etc., particularly to 
an aspect of such a discipline that takes as its epistemolog-
ical object ‘material culture’ - the world of ‘things’ and the 
documentary evidence we associate with the life and 
organization of things; and (2) to a professional ethos, 
which holds that an holistic, socially responsible, histori-
cally informed approach is required to the selection, 
preservation and institutionalized exploitation of material 
culture, and requires practice to be governed by an ideally 
universal ethical code that overrides all contingent 
commercial and political interests.48
Although, in practice, individuals normally contend 
with more than one of these praxio-logics - there is a bit of 
the conservator and the designer and the curator in almost 
every museum person - it would be rare indeed (if not 
psychologically risky) not to have a dominant mode of 
thinking and acting. Having set up a typology, which to 
some degree caricatures reality, it may also serve to clarify 
the nature of some of the discourses that have been elabo-
rated in recent times. In one view, the curator, as a type, 
has given birth to the conservator and the designer. They 
practice specialisms which have developed and expanded 
aspects of curatorship. An alternative view is that the 
curator has expanded the boundary of the museum to 
include scientific, managerial and creative practices that 
previously existed only outside its normal domain. 
Curatorship has thereby expanded by the accumulation of 
new practices rather than by a fragmentation and elabora-
tion of an existing practice. Neither point of view is ‘wrong’ 
as each reveals a positive discourse that is important to the 
museum process and to the relationship between the 
museum and its environment. 
 180 
There have been many examples of museum develop-
ments, that bear out the nurturing view of curatorship, 
that started as solitary visionary projects and grew out of 
the curator’s practice in an organic manner.49 However, at 
some point such projects generally reach a critical stage of 
development where the increasing scale of operations 
demands a dramatic change in approach to finance, 
functional organization, accommodation, public access, 
etc., demands a vastly increased interaction with the social, 
commercial and political environment and the formal-
ization of certain relationships. This might involve for 
instance meeting the requirements for MGC registration 
so that the museum may become eligible for various 
grants, awards, technical support schemes, etc.50 At such a 
turning point in a museum development a team of diverse 
specialists with the right spread of experience gained 
outside the museum can transform the situation from one 
of vulnerable stagnation into one of robust dynamism. 
It is the opus which demon-strates 
the work of collection and 
curation, and the creation of the 
lattice of reference and interrela-
tionship, which requires con-
trolled space for its exposition. 
... the curatorial work of selection 
and description and the design 
work of presentation play the 
crucial creative role. Exhibitions 
are works of imagination 
operating within an understood 
tradition of knowledge and inter-
pretation, and contributing their 
share towards both the mainte-
nance and the development of 
this tradition. [my emphases] 
PEARCE, 1992, pp. 139 & 141. 
 
39. CHECKLAND, Peter. 
Systems Thinking, Systems 
Practice. John Wiley, 1981. 
... its aim... was to ascertain to 
what extent systems concepts 
could be used in a helpful and 
coherent way to tackle problems 
which reside in social systems and 
are of their nature difficult to 
define. [p.150] 
The contents of such systems are 
so multivarious, and the influ-
ences to which they are subject so 
numerous that the passage of time 
always modifies the perception of 
the problem... It became clear that 
the... research was to be concern-
ed not with problems as such but 
RORTY, Richard. Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity. Camb-
ridge University Press, 1989. 
 
37. EAGLETON, Terry. 
Ideology: an introduction. Verso, 
1991. p.xii. 
 
38. HOOPER-GREENHILL, 
1992, p.215. Pearce makes this 
point in respect of the museum’s 
principal means of embodying 
and expressing its activity, the 
exhibition: 
Equally there have been many examples of museums 
that, having reached a kind of maturity, became vulnerable 
because of their size and complexity. The confident multi-
disciplinarity of which the accumulative view of curator-
ship speaks may be threatened and disrupted by external 
forces as easily as by an internal breakdown. At such times 
the visionary lead of the curator may serve as a re-
integrating force and as a seed from which a new dyna-
mism may grow.51
The key change of the 1980s in the nature of these curator-
ial positions is the degree to which they have become 
characterized by self-aware critical practice. It may no 
longer be true, as it was into the first half of this century, 
that the curator is typically an old and highly conservative 
man trapped in museum service by very low levels of pay 
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or else the son or nephew of a curator with the private 
means to support a life of connoisseurship and academic 
study and the social status that eases access to public 
office,52 but in the sense that the curator has benefitted 
from an academic higher education, most likely in an older 
university, has been able to afford the time (probably 
unpaid) to accumulate practical experience, and has been 
able to stay in or return to higher education to study for a 
higher degree, he or she is already a member of an 
academic and cultural elite, committed to an intellectual 
and non-industrial working mode, and imbued with the 
values and ideologies of an educated ‘class’, regardless of 
the social milieu of his or her formative years. 
 
43. HALE, Prof. Sir John. et al.
Museum Professional Training
and Career Structure. Report by
a working Party. Museums &
Galleries Commission, 1987.
30% of junior curatorial posts
were taken by graduates of these
two universities, see: 2.51 p.29. 
 
40. See above: 3.1 Organization:
Simplification and Adequacy,
also note 35. 
 
41. Statistics based on “Staffing
Profiles - Overview” in PRINCE
& HIGGINS-McLOUGHLIN,
1987. pp.78-80. and Figure 4.2.
“Proportion of total full-time 
staff employed in each activity,
by type of museum”, p.81. For
analysis see: Appendix 2a. 
 
42. The primary functions one
might expect a curator to per-
form, the management and
research of collections, turn out
to be minor or extremely frag-
mented activities. This is espe-
cially the case in smaller muse-
ums, but even in the relatively
small number of large museums,
where specialization has increa-
sed, only a minority of curators
is concerned with ‘core’ curato-
rial work. 
Curators in the smaller museum
services all indicated that they
had little or no direct contact with
collections on a day-to-day basis,
or were only able to do so by
insisting on setting apart blocks of
time for collections work. 
LORD, LORD & NICKS,
1989. p.51. 
with problem situations in which
there are felt to be unstructured
problems, ones in which the 
designation of objectives is itself
problematic. [p.155] 
An older museology (more properly a ‘museography’) 
allowed the curator to concentrate on perfecting methods 
without questioning the way that the purposes which they 
served were shaped by the prejudices, preconceptions, 
values and agendas of the privileged class to which he or 
she belonged. 
The new museology has brought into question form-
erly foundational notions about curatorial practice - that it 
could be objective, neutral, value-free, etc. Reflective 
practice now requires the curator to ask not only questions 
of what? and how? and when? but of who for? and why? 
The new museology is less about “museum methods” and 
more about “the purposes of museums” and it addresses 
not just an audience of ‘curators’, in the older generalist 
sense of the term, but an audience of ‘curatorial’ specialists 
including: director, curator, scholar, conservator, designer, 
educator and marketer, as well as a wider audience of 
academics and students of media and cultural studies, 
sociology and history.53
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44. Conservation has the best pre-
entry training provision - several 
specialist courses in each area:
archaeological material, easel paint-
ings, works of art on paper,
textiles, social/industrial history,
decorative and applied arts, and
sculpture. 
Exhibition design training began 
in Hull in 1947, since 1981 this has
formally included museum design
studies. It remains the only such
course in Europe. 
 
45. Speaking at a meeting of the
Yorkshire and Humberside
Federation of Museums and Art
Galleries, October 26, The Old 
Grammar School, Hull. 
 
46. See: DIAMOND, Michael.
“Personnel management” in
THOMPSON, 1992, pp. 159-62. 
 
47. See above: 3.2 Design:
Epistemological Object, note 25
and Figure 3.2.7. 
 
48. The Museums Association (UK)
maintains an ethics committee, in
1993-4 convened by Fellow of the
Association David T-D Clarke, and
has a published Code of Conduct for
Museum Professionals (Museums
Year-book 1993-4, pp.395 & 398-
402.) Professional museum associa-
tions in other countries follow
broadly similar principles as does the
International Council of Museums
(ICOM) which is a supranational
museums association with member-
ship open to both museums and
individual museum professionals. 
 
49. Frank Atkinson and the develop-
ment of the North of England 
Open Air Museum at Beamish, Co. 
Durham, is a particularly notable 
example. 
Frank Atkinson had to develop a 
completely new kind of folk-life 
museum, one in which industrial 
buildings were moved to the museum
site. It was to be, he said, ‘a museum 
dealing much more in social history 
than folk-life’. 
HUDSON, Kenneth. Museums of 
Influence. Cambridge University 
Press, 1987. p.127. 
 
50. This is a national scheme intro-
duced in 1991 and operated by Area
Museum Councils in conjunction 
with the Museums and Galleries 
Commission. 
 
51. Between 1990 and 1993 the 
Natural History Museum in London
underwent major restructuring; a 
corporate identity review, redesign 
and associated staff training for a 
new ethos of ‘customer care’; a revi-
talization of exhibitions policy, and 
the cutting of in-house design capa-
bility in favour of the commission-
ing of ‘top’ independent design con-
sultancies; and a change in research 
priorities that involved the loss of 
fifty scientific curatorial posts. 
Although the rapid and extensive 
changes have been a response to a 
wide range of external pressures -
financial, political and social - a 
clear vision of what a national muse-
um should be in the 1990s has also 
been brought to the situation by the
museum’s director, Neal Chalmers. 
Ref: The Terracotta Time Machine, 
Horizon, BBC2, 1991. 
52. As an example of this conser-
vatism which was exemplified in the
devotion to connoisseurship E E 
Lowe, Curator of Leicester Museum,
is recorded as having said at a meet-
ing with the Permanent Secretary 
for the Board of Education in 1919: 
when we long for a rare or beautiful 
or typical thing, we are desiring it for 
its own sake primarily, and not 
chiefly because it will educate person 
or persons unknown. 
Museums Journal 19, 1920 pp.123-9 
quoted by KAVANAGH, G. “The 
Museums Profession and the Artic-
ulation of Professional Self-consci-
ousness” in KAVANAGH, G. (ed.)
The Museums Profession. Leicester 
University Press, 1991. pp.39-55. 
In 1946 Parr reflected that: 
The still predominant amateur con-
cept of museum research has had 
some very unfortunate effects upon 
the economic and social status of 
museum workers. 
PARR, A. E. Mostly About Museums.
The American Museum of Natural 
History, 1959. p.27. 
In 1987 Tait could still write: 
Curators were still being seen, and 
often seeing themselves, as enlight-
ened dilettantes, experts who did the 
job for the love of it rather than any 
career expectation. ...in terms of pay 
among the professional classes they 
were one from the bottom, above pro-
fessional dancers, in 1987. 
TAIT, Simon. Palaces of Discovery: 
The Changing World of Britain’s 
Museums. Quiller Press, 1989. p.159. 
 
53. VERGO, P. (ed.) The New 
Museology. Reaktion Books, 1989. 
p.3. 
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4.0 Intervals and Excursions 
The Three-Game Plan: a Play of Différance 
The three rather tenuous discourses opened up in the 
previous chapter already include their own reliance upon 
relations with the others. Differences of material focus, of 
linguistic surface, cannot mask the interfaces they con-
struct and which, as the meeting of boundaries between 
disciplines, present the possibility of productive dialogue. 
If museum, design and organization, in reverse or any 
other order, immediately suggest ways of growing over and 
around and through each other’s constructions it is 
because each, in its own way, is a voracious conception 
always looking to account for and to intervene in ever 
larger realms of experience, in more and more comprehen-
sive collections of phenomena. Perhaps the only counter to 
this implicit imperialism lies in the play of their implied 
circularity – a kind of three-game plan of appliance to 
application or, if one prefers, of analyst to analysand. 
Between organization and design one involves a 
constructive interest in spatialities: the organization of 
design is immediately a question of a constellation of 
differently expressed phenomena – physical, social, 
documentary and paradigmatic. 
Between design and museum one is immediately 
engaged in the problematic of change and of communica-
tive activity – a dynamics of process. The museum process 
designs – creatively produces – the museum: the design of 
museum process, therefore, is a design of museum design. 
Between museum and organization a context emerges 
over conceptions of (material) culture and over what it is to 
sustain something which by definition is concerned with 
the possibilities of communication and change. The organi-
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zation subtracts from the world that constructs the 
everyday meaning of things, an actor network that never-
theless remains in contact, connected by its reconstructed 
difference, its power to signify through it play of différance: 
this is a ‘museality’ – the museality of organization. 
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4.1 Organization of Design 
Foucault's Spatial Framework 
In the Birth of the Clinic Foucault introduces the archae-
ology of medical perception with a discussion of the types 
of spatiality involved in the definition of disease. We learn 
that, at the first level, the clinician’s gaze is directed 
towards the differentiated minutiae of conditions, 
symptoms, states, and properties of the diverse visible 
aspects the patient presents. The configuration of these 
alone is the material of the proper classification and 
recognition of a species of disease. And ironically this 
process of classification “reaches the truth of the disease 
only by allowing it to win the struggle and to fulfil, in all 
its phenomena, its true nature”.1 The space here is that of 
abstracted ‘homologies’ – a system of signs independent of 
the individual. 
At the second level of spatialization disease is mapped 
out in the concrete space of the body: “... disease undergoes 
metastases and metamorphoses” and causes qualitative 
changes in the organs and tissues of the body which 
become a recognisable pathology.2 The practitioner’s gaze 
becomes a highly focussed investigation of the individual. 
The third level occupies the social space. At this larger 
scale “a disease is circumscribed, medically invested, 
isolated, divided up into closed privileged regions, or 
distributed throughout cure centres, arranged in the most 
favourable way”.3 The political and the economic come into 
play through the power plays of the larger professional 
group, its immediate administrative relatives and its more 
distant legislative and cultural counterparts. The hospital 
becomes an artificial site which alongside other institu-
tions – prison, school, museum, etc. – facilitates the 
administration of society. By this means medicine is 
 
3. ibid. p.16. 
 
2, ibid. p.10. 
l. FOUCAULT, Michel. 
[1963] The Birth of the Clinic. 
Trans. A M Sheridan. Tavistock, 
1973, p.9. 
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“bound up with the state” in a “general but differentiated 
policy of assistance”, “a certain supervision ...[is] exercised 
over the doctors themselves”, and to a large extent “abuses 
...[are] prevented and quacks forbidden to practise”.4 
 
In the material object, systemic process, and social 
condition one may perceive a group of epistemological 
objects that could be just as well conceived for design as for 
disease, for the museum artefact as for the body: Foucault’s 
approach to spatiality has resonances. Such ideas of the 
spaces which different means of defining or understanding 
occupy create an organizational framework which encom-
passes at first sight different orders of concepts - objective, 
systemic, social - which are not in any obvious way logically 
connected. Each has a rationality that can be characterized 
in relation to ideas of the epistemological and of the 
ontological, and in general to philosophical standpoints. 
In Foucault’s scheme, relating to disease in the 18th 
century, the first level points to an overarching scheme of 
classifications which is free of the subjective both in the 
picture that it provides of a realm of identifiable diseases 
and in the process of observing the differentiable specifics 
of objective phenomena. To be simplistic, this describes an 
underlying positivist epistemology and realist ontology. 
And we might ask how such a material objectivity relates 
to the classification of design phenomena, what proper 
limits the approach defines. 
In the second level the epistemology remains 
positivistic in tenor in that the system of knowledge 
ultimately relies upon the assumption of causes and effects 
at play in creating the observable qualitative changes in the 
organs and tissues of the body. However, the ontology 
becomes increasingly nominalist in tenor. Disease is never 
“confined to a particular course” and the organs of the body 4. ibid. p.19. 
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provide no observable structure for the disease itself but 
only of its transformations and transportations: the 
process of mapping is one of naming the traces of disease 
rather than of fixing its sites. Such an approach provokes 
the question of how relations of programme/context to 
process in design may be delineated and circumscribed. 
The third level of spatiality emphasizes another 
dimension. In the endlessly played out debates that 
accompany the social regulation of disease there is a 
constant level of confrontation between the forms of social 
space presented by its institutions and the orders 
presented by individual practitioners and their subjects. 
The always latent potentialities for new configurations to 
emerge and the radically different views obtained by 
different participants in the debates, tends to push this 
third spatiality towards the relativistic end of epistemology 
whilst preserving something of the ontologically realist 
perception that certain underlying social forces perpetuate 
the process of change. In design the political and ethical 
aspects may be highlighted in such an approach – the twin 
relations between programme and ideology/Philosophy and 
between process and ideology/Philosophy. 
Spatiality in Discourse 
Lefebvre offers a critique of the tendency in philosophy, 
semiology, deconstruction, and critical theory to move, 
without regard for logical consistency or apology, from one 
species of space to another – to move from linguistic space 
to social space, from cognitive space to physical space, etc. 
– without proper consideration of the positions, relations 
and movements that are being invoked or transgressed. In 
particular he criticizes the readiness to invoke “as the need 
arises, some such notion as coupure or rupture or break” 
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and to avoid an account of the gap in terms of a spatial 
theory in which rhetorical and logical turns (transforma-
tions/translations) are explicated.5 
Physical space, when mathematicized, becomes 
conceptually and minimally three-dimensional. However 
inadequate such a schema may be to the accommodation 
of wider experience, absolute concepts of position, 
distance, area, direction, volume, etc., proper to an 
idealized, mathematicized three-dimensional realm, make 
unambiguous and definitive sense. ‘Wider experience’ 
implies, minimally, the playing out of spatial relations in 
the perceived or imagined passage of time. In this 
experiential notion of three-dimensional space the measure 
of all other relations becomes ‘speed’ – speed of the actions 
of movement, perception, envisioning, between which 
three-dimensional space is transformed and all phenomena, 
defined within its realm, translated from the objective and 
concrete, to the subjective and sensational, and to the 
subjective and abstract. That is, a higher dimensionality is 
the key to accounting for the paradoxical discontinuities 
of phenomena apparently all ‘three-dimensional’ in 
character. 
In general one may expect dimensionality to play a 
crucial role in accounting for the apparent (cognitively real) 
discontinuities of similar spatial phenomena, regardless of 
the constitutive dimensions of the spaces. Even the most 
exotic psycho-social spaces will have one or more dimen-
sions in common with other more or less imaginable realms. 
In Foucault’s explanation of the space of the body, as 
contrived by medical practice, certain apparent rifts exist 
between one realm of the medical gaze and another. 
However, we are aware that one or more of these modes of 
perceiving and constituting the body may coexist in 
discourse and in practice although they may never be 
5. LEFEBVRE, Henri.
[1974/84] The Production of
Space Trans. Donald Nicholson-
Smith. Basil Blackwell, 1991.
p.5. 
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collapsed into one another. The physical siting of disease 
in the material structures of the body may form a constel-
lation of pointers with the systemic, the institutional, and 
the social explications of disease. Although their incom-
mensurate language prohibits meaningful synthesis a 
common purpose permits their mutual accommodation. 
The body of locations is a physically three-dimen-
sional conception. With the addition of a temporal scale 
this transforms into a systemic conception of the space of 
disease. By allowing a multiplication of the body the 
systemic conception is expanded to a scale of possibilities 
from two bodies to an entire population: a further 
dimension is added which transforms the conception into 
one that is social. And finally, by zeroing the physical 
space of the body and multiplying the dimensions of social 
space, the space of disease becomes institutionally 
contrived and controlled. 
The object of knowledge is transformed by stages 
from the concrete and tangible to the abstract and linguis-
tic, and modes of thought from that immanent in acting to 
practical and then analytical and abstract reasoning. 
 
We might expect patterns of spatiality such as this one to 
be repeated in other areas of practice, particularly ones 
dependent upon the legislation and administration of 
professional forms of ‘gaze’ and the interpretation and 
definition of problematic objects whether they be construed 
as personal or social, specific or general, in nature. Design 
is one such area of practice. 
Spatiality in Design 
Foucault’s spatiality of disease, when translated directly to 
design, becomes confused at levels two and three. 
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King and Miranda gently steer 
conversation away from any 
investigation of their individual 
creative characters [p.9] ...The 
studio itself seems designed to 
sustain a certain myth regarding 
the principals’ creative process. In 
the middle of the space, sand-
wiched between the open studio 
on one side and the reception and 
conference areas on the other, is 
an inner sanctum. It is here, 
8. For example, Hugh 
Aldersey-Willams tried in vain 
to get straight answers out of 
Perry King and Santiago 
Miranda about who did what in 
their remarkable partnership. 
POTTER, Norman. What is a 
Designer: things.places.messages. 
Revised Ed. Hyphen Press, 
1980. p.14. 
I add to this inventory the con-
cept of ‘systems’ to accommo-
date the notion that increasingly 
designers deal with objects 
which are interrelated and not 
in all their aspects tangible. 
 
7. ... it is convenient to group 
the work [of designers] into three 
simple categories, though the 
distinctions are in no way 
absolute, nor are they always so 
described: product design 
(things), environmental design 
(places) and communication 
design (messages). 
 
DORMER, Peter. Design Since 
1945. Thames & Hudson, 1993. 
p.9. 
6. Designing is about planning 
and making ideas explicit. if the 
product is to be made to the 
designer’s specifications, then the 
designer must ensure that the 
factory has the tools and the 
intelligence and that each element 
specified is practicable. 
 Relations between programme/context and process and 
between both of these and ideology/Philosophy, imply a 
complex dimensionality which it would be sensible to try 
to reduce, at least in the first analysis. Following on from 
the designed object (product), the design specific terms 
‘programme’, ‘process’ and ‘philosophy’ suggest that a 
clearer scheme of spatiality may be possible if four, rather 
than three, levels are defined. And we may expect that in 
the analysis of constitutive dimensionality the spaces of 
design will exhibit transformations that similarly define a 
constellation of pointers, in this case in design discourse 
and practice. It will also be argued that the idea of ‘repre-
sentation’ or ‘social reconstruction’ may not be easily 
separated from that of ‘social construction’. 
Product: the designed object 
In talking about the designed object, generally speaking 
the focus of attention is on the end product of an invisible 
process. In design history, as much as in the popular press, 
there is a long tradition of taking the object at face value. 
This has the effect of reducing the topics of conversation 
to those based an the immanent aspects of the object’s 
materiality and on socio-cultural discourse. In this sphere 
‘design’ is a quality which attaches itself to the products of 
human forethought in industry,6 in particular, the 
manufacture of ‘things, places, ...messages’ and systems.7 
The option of delving deeper into the nature of the 
designed object is usually precluded by the equally long 
tradition on the part of designers of maintaining a fearful 
silence about the means by which these products actually 
came into the world.8 The glossy magazines, with their 
star profiles and product reviews, rarely do anything to  
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Erskine has done all he can to 
suggest a new approach to 
working practices. Now it's up 
‘I’m not quite clear what a 
trading floor is’ he [Ralph 
Erskine] says, ‘but I get the 
feeling that this is a large space 
where people are just moved into 
a fairly anonymous environ-
ment.’ At his age, [78] he knows 
no one is going to challenge him 
is he pretends not to know what a 
trading floor is. [p.32] 
The unwarranted assumptions 
made in such a statement 
glosses over the most interest-
ing aspects of such projects: the 
creativity released by financially 
(or otherwise) constrained pro-
grammes, and the dynamics of a 
design process that generates 
richly rewarding results from 
minimized (in terms of time) 
and cleverly managed design 
effort. 
Second from: MURRAY, 
Callum. “Ark de Triomphe”, 
Designers’ Journal No.78, June 
1992. pp.32-8. 
With most architects and 
designers struggling to do the best 
they can on minimal budgets, the 
power of lighting to transform 
what might otherwise be fairly 
unexceptional spaces has become 
all the more important. 
9. Two examples from the 
many hundreds that could have 
been cited. First from: 
MELHUISH, Clare. “Light 
Snacks”, Design Week, 3 June 
1994, pp.16-7. 
 
ALDERSEY-WIILLAMS, Hugh. 
King and Miranda: The Poetry of 
the Machine. Fourth Estate, 
1991. 
 
behind closed doors, that King 
and Miranda generate their ideas. 
... [p.22] 
enlighten us as to the connectedness of the invisibles of 
design to the visible end product. Almost inevitably, the 
gloss we are likely to read will be based upon hearsay, 
post-rationalizations of the most outrageous neatness, 
marketing circumspection and advertising hype.9 As a 
space in which design may be defined, the designed object, 
or product, presents a paper-thin first level – the three-
dimensional materiality of Figure 4.1.1. 
              
h 
 d 
   w
Figure 4.1.1 
  
The ‘real’ space of the designed object, which may be thought of as a 
three-dimensional region, defined by the height (h), width (w) and 
depth (d) of the designed object, within an open and indefinitely 
differentiable Cartesian space. 
  
However, its gloss is based upon mediated relations 
between manufacturer and consumer, between product 
and material culture, and between various interpreters 
and their audiences. The consumer’s gaze and the inter-
preter’s gaze – a gaze continuous with the operation of all 
the senses – work in consort on the visible surface and 
physical presence of the object each separating out the 
aspects of image and materiality of significance to their 
respective practices – semblance and resemblance, function 
and evocation, economy and effectiveness, narrative and 
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In this lengthy article (for such 
a newsy journal) nothing about 
the extraordinary concept 
behind this building is chal-
lenged. A prime target could 
have been the process which 
allowed so much early indul-
gence in social ideas to have 
gone untested against the prac-
tical situation represented by 
the location (temporal as well as 
geographical) of the project. 
What we are presented with is 
little more than a letting agent’s 
advertisement. Which, incident-
tally, failed: two years after the 
article was written the building 
remained unlet. 
to the tenants. ‘Dreams are very 
important for people and for 
societies’; he explains. ‘If 
architects can find a common 
dream and make it known , then 
it would be a very good thing. If 
they can’t, then it will be the same 
kind of fragmented situation 
we’ve got today’. [p.38.] 
identity, form and signification, pleasure and purpose, etc.  
The space here is actual and three-dimensional but 
passes into the social realm via the cumulative acts of 
perception and the motions of economic activity. However, 
the individual consumer plays no part in the orientation of 
the whole space. Consumer acts of discrimination are 
statistical, meaningful only as an analysable mass. In this 
sense, each tiny aspect of the consumer’s practice is disso-
ciated from every other to be recombined with those 
identical to itself in the creation of a system of latent 
marketing and marketable knowledge. Equally, inter-
preters’ acts of discrimination are symbolic, meaningful 
only as constructions after the fact in a discourse in which 
a design determinism holds sway: the object as design may 
only be realized as a process which has already been played 
out, which, in Foucault’s words, has been allowed to “win 
the struggle and to fulfil, in all its phenomena, its true 
nature.” When one focusses on the end product that 
results from implementing the design communicated by 
the designer’s drawings, models, specifications, etc. the 
designed object is a fait accompli. 
We may visualize the transformation between the 
designed object and the ‘object as design’ as an enfolding of 
the three-dimensional physical space of the designed object 
in the extended socio-temporal space described in Figure 
4.1.2 which is defined by the dimensions that accommo-
date, amongst others, the motions of perception and 
consumption: the dimension of time, in its simplest guise, 
is linear and directional, and the simplest space of social 
relations is two-dimensional, that is, planar and differen-
tiable. Only through this higher dimensionality do we gain 
the space in which to talk about and act upon the material 
possibilities of the designed object. But this must not be 
taken to imply that the first level of spatiality in design,  
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CROSS, Nigel. “Styles of 
learning, designing and 
computing”. Design Studies, 
Vol.6, No.3, July 1985. 
JONES, J Christopher. Design 
Methods: seeds of human futures. 
1980 edition. John Wiley & 
Sons, 1981. pp.xix-xx. Nigel 
Cross took this notion further 
to consider the implications of 
the idea that 
people differ in the basic cogni-
tive styles that they bring to any 
learning task. 
11. Often a design process ends 
with the thought “if we had 
known at the start what we know 
now we'd never have designed it 
like this”. ... I think of the [design 
process] as a specially designed 
‘education’; or ‘course’; which 
one devises, and undertakes, in 
order to complete the design. 
 
10. I cite my own experience of 
writing for an international 
English-speaking market. 
Butterworth-Heinemann (for-
merly Architectural Press 
Books) advised me early on in 
the writing of Museums and Art 
Galleries: Design and Develop-
ment Guide (1991) to adopt 
American terminology. 
Figure 4.1.2 
  
The ‘social’ space of the object as design which may be thought of as a 
two-dimensional region, defined by dynamic and static dimensions of 
society into which is enfolded the physical space of the object and 
which, as an activated space, is projected forward in a dimension of 
time. 
  
that of the individuated ‘physical body’, is in any way 
deficient. What it does imply is that the designed object 
may only be represented or reconstructed through socially 
mediated actions and therefore is always interpreted. 
Programme: the object of design 
The second level in design takes its epistemological status 
from the notion that a design ‘idea’, as a pre-visual concept, 
can be constituted by a system of circumscribing documen-
tary actions. The word ‘programme’, which is the common 
American term for the design brief,10 is a useful one to 
adopt for its other connotations. There is an educational 
use of the term ‘programme’ which implies a course of 
learning shaped to some extent by the learner. And design 
has been characterized as a learning process,11 one which is 
reinvented in each design situation to meet specific goals, 
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goals which generally relate in the first instance to the 
opening up of creative opportunity and subsequently to 
closure in the process of visualization and specification. 
‘Program’, in the computing sense, can also mean a 
protocol, a system of instructions which directs particular 
kinds of operations. And in Design – the professional 
practice of design – certain conventions of procedure and 
behaviour are regulated by more or less common systems 
of documentation which include: design contracts, project 
briefs, surveys, project plans and schedules, tendering 
packages, production contracts, work logs and diaries, 
formal correspondence, accounts, etc.12 In the performing 
arts ‘programme’ refers to a document setting out a list of 
features or acts to be presented and the people (performers) 
participating in the event, perhaps with subsidiary 
information that establishes narrative, interpretive or 
circumstantial purpose and the credentials of the company 
or prestige of the production. And in Design key 
communications at several points in the performance of 
the design take the form of formal documents: at the 
beginning, a credentials presentation, an initial brief and a 
contract which makes an offer of services and sets out fees; 
at design concept stage, a presentation that describes the 
interpreta-tion of the brief, the main features of the design 
proposal, and the implications of the design for 
production. ‘Programme’ may also refer to the 
performance itself, in the sense that a performance 
characterized by some feature that gives it a sense of 
coherence and continuity, such as the presenter in a radio 
broadcast, is a ‘programme’. Similarly, in Design there is a 
process of lending continuity to the communicative 
interaction between the client ‘group’, the design ‘team’ and 
the production ‘community’ which takes the form of an, 
often rather informal, performative sequence of mutual 
• Encouraging designers in 
academic environments to publish 
14. For example, the inade-
quacy of extant documentation 
encountered by Kenneth 
Agnew formed a central ele-
ment in his proposals for a new 
research culture in design, 
amongst his recommendations 
were: 
• Teaching the documentation 
of the innovation point as a 
routine of design work in any 
environment ... 
 
 
13. ALLINSON, Kenneth. The 
Wild Card of Design: a per-
spective on architecture in a 
project management environ-
ment. Butterworth Architecture, 
1993. Although ostensibly 
concerned with architectural 
practice Allinson uses ideas of 
team building and management 
and organizational dynamics 
common to all areas of corp-
orate creativity and specifically 
design activity. 
 
 
GOSLETT, Dorothy. The 
Professional Practice of Design. 
Revised Ed. Batsford, 1971. 
LYDIATE, Liz. (ed.) Professio-
nal Practice in Design Consult-
ancy. Design Council, 1992. 
CHAPPELL, David. Report 
Writing for Architects 2nd Edn, 
Legal Studies & Services Ltd., 
1989. 
12. For example, sources which 
are likely to be familiar to 
exhibition designers include: 
Checklists and specimen letters 
in "Part Three: Essential 
Information" in ALLWOOD, 
John & Bryan MONTGO-
MERY. Exhibition Planning and 
Design: A Guide for Exhibitors, 
Designers and Contractors. 
Batsford, 1989. pp. 133-62. 
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understanding, professional trust, working relationship.13 
Design programme, as the object of design, therefore 
encompasses a primary space of documentation and an 
interpretive space of social performance. 
15. The National Art Library at 
the Victoria and Albert 
Museum, contains the extant 
documentary material of most 
of the leading decorators, 
applied artists, craftspeople and 
designers from the period 1850-
1950. Archives at the Science 
Museum, London and its 
branch museum, the National 
Railway Museum, York contain 
vast collections of engineering 
drawings and associated 
documentation. The National 
Maritime Museum, Greenwich, 
is the national repository for 
ships plans and the ship models 
collection and supporting 
archives contain a wealth of 
information on admiralty com-
missions and many other ship 
buildings. Ironically, the Design 
Museum in London was set up 
without permanent collections 
 
 
 AGNEW, Kenneth. “The 
Spitfire: Legend or History? An 
Argument for a New Research 
Culture in Design”, Journal of 
Design History. Vol.6, No.2, 
1993. pp.121-30. 
• Offering graduate historians 
related research studentships in 
design and engineering schools 
and then interfacing them with 
enthusiastic designers and 
technologists ...  
• Submitting products which 
have received such study, sup-
ported by the research material, 
for curation in national collec-
tions wherever possible. 
• Pressing museums, gently, for 
correspondingly more penetrating 
curation of products wherever 
they are exhibited. 
or at least deposit in the 
institution library a (very) short 
report of the innovation point as 
a condition of credit for any 
professional design work. 
In talking about the design programme, generally 
speaking the focus of attention is on the documentary 
products continuous with a visible process of design. The 
participant and the researcher, who are present in the time 
of the design process, perceive the design programme quite 
differently to the design historian who is involved with the 
documentary evidence of a design process which is past. 
Continuity in the dimension of time enfolds the docu-
mentary space of the design programme into its perform-
ative social space. The temporal discontinuity which the 
design historian experiences prevents the realization of 
design programme proper, what may be reconstructed is 
limited by the lower dimensionality of the space of the 
surviving documentary evidence. It is generally an 
incomplete body of information, it is separated from the 
context of its production, and therefore it refers to a 
process which is invisible. This invisibility tends to turn 
the design historian to the ontological focus, to steer them 
clear of the more speculative areas grounded in subjectivist 
interpretation and towards the more ‘secure’ ground of 
empirical study.14 The object, in this ontology, becomes 
the autographic product, the drawing and the letter ‘by the 
hand of’ the designer, and it is assigned a material cultural 
status that allows it, for instance, to live happily in a 
museum archive along side the designed object with 
which it may be associated.15 To the participant, the 
programmatic aspects of the design have a performative 
function, and the focus therefore is an epistemological 
one. It is not the materiality of the document that counts 
but its place in a system of communicative acts. 
 196 
Therefore, we may picture the design programme as an  (neither designed objects nor 
supporting archive material) and 
with only a library of printed 
books to support exhibition and 
research projects. 
asymmetrical construction. In the first instance, the 
documentary space of the autographic product (Figure 
4.1.3) is enfolded in the performative social space of the 
design programme (Figure 4.1.4.) 
abstract concrete
local
global
Figure 4.1.3 
  
The ‘documentary’ space of the autographic product, which may be 
thought of as a two-dimensional region defined by a formal abstract-
concrete dimension that places the type of signifier (semiotic form) 
and a conceptual local-global dimension that places the scope of 
signification (content quality). 
  
social dynamics 
so
ci
al
 s
ta
tu
s 
time 
enfolded 
two-dimensional 
documentary space
Figure 4.1.4 
  
The performative ‘social’ space of the design programme which 
dimensionally identical to the social space of the object as design (see 
Figure 4.1.2 above.) though, in practice, not differentiated in the same 
ways. 
  
 197 
And in the second instance, the three-dimensional physical 
space of the autographic product is enfolded in a docu-
mentary space thus mirroring the spatiality of the designed 
object (Figure 4.1.5.) 
abstract concrete
local
globalenfolded  
three-dimensional space
Figure 4.1.5 
  
The ‘documentary’ space of the autographic product as material 
cultural object. 
  
In this second construction, however, the performative 
social space is reduced to a zero point by its dislocation in 
time. Certainly, it is the autographic product that connects 
the worlds of the participant in the design situation and 
the design historian, but, in a reversal of the case with the 
designed object, on this occasion the higher dimensionality 
rests not with the design historian’s object but with that of 
the design participant. As before, this does not imply that 
the object of lower dimensionality is deficient. What it does 
imply is that it is only in the case of the higher dimension-
ality that we gain the space in which to talk about and act 
upon the design programme, and that it may only be repre-
sented or reconstructed through socially mediated actions 
and therefore is always interpreted. 
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Design Process 
Two alternative foci have been provided in the discourse 
on design process. The first is the process of designing as 
experienced. This provides a biographical or ethnographi-
cal narrative of the type familiar to the existentialist and to 
the anthropologist or ethnographer. Its epistemological 
framework is subjectivist and, depending upon whether it 
is the existent or the participative researcher doing the 
talking, ranges from the most liberal, anarchistic and 
humanist to the most cautious, conservative, phenomeno-
logical and interpretive accounts of design process. Such 
accounts tend to avoid the idea of modelling except en 
passant. The goal of humanist accounts tends to be a, 
usually utopian, normativity grounded in a critique of 
industrial, capitalist, Eurocentric, culture.16 And interpre-
tive accounts tend towards a normalizing pluralism 
grounded in an assimilative, tolerant, cultural competence; 
a kind of apolitical eclecticism that skims off the surface of 
postmodernism but lacks the deeper ironic reflexivity of 
its sharper forms.17 
18. See the examples quoted 
above in 3.2 Design: Epistem-
ological Object. 
CUFF, Dana. Architecture: The 
Story of Practice. MIT, 1991. 
SHOSHKES, Ellen. The Design 
Process: Case Studies in Project 
Development. Architecture 
Design and Technology Press, 
1990. 
 
17. For example: 
BLAU, Judith R. Architects and 
Firms: A Sociological Perspective 
on Architectural Practice. MIT, 
1984. 
 
WRIGHT, Frank Lloyd. The 
Future of Architecture. Horizon 
Press, 1953. 
NEUTRA, Richard. Survival 
Through Design. Oxford 
University Press, 1954. 
PAPANEK, Victor. Design for 
the Real World. Thames & 
Hudson, 1972. 
16. For example: 
CHERMAYEFF, Serge & 
Christopher ALEXANDER. 
Community and Privacy. USA: 
Doubleday, 1963. 
The second focus is on models of the design process 
that provide ideal visualizations of or prescriptions for the 
process of designing. The epistemological framework here 
is objectivist and ranges from the strictly analytic, 
empiricist and functionalist to the more synthetic, idealist 
and constructivist models of design process. Such models 
tend to marginalize the messiness of experience and 
propose instead a generalization of simple structure, 
usually of underlying linearity, to which modifying 
elements may be added to account for the contingencies of 
practical situations and the imperfections of human 
activity in the ‘real’ world.18 
Not all theorists have satisfied themselves with the 
limitations of these alternatives. For example, in a flawed 
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but nevertheless interesting attempt at behaviourist 
relativism, Omer Akin developed a version of protocol 
analysis to look at the behaviour of professional designers 
in relatively controlled experimental conditions.19 Although 
Akin was being too optimistic in hoping to generate: 
(1) a catalogue of operations that can be applied in a task 
environment, (2) the circumstances under which such applica-
tions are made, and (3) the paths developed during the ‘search’ 
for a solution.20 
He nevertheless reached forward-pointing conclusions. 
From the evidence of protocol analysis he was able to 
make observations that contradict the familiar simple 
linear models of design process and specifically that 
proposed by Jones (1963): ‘Analysis’ it turns out “is part 
of virtually all phases of design”;21 and what he calls the 
‘search process’ may start “from any point in the problem 
space”.22 Other observations included: the fact that no 
single issue occupied the designer’s attention for very 
long; that the focus of attention at any one time was 
largely dependent upon the material of the design, initially 
programme documentation and, later, increasingly, the 
stimulus to thinking provided by design drawings, models, 
diagrams etc; and that very regularly (in the four-hour 
experimental situation, an average of every 14 minutes) the 
attention of the designer opens out to undertake an 
evaluation of the success of the process to date. What we 
learn from efforts such as Akins’ is that so-called 
‘intuitive’ processes hold a key to understanding human 
designing behaviour, that the range of techniques in which 
the designer has competence will be brought to bear in a 
design situation in complex and messy ways, ways that 
follow practical reasoning discontinuously and rely just as 
heavily on the stimulus of the work in progress, and 
sometimes take irrational leaps that can only be justified 
by the results they produce. 
 
22. ibid. 
20. ibid. pp.191-2. 
 
21. ibid. p.205.  
19. AKIN, Omer. “An Explor-
ation of the Design Process” in 
CROSS, Nigel (Ed.) Develop-
ments in Design Methodology. 
John Wiley, 1984. pp.189-207. 
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The only seemingly contradictory conclusion Akin 
suggests is that “The process of design is primarily a top-
down, breadth-first process”.23 To impose such an interpre-
tation requires too much confidence in the directionality of 
the specific protocol analysed. The implication that differ-
ent aspects of the design activity are hierarchically depend-
ent on one another attempts to generalize on the basis of 
theoretically unsound assumptions. One cannot assume 
that dimensions of freedom in the design process that are 
less frequently explored than others are therefore 
secondary in importance. One could argue that the 
moments, however infrequent, in which bottom-up detail-
first possibilities are explored are in fact the primary 
moments, the moments that give the design process its 
defining characteristics, the moments which clearly 
separate strategies which are first and foremost problem-
solving strategies from those which leave open the 
question of whether the task in design is of exploring 
creative opportunities, opening up the possibilities of 
change, or of contriving accommodating coincidences 
between problem and solution definitions. 
To picture the design process in such a way as to 
accommodate the freedom of movement revealed by Akin’s 
protocol analysis at the same time as avoiding the trap of 
crystallizing too solidly synchronic ‘states’ of the problem-
solution complex requires that an open space be visualized 
that may be blurred across a slice of time. In retrospect we 
do reconstruct, quite successfully, stages in the process of 
arriving at a design. The mistake is to believe that these can 
be characterized as actually synchronic. The speed of action 
in design varies across the process in relation to the infor-
mation available to be acted upon. In this respect différance 
in design is no different to that in language. Where Akin 
states that: “Attention also seems to depend on the amount 23. ibid. p.206. 
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of information gathered about certain issues at that point in 
time” he is rather clumsily admitting an instance of the 
general point about speed of action. What he fails to 
recognize is that slow action, action that encounters the 
local and the detailed, can also occur in the earlier moments 
of the design process as easily as in later ones such as, in 
his own example, when “the overall context of the design is 
adequately understood”. The picture we settle on must be 
able to encompass the moment of the de-differentiation of a 
complex programme at an early stage in the design process 
as easily as the moment which loosens up a design that has 
developed an inhibiting rigidity at a later stage. 
Minimally three dimensions are necessary to provide 
such a picture (Figure 4.1.6.). 
abstract concrete
local
globalenfolded  
two-dimensional 
social space 
time 
Figure 4.1.6 
  
The ‘pseudo-synchronic’ space of the design process, which may be 
thought of as a two-dimensional region defined by an abstract-
concrete dimension that places design technique in terms of its quality 
of form and a local-global dimension that places the scope of attention 
in terms of content quality, which is projected forward in a dimension 
of time. 
  
 202 
However, it bears a certain symmetrical relation to the 
performative social space of the design programme. The 
two-dimensional space of the autographic product (Figure 
4.1.3 above) is stretched out on a time line and into this is 
enfolded the performative social space of design practice. 
 
25. Professional architects not 
only bring conviction to design, 
but in attempting to manage the 
uncertainties of practice, they 
establish priorities on the basis of 
conviction. Convictions of prac-
tice, however, differ from convic-
tions of design in that the former 
are more pragmatic, rooted in the 
economic realities as well as the 
social relations of the firm. 
[BLAU, 1984, p.15.]. 
24. This general comment is not 
untypical: 
Designers themselves have ideas 
about what is involved in the 
design process. These views are 
subjective - often ideological, and 
sometimes idiosyncratic ...[p.223, 
my emphasis] THOMAS, John 
C. & John M Carroll “The 
Psychological Study of Design”, 
in CROSS, Nigel (ed.) Develop-
ments in Design Methodology. 
John Wiley, 1984. pp.221-35. 
In trying to explain (or perhaps 
avoid explaining) an apparently 
capricious but actually essential 
and distinguishing design feature 
of the otherwise very ‘formal’ 
Concept range of tableware, the 
swan-shaped knob of the tea 
pot, Martin Hunt, the designer 
admitted to nothing but "post-
rationalisations". 
I rationalise it by comparing the 
curves to the ripple formed by a 
pebble in a pond, and all those 
post-rationalisations did seem to 
fit - there is a sort of logic to the 
swan. [p.32] 
WALKER, Susannah. Queens-
bury Hunt: Creativity and 
Industry. Fourth Estate, 1992. 
In this construction the three-dimensional physical 
space of the designed object is projected as a zero point: 
during the design process it clearly lies in the future, that 
is, it is enfolded, in a virtual sense, at a point along the time 
line which the design process has yet to reach. This is its 
dislocation in time. Therefore, once again it is the auto-
graphic product that connects the worlds of the partici-
pant in the design situation and of the design historian, 
and, in symmetry with the case of the design programme, 
the higher dimensionality rests not with the design 
historian’s object but with that of the design participant. 
As before, this location of higher dimensionality implies 
that the participant gains the space in which to talk about 
and act upon the design process and that it may only be 
represented or reconstructed through socially mediated 
actions and therefore is always interpreted. 
Design Philosophy 
Many researchers have observed that designers generally 
have implicit ideas about the underlying rationale of design 
activity which may or may not be made explicit.24 Those 
designers whose primary contact is with other designers in 
a team are likely to express the values and beliefs that they 
hold, if at all, as a component of the ideological and 
political negotiation of programmatic space;25 and those 
who write about what they do and whose contacts perhaps 
include opinion makers and policy makers as well as clients 
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are likely to broaden the scope of this rhetorical function 
to the social space of an entire field of design.26 In both 
cases one can see the designer attempting to play a role in 
shaping the context of design. In the former case the 
shaping activity has a local focus in the latter it expands 
and occasionally may be global in intent. 
Wally Olins is Co-founder and 
Chairman of Wolff-Olins – ‘the 
doyen of the corporate identity 
business’ (The Observer). He is 
Visiting Professor at the 
Management School, Imperial 
College of Science & Technology, 
London and Visiting Lecturer on 
Design Management at the 
London Business School. He is 
also a trustee of the Design 
Museum. [Flyleaf notes] 
 
27. Canadian museum and 
exhibition designers such as 
Jerry Krause at the Ontario 
Science Centre, Jacques Guillon 
and associates Laurent Marquart 
and Morely Smith in Montreal, 
Rudy Kovach, Gordon 
Robinson, Dick Lott and Bill 
McLennan associated with the 
Museum of Anthropology, 
University of British Columbia, 
Amy Forman and the Royal 
Ontario Museum’s Communi- 
OLINS, Wally. Corporate 
Identity: Making business 
strategy visible through design. 
Thames and Hudson, 1989. 
... identity management in major 
corporations must be the job of 
the Chief Executive or senior 
board member, support ed by an 
in-house team and where 
appropriate by outside 
consultants. [p.9 my emphasis} 
By its erudition and powerful 
rhetoric, the book in effect goes 
on to make the case that 
nothing is more important than 
the role of design in corporate 
identity and that expert inde-
pendent intervention produces 
the best results. Olins has 
proved himself one of the great 
shapers of this high-profile 
socially constructed object of 
design: 
26. For example: 
In the UK, and to a large extent in North America, it 
tends to be the case that designers direct their statements 
about the nature and practice of design to the furtherance 
of the institution of Design rather than to the extension of 
knowledge about design phenomena. This orientation is 
perhaps a consequence of educational background: tradi-
tionally design education is primarily concerned with 
learning to design and, only as an adjunct to this, with 
learning about design. In mainland Europe traditions vary, 
but an extended education and training that encompasses 
the humanities, arts and technology, and culminates in an 
architectural qualification is more common: British archi-
tectural education, at seven years, is one of the shortest. 
British designers, other than a minority of architects, 
typically know little of Philosophy, have little time and a 
relatively poor vocabulary for theoretical debate, and have 
difficulty in relating design to other aspects of social, 
historical and cultural experience. But, and this is a big 
‘but’, they are respected around the world as effective 
practitioners. For example, in the past 20 years the work of 
British exhibition designers has had a greater influence 
than that of any other group27 and currently they tend to 
attract a higher proportion of international work than 
those of any other nation.28 
This is not to say that design philosophy, design 
ideology, is unimportant, quite the contrary. Whether one 
focusses on theory specific to the design process in hand, 
that is, on ‘rationale’, or on theory providing a set of under-
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‘Consider what effects, which 
might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object 
of our conception to have. Then 
our conception of these effects is 
the whole of our conception of the 
object.’ The term was soon 
borrowed by William James, F C 
S Schiller, and John Dewey, who 
all in their different ways made 
pragmatism a theory of truth. 
28. Event Communications, 
Imagination, Met Studios, Neal 
Potter and John Sunderland 
amongst others have been 
reported in Design Week as 
winning international work on a 
regular basis. 
 
29. The term was first coined by 
C S Pierce in 1878: he defined a 
theory of meaning: 
cation Design Team, and David 
Youngson, Louise St. Pierre and 
Celina Ducceschi at the 
Vancouver Science World 
British Columbia made an 
international impact in the early 
and mid-1980’s. However, the 
work of James Gardner, 
Margaret Hall and Robin Wade 
was already well known by this 
time through such high profile 
projects as Pilkington Glass 
Museum (Gardner, 1964), 
Evoluon (Gardner, 1975) 
Tutankhamun (Hall, 1972), 
Coalbrookedale Museum of 
Iron and Furnace (Wade, 1979) 
Throughout the 1980’s a wealth 
of innovative work came from 
the studios of several companies 
including Furneaux-Stewart and 
Gardiner & Torne, and since 
the mid-1980s from: Brennan & 
Whalley, Compleat Works, 
Event Communications, Haley-
Sharpe, Hall & Redman, 
Heritage Projects, Imagination, 
Met Studios, Neal Potter, and 
many others. 
 
pinning ideas and beliefs, that is, on ‘general theory’, 
guiding principles may be discerned in such utterances as 
are made by designers. And one must also respect the 
tradition of pragmatism in design in which there is a tacit 
belief that the work will speak for itself through its 
physical and social impact, that ‘words’ are to a large 
extent superfluous, that the interpretations put upon 
design by theorists, historians and critics, even if necessary 
to the cultural and economic spheres of practice, are 
secondary to the visual, formal and socially active commu-
nication mediated by design itself. This pragmatism is 
itself ideological and has a Philosophical pedigree.29 Whilst 
respecting the underlying suspicion of logocentric culture 
apparent in pragmatism of this sort, one must also note 
that the invisibility of much of Design is cause for suspicion 
from other quarters.30 Although there is nothing mysteri-
ous about design, it is a basic human ability – some would 
say, along with language, it is the characteristic trait of the 
human31 – Design (with a capital ‘D’) is quite regularly the 
subject of obfuscation particularly in the theory-laden texts 
of certain architectural journals: translation from Italian or 
German does not help, but even the Architectural Review, 
AA Files, and Architectural Design are not immune. Not 
only do we consciously and purposefully shape the environ-
ment around us, we use the process and the products of the 
process to embody and transmit systems of meanings and 
values.32 If design philosophy has a space, therefore, it is as 
a bridge between the language of design discourse and the 
process of design, a bridge which refuses to separate off, as 
a foreign land, the institutionalized zone of Design. 
To picture the space of design philosophy two types of 
space must be linked: (1) a social space of design discourse 
which accommodates essentially a pragmatic conception of 
communicative activity (Figure 4.1.7), 
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RORTY, Richard. [19821 
Consequences of Pragmatism. 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991. 
p.xxxvii. 
...professionalized philosophy 
may or may not join transcend-
entalist culture, but ...it should 
not try to beat it. 
[ibid. p.69.1 
In comparing the recent writ-
ings of Ian Richie, the British 
hi-tech (late modern in Jencks’ 
terms) architect, and Bernard 
Tschumi, the European, decon-
structivist (in Jencks' terms, 
postmodern) architect, Richard 
Weston had this to say: 
... in the process of playing 
vocabularies and cultures off 
against each other, we produce 
new and better ways of talking 
and acting - not better by refer-
ence to a previously known 
standard, but just better in the 
sense that they come to seem 
better than their predecessors. 
More recently Richard Rorty 
has considered the implications 
of pragmatism for a post-
Philosophical culture: 
FLEW, Antony. (Consultant 
ed.) A Dictionary of Philosophy. 
Pan Books, 1979. p.284. 
Pragmatism represents a perfectly 
familiar attitude in philosophy, 
the empiricist attitude, but ... in 
both a more radical and in a less 
objectionable form that it has ever 
yet assumed. ... It means the open 
air and possibilities of nature, as 
against dogma, artificiality, and 
the pretence of finality of truth. 
JAMES, William. [1907] 
Pragmatism. Edited by Bruce 
Kuklick. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 1981. p.28. 
Ideas become true just so far as 
they help us to get into 
satisfactory relations with other 
parts of our experience ... This is 
the ‘instrumental’ view of truth. 
[ibid. p.30] 
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Figure 4.1.7 
  
The ‘social’ space of design ideology becomes dimensionally identical 
to the social spaces of the object as design and of the design 
programme (see Figures 4.1.2 & 4.1.4 above) when given a dimension 
of time in which to play out its differences in communicative activity, 
although, in practice, the resulting space will not be differentiated in 
the same ways as either of these models. 
  
and; (2) a paradigmatic space of design ideology of the sort 
made familiar by Burrell and Morgan (See Figure 2.4.3). In 
the context of design discourse paradigmatic possibilities 
are played out in ideologically committed communicative 
activity which means that a dimension of time must be 
added to the paradigmatic model (Figure 4.1.8). 
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time 
Figure 4.1.8 
  
The ‘paradigmatic’ space of design ideology (see: Figure 2.4.3.) 
becomes a performative ‘discursive’ space when given a dimension of 
time in which to play out its differences in communicative activity. 
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30. This example is from a 
former University Vice 
Chancellor, and at the time of 
writing the President of the 
Design Industries Association 
who admitted to not being and 
never having been a designer 
and expressed the desire "to 
redefine design and design 
education", as best one can tell, 
as an academic, technically 
oriented, general education.  
... being a widely spread mixture 
of other disciplines, design in its 
verb form appears marginal or 
superficial when compared with 
the main subject disciplines which 
are focused, coherent, lead to 
degrees and are supported by 
considerable bodies of research. 
The phrase ‘Jack-of-all-trades, 
master of none' fits design like a 
glove. Moreover, as with drama, 
art and architecture, the 
inspirational character of design 
is difficult to measure or examine. 
In its hand-waving form, it looks  
Richie ...is a natural designer 
more at home with crafting 
materials than words. He has 
much to say ...but his writing is 
less elegant than his projects and 
is rooted in that empirical Anglo-
Saxon tradition to which theorising 
such as Tschumi's is alien. 
Weston himself a British 
architect, writer, and teacher, 
and typically modern and prag-
matic in outlook, concludes: 
Tschumi impresses with his 
erudition but leaves me un-
moved, whereas Richie excites. 
WESTON, Richard. "Theory 
and practice as the century 
closes" (Book reviews of: 
TSCHUMI, Bernard. 
Architecture and Disjunction. 
MIT, 1994. and RICHIE, Ian. 
(Well) Connected Architecture. 
Academy, 1994.), The Architects' 
Journal, 27 July 1994, p.50. 
 
In this we can see the pragmatic aspect as a resort which is 
particularly of relevance to an instrumentalized paradig-
matic field. In this sense, the social space of design 
ideology may take one of two alternative relations to the 
whole in a symmetrical construction. (1) In the case of 
ideologically committed communicative action it may be 
enfolded in the paradigmatic space at the point of action 
on the time line and be carried forward as the actor's 
socially defined identity (Figure 4.1.9.) 
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Figure 4.1.9 
  
The ‘paradigmatic’ space of ideologically committed communicative 
action: a performative ‘discursive’ space in which is enfolded a social 
space of design ideology. 
  
(2) In pragmatic communicative action, on the other hand, 
the social space is open and active; the time line carries it 
forward along with an enfolded paradigmatic space in 
which a series of traces may be inscribed as the 
(retrospective) defining characteristics of any 
communicative action (Figure 4.1.10.) 
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Figure 4.1.10 
  
The ‘social’ space of pragmatic communicative action: a performative 
social space in which is enfolded a paradigmatic space of design 
ideology. 
  
In this construction neither the three-dimensional 
physical space of the designed object nor the two-
dimensional documentary space of the autographic 
product are located. Their dislocation is partly a matter of 
absolute dimensionality – no overlap occurs between, for 
example, three-dimensional physical space and two-
dimensional paradigmatic space – and partly a matter of 
the process of generalizing schemata at this stage in the 
project, a process which tends to mask the potential for a 
bridging between incommensurate spaces that may be 
achieved by defining a common space of interpretation, 
practical discourse, of communicative action in general. 
However, certain written statements by the hand of the 
designer, as well as those composed by the journalist, critic 
or historian, that quote the designer, do concern design 
philosophy. Indeed, outside of a direct experience of the 
practical context of any ideological mediation, the text, 
whether visionary or revisionary in intent, is the principal 
source of information upon which to base the study of 
design philosophy. 
social dynamics 
so
ci
al
 s
ta
tu
s 
time 
enfolded 
two-dimensional 
paradigmatic space 
a soft option. For all these reasons
and more, design is not a regular,
respectable discipline of higher
education.  
HILLS, Sir Graham. "A
renaissance in design education"
in MYERSON, Jeremy. (ed.)
Design Renaissance Selected
papers from the International 
Design Congress, Glasgow,
1993. Open Eye/CSD, 1994.
pp.87-93. 
 
31. See 2.3, Note 6. 
 
32. See 2.3, Note 12.  
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In the case of the text, a spatial relationship, which 
parallels that between the three-dimensional physical space 
of the autographic product and its documentary space in 
forming an object for the design historian (see Figure 
4.1.5), can be defined which encompasses the text as an 
object of study. The social space of pragmatic commu-
nicative activity and/or the paradigmatic space of ideologi-
cally committed communicative activity are enfolded in the 
documentary space of the text (Figure 4.1.11.) 
abstract concrete
local
global
enfolded  
two-dimensional 
social space 
enfolded 
two-dimensional 
paradigmatic space 
Figure 4.1.11 
  
The ‘documentary’ space of the text as evidence of design ideology. 
  
In those cases where the text in question forms part of the 
design programme some link may be forged by the design 
historian between the representation or reconstruction of 
design process and the interpretation of ideology. However, 
texts that stand in a more general relation to the output, 
circumstances and creative activity of the designer are, by 
their very nature, only open to broader socio-cultural (or 
socio-technical) interpretation – in this sense, they are 
dislocated from the active spaces of design. 
 209 
Summary Schemata 
The spatial framework outlined above for design provides 
a conceptual starting point and is summarized in Figure 
4.1.12. In the following section the specific intervals and 
movements of museum design will be used: to explore the 
animation of the spaces described here; to highlight where 
deficiencies may exist in the developing model; and to 
point to possible enhancements and additions that may be 
necessary in order to consider the broadest range of design 
phenomena. 
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Spatial framework for design (Figure references in brackets) 
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4.2 The Design of Museum Design 
Contingency and Social Construction 
Museum design is a multidisciplinary area of activity that 
brings together the expertise of a wide range of museum 
specialists. Fundamental to the professional practice of 
museum design is the notion that the unique context that a 
museum provides - through its aims and objectives, 
policies, collections, research and communication activi-
ties, geographical location, form of accommodation, visitor 
population and pattern of use - requires of the Design team 
a particular competence in dealing with complex project 
information, rigorous conservation and security require-
ments, and a wide range of possibilities for creative inter-
pretation and communication.1 
Each of these categories itself 
outlines a complex of descriptive 
detail and practical implications, 
for example, pattern of use in 
terms of access and communica-
tions: 
attitudes to such debates as those 
on: heritage and commercialism; 
entertainment and education; and 
natural and artificial lighting of 
works of art ...become the found-
ation for statements of policy on 
research, exhibitions, education, 
7. Style of management ... (type 
of client organization) 
[p.4-5.] 
6. Source(s) of funding.  
5. Geographical location.  
4. Pattern of use (access and 
communications). 
3. Content/character of collec-
tions. 
2.  Size. 
1. Interpretive approach or dis-
cipline. 
The object of museum design, 
which broadly refers to the 
range of information that the 
design team must be competent 
to deal with relates to: 
to provide all those involved in 
the initial stages of the building 
process - clients, users and mem-
bers of the design team - with a 
set of tools. These tools, or re-
sources, will help them to com-
municate more effectively so that 
they are able to work together to 
develop rich design programmes 
which will, it is hoped, culminate 
in the best solutions to their par-
ticular problems. [p.l.] 
l. The whole purpose of 
Museums and Art Galleries: 
Design and Development Guide 
[Butterworth Architecture, 
1991] was: 
Anyone expecting a straightforward explanation of 
what design is will always be disappointed: the question 
easily draws us into the most heated areas of philosophical 
debate. To some design is the essentially technical practice 
of optimizing structures and the use of resources, or it is 
the art of creating form and meaning in things, to others it 
is a strategic organizational practice in developing and 
interpreting complex systems, or it is the fundamental 
human activity of bringing order into the environment.2 
There are many intermediate positions combining or 
falling between instrumental science and pragmatic art, 
between functionalist determinacy and humanist 
expectancy. However, as was noted earlier in this paper, 
few practising designers outside of the architectural 
profession have bothered themselves with these debates: 
why should museum designers? 
One argument, which perhaps should be considered, is 
that, as the socio-cultural/socio-technical context in which 
any design appears to operate is constructed by the beliefs 
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PINCH, Trevor & Wiebe E. 
BIJKER "The Social 
Construction of Facts and 
Artifacts: Or How the Sociology 
of Science and the Sociology of 
Technology Might Benefit Each, 
3. ...the sociocultural and poli-
tical situation of a social group 
shapes its norms and values, 
which in turn influence the 
meaning given to an artifact. 
 
See above 2.3 Design, the discus-
sion of différance, and the onto-
logical and epistemological 
objects of design. 
2. ...a collection of attitudes, 
which we will call here philoso 
phies, ...must be seen to have their 
effect on the design process itself. 
In particular the view that a 
designer takes of his role in 
society and the function and 
reason for his work are crucial to 
any real understanding of the 
process he employs. 
LAWSON, Bryan. How 
Designers Think. Architectural 
Press, 1980. g.119. 
 
And half of the book is devoted 
to policy issues, organizational 
implications, project planning 
and the design brief. 
 ["Introduction", p.1.] 
This book ...is not a design 
grammar, nor a survey of design 
solutions to exhibitions. [It] 
attempts ...to provide an intro-
duction to the various factors 
which relate to exhibitions 
...which might be considered 
‘essential knowledge’. 
Michael Belcher also expends 
considerable effort in outlining 
the contextual depth relevant to 
museum design in Exhibitions in 
Museums (Leicester University 
Press, 1991.] 
marketing, etc., and/or for a 
museum-wide communications 
strategy. [p.5] 
and actions of the participants, the way that we 
comprehend design is fundamental to the uses to which it 
may be put and the outcomes that we may expect it to 
achieve.3 A functionalist approach to design will not easily 
serve liberatory ends and vice versa. 
In the museum context we can clearly see how this 
proposition may be tested. If we analyse the statements 
that a museum makes about its identity and purpose, and 
the processes that it employs in pursuing its aims, we may 
determine in what mould it is formed. A museum that 
takes a mechanistic view of the structure and advance of 
knowledge in any particular field and concerns itself with 
the classification and ordering of things will not easily be 
served by a Design practice that develops radical interdis-
ciplinary narrative interpretations however unambiguous 
and persuasive they may be. Equally, a museum that takes 
a more holistic view of the condition of human under-
standing and primarily explores the relationship between 
distant (in time or place) and present cultures interactively 
with its local community will be poorly served by a Design 
practice that separates and displays artefacts and facts 
however correct and beautiful the result may be.4 
These examples exaggerate what we are more likely to 
find in reality, but they make a point: if one wishes to 
determine what to do and how to do it one needs to decide 
why anything should be done at all. Using such ideas as 
analytical tools, when we look at any museum’s statements 
of policy we are likely to find a blend of functionalist, 
structuralist, liberatory and interpretive objects which 
together help to define the unique character of the insti-
tution, to signal its peculiar needs, and ultimately to direct 
the appropriate means and methods of satisfying them.5 
There are different ways of understanding what 
museum Design is and what it is for, in addition there is 
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5. In the past, the British
Museum has managed the ‘diff-
erence’ primarily by institution-
alizing a clear distinction
between the ‘permanent gallery’
approach and the ‘temporary, 
4. We should consider, for
example, how the British Museum
will deal with the return of the
ethnographic collections to the
main buildings in 1997. The
classical departments hold to a
traditional object-centred view
of the purpose of exhibition and
engage a design devoted to
ordered display - an ontological 
emphasis - which makes few
concessions to an ‘audience’-
serving narrative construction
of communications. Whereas
the ethnographic department
operates from an opposing
position in which the exposition 
and celebration of cultural div-
ersity engages a design devoted
to often theatrical story telling -
an epistemological emphasis. In
future will ethnographic appr-
oaches be suppressed? Or will
new gallery spaces, in prime
locations in the restructured
building, be used to establish a
high-capacity core of crowd-
pulling ‘shows’ rather like those 
on the ground floor of the
Natural History Museum? The
former approach may preserve
the institution’s traditional 
reserve but at the risk of
alienating a disciplinary culture
and the audience it serves. The
latter course would undoubtedly
radically alter the nature,
identity and constituency of the
institution as a whole. 
 
 
Other" pp. 17-50 in BIJKER, 
Weibe E., Thomas P. Hughes &
Trevor Pinch. The Social
Construction of Technological
Systems. MIT Press, 1987. p.46. 
always the question of what museum Design ought to be 
about. One cannot prescribe in general: the function of 
Design in any particular museum can only be determined 
by consideration of the local, historical, contingent 
context. What one can say is that historical accident and 
ill-considered imposition are not the processes likely to 
produce a Design that suits the organization's needs. If 
you like, museum Design must itself be designed or at very 
least selected according to deliberately and carefully 
thought through criteria.6 
Although it is common to think of Design in terms of 
its products and its end products, as a practitioner or a 
member of the wider creative team, it is equally important 
to think of Design in terms of its processes and its philoso-
phies. It is only through developing this understanding 
that we can hope to relate our activity to the practical 
situations in which we are expected to intervene and in the 
process to define problems worth solving and a comprehen-
sive range of criteria by which solutions may be evaluated. 
Ideology, Programme and Differance 
The dimensions peculiar to each aspect of museum 
designing open up the spaces of interaction, the intervals 
of differance.7 A group of people situated with a complex of 
material and intellectual effects begins as a more or less 
open field of possibilities - an actor network capable of re-
defining the identities, extents and interrelationships of its 
actors, and in which neither human nor non-human actors 
are privileged in the process.8 But not all possibilities are 
equally probable for two key reasons. (1) A dynamic is 
implicit in any specific network of actors - propensities 
may be uncovered, a nascent force field activated. (2) 
Before a programme begins certain possibilities are 
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proscribed and others favoured by the prejudices, pre-
conceptions, diverse projects and allegiances of the human 
actors, and by the preconfigurations of energy and material 
in the non-human actors. Potentiality, therefore, is there 
to be negotiated, shaped, liberated. However, there is 
always the danger that not only may potentiality and 
possibility be too tightly circumscribed but that pro-
gramme and process may be prescribed in such a way as to 
prefigure or predetermine the product. If the latter is 
allowed to happen, complexity is artificially diminished, 
the visionary and the analytical aspects of Design are 
dissociated, and the whole operation reduced to one of 
artistic indulgence and/or technical treatments. The point 
of design is to envision the widest field of possibilities 
genuinely available to the group in a specific practical 
situation, to open up and to empower the design process. 
3. social status  
4. local-global, 
2. social dynamics 
1. time 
 
7. These defining dimensions 
are: 
6. It is no accident that in their 
respective books Margaret Hall, 
Head of Design at the British 
Museum, promotes a normative, 
display grammar for museum 
exhibition design whilst Roger 
Miles et al at the Natural 
History Museum promote an 
educational empiricism. See: 
HALL, Margaret. On Display. 
Lund Humphries, 1987, and 
MILES, Roger S. et al. The 
Design of Educational Exhibits. 
Unwin Hyman, 1982. 
 
WILSON, Sir David M. The 
British Museum: Purpose and 
Politics, Trustees of the British 
Museum, 1989. pp.118-9. 
A museum is not a business nor is 
it primarily a pedagogical insti-
tution, nor a part of the 
entertainment industry ... Busi-
ness ability, educational prowess 
and public relations experience 
must all be subordinated to this: 
... protect[ing] the collections and 
present[ing] them to the public. 
and considers that: 
exhibition’ approach. The former 
one could call an ‘architectonics’ 
of material culture and the latter 
a (rather conservative) ‘the-
matics’ of material culture. The 
former Director, Sir David 
Wilson, made it very clear that 
he disagrees with the view that: 
In a period of greater sophistica-
tion in the entertainment indus-
try, of high investment in the arts, 
...the customer must be appeased 
with ‘exciting’ and ‘more rele-
vant’ museums - closer perhaps to 
theme parks ...  
The actor network contains and continually redefines 
heterogeneous actors. Therefore, in attempting to account 
for the non-human, as much as for the human, aspects of 
dynamic activity one encounters a self-reflexive difficulty. 
In retrospective analysis, even if not obviously in the 
immediate experience of the participant, the various 
phenomena uncovered are potentially the outcome of two 
layers of social construction. The first refers to the ‘real’ 
substance of the design - philosophy, programme, process, 
product - to its actuality, its social and material context, and 
the second refers to the ‘ideal’ design which is presented in 
such evidence as reaches the analyst, in the actuality of that 
presentation, the social and material context of analysis. 
This layering blurs any distinction that one might hope to 
make between the social construction of a design and the 
social construction of its reconstruction (social reconstruc-
tion). They present their own pseudo-synchronic slices 
through performative social space which have the added 
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complexity of contrasting enfolded spaces the effects of 
which are difficult to separate in time (Figure 4.2.1.) 
Figure 4.2.1 
  
The layering effect of social-construction/reconstruction. The retrospective analysis of material 
evidence (such as project documentation) tends to blur effects such as post-rationalization between 
any pseudo-synchronic slice that shows a ‘moment’ in the social construction of a design and one 
that shows its social reconstruction. What links these moments is the documentary (material) 
evidence that reaches the analyst. 
  
The paradoxical nature of this problem must be accepted.  
At the first level, as participant in the design situation, 
a pragmatic approach may be adopted. The configurations 
of energy and material that succumb to direct mani-
pulation may be regarded as cartesian fixities, as three-
dimensional materialities present to human actors but as 
temporal zeros that are therefore impotent in the 
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negotiation of potentiality: those that do not, as integral 
aspects of human actors under whose shaping power they 
may be subsumed. 
CALLON, Michel. "Society in 
the Making: The Study of 
Technology as a Tool for 
8. ...the actor network should not 
...be confused with a network 
linking in some predictable fash-
ion elements that are perfectly 
well defined and stable ...An 
actor network is simultaneously 
an actor whose activity is net 
working heterogeneous elements 
and a network that is able to 
redefine and transform what it is 
made of. 
 
(b) dimensions l, 2 & 3 define 
the ‘ideal’ space of the socially 
constructed object as design 
(once again this identical to the 
other socio-temporal spaces to be 
found in design philosophy (b) 
and in the design programme 
(b).) 
(a) dimensions 8, 9 & 10 define 
the ‘real’ physical space of the 
material object, and 
(b) dimensions 1, 2 & 3 define a 
performative social space of 
pragmatic communicative action 
identical to that in design philos-
ophy (b above: only the contrast-
ing enfolded spaces determine 
that phenomena and patterns of 
differentiation will appear differ-
ent). 
In the designed object: 
In the design programme: 
(a) dimensions 4 & 5 define the 
documentary space of the 
autographic product; and 
dimensions 1, 4 & 5 define a 
performative documentary space 
of pseudo-synchronic ‘moments’ 
in design. 
In the design process: 
(b) dimensions 1, 2 & 3 define a 
performative social space of 
pragmatic communicative action. 
performative discursive space of 
ideologically committed commu-
nicative action; and 
At the second level, as dislocated observer, as analyst, 
critic or historian, a socio-cultural/technical approach to 
the reconstruction presents the broadest possibility for 
interpretation and reflective practice. The paradox can not 
be dissipated but phenomena that appear to be associated 
with the different levels - social construction and social 
reconstruction - are at least equally likely to be uncovered 
and therefore will constantly pose the problem of 
accommodation in the critical discourse. 
In this way a contingent humanistic manoeuvre allows 
some sense to be made of the notion of ‘identical’ 
performative social spaces in different aspects of design. 
The key to this lies in the communicative nature of 
performative and productive activity in design. 
Communicativity depends upon the contingent produc-
tion of rationale, which by definition must have a basis in 
ideology, in beliefs and values that are paradigmatically 
locatable. Discourse in general is similarly constrained: 
even if the incommensurable are held in tension, in post-
modern fashion, the very idea of incommensurability relies 
upon differentiated paradigmatic space for its meaning. 
...attempts to abandon paradigm incommensurability lead, 
apparently inexorably, towards epistemological authoritarianism. 
The contribution that the paradigm model made was to provide 
a legitimate channel of communication and development for 
beliefs systems which do not accord with the dominant ones.9 
Ideologies, therefore, need to be made explicit, differences 
located as the sites of ‘conversation’ and ‘interaction’, as 
interfaces, as intervals. Ideological conversation and 
accommodation need to be meshed into the programme, 
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meshed into its performative social space as an aspect of 
pragmatic communicative action, and into its documentary 
space in the form of ‘rationale’. Such tensions as inevitably 
exist between differently committed practitioners, need to 
be in the open and tested again and again against the 
requirement for performative and productive communica-
tive activity. In this situation, of forging a shared project, a 
pragmatic instinct will prevail. This is not an individualis-
tic, self-censoring, pragmatism that suppresses commit-
ment and breaks allegiances for the sake of progress, which 
conjures up an experience of dislocation and pain that the 
existentialists were all too conscious could characterize the 
condition of modernity. It is a new kind of pragmatism 
that engages the certainty of identity and knowledge only 
in moments that require individual expertise and defers to 
the opportunities in explored difference, engages in a play 
of differance, in moments that require solidarity. This 
invokes the contingency and irony that Rorty proposes 
can characterize a positive experience of the postmodern 
condition.10 
 
12. DEAN, David. Museum. 
Exhibition: Theory and Practice. 
Routledge, 1994. pp.11-2. 
11. By the time an exhibition has 
been built and opened, many 
people have been involved...  
1 curator, 2 designer, 3 editor, 4 
coordinator, 5 graphic designer, 6 
lighting designer, 7 production 
manager, 8 joiners, 9 painters, 10 
electricians, 11 security adviser, 
12 warders, 13 conservator, 14 
lecturer, 15 publisher, 16 photo-
grapher, 17 printers, 18 sales 
people, 19 ‘preparator'. 
HALL, 1987, pp.22-3. 
This experience is that of the 
‘liberal ironist’ who accepts that 
the working out of private inter-
ests and of public obligations can 
not be subsumed under one final 
vocabulary but that they can be 
combined in life. Solidarity is 
something which must be 
created and expanded as an act 
of imagination: it is not some-
thing we will ‘discover’ when we 
understand something essential-
ly human in us all. 
 
 
10. RORTY, Richard. Contin-
gency, Irony, and Solidarity. 
Cambridge University Press, 
1989. 
 
9. JACKSON, N. & P. 
CARTER "In Defence of 
Paradigm Incommensurability", 
School of Management Working 
Paper HUSM/PC/2, University 
of Hull. pp.31 & 32. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sociological Analysis", pp.83-
103. in BIJKER et al, 1987. p.93. 
 
Actor Network Construction of Museum Design Ideology 
If one takes a familiar network of actors in museum 
design, such as that described by Hall (1987),11 a number 
of observations can be made: 
(1) The ‘idea’ for an exhibition may come from any of a 
wide range of sources: 
audience suggestions, board members or trustees, collections 
management personnel, community leaders, curators, current 
events, director, educators, staff and volunteers.12 
Often the museum director or the head of department will 
have recognised a need or discerned the merits of an idea, or 
Government departments prompted perhaps by subject experts 
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or potential sponsors, or entrepreneurs will have fed in the 
idea from outside.13 
(2) The initial team involved at the inception of a project 
will be small perhaps only two people, rarely more than a 
handful. This is the team that shapes an idea and begins to 
make explicit a project programme. At the outset Hall 
includes the following roles: curator, editor, designer, and 
coordinator,14 Belcher: director (to initiate project), curator, 
designer, conservator, educator/editor, and organizer/ 
manager,15 and Dean: director (to set up planning team), 
curator, educator, designer, and project manager.16 
(3) Even at the beginning of a project, there are both 
management-oriented and product-oriented issues to be 
addressed.17 The issue of who is ‘client’ and who is 
‘designer’ may appear to be contingent upon the prog-
ramme and the scale of the project. But in fact this is a non-
issue, the result of misappropriating terms devised for legal 
clarity in commercial contexts: if the designer has to form 
a special contract in order to engage in the project then 
normally it is the museum authority that is the client and 
the designer the provider of contracted services. In a 
general ‘performative’ sense this legal contingency is, if not 
irrelevant, then of secondary importance: in any specific 
project it may affect the hierarchical positioning of the 
designer, but the dynamic nature of the roles and relation-
ships mean that the character of various interfaces is of 
primary importance. Dean’s terminology is better at cap-
turing the relationship between various actors in that it 
identifies roles which are different in type - a cluster of 
productive roles and a separate co-ordinating role - and it 
holds true whether the design, or any other role, is fulfilled 
by specially contracted or by traditionally employed staff. 
However, there are other ways of categorizing roles that set 
up different structural expectations of the team. For 
16. DEAN, 1994, p.14. 
 
17. ibid. p.13. 
 
 
15. BELCHER, Michael. 
“Communicating through mus-
eum exhibitions" pp.649-59. in 
THOMPSON, John. M. A. (ed.) 
Manual of Curatorship. Butter-
worth / Museums Association, 
2nd edition 1992. p.655. 
14. ibid. p.22. 
 
13. HALL, 1987, p.21. 
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example, one might suggest that the appropriate role-types: 
are strategist, advocate, facilitator, and maker. In such a 
scheme which hat a particular individual wears will tend to 
change depending upon the nature of the task in hand, and 
the problem of dynamics comes down to maximizing the 
variety and minimizing the number of hats in use. 
(4) As a developing project reaches the point where signif-
icant resources must be committed, the team gets bigger, a 
wide range of specialists get involved, communications 
become intensive and detailed, the opportunities for things 
to go wrong multiply, and design project management 
becomes the centre to which all other activities relate.18  
(5) The designer, in wrestling with the many conflicting 
requirements of the programme, acts as a kind of “broker 
between the other interests behind the project”.19 In this 
general sense, every designer plays an ‘interpretive’ role. 
What is sometimes simplistically referred to as ‘responding 
to the brief’, is often, even if not always consciously, a 
context-shaping activity, in the socio-technical sense, as 
well as a product-shaping activity. A constellation of others’ 
interests is represented or reconstructed, and repeatedly 
reconstrued through the design process and recorded in the 
programme documentation. An embedded, progressively 
distorted, ‘message’ emerges, first in the autographic pro-
duct and ultimately, after the opportunities for anamorpho-
sis that realization, production and customization represent, 
in the designed object. Thus however imperfectly: 
 
20. HUGHES, Thomas P. "The 
Evolution of Large Technological 
Systems" pp.51-82. in BIJKER 
et al, 1987. p.77. 
19. ibid. p.22. 
 
18. Others may join the team for 
a large project; experts on conser-
vation, security, education, eval-
uation, publicity, and technical 
advisers on the more specialised 
aspects of the lighting, use of 
computers and audio-visual pre- 
sentation. 
Hall, 1987, p.23. 
Durable physical artifacts project into the future the socially 
constructed characteristics acquired in the past when they 
were designed.20 
This is an interpretive role which addresses the semiotics 
of social and cultural values. It should not be confused with 
that intentional notion of purposefully communicating an 
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explicit information content, which defines the more 
obvious interpretive role that is expected of the exhibition 
designer, of all communication designers. 
These observations point to an initial picture of how 
the ideological may be accommodated in museum design 
activity. In Figure 4.2.2 the social space of pragmatic 
communicative action allows that the roles defined in the 
initial development team form a differentiated zone - an 
actor network - in the midst of the wider social context. In 
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Figure 4.2.2 
  
The pseudo-synchronic moment of museum design project inception. The enfolded paradigmatic 
space allows ideological tensions to be pictured in the performative social space. 
  
any pseudo-synchronic state of the actor network’s trans-
formations, each role assumes a particular position in the 
paradigmatic space of design ideology. However, if roles 
are defined one way these ideological positions may appear 
relatively stable, if another to be quite volatile. 
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For example, if roles are defined according to a system 
of institutionally defined jobs - curator, designer, conserva-
tor, educator, project manager - then we must accept that, 
although the conservator’s ideological position may be a 
fairly stable functionalist one, perhaps with leanings 
towards radical structuralist interpretations of meaning 
wherever historical or contextual knowledge impinges 
directly upon the empirical knowledge of the conservatorial 
object, the curator’s ideological position may be far more 
difficult to pin down. On the one hand, the traditional 
curator, a believer in museographical norms enshrined in 
professional codes, may be firmly associated with function-
alist notions and concerns – objective knowledge, order and 
control of social and material conditions, established 
protocol. On the other hand, the ‘modern’ curator, one 
familiar with the new museology, may be loosely associated 
with both radical structuralist and interpretive concerns. 
He or she may believe that the shaping and directing of 
museum aims and practice to worthwhile social purposes, 
as determined by an objective critical analysis of current 
conditions, ought to be attempted even though the inter-
pretation of current conditions is ultimately a question of 
individual experience and is itself a culturally and socially 
conditioned activity. Such tensions highlight the unresolv-
ability of museological concerns, and the resulting lack of 
traditional normativity presents the curator with a daily 
experience of the post-modern condition.21 
LYOTARD, Jean-Francois. 
[1979] The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge. Trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi. 
Manchester University Press, 
1984. p.xxiv. 
21. I define postmodern as incre-
dulity toward metanarratives. ... 
our incredulity is now such that 
we no longer expect salvation to 
rise from these inconsistencies ... Generic Roles and Ideological Stability 
If roles are defined generically, via group dynamics for 
example, a different set of ideological associations will 
emerge in any pseudo-synchronic state of the actor 
network (Figure 4.2.3.) 
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Figure 4.2.3 
  
The pseudo-synchronic moment of museum design project inception. The enfolded paradigmatic 
space allows ideological tensions to be pictured in the performative social space. 
  
Brunelli has suggested that the designer may adopt any of 
four quite distinctive roles in the context of museum 
development: 
1. The Exhibitions Officer - the provider of cases, stands, etc. to specific 
dimensions; the producer of labels, leaflets, catalogues, etc. using text 
provided by others; and the provider of illustrations, photographs, models, 
computer technology, lighting and other specific expertise, who goes 
beyond performance specification. ... 
2. The Planner Innovator - a designer involved at the planning stage 
either a) before a brief exists to offer alternative schemes to fit an 
established strategy or b) to discuss a brief in such a way as to cause a 
change in what was required. 
3. The Manager - a designer responsible for delegating work and 
overseeing the implementation of a project within its conceptual frame-
work, budget and progress from its early stages up to completion. 
4. The Strategist - a designer engaged in the formulation of new strategy 
or changes in existing strategy. 22 
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25. The radical humanist para-
digm is defined by its concern to 
develop a sociology of radical 
change from a subjectivist stand-
point. Its approach to social sci-
ence has much in common with 
that of the interpretive paradigm, 
in that it views the social world 
from a perspective which tends to  
...the staff member responsible for 
promoting the needs of visitors, in 
developing, reviewing and revising 
exhibitions 
she says of her conclusions: 
these are excellent guidelines 
[pp.178-9.] 
 
24. HILKE, D D. "What is an 
audience advocate? A Position 
Paper", unpublished, undated. 
Also quoted in HOOPER-
GREENHILL, Eilean. Museums 
and their Visitors. Routledge, 
1994. On Hilke's consideration 
of the audience advocate: 
 
BURRELL, G. & G MORGAN. 
Sociological Paradigms and 
Organisational Analysis. 
Heinemann Educational Books, 
1979. p.33-4. 
23. Theorists located within this 
paradigm advocate a sociology of 
radical change from an objec-
tivist standpoint. ...Radical struct-
uralism is committed to radical 
change, emancipation, and poten-
tiality, in an analysis which 
emphasises structural conflict, 
modes of domination, contra-
diction and deprivation. It 
approaches these general concerns 
from a standpoint which tends to 
be realist, positivist, determinist 
and nomothetic.  
 
22. BRUNELLI, Maria. The 
Role of Designers in the 
Management of Museums. Ph.D. 
Thesis. Institute of Advanced 
Studies, Manchester Metropolitan 
University, 1993. pp.255-6. 
These roles may be compared with the role-types 
suggested earlier (observation 3) strategist, advocate, facil-
itator, and maker. In reverse order: the designer as strate-
gist is almost self-explanatory, what is implied in the 
generic term ‘strategist’ is that overall direction is deter-
mined and contradictions arising out of implementation 
are resolved by the strategist. The strategist’s role is 
concerned with shaping the conditions for change and in 
this sense the strategist is a natural radical structuralist.23 
The designer as planner-innovator is, amongst other 
things perhaps, an ‘advocate’. The advocate presents 
particular ideas and represents particular interests, that are 
not necessarily his or her own, that are relevant to the 
situation, and that may not otherwise get a fair hearing. 
Advocacy may be necessary either because the ideas and 
interests come from outside the immediate environment or 
because the party they concern is not present or competent 
to make its own case.24 There is an aspect of design 
advocacy, therefore, which is visionary and concerns radical 
change, and in this sense the advocate is a natural radical 
humanist.25 But there is also an aspect which is about 
accounting for the richness and variety of human experi-
ence - what is ‘other’ than ourselves - and in this sense, the 
paradigmatic sense, the advocate is a natural interpreter.26 
The designer as manager is a ‘facilitator’ in the sense 
that the smooth progress of implementation is the central 
concern and the organization and monitoring of resources 
and processes to achieve some predetermined overall goal 
are the main activities. The facilitator’s role is concerned 
with cause and effect – causing, by means that are relatively 
reliable, effects that are relatively certain – though with 
some of that concern to be sensitive to and responsive to 
social conditions that characterizes the strategist’s shaping 
role and the advocate’s interpretive role. The facilitator, 
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of a solution to a tightly defined 
problem and solution concept; the 
client may actually dictate the 
form of solution, in which ease 
the designer's involvement relates 
to the translation of the solution in 
28. Topalian describes a ‘fully-
fledged design project’ as involv-
ing: conceptualization, interpret-
ation, formulation, and imple-
mentation. In a ‘pair-of-hands’ 
assignment the designer’s 
involvement is focussed on the 
‘formulation’: 
 
ibid. p.26. 
27. The functionalist paradigm ... 
is a perspective which is highly 
pragmatic in orientation, concer-
ned to understand society in a 
way which generates knowledge 
which can be put to use. It is often 
problem-oriented in approach, con-
cerned to find practical solutions 
to practical problems. It is concern-
ed with the effective ‘regulation’ 
and control of social affairs. 
 
ibid. p.28 & 31. 
26. The interpretive paradigm is 
informed by a concern to under-
stand... the fundamental nature of 
the social world at the level of 
subjective experience ...within the 
frame of reference of the part-
icipant as opposed to the observer 
of action. ...it is underwritten by 
an involvement with issues relat-
ing to the nature of the status quo, 
social order, consensus, social inte-
gration and cohesion and actuality. 
 
be nominalist, antipositivist, 
voluntarist and ideographic. 
However, its frame of reference is 
committed to a view of society 
which emphasises the importance 
of overthrowing or transcending 
the limitations of existing social 
arrangements.  
BURRELL & MORGAN, 
1979. g.32. 
one could say, is a natural functionalist but a rather soft 
one who has leanings towards both radical structuralist and 
interpretive positions.27 
The designer as Exhibitions Officer is a ‘maker’ in the 
sense that the business of producing the exhibition is 
dependent upon the maker getting practical things done. 
This does not always mean that the designer as maker 
actually handles construction materials, operates the work-
shop machinery and fixes things together on site (although 
at crucial moments it can) but it does mean that 
production documents: working drawings, artwork, specifi-
cations, etc., quality control, and finishing processes are all 
the designer’s direct responsibility. The maker’s role is 
concerned with causes and effects that are more reliable 
and more certain than those generally encountered in the 
facilitator’s organizing and monitoring role, and therefore 
the maker is more clearly a natural functionalist. 
In overall project terms the designer’s role may change 
little. What Topalian calls a ‘pair-of-hands’ project involves 
the designer as ‘maker’ from the moment he or she is 
engaged.28 Equally, the consultant designer, especially on a 
larger project of this type, is likely to be cast in the role of 
facilitator and be primarily concerned with client liaison 
and with delegating, co-ordinating and chasing design and 
production work. In either of these cases room for 
ideological posturing is severely limited, in the maker’s 
case primarily by the consuming involvement of the design 
process, and in the facilitator’s case by the almost irresist-
ible demand for pragmatism that is the normal result of 
occupying a nodal position constructed by the actor 
network. However, in the case of the planner-innovator, 
who is a design advocate and probably also an advocate for 
one or more other interests such as audience, sponsor or 
technology, and the strategist, who is in effect associated 
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directly with the client’s interests, the role is likely to be 
short-lived and to be transformed by the actor network 
rather rapidly into either that of facilitator or of maker. 
Whilst the role of strategist lasts, for instance during the 
inception of a new project, the scope, indeed the necessity, 
for an ideological position is clear: in order to establish an 
identity and a profile, gain political and institutional 
endorsements, and public and financial support, a clear and 
consistent presentation of principles, purposes and goals 
needs to be made with great conviction to a variety of 
audiences.29 Equally, during the relatively short duration of 
the type of advocacy role the designer as planner-
innovator represents, an ideological position emerges out 
of the presentation of a scheme or the revision of a 
programme that clearly has the aim of influencing sub-
sequent strategy. The designer must make this ideological 
position explicit simply to convince the client, or the 
strategist of the moment, that the proposal is being made 
with some appreciation of its wider social, cultural and 
possibly technical implications. 
Ideological Constellation and Generic Role Drift 
The ideological associations of the designer form a constel-
lation in themselves. In Figure 4.2.4 three possible pseudo-
synchronic slices across the performative social space of the 
design programme are layered onto each other: in effect the 
dimension of time has been collapsed to produce a simpli-
fied view in which each actor appears frozen to a point. The 
first slice shows the project inception. A designer recruited 
very early on may be involved in shaping the original idea 
and in formulating strategy, a role clearly associated with 
the radical structuralist paradigm in design ideology. In the 
second slice such a designer would be concerned initially 
the clients mind into physical 
reality - no more, no less. 
TOPALIAN, Alan. The 
Management of Design 
Projects. Associated Business 
Press, 1980. p.8. 
29. op. cit., Topalian points out 
that: 
... on some occasions, clients will 
value the fresh viewpoint design-
ers can adopt when they are 
allowed to seek out problems, and 
designers may be involved almost 
single-handed in the definition of 
problems right through to the 
formulation of solutions.  
Clearly the ‘ideation’ involved in 
the interpretation of a practical 
situation and the social-cultur-
al/technical context, and the 
conceptualization of problem-sol-
ution definitions only succeeds 
if articulated in terms of pers-
uasive and unambiguous ration-
ale. Therefore, project inception 
is unavoidably ideological - a 
function of competing dis-
courses, of language games, of 
politicized rhetorics. 
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Figure 4.2.4 
  
The performative social space of the museum design programme. The areas labelled ‘inception’, 
‘conception & development’, and ‘specification & production’ represent three possible pseudo- 
synchronic: slices through the space. 
  
with the development and presentation of “alternative 
schemes to fit an established strategy” and thus to act as a 
design advocate, a role clearly associated with the radical 
humanist and interpretive paradigms in design ideology. 
On a larger project this designer would subsequently be 
concerned to control the process of developing the ‘concept 
scheme’ into a realizable design. This constitutes the facili-
tator role which is clearly associated with a ‘soft’ functional-
ist position near the centre of the paradigmatic space of 
design ideology. On a smaller project, as the only designer 
on the team, this designer may be involved in continued 
advocacy drifting further and further towards the hard 
functionalism of the maker’s ideology as the design becomes 
more and more clearly realizable. Finally, in the third slice 
the designer becomes wholly concerned with the practicali-
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ties of specification and production on a larger project 
partly as facilitator, managing the makers, and partly (or 
on a smaller project, wholly) as the principal maker. 
From this pattern one can see that, as a project 
progresses, there tends to be a ‘drift’ across the roles from 
strategist to advocate to facilitator to maker (Figure 4.2.5.) 
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The drift of generic roles adopted by the designer as a function of project scale 
  
The larger and more prestigious the project the more likely 
the designer is to start at the strategist end of the scale and 
the smaller and more low key the project the greater the 
proportion of his/her time is taken up in the role of maker. 
Programme Dynamics and Status Ambiguity 
Successive slices through the performative space of the 
design programme it seems may be related to a drift in the 
designer’s generic role. This drift presents a two-dimen-
sional movement in the designer’s position in social space. 
Not only do the social dynamics gradually become less 
focussed on symbolic interests and intellectual concerns 
and increasingly dominated by material interests and 
practical or technical concerns, social status is also affected. 
For contingent and historical reasons society values those 
who are able to apply intellectual abilities, literacy and 
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articulacy to social purposes more highly than those who 
apply practical abilities, visual literacy and skilfullness.30 
There is a tendency, therefore, for the designer’s and others’ 
relative status to be higher during moments when the role 
of strategist is adopted and to be progressively lower as the 
roles of advocate, facilitator and maker are adopted. 
In some practical situations this can lead to a great 
deal of confusion about the ‘true’ status of an individual. 
One should remember that ‘inception’, ‘conception & devel-
opment’, and ‘specification & production’ are conventional 
but arbitrary pseudo-synchronic slices through a performa-
tive social space. Aspects of project inception may happen 
concurrently with, and some later than, aspects of project 
conception and development. The ‘blur’ in any project, 
that opens up the design process significantly, will take up 
a very significant proportion of the ‘performance’ time, the 
duration of the project (Figure 4.2.6.) The hierarchical 
status of an individual, therefore, may change dynamically 
in the course of a project and only give the appearance of 
smooth transformation in retrospect, in the reconstruction 
of pseudo-synchronic states. Looking again at Figure 4.2.4 
one can see that, for example, the conservator may have an 
important advocacy role during project inception advising 
on the availability and suitability of collection items, 
technical resources and physical space. This would consti-
tute a social status comparable with those of the designer, 
the educator, and the project manager in the executive 
project team. During conception and development the 
conservator may continue an advocacy role directed 
towards the development of the design, but now alongside 
subject expert, audience advocate, and contractor. And, in 
the same figure, during specification and production of a 
smaller project the conservator may have a highly skilled 
productive   role  as  a  maker   concerned  with  stabilizing  
30. ..."linguistic chauvinism"... 
can very easily incline us to sup-
pose that the best talkers, most 
cogent language users among us, 
are at the same time those who 
most admirably show that cen-
tral human trait of rationality - 
are in effect the best people. 
HARRISON, Andrew. Making 
& Thinking: A Study of 
Intelligent Activities. Harvester 
Press, 1978. p.2. 
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Figure 4.2.6 
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A sequence of pseudo-synchronic slices through the performance time of a design programme 
showing the potentially substantial period during which activities across conventionally defined 
project ‘stages’ may be happening concurrently. Aspects of what are thought of, in conventional 
linear terms, as ‘later’ stages may in fact precede aspects of ‘earlier’ stages.. Such contingent messiness 
requires of the designer the ability to cope with frequent role reversals and recapitulations. (Compare 
with figures 4.2.4 and 4.2.5.) 
  
collection materials and preparing mounts and supports to 
the 3-dimensional designer’s specifications. On a larger 
project this may be primarily a facilitator’s role in respect 
of the work of a conservation team perhaps including 
museum sub-contractors. In either case the conservator is 
assigned or expresses a status comparable with that of the 
editor, the contractor, and the graphic and media designers 
who at this stage are also involved in highly skilled 
production work – illustration, artwork production and 
the supervision of designer's sub-contractors such as 
photographers and typographers. 
An aspect of any actor’s existential angst therefore can 
be knowing just where he or she stands in the contingent 
hierarchy constructed by the actor network. And the 
greater the range of generic roles undertaken by the actor, 
and the more dynamic the actor network’s transform-
ations, the greater the potential for angst becomes. In 
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these terms the designer, one can appreciate, is a rather 
vulnerable individual and the first section of the next 
chapter (5.1) will attempt to focus on and situate the 
individual particularly in relation to the space of the design 
process and to the nature of the complexity with which 
this engages. But, before that the last pairing of discursive 
locations opens up another interval by exploring the 
organizational quality of the museum in reflexive mode. 
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4.3 Museality of Organizations  
When is a museum not a museum?  
‘Museums collect, document, preserve, research, exhibit 
and interpret material evidence and associated information 
for the public benefit’.1 This definition may be read as 
inscribing the definitive operations of a museum in a code. 
Adherence to the code therefore legitimizes the museum in 
the social and political context. The code is the museum’s 
qualification: adherence to it the expression of a compe-
tence.2 Were we to find this same expression of competence 
elsewhere - in some organization other than what we think 
of as a museum - we would be presented with a dilemma. 
Either an organization we thought was not a museum is in 
fact a museum, even if of a new sort, or, a code we thought 
defined and legitimated only museums in fact has a broad-
er application and expresses a competence found not only 
in museums as such but also in other organizations.3 We 
might conclude that some organizations have museum-like 
qualities, a museal focus. 
5. KAVANAGH, Gaynor. 
“Museums in Partnership” [pp. 
127-8] in HOOPER-GREEN-
HILL, Eilean. (ed.) Museum 
Media Message, Routledge, 1995. 
pp. 124-34. 
 
 
4. The words ‘museal’ and 
‘museality’ do not appear in the 
Oxford English Dictionary. 
3. The Jorvik Viking Centre in 
York, which does not meet all 
of the expected criteria in the 
Museum Registration Scheme, 
has nevertheless made a success-
ful application for registration. 
2. The Museum Registration 
Scheme operated by the area 
museum councils on behalf of 
the Museums and Galleries 
Commission sets out a wide 
range of criteria which take 
their logic from the definition 
of a museum. 
 
 
1. Museums Association, 1984. 
Defining the Museal 
The term ‘museality’ has found little favour in the UK4 
where it can be taken to imply a discredited belief in the 
certainties of traditional museographic practices. 
The deadening hand of the concept of ‘museum worthiness’ (or 
is the ghastly word ‘museality’ to be used here?) has got a fair 
amount to answer for, including: partial and often tediously 
repetitive collections, the omission of those objects - and therefore 
histories - that fail to conform and the perpetuation of damaging 
stereotypes.5
Museum worthiness however is not the key question. As  
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Maroević has shown in a structural-functional analysis of 
museum communication based on Tudman, museality, as 
the socially constructed quality that allows a museum 
object to function, is easily implicated in a multidimen-
sional field of information, meaning, difference.6 Further 
than this, once the object as document has been so impli-
cated it can be shown that any notion of finality in the 
process of communication must be abandoned, that the 
presence of the document must be continually deferred, 
distorted, distanced. 
The visibility of this play of différance is somewhat 
masked by the style of notation adopted by Maroević. 
Using this, radically different spatialities - the physical, the 
social and the documentary - are each collapsed into a single 
dimension and sheared in order to produce a rather exotic 
virtual space of bridges between contributing elements. In 
this way the ‘semiotic’ (Figure 4.3.1.) is played off against 
the ‘materialist’ (Figure 4.3.2.) in a hybrid structural -
functional schema (Figure 4.3.3.) 
Sign
Document
Communication 
Process 
Message 
Documentation 
Process 
Information 
Information 
Process 6. MAROEVIĆ, Ivo. “The 
Museum Message: Between the 
Document and Information”, in 
HOOPER-GREENHILL, 1995. 
pp.24-36. 
Figure 4.3.1 
  
The semiotic or structural sub-schema implicated in the Tudman 
analysis of the museum object as used by Maroević. 
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Space 
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(meaning of 
Musealia 
Figure 4.3.2 
  
The materialist or functional sub-schema implicated in the Tudman 
analysis of the museum object as used by Maroević. 
  
Figure 4.3.3 
  
The Tudman structural-functional analysis of the museum object as 
used by Maroević in which semiotic and materialist sub-schemata are 
set off against each other. Parallel axes are in effect sheared as 
indicated by the connecting dot-dash lines. The Sign-Museum Object 
relation is indicated by the dotted line. 
  
I find this unhelpful and also in breach of Lefebvre’s rule 
regarding the need to account for any move from one 
spatiality to another.7 In place of the conflated structural-
functional analysis adopted by Maroević I propose a multi-
dimensional analysis in which the contributing physical, 
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7. See above 2.0 Space and 
Theory: Spatial Models. Ref: 
LEFEBVRE, Henri. [1974] The 
Production of Space. Trans. 
Donald Nicholson-Smith. Basil 
Blackwell, 1991. p.5. 
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social and documentary spatialities remain distinct. This 
requires a symmetrical construction of schemata in which 
the moves between one spatiality and another are account-
ed for in the clear activation of each space in turn by 
projection along a linear dimension of time. 
In the first construction the museum object, as part of 
a ‘moveable cultural heritage’, is construed as a document 
of the physical/social ‘reality’ from which it is taken by the 
museum. In materialist terms, as a document it has an 
accumulated information content which may be ‘read’, 
translated, reinscribed, etc. as a documentation process. 
The focus on documentation constructs a pattern of un-
covered, masked and recovered information which changes 
over time - this is the documentation process. Invisible to 
this but contributing its specific form and context are (1) a 
material physical object which is embedded in the process 
as the sign and (2) the social reality of the object which is 
embedded in the process as its margin of uncertainty, its 
linguistic (in the broadest sense) negotiation, its meaning-
fulness. Being operated on only as a sign, the presence of 
the physical object is distanced and distorted. Indeed, it 
will be repeatedly substituted for and simulated in the 
reading-translating-reinscribing process. And, as a contested 
object always involved in a movement from one meaning 
context to another - a participation in narratives that con-
struct identity, social ‘place’ - its social presence is similarly 
always deferred, distorted and distanced from the 
documentary space (Figure 4.3.4.) 
In the second construction the museum object, as part 
of a socially contested arena of meaning, is construed as 
the ‘museal’ object - an object which invokes the quality of 
museality. Museality is a particular form of socially 
constructed meaning that processes indefinitely through 
the language games, power plays, and shaping activities of 
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Figure 4.3.4 
  
The object as ‘document’. 
  
the various individuals and groups in the museum environ-
ment. By focussing on ‘museality’ a specific idea of socially 
constructed meaning is being referred to, one which: (1) is 
irredeemably bound up with the material culture; (2) is 
dependent upon the removal (actual or symbolic) of the 
material object from the ‘real’ world context in which it 
was created and used, and; (3) is selective, reflexive and 
radically conservative in its attitude towards the identity of 
the object. In the social contest over meaning the physi-
cality and the information content of the object remain 
invisible contributors, enfolded in the social space but 
continually distorted, distanced and deferred in a play of 
différance (Figure 4.3.5.) 
The third schema constructs the ontic track of the 
museum object as a physical material entity. This antic 
track is primarily characterized by a moment of radical 
transition - that turning point at which the social context 
of constructed meaning changes from one related to the 
object’s conception, creation, distribution, use and disposal 
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Figure 4.3.5 
  
The object as `implied museality'. 
  
to one related to implied museality.8 At this moment the 
process of accumulating information in the object is quali-
tatively altered: in the ‘real’ world, the world outside the 
museum, the process embodies in the object-as-sign the 
physical traces of the life of the object - its form, iconicity, 
inscription (with the marks of use and abuse as well as of a 
more obvious ‘linguistic’ surplus) - whereas, in the museum 
context these signs of life are overlaid with those of a slow 
lingering death, a symbolic suspended animation, the 
physical impress of the museum process. Any further 
accumulation of information, therefore, is an embodiment 
of implied museality, the development of the form and 
physical characteristics of musealia (Figure 4.3.6.) 
The process of selecting, preserv-
ing and recycling certain kinds of
material culture and associated
information ...justifies the position
given to the museum institution
in the Production-consumption
model. 
8. See above 3.2 Design:
Epistemological Object. Figure
3.2.7 The Production-consump-
tion model. And 3.3 Museum:
Manifestations.: 
The museum context may be distinguished from the 
‘real-world’ context only in relative terms. The removal of 
the material cultural object from one or another complex 
location in the physical, social and documentary constella-
tion of spatialities and its relocation in the realm of 
musealia represents one, admittedly rather peculiar, move- 
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The object as sign. 
  
ment amongst many possible movements during the ‘life’ 
of the object. If, instead of regarding the difference of the 
museum process as definitive, we regard its similarity as of 
reflexive value then it becomes one of a class of move-
ments characterized by a complex relocation, a simultan-
eous discontinuity in several spatialities, and a rather 
different complexion is placed on the process. What we are 
interested in, as an exemplar of complex relocation, is the 
moment of transition itself, the radical renegotiation of a 
placement in physical, social and documentary spaces. This 
is not a moment in the synchronic sense, neither is it an 
event explicable in purely diachronic terms. The reconstr-
uctable fields of meaning rather are the interfaces between 
one state of being and another and are best visualized as 
pseudo-synchronic slices through one or another activated 
space.9 Perhaps the most revealing is that of the object as 
implied museality. If one imagines a differentiation of the 
material cultural field, one that includes that being created 
(design) and that received from the past (site specific and 
9. See above 3.1 Organization: 
Simplification and Adequacy for 
discussion of the practical 
impossibility of the synchronic 
moment. 
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moveable cultural heritage), one may visualize several 
layers of complex relocation each significantly overlapping 
the next in a series of pseudo-synchronic slices through a 
performative social space in which meaning is continually 
(re)constructed (Figure 4.3.7.) 
Figure 4.3.7 
‘Performance’ of 
constructing a 
meaning 
Pseudo-synchronic 
slice through the 
performative  
social space 
time
Information 
content of the 
object as 
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constructed 
meaning 
Physicality 
of the 
object as  
a sign 
  
A series of pseudo-synchronic slices through the performative social space of meaning (re)con-
struction showing the object's movement through several complex locations. 
  
In the end it is because the museum process normally 
appears so definitive that it possesses a seminal organiza-
tional value. I will, therefore, introduce the term ‘museal’ 
to connote any organizational process of complex relocation 
in which an ‘object’ becomes the site of socially constructed 
meaning, is construed as a sign, and accumulates a special 
information content related only to the extraordinary 
organizational process. 
The Museal Organization 
A museum acquires collection and archive material: every 
organization acquires people and things and information 
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about them.10 In a museum the range and type of material 
acquired is determined by a view of the purpose of the 
museum. In this respect all organizations have a parallel 
problem, one of recognizing a particular purpose and of 
accumulating the material necessary to that purpose. 
12. The terms ‘material’ and 
‘culture’ have a variety of mean-
ings in modern/postmodern dis-
course. I take my lead from the
following amongst other sources:
‘Material’ in material culture 
LEWIS, Peter. "Museums and
Marketing" in THOMPSON,
John. M. A. (ed.) Manual of
Curatorship. Butterworth/
Museums Association, 2nd
edition 1992. pp. 148-58. and 
SILBERBERG, Ted. "The
Importance of Market and
Feasibility Analysis", in LORD,
Gail Dexter & Barry Lord (eds.)
The Manual of Museum
Planning. HMSO, 1991. pp.53-70. 
 
AMBROSE, Timothy & Sue
Runyard (eds.) Forward
Planning: a handbook of busi-
ness, corporate and development
planning for museums and gal-
leries. London: Routledge, 1991.
The museum's corporate or orga-
nizational objectives are drawn
up on the basis of the market
intelligence available to the
museum and on the basis of the
assessment of the museum's over-
all operation. [Ambrose, p.4.] 
11. The idea of a ‘market’ has, 
since the 1980s, become a com-
monplace in museum manage-
ment and development. See, for
example: 
 
10. Clearly an organization
acquires accommodation, equip-
ment and various inputs to the
manufacturing or service process
as well as personnel. The princi-
ples outlined here of documenta-
tion, preservation, etc. apply in
much the same way to things as
to people. I focus here on person-
nel for no other reason than one 
of clarity and in preparation for
a reflexive turn at the end of the
chapter - museums also have
personnel. 
A particular aspect of or approach to material culture 
is deemed to be the proper province of a museum by reason 
of geography, patronage, cooperative agreement, competi- 
tive space or cultural policy.11 And it seeks to acquire and 
to preserve both the ‘material’, the physical substance, of 
that material culture and the ‘culture’, the collective values 
and beliefs which it embodies and carries forward.12
All organizations are similarly identified and located 
by what they do and how they do it, and recruit appropri-
ately qualified and skilled personnel and adequate physical 
and other resources to sustain their activity. The material 
and other resources may be transformed and passed out of 
the system as products, by-products and waste. But the 
human acquisitions, on the contrary, must be ‘preserved’ 
indefinitely. By its continued existence and functioning, it 
is the collective (collection?) that sustains the organiz-
ation’s defining activity, its purpose, and the identity that 
these project. 
Once an item of moveable cultural heritage is made 
part of a museum collection the process of preservation 
and documentation continues indefinitely. Whatever 
primary function the object performs from time to time - 
specimen, document, display item, research object, conser-
vation object, etc. - the museum is bound to sustain the 
object’s movement through the museum process: it may 
not wilfully destroy or permanently dispose of the object. 
An unexhibitable painting cannot be taken to the muni-
cipal incinerator and burned: in one way or another it must 
remain in public circulation.13
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...the Faustian, Promethean (per- 
I also accept the tenuous
existence of the concept of the
cultural in our communication
and speed obsessed postmodern
condition in which: 
 AUSTIN-BROOS, Diane J.
"Introduction" [p.xx] in
AUSTIN-BROOS, Diane J.
(ed.) Creating Culture. Allen &
Unwin, 1987. pp.xix-xxxi. 
 ‘Culture’ [is] now understood as
a concept which reveals human-
kind’s creative capacity. 
GEERTZ, Clifford. The Inter-
pretation of Cultures. New York:
Basic Books, 1973. p.89. 
SAPIR, E. Culture, Language
and Personality, University of 
California Press, 1949. pp.79-80, 
quoted in BAUMAN, Zygmunt.
Culture as Praxis. London: Rout-
ledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. p.2. 
[Culture] ...denotes an historical-
ly transmitted pattern of mean-
ings embodied in symbols, a sys-
tem of inherited conceptions
expressed in symbolic forms by
means of which men communi-
cate, perpetuate, and develop
their knowledge about and
attitudes toward life. 
...Sapir’s famous distinction
between a culture which embod-
ies ‘any socially inherited element
in the life of man’ and one which
‘refers to a rather conventional
ideal of individual refinement’. 
typically refers to a broad but
usually not unrestricted range of
objects. It comprehends the class
of objects known as artefacts -
objects made or modified by
humans. 
SCHLERETH, T J. "Material
Culture Studies: America 1876-
1976" [p.2] in SCHLERETH,
Thomas J. (ed.) Material Culture 
Studies in America. Nashville:
American Association for State
and Local History, 1982. pp.l-75. 
Similarly, the individual must be sustained within the 
scope of the organization’s purpose, perhaps to serve a 
series of different functions, and the organization may not 
neutralize or permanently dispose of personnel: an ineffi-
cient electrician cannot be taken out and shot!14 Preserving 
the material of a collection is an operation focussed on 
preventing its physical deterioration, on sustaining a viable 
condition. Such an operation relies upon an understanding 
of the physics and chemistry of material combinations and 
of the environment, and on a wise and skilful application 
of practical techniques.15 Preserving the cultural is an oper-
ation with diverse possibilities. For example, it may focus on 
the process of documentation and have an encyclopaedic 
ideal or it may focus on the process of interpretation and 
value narrative coherence, purposeful communication, a 
comprehensible message above comprehensive information.16
Every organization develops a notion of what 
expertise is appropriate to its type and style of operation. 
Preserving the material aspects of its operation focusses on 
preserving the person as one of a network of actors in the 
organizational context, on sustaining the viability of the 
actor as an interactive and adaptable entity.17 This oper-
ation relies upon an understanding of the physiology and 
psychology of the individual, an ergonomics,18 and the 
total dynamics of the environment, an energetics.19 One 
might assume, therefore, that an organizational design 
process should encompass and integrate both social and 
physical spatial disciplines in a creative practice.20
Preserving the cultural, a corporate identity for 
instance, is a multifaceted operation. Wally Olins draws 
our attention to the scope of corporate identity. 
... identity cannot simply be a slogan, a collection of phrases: 
it must be visible, tangible and all-embracing. 
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15. Although it is rather artifi- 
 
 
14. Employment law prescribes 
the circumstances and the proce-
dures for dismissal, redundancy 
and retirement. It is ironic that 
far greater efforts must be made 
by a museum to place an item in 
another public collection than 
must be made by any industrial, 
commercial or public service 
organization to place dismissed 
or redundant staff in subsequent 
employment. In the museal pers-
pective perhaps we should be 
ashamed of the very concept of 
‘retirement’. 
13. The disposal of collection 
items is a most delicate issue for 
museums. Difficult questions 
regarding the status and poten-
tial of an item must be thorough-
ly considered by a museum 
authority before a decision to 
dispose of an item may be rati-
fied. An item may only be deac-
cessioned by transfer or sale to 
another museum or to an appro-
priate charitable institution such 
as a college or university. If 
these methods fail some muse-
ums are legally permitted to sell 
items to the public. However, in 
practice this is a very risky busi-
ness invariably attracting pro-
fessional censure and sometimes 
public condemnation. 
 
BAUDRILLARD, J. “The 
Ecstasy of Communication” 
[p.127] in FOSTER, Hal. (ed.) 
Postmodern Culture. Pluto 
Press, 1985. pp.126-34. 
haps Oedipal) period of produc-
tion and consumption gives way 
to the ‘proteinic’ era of networks, 
to the narcissistic and protean era 
of connections, contact, conti-
guity, feedback and generalized 
interface that goes with the uni-
verse of communication. 
Everything that the organization does must be an affirma-
tion of its identity. 
The products ...buildings ...communication material 
[and] ... how the organization behaves. 21
It encompasses not only the outwardly visible, overtly 
visual, manifestations of an organization - its corporate 
image - but also the communicative style and the sense of 
community it generates largely as an internally experienced 
condition.22 This operation relies upon an understanding 
of visual language and the development of a value-laden 
expression - an aesthetics - and the development of a 
narrative identity - an ethnology, a history, a mythology.23 
One might expect, therefore, that an organizational design 
process would also encompass and integrate creative visual 
practice and creative interpretive practices in the gener-
ation, preservation and exploitation of an archive.24
Objectified in these ways the ‘material’ and the 
‘cultural’ are simply subjected to instrumental processes 
which give the impression of an unproblematic operational 
complex. However, in same respects the nature of the 
operation appropriate to a museum collection is highly 
problematic and, if we view the museum as a whole, as an 
actor network which includes both human and non-human 
actors, the relationship between material and expertise 
resists this functionalist drive. The interpretation put upon 
collection material - of its value, its proper place in the 
scheme of things, etc. - influences how it is treated in the 
physical sense. To the museum conservator, the material 
of a machine or a picture may normally mean the chemical 
compounds and their macrostructures which give the 
object its unique physical form. However, there are 
circumstances in which the mechanical function may be 
deemed to be the ‘material’ of a machine and the image the 
‘material’ of a picture rather than, in each case, the 
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The actor network is reducible 
neither to an actor alone nor to a 
network. Like networks it is com-
posed of a series of heterogeneous 
elements, animate and inanimate, 
that have been linked to one an-
other for a certain period of time. 
CALLON, Michel. "Society in 
the Making: The Study of 
Technology as a Tool for 
Sociological Analysis", [p.93] in 
BIJKER, Weibe E., Thomas P. 
HUGHES & Trevor PINCH. 
The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems. MIT 
Press, 1987. pp.83-103. 
 
18. Ergonomics has been defined 
as the scientific study of the rela-
 
17. See above 4.2 The Design of 
Museum Design: Ideology, 
Programme and Différance and 
note 8. 
 
16. Again, although this is a 
rather artificial notion - it posits 
a duality which in practice is 
more a range of contingent pos-
sibilities - it is useful to note a 
commonly felt divergence in 
museum ethos. The encyclo-
paedic supranational professional 
neutrality upheld by such insti-
tutions as the British Museum is 
in tension with the overtly edu-
cational, inspirational, locally 
oriented and socially committed 
stance taken by institutions like 
the People’s Palace Museum in 
Glasgow. 
 
cial to talk of the conservation 
process in isolation from the 
holistic notion of curation, I am 
merely reflecting the common 
division of expertise in present 
day museums. The conservator 
has become, in the last forty 
years or so, a highly qualified 
specialist and recognized as such 
within the ‘professional’ curator-
ial community. 
substances of which it is made. Such judgements are 
culturally contingent, determined by the values and beliefs 
we wish to carry forward in our works rather than by 
those contemporary with the object’s genesis and past use, 
and belonging to the engineer, the manufacturer, and the 
operative, or to the artist, the patron, and the subject, or to 
their respective societies. 
In any organization there is a temptation to abstract 
from the individual human actor a mechanistic definition 
of function and an iconic purpose and to treat these as the 
object of the organizational design process.25 Such 
approaches ought to be seen as contingent and as less than 
ideal but are often regarded as unavoidable, as the norm. 
They are dangerous because they de-humanize the actor’s 
position and make more likely a slip into inauthentic 
relations characterized by alienation and cruelty.26 In an 
actor network the human may not be privileged over the 
non-human but this does not mean that the human may be 
treated as non-human.27 If we may better understand 
certain technologies as extensions of the body and of the 
mind, and some of them as invested with an aspect of 
collective rather than or as well as of individual life/being, 
then the reverse is more the case. As, ultimately, there is 
no certain way to draw a line between the human and the 
non-human, perhaps we should treat all of the actors in 
actor network as significantly human.28
These judgements may also be simply ones of expedi-
ency: if a museum collection item cannot be preserved as a 
unique material complex, perhaps because component 
chemicals or physical structures are inherently unstable, 
then it may be possible to preserve it as a material ana-
logue, a model, a copy, or as a virtual object, as an image, 
as digital information.29
Equally, if an individual cannot be sustained as a viable 
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22. If one accepts, given our 
postmodern uncertainties, the 
necessity of a cultural hermen-
eutics, as does Geertz, then what 
qualifies as local culture is an  
 
21. OLINS, Wally. Corporate 
Identity: Making business strategy 
visible through design. Thames & 
Hudson, 1989. p.7. 
 
19. Energetics as: "the total 
energy relations and transfor-
mations of a system". LONG-
MAN DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 
Longman, 1984. p.484. 
 
20. But, this is not normally the 
case: in theory and in practice, 
interior design (architecture) 
remain quite distinct from hard 
and soft systems consultancy. 
 
JACKSON, N. & P. CARTER. 
"The Ergonomics of Desire", 
Personnel Review, 14:3, 1985. 
pp.20-8. 
 -tionship between man and his 
working environment. In this 
sense, the term environment is 
taken to cover not only the ambi-
ent environment in which he may 
work but also his tools and mate-
rials, his methods of work and the 
organization of his work, either as 
an individual or within a work-
ing group. All these are related to 
the nature of the man himself to 
his abilities, capacities and limit-
ations. 
MURRELL, K F H. Ergonomics: 
Man and his Working 
Environment. Chapman and 
Hall, 1965. p.xiii. 
An example of the focus on psy-
chological and organizational 
compatibility and of an approach 
opposed to the dominant mecha-
nistic determinism of industrial 
ergonomics - "man and machine, 
man as machine" - is provided in 
actor in an organization then it may be necessary to define 
tasks and jobs, responsibilities and roles, that preserve a 
contingent functional need even if the individual or group 
upon which such a procedure is enacted is, as a conse-
quence, made redundant or destroyed. It is not an un-
common feature in organizations for a ‘post’ defined by 
the absence of a former worker (resigned, retired, deceased, 
etc.) to remain vacant because a suitable replacement 
individual is not found and for the group surrounding the 
position to find imaginative ways of absorbing its func-
tional aspects and dissolving its iconic purpose. Typically 
the post is then axed. 
In the above the proposition is that any typical organiza-
tion may be shown to have a ‘museality’. By focussing on 
museality we see organization in a new light: as a process 
of collecting, of assembling things according to contingent 
rules, for the purpose of preserving an essentially materi-
alist notion of culture. We see organization as reliant upon 
a process of documentation, of extracting and recording 
information about the objects in a collection, which 
uniquely identifies and locates those objects in a scheme of 
things. Research, the expansion of knowledge beyond that 
intrinsic to the object, becomes inextricably bound up with 
the process of documentation. As the social, political, 
economic, functional and personal attributes of individuals 
are revealed they are brought into an organizational nexus 
of mutual surveillance and therefore of control: with or 
without the enhancement of the new information 
technologies, organization is the archetype of self-
regulation, the model of reflexive panopticism.30
Application of the panoptic principle to the museum 
has in the past focussed very much on the effect of 
creating a public watching over itself.31 In this view, the 
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museum, as a place of public spectacle, is seen as a model 
of self-regulating society. But perhaps this misses a 
fundamental point which is that a museum, as an 
organization that recognizes and reflexively utilizes 
museality, watches over itself - the museum, therefore, is a 
model of self regulating organization. 
GEERTZ, Clifford. Local 
Knowledge. New York: Basic 
Books, 1983. p.12. 
Our initiation into a local cul-
ture could be said to involve not 
only rites of passage, ritual 
investments, a practical experi-
ence but also a ‘turning’ of the 
mind. 
 
23. There is an argument here 
that the awareness that the indi-
vidual within an organization 
may have of the visible and tan-
gible aspects of identity is quite 
different in kind from that of the 
less tangible aspects. It is only 
when a person moves from one 
company to another that he or 
she fully realizes to what extent, 
and in what ways, the behaviour 
of one organization can differ 
from that of another. Codes of 
language, deference, gesture, and 
protocol may all be distinctive. 
 
24. In this respect the work of 
corporate image designers paral-
lels that of corporate interior 
designers in being quite distinc-
tive as a discipline. The differ-
ence in practice is that develop-
ment of the more prestigious 
corporate identity programmes 
tends to involve consultancies 
able to bring both organizational 
and visual expertise to bear on 
analysis and on concept and 
strategy development. 
 
25. Foucault's studies of various 
institutions reveal this central 
theme in organization: bodies  
open question - what is local? 
And how local is local? Geertz 
seems to find acceptable the 
notion of an expressed ‘com-
munal sensibility’ as qualifica-
tion enough when inscribed in a 
specific system of signifiers that 
presents ‘locally to locals a local 
turn of mind’. 
Under pressure of the panoptic principle, the 
operation of preservative techniques moves quickly away 
from a focus on the individual and takes on an over-
arching responsibility for the perpetuation of organiz-
ational life. Individuals become merely examples of a class 
of objects. Conventional orders take over from the creative 
possibilities of taxonomy - systems ossify, actors within 
them become petrified, both fearful and immobile.32
The history of museum farms can be seen to reflect 
the progress of organization.33 The characterization above 
of the tendency of a maturing organization to fossilize as 
its operations become concerned with a general notion of 
self-perpetuation connects with two ideas. (1) A conserva-
tive tendency in the museological notion of ‘conservation’ 
‘Conservators agree that ideally all treatments should be 
reversible’.34 And (2) a universal, teleological nation of 
organization in modernity.35
Up to this point the museal organization has been 
discussed primarily in traditional 'museographical' terms. 
The conventional theme of museum process as: collect > 
document > preserve > research > exhibit > interpret, and 
the implication of an order of priority in these functions, 
has been used to outline a scheme that reflects a function-
alist conventionalism in organization. However, museogra-
phy has changed (see 3.3 Museum: Discourses above) and 
much of the procedural prescriptiveness of the past, which 
attempted to be objectivist, ‘scientific’ and value-free, is 
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AHRNE, Göran. Social Organiz-
ations: Interaction inside, outside
and between organizations, Sage 
Publications, 1994. p.36. 
Identities may be safe and ‘un-
problematic' only inside a secure
social space: spacing and identity-
production are two facets of the
same process. But it is precisely
the great modern project of a
unified, managed and controlled
space which has today come
under such pressure. 
As far as the prospects of safe-
guarding human lives against
cruelty ...are concerned ... If any-
thing does matter, it is ... the
remoralization of human space. 
BAUMAN, Zygmunt. Postmodern
Ethics. Blackwell, 1993. pp.234
& 239-40. 
26. The strategy of organization-
al coordination is usually to mini-
mize the human part to be able to
increase control and predict-
ability of actions. 
‘Logos and Techne, or Tele-
graphy’ in LYOTARD, Jean-
François. [1988] The Inhuman:
Reflections on Time. Trans.
Geoffrey Bennington & Rachel
Bowlby. Polity Press, 1991.
pp.47-57. 
 
is nothing other than this sup-
pression of the human. In these
terms what makes us human is
our creativity, the capacity for
'habit-breaking'. 
...an energetic set-up which is
sometimes complex, of variable 
plasticity, which structures a cer -
tain type of behaviour in a cer-
tain type of contextual situation.
The stability of the set-up allows
the type of behaviour to be
repeated with a significant saving
of energy... 
What Lyotard defines as ‘habit’: 
and minds are constructed, de-
formed, constrained and con-
trolled against the claims of
autonomy, identity, humanity. 
now open to a fundamental questioning of foundations. 
If this section has emphasized a ‘museographical’ view, 
primarily of the collecting, documenting and preserving 
aspects, of the museal organization, the next will examine 
primarily the exhibiting and interpreting aspects of the 
museal organization insofar as they reflect a new museality 
- the new museology’s focus on the necessity of cont-
ingent self-definition and continual re-creation. 
The New Museal Organization 
In every museum we witness the genesis of a language, the 
structuring of a vocabulary, the organization of a grammar, 
the design of communicative acts. But this linguistic oper-
ation only appears so linguistic in written explication and 
in spoken exposition. This genesis, this organization, this 
design is also pre-linguistic. All notion of meaning and 
form is encompassed in the linguistic only by privileging 
speech acts above those of making and of imagining. And 
in equal senses we are witness to the museum’s artificiality 
and gravity in its factoring and envisioning aspects in 
which spatiality may be actual or illusory, material or 
pictorial, that is, sensorial, rather than conceptual and 
intellectual. 
The organization generally is no less the site of 
productive differences, of burgeoning differentiation and 
tension. In the material of this production a potentiality 
exists for an infinite realization of unpredictable states - 
intentionality, if it plays a part at all, plays the part of 
governing, comforting myth. In the structural relations of 
this production, therefore, the irrational underpins the 
rational - physicality and immediacy characterize the 
process of inscription (which becomes trivial) and inter-
minable narrative play characterizes the process of encryp-
tion (which becomes ‘vital’) literally providing ‘the signs of 
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28. Perhaps the animism that
informs Japanese product design
is more than a Shinto hangover.
How long before machines share
our deepest psychical qualities?  
...after a few years they might
develop their own emotional
responses - hate, love, fear, anger,
envy - so they built in a fail-safe 
device ...a four-year life span 
The character Bryant briefing
the blade runner on the latest
generation of replicants (and-
roids) in the film: Blade Runner, 
(Ridley Scott dir.) Warner
Brothers, 1982. 
 
29. For example: 
- nitrate film is inherently chem-
ically unstable and highly in-
flammable: the images are pre-
served by copying onto a modern
optical or digital medium; 
- most rescue archaeology
destroys the bulk of the physical
evidence uncovered: data collect-
ed on site can be used to produce
a virtual 3-D model on computer
and with the aid of record
photography and in-situ casts
same material can be physically
reproduced in the museum.  
27. Debate about the unique-
ness of the human continues:
machines already extend the
body and the brain. 
Discussions about technology - its 
capacity, what it can and cannot 
do, what it should and should not
do - are the reverse side of the
coin to debates on the capacity, 
ability, and moral entitlements of
humans. Attempts to determine
the characteristics of machines are 
simultaneously claims about the
characteristics of nonmachines. 
W0OLGAR, S. ‘Reconstructing
Man and Machine: A Note on
Sociological Critiques of
Cognitivism’ [p.312] in BIJKER
et al, 1987. pp.311-28. 
life’. Organizations that realize their museality in this new 
spirit became flexible, able to reconstrue themselves at will. 
In the museum great store is placed in the power of 
spatial relations, literally in the ranks of shelves and cases 
laid out and labelled in the space of the store and 
metaphorically in taxonomies, iconographies and narra-
tives set out in the documentary spaces of the media. Each 
spatiality refers back to a centre, a hub, which, though all 
may be in motion around it, gives the appearance of 
stability, certainty, immutability. This centre is the 
measure of all things that may be spoken, made or visual-
ized. This centre is the humanity to which the human pays 
automatic homage in the very act of being. Yet this ‘centre’ 
is not a focus: it falls outside the consciousness that binds 
linguistic, constructive and imaginative acts together. 
Derrida speaks of ‘a centre which is not a centre’ of an 
‘event’ without location, of a ‘rupture’.36 In the museum 
this rupture contradicts the history of museality, and yet 
confirms its historicity. It speaks against a museality 
conceived as a teleology, as a motion towards the grand 
narrative, the crystallization of the sum of human know-
ledge in a massive superstructure which is the perfect mirror 
of the world (or its double). Yet it is always the absence of 
a supplement, merely a sampling of the world which shifts 
and plays in the space of museal contingency. 
In the organizational microcosm physical space pro-
vides an arena for instinctual display, a contest of bodies, 
and for the controlling gaze in which all eroticism is 
banished - id and superego collide - and yet neither spect-
acle nor spectator (and each in realizing itself becomes the 
other) need any longer be ‘present’ to the other. Through 
the telematic power of communication technologies a 
substitution for the physical, a simulation of the 
transaction, and a fracture of structuring linear time have 
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constructed the necessity of an ‘economy of signs and 
space’. On the local level there is the possibility of 
34. PYE, Elizabeth. 
‘Conservation and storage:
archaeo-logical material’, in 
THOMPSON, John. M. A.
(ed.) Manual of Curatorship.
Butterworth/Museums 
Association, 1984. p.204. 
 
35. See: HASSARD, John. 
Sociology and Organization
Theory. Cambridge University
Press, 1993. On the foundations
of the modern orthodoxy:
Auguste Comte whose: 
...method is the basis for develop-
ing a grand ‘positive’ scheme for 
the reconstruction of society
[p.16]; Herbert Spencer who
develops: ‘an evolutionary typo-
logy of societies’ [p.17]; and
Emile Durkheim who believed
that ‘in time ...sociology will pro-
vide the rules of action for the
future’ [p.14.] 
31. BENNETT, Tony. ‘The 
Exhibitionary Complex.’ New 
Formations. 1988/4, pp. 73-102. 
and: 
HOOPER-GREENHILL, 
Eilean. Museums and the Shaping
of Knowledge. London:
Routledge, 1992. 
 
32. Under fear's unrelenting
pressure, the rational self takes
charge. 
FLAM. Helena. ‘Fear, Loyalty
and Greedy Organizations’
[p.60] in FINEMAN, Stephen.
(Ed.) Emotion in Organizations.
Sage Publications, 1993. pp. 58-
75. 
 
33. See above: 3.3 Museum:
Ideology. 
 
30. GANDY, Oscar H. Jnr. The 
Panoptic Sort: A Political Econo-
my of Personal Information.
Westview Press, 1993. 
 a new logic of place and practical will-formation [developed] 
on the basis of decentralized data banks, interactive 
communication systems and community-based multi-media 
centres [or] ...a kind of Foucauldian power/knowledge 
dystopia ...in which even moral and practical knowledge is 
transformed into cognitive and technical systems which 
normalize and regulate what was previously private ...37
and on the global level, in ‘hollowed-out’ nation states 
which, because of their inability to control information 
flows within their national boundaries, disappear between 
‘supranational or international bodies’ and ‘regional or 
local states or a private sector’, there is the possibility of ‘a 
more localist and pluralist democracy’ or a ‘nightmarish 
dystopia’ of ‘ungovernable wild zones next to highly disci-
plined tame zones, where each reinforces the other...’.38 
What is constructed in the organization is not straightfor-
wardly a singular purposeful and productive ‘body’ – 
Lyotard’s great Monad39 - but a chameleon community in 
which each element is able to act as either origin or relay, 
and which is a sampling of the world that shifts and plays 
in the space of a ‘museal’ contingency. The museal is also 
that economy of signs and space. Any organization may 
display that chameleon-like adaptability which character-
izes the designer and the museum as creative collectives.40  
‘Collection’ implies either selection or serendipity: in 
both the totalizing drive is subverted, the mirror a distort-
ing fragment, the imaginative double inseparable from its 
source. The world is everything including its own reflec-
tions, including their own reflections, in an infinite regress 
of deferred presences. Museality is the quality of all reflec-
tions that are caught in fragments of the reflected: 
museality is the condition of reflexivity made concrete, the 
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past enfolded in the material of the present: it is the 
structure of structuration, the history of historicization, 
the culture of culturation, the image of imagination. 
 
39. LYOTARD, [1988] pp.64-5. 
 
40. See above: 3.2 Design:
Design, Post-Design (and note
38) and 3.3 Museum: Institution. 
36. DERRIDA, Jacques: [1967]
Writing and Difference. Trans. 
Alan Bass. Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1978. p.279. 
 
37. LASH, Scott. & John
URRY. Economies of Signs &
Space. Sage, 1994. p.324. 
 
38. ibid. p.325. 
Beneath the articles of legislated museality (collect, 
document, preserve, research, exhibit, interpret), which 
attempt to be labels for objective procedure, we are dealing 
with the covered, unrecovered, aspects of all material 
organizations - their ironic presence to themselves, the 
enigmatic quality of their identities, and the paradoxical 
relations between their notions of change, purpose, 
location and integrity. If we ask what ironic presence the 
museum has to itself, we mean that which it achieves 
through the communicative complex of collection and 
media, the physical space of curation and the curated: 
through exhibition. Exhibition is public play, a spectacle, a 
space in which a ritual observance is enacted, the material 
embodiment of cultural values is projected into the space of 
a public watching over itself and thereby called into play as 
an order of knowledge and power. As an internal organiz-
ational conceit, a rhetorical contrivance, exhibition achieves 
its status through a combination of privileged location, 
authoritative style, distorting form, contingent structure, 
symbolically indeterminate material content and distract-
ing (entertaining) surplus. Materiality is covered over in 
the museum process and its unrecoverability ensured in 
the process of exhibition which, whatever else it may be, is a 
process of fulfilling a present-day politicized agenda that 
calls for commodity and inheritance to be assigned the 
symbolic aspect of property and knowledge. But material-
ity is covered over in all organizations to the extent that 
the collection of resources, human and otherwise, involves 
a rupture. The acquisition is objectified in the documen-
tary process: its provenance frozen and its significance 
changed. It becomes, at least symbolically, a possession, a 
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property, whose newly defined purpose binds it to the 
organization and simultaneously suppresses its extramural 
significance. The exhibitionary process of structuring 
purposes therefore is also one of layering meaning and of 
constructing (recreating) organizational integrity. 
The enigma of museum identity in the postmodern 
context is that the public face of the museum - the exhibi-
tion - not only can, but must, radically alter its form, 
structure, material and content, and the very values and 
beliefs it makes explicit in its play of différance, to sustain 
the identity of the museum qua museum. And the more 
interactively it is able to achieve its own repeated trans-
mutation the more the new museality is confirmed: this 
museality is an interpretive potential, an unlimited power 
of signification. 
The organization’s image is no mirage. It is an artifice 
of ephemerality - it changes by zooms, pans, fades and cuts 
and responds to the touch like interactive video - and it is 
projected by the actor network that exploits its possibility 
for imaginative transformation. The idea of structural 
relations becomes a paradox as the space of organization is 
defined as a dynamic, open-ended process of design, which 
is, in generic terms, that endless play of différance required 
to keep alive the possibility of meaning, structure, and utility. 
One of the key impetuses in new museology, as far as 
attitudes to collection are concerned, is the open-ended 
search for new possibilities in the relations between 
individual items. Polyvalency emerges as the characteristic 
linguistic object of exhibition and interpretation: the notion 
that an individual item or a contingent grouping of items 
can serve several simultaneous semantic purposes, some of 
which, rather than being prescribed, are offered as inter-
pretive possibilities. In the museum the implication is that 
it is neither desirable nor actually possible to put a firm 
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boundary around the meanings that may be communicated 
by a particular exhibit let alone by a whole exhibition. 
In general the characteristic of museal organizations is 
that the actor network is polyvalent. Therefore, it is 
equally undesirable, in fact impossible, to clearly identify 
what is inside and what outside. The museal organization 
is a system of interfaces: boundaries are at its focus, 
therefore, it has no centre, in a sense its ‘integrity’ cannot 
be ‘placed’. The museal organization only has customers, 
clients, insofar as they became participants, collaborators, 
actors in the actor network which is the projector of the 
organization’s succession of appearances. The unexpected 
is expected, the unusual commonplace: the ‘proper business’ 
of the museal organization is never stated except in the full 
knowledge that it may be contradicted by what happens 
next. Rather than existing as a promotional basis, a 
teleological normativity, it effectively remains uncon-
stituted until catalysed and completed by a supplement 
unique to each customer/client. 
The process is identical in the museum: the exhibition 
visitor is presented with a layered complex of meanings in 
a ‘text’ some of which are susceptible to a direct linear 
reading, some of which are not. The latter must be const-
ructed rather than reconstructed: they present themselves 
as unresolved possibilities, fragmentary and perhaps, on the 
surface, contradictory narratives that can only be completed 
(closed) by a supplement unique to each visitor or group. 
The admission of this polyvalency allows the individ-
ual item many possible positions in the scheme of things, 
and creates, alongside the polyvalency of all other individual 
items, many possible schemes. A symmetrical uncertainty 
of identity and narrative is the result. To some extent, 
therefore, all that one can do is to put things together, 
with or without a strong rationale, and wait to see what 
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meanings arise, what purposes are served. Total open-
endedness is, of course, not possible. Regardless of our 
attempts to eliminate them, we bring preconceptions and 
personal projects to bear in any situation that requires 
organization. But, at the end of the day, what matters is 
that some degree of possibility is admitted that ensures the 
occurrence of the unpredictable and makes probable its 
utility. Collection is not a random process, but neither can 
it be guided by a comprehensive specification or qualific-
ation. The item acquired because it conforms to a range of 
criteria set out in a collecting/recruitment policy is not as a 
consequence circumscribed. Documentation and research 
will reveal many qualities other than those qualifying the 
item for inclusion in a collection. It is these other qualities 
which ultimately take the possibilities of a collection 
beyond the predictable, which introduce a complexity and 
the scope for endless reconfiguration in exhibition and 
reinterpretation. The unorthodox configuration of individ-
ual items in a collection creates the narrative possibilities 
but in the process it necessarily redefines and recreates 
identity. It is not only what the museal organization 
collects and what it reveals through exhibition - the visible, 
tangible aspects of identity - that are open to change, but 
the very processes of exhibition and interpretation them-
selves: identity is also a question of how the organization 
chooses to behave towards itself, for there is always a 
contingent directionality in any interface, towards consumer 
and non-consumer groups (visiting and non-visiting 
public), other organizations, and towards the physical 
space it occupies and the material/culture under its care. 
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5.0 Force Fields and Constellations 
Complexity, Praxis and Interpretation 
In museum-design-organization the intervals organization-
design, design-museum, and museum-organization con-
struct a fascinating realm of possibilities for the postmodern 
condition. In this realm complexity is exhibited in its most 
radical form: the epistemological, the conjunction of in-
commensurable problematics - psychical, social and material. 
Action and theory are irredeemably bound into a creative 
nexus which effectively dethrones the sovereign rational 
subject and centres play at the boundaries between imag-
ination and reason, vision and speech, making and writing, 
inscribing and encrypting. Explanation is freed from the 
telos of ‘truth’ and revealed as the continuous creative 
process of negotiating and shaping the world through our 
conversations and envisionings. 
If our situation is characterized by complexity, incom-
mensurable frames of reference, and by the need to forge 
narrative and identity out of our dealings in this messiness, 
if difference, in the anthropological sense, is necessary to 
life, then change is a Janus-faced project and it is the 
challenge. 
The process of globalization engages a superficiality of 
change but with increasing speed. In this sense, the 
putative homogenization of material culture should dim-
inish the resources available for transforming the world, 
for creating new narratives and new identities. It should 
lead to an implosion. Against this, however, the process of 
differentiation, of localization, proceeds ever more slowly 
into complex layered change in which the possibilities for 
material culture become energized. This should lead to an 
explosion. We travel in both directions simultaneously: our 
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location and speed, like those of the lonely electron, are 
governed by an uncertainty principle of sorts. Culture is 
sustained only by continually putting itself at risk, by 
changing its form and content, its material and meaning. 
But, the extremes of the process of change do have to be 
avoided: relapse into chaos or push complexity too far and 
difference, perceivable pattern, meaning, disappears. 
In this chapter I draw out a range of constellations in 
the preceding material to set up a thematic triad of force 
fields. (1) The surfacing of complexity in the human situ-
ation reflects most permanently in the material culture and 
ultimately this is the process that defines the designerly 
and museal responses as ones which are characteristically 
human. The challenge of change is to engage the museal 
and the designerly in a continuing play of differance. This 
defines a praxis in which the material cultural focus 
presents a simultaneity of psychical, social and physical 
realities and, therefore, touches individual and collective 
existence through every channel. (2) As an engagement of 
the whole being in a process of preparing for future well-
being, design is a form of praxis not opposed to but contin-
uous with that similarly all-consuming process of connect-
ing with the material past. The praxis thus conceived as 
both designerly and museal is both forward and backward 
projecting and yet its moment is here and now. Museality 
must also be projected forwards, a process achieved through 
design. And design must connect with the past, a process 
achieved by the museal. The moment in which we find 
ourselves is thus a place identified by the cross flow of 
energies, the eclecticism of our interests and concerns, and 
the ironism of our actions. (3) We have the possibility of 
continuously transforming any constructed order and any 
image of order, a process which makes interpretation 
integral with action and, therefore, both interminable. The 
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question of interpretation arises primarily because at the 
‘moment’, at that constant turning point between the 
backward- and the forward-projecting energies, at that 
meeting point of the material culture which has survived 
its present and that which has yet to be realized, we have 
the possibility of seeing an order in our situation and of 
acting upon the meanings we thereby construct. Trans-
formation is immediately a process that can be applied to 
this project.  
Any idea of organization is ultimately the comfort of 
the meaningful, in a profound sense, of the ‘familiar’. There 
is magic in all of this, more than there is science or faith. 
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5.1 Complexity and the Design Paradigm 
Designer as Paradigmatic Existent 
Design, as an arena of human knowledge and praxis, shares 
with existentialism a key epistemological point of departure 
and that is the discontinuous nature of our knowledge of the 
world. We are limited by the possibilities of our own experi-
ence and at the same time bound to act upon what we know 
however incomplete that knowledge may be. ‘In the existen-
tialist view there are always loose ends. Our experience and 
our knowledge are always incomplete and fragmentary...’.1 
The proposition that existentialism lacks any ‘common body 
of doctrine’ leads Macquarrie to treat it ‘not as a “philoso-
phy” but rather as a “style of philosophizing”...’ and this also 
makes existentialism important in another respect: as a 
pointer to methodological principles. The first principle 
must be that the designer, like the existentialist, operates 
‘not with the reason only, but with the will, with the 
feelings, with the flesh and with the bones, with the whole 
soul and with the body.’ Whereas in the bulk of subjective 
theory the human is, first and foremost, the ‘thinking 
subject’, in existentialism and, as I maintain, in design the 
existent is also ‘an initiator of action and a centre of 
feeling’.2 Moreover he or she is also the creator of images, a 
visionary, a point often understated or overlooked in 
existential works. The distinguishing characteristic of 
humans which is pointed up by this orientation to theory is 
that of purposefully exercising choice in visualizing and 
shaping the future: ‘It is the exercise of freedom and the 
ability to shape the future that distinguishes man from all 
the other beings that we know on earth’.3 And in placing 
and identifying themselves in relation to the past: ‘...every 
act we take, every plan we make, entail the past’s more or 
less conscious re-evaluation, revision, and recreation’.4 In a 
4. LOWENTHAL, David. The 
Past is a Foreign Country. 
Cambridge University Press, 
1985. p.412. 
3. ibid. p.4 
 
 
2. ibid. p.2 & 3. 
 
1. MACQUARRIE, John. 
Existentialism. New York: World 
Publishing, 1972, p. 1. 
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fundamental sense, therefore, existentialism and design 
hold important correlational attributes and, although the 
picture cannot be completed by extrapolating from such a 
limited range of ideas, we can pursue a certain aspect of 
theory by manipulating and reinterpreting dimensions of 
the model of museum-design-organization to help us to 
visualize and to cope with the personal, the interpersonal 
and the communal - all areas which have been explored 
from an existential point of view.5 The complexity of the 
human situation surfaces in the breadth of the designerly 
and museal responses. 
Although the phenomenological, structural and material 
problematics may not be synthesized in any account, even 
the existentialist one framed here, this is not a particular 
worry. The approach allows one to explore the epistem-
ological complex as a constellation of accounts which one 
hopes may be adequate to one’s practical purposes at the 
end of the day, or at least that points in a hopeful 
direction. What is clear is that the subjective focus on the 
existent does not lead to a common body of knowledge nor 
even to shared beliefs and values: the existentialist 
approach is as capable of reaching a totalitarian as it is an 
anarchistic interpretation of the individual’s scope for 
‘freedom, decision and responsibility’ with all of the impli-
cations these extreme possibilities hold for the political 
sphere.6 If we can see the following focus on the designer as 
‘paradigmatic existent’ in the above light we can belay the 
desire to grasp at an encompassing interpretation of any 
sort in the hope of picturing the perceptual process involved. 
CAMUS, Albert. [1951] The 
Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower,
Hamish Hamilton, 1953. 
6. Camus explores both the
fascist (ab)use of Nietzsche’s 
nihilism and the ‘secular 
Jesuitism’ of modern socialism
in The Rebel. 
 
5. ibid. Macquarrie cites, for
example, the 'near-existential-
ists' Martin Buber and Gabriel
Marcel as having been ‘pioneers
in the investigation of interper-
sonal relations’. 
The most revealing existentialist works explore the 
tragic aspects of human existence: the tenet in such works 
seems to be that by considering our failings and our failures 
we learn more about ourselves and about our relationship 
to the world than we do by tracing human teleology. 
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The Moment of Design 
The immediate social context of a design provides the 
individual designer with a range of uncertainties as to 
status, behavioural and cultural norms, power relations, 
and personal freedom. These define a worldly regime 
against which the designer may have little option but to 
react at a metaphysical level. The inevitability of this 
response arises out of a contradiction that surfaces in the 
idea of ‘Design’. The professional sphere of design activity 
is bounded by the legislated expectations of the institutions 
- professional bodies administer their communities through 
the imposition of ethical codes; determination of ‘legiti-
mate’ and ‘criminal’ practices is embodied in law; 
procedure is conventionalized to facilitate communicative 
and productive activity within and between organizations; 
and various informal (and potentially vicious) sanctions 
may be waged against those whose appearance, utterances, 
or gestures offend the group or the powerful. Design is also 
intimately connected to the broader humanistic concern 
for purposeful and meaningful creative activity which is 
generally implicit in the expectations projected by litera-
ture, material culture, and the media. Design is a contested 
phenomenon. The designer is caught between cultural 
reflections of faith in human creativity and its bureaucratic 
instrumentalization. The tensions and counteractions of 
liberatory and regulatory forces, therefore, are immanent 
in Design, and their inescapability gives the designer good 
cause to engage in, what Camus described as, ‘metaphys-
ical rebellion’, a reaction, not ‘against the condition of his 
state of slavery’ but ‘against the human condition in 
general’.7 What is of interest here is not the reaction 
catalysed by the context of a particular design, but rather, 
the general condition that sets the ‘right’ of conscious 7. ibid. p.29. 
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individuals to exercise their practical creative competence 
in an increasingly complex and unsatisfactory world 
against the administrative strictures of ‘modern’ society 
which regulate when, how and why designerly interven-
tions may be made. The only alternatives to metaphysical 
rebellion are acquiescence, silence and impotence, and the 
deep feelings of resentment, alienation and guilt that 
inevitably accompany such responses.8 The existential 
question is a bold one: is the designer to engage hopefully 
in visionary projects or to be the slave of circumstance? 
Being at the Turning Point 
The first moment of design is that which marks the 
beginning of dialogue. A dissatisfaction with the state of 
things, however defined, becomes the locus of potentiality, 
the pregnant pause, the point of fracture in material condi-
tions that demands the making of two world views. 
Whether as a response to catastrophe or as mere whim, as 
technological breakdown or as a shift of fashion, the 
realization that something needs to be changed - even 
though there may be some dispute as to what that 
‘something’ is or even that there may be no real idea of 
what ‘change’ may actually mean, only a general unease 
about the current situation - calls for a different construc-
tion to be placed on the practical situation.9 The situation 
‘as it is’ must come to be understood in a new way if it is to 
become amenable to intervention. In the first instance, the 
drive to see the situation differently is formalized in 
engaging the designer. The designer, whether as an exter-
nal agent brought in to the situation or as a latent capacity 
of the existing actor network, is able to expand the ‘point 
of potentiality’ into a full-blown ‘arena of possibilities’, to 
engage the visionary aspect of change, to explore the play 
 
9. See above 2.2 Social Space:
(concluding paragraph): the
ideas of the prophylactic, the
therapeutic, and the innova-
tional practical situation in:
GASPARSKI, W. ‘On the
General Theory (Praxiology) of 
Design’, Department of
Praxiology, Polish Academy of
Sciences, 1985? 
ibid. p.20. 
8. To keep quiet is to allow your-
self to believe that you have no
opinions, that you want nothing ... 
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of différance - what Husserl calls the process of ‘free varia-
tion’ in phenomenological investigation.10 The process of 
constructing a view of the situation ‘as it is’ and of opening 
up the situation and seeing it ‘as it could be’ engages the 
interpretive aspect characteristic of identifying the museal 
- one selects a metonymic sample from the multiple forms 
available and identifies a metaphorical potential - and the 
imaginative aspect characteristic of exploratory design 
thinking. But this achievement is necessarily different to 
that implied by the idea of engaging a process to intention-
ally change a situation. There is a limit to the scope of our 
intentions in any practical situation, a limit to their 
affectivity. It is when we realize that intended outcomes 
are unstable or occurring in unpredictable ways or failing 
to occur at all, that we may conclude that it is the practical 
situation itself, and not necessarily our knowledge and our 
ability to apply it, that has failed. Change per se is no longer 
the problem: change as an inherent quality of necessarily 
dynamic practical situations may be managed. The problem 
has become one of changing the arena of change in order 
to establish a new pattern of persistent dynamics. This 
kind of change can not be ‘managed’, in any straight-
forward sense, but rather has to be ‘designed’. A concept 
of what is to be changed and one of what change is to be 
made are developed together as the complementary aspects 
of a single design proposition and their difference consti-
tutes its meaning. ‘What is to be changed’ describes an 
interpreted, to some extent arbitrarily delineated, practical 
situation: being framed one way rather than another, 
including some elements and not others, it is socially 
constructed to coincide with a concept of ‘what change is 
to be made’. Rejection of one is automatically a rejection 
of the other. In a very direct way the projection of a future 
identity depends upon a parallel projection of a narrative 
10. ...the phenomenologist
refashions the given data of an
object - say a table - by freely
varying it in his imagination ...In
so doing, the imaginer becomes
aware of all the possible vari-
ations which the identical pheno-
menon of the table may be sub-
jected to; and such an awareness
culminates in the intuition of a
general essence of tableness. 
KEARNEY, Richard. Poetics of
Imagining: from Husserl to Lyo-
tard. Harper Collins, 1991. p.24. 
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past – ‘direct’ because the medium that embodies the 
dependence and lends an infinite renewability to the 
process is the material culture (Figure 5.1.1. ) 
time
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Figure 5.1.1 
  
The museal response of retrospective narrative projection reconstructs the practical situation to be 
changed in the same moment (the moment of design) that the visionary response of imaginative 
identity projection constructs the design possibility. The reconstructed practical situation, the 
moment of design and the visualized change are pseudo-synchronic slices - through the social space 
and to greater or lesser extent they overlap in time. 
  
The task calls upon an artificially constructed evocation of 
those fundamental human traits of (l) organizing the future 
by making plans for change and (2) organizing the past by 
making up stories to explain who we are and where we came 
from. The former involves intervening in a situation as if 
from outside, of successfully acting on a situation without 
or despite inside knowledge of its history, condition and 
dynamics. The latter involves a selective remembering, a 
selective telling and/or writing and a selective keeping of 
things which together make the functional myths by which 
we live.11 In this sense the designer is always a kind of 
‘outsider’ - the other within ourselves - and the influence 
of the outsider is profoundly unsettling because it engages 
a compulsion to leap into the unknown: 
PORTELLI, A. ‘The Peculiar-
ities of Oral History’, History
Workshop Journal, 12, pp.96-107. 
...it is precisely where memory
diverges most clearly from fact
that ‘imagination, symbolism
desire break in’.  
JACKSON, N. & P. CARTER.
‘The Attenuating Function of 
Myth in Human Understanding’,
Human Relations, 37:7, pp.515-
33. 1984.  
LOWENTHAL, 1985. pp.185-
259. The selectivity of all of the
contributing processes atten-
uates the information content
imparting the mythic quality to
our guiding narratives. 
11. Lowenthal explains how we
know the past in terms of 
memory, history and relics. 
 261 
It is not enough to accept a concept of order and live by it; 
that is cowardice, and such cowardice cannot result in 
freedom. Chaos must be faced. Real order must be preceded 
by a descent into chaos.12
quoted in SAMUEL, Raphael
and Paul Thompson (eds.) The 
Myths We Live By. Routledge,
1990. p.7. 
12. WILSON, Colin. [1956]
The Outsider. 2nd edn. Pan 
Books, 1963. p.58. 
 
13. ‘Analysis’ and ‘conjecture’
being the opening gambits of
Systematic and Kuhnian pro-
cesses respectively. These stand 
for the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ extremes
of the methodological spectrum.
See: Figs. 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 above. 
 
14. Gary Withers, Creative
Director, Imagination quoted in
a video interview at The Tom
Peters Seminar (London, 1993.) 
And the designer is also a kind of priest ... 
In the sense that the effect either of analysis or of conjec-
ture is to bring into question, and ultimately to dismantle, 
the internal relations that comprise the structure and 
meaning of the familiar, Design is at first destructive.13 This 
redefining and reconstruing process involves loosening our 
grip on reality. This is a fearful and potentially dangerous 
exercise. The ‘knowledge’ it calls upon is no resort to hard 
evidence, probability, or natural law: rather it is an act of 
faith in one’s own and in others’ capabilities. 
I think crazy people are all different ...but they all have one 
thing in common: they can be creative ...you just have to give 
them confidence. I think everybody has got it in them, you just 
have to give them an environment, an atmosphere, in which 
you encourage them to believe in themselves and they can go 
out and achieve the impossible. ...I don't think more than once 
or twice about the fact that they could or can't do it. they're 
there, I believe they can do it, and so I assume they can!14
Not only does the designer experience the fear and danger 
inherent in shaking the ground upon which a practical 
situation rests, through the unpredictability of the design 
process, the client and the participant user feel a threat is 
posed to the world they know. In the face of such uncert-
ainty they rely upon institutionalized procedure to protect 
the social fabric from being ‘conceptually’, and perhaps 
‘actually’, unravelled. Design is engaged but not unreserv-
edly: limits are placed on the scope and speed of action and 
boundaries are set up and protected with all the force that 
can be mustered. A museum may be radically reorganized 
in the process of change, but it may not be dissolved into 
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something other than a museum - a recycling plant, for 
instance. Even if a free-ranging design process might 
identify the rationale for such a change, the possibility of 
its specification and implementation is literally ‘ruled’ out. 
The adventure is a free fall into confusion - a state of 
doubt about the local pattern of forces that hold a practical 
situation together as a comprehensible and functioning 
environment. When our faith in the coincidence of out-
ward appearances with their material and social conse-
quences is shaken not only do we become disorientated we 
become isolated. When the emotional continuity of 
perception and objective knowledge is severed we suffer 
the existential moment of angst and alienation. From the 
designer’s point of view such a moment is all consuming; 
detachment is not an option. The most potent symbolic 
instance of this terror is that of facing a blank sheet of 
paper whilst charged with energy and devoid of vision. 
Practical reasoning, in the Philosophical sense, offers no 
way out of such imaginative paralysis. Only two paths are 
open: (1) a slavish expression of conformity to precedent, 
preconception and prejudice which is an admission of 
defeat, of subservience to the other, of less than human 
quality, of a willingness to be subject to instrumentalizing 
bureaucratic power; and (2) a defiant refusal, a headlong 
dive into chaos, an intuitive outpouring that defers any 
thought of establishing coherence, pattern, structure, 
meaning. This amounts to an absolute act of faith in one’s 
own humanity - a momentary egoism of monumental pro-
portions in which the individual ‘knows’ that designerly 
skill will ultimately prevail over the resulting chaos. 
The late James Gardner, the internationally renowned 
museum and exhibition designer, calmly post-rationalized 
his strategy for coping with the crucial moment during the 
Evoluon project: 
 263 
I will use well understood images as they come up in my 
mind, but arrange them in unexpected contexts ...surprise 
focuses the mind. It may even focus mine.15
The strategy relies upon the designer’s ability to withdraw 
from the practical situation in which an attachment to the 
existing world view holds sway. Although one comes to any 
situation with one’s preconceptions and prejudices intact 
there is a need to suppress the inclination to give in to 
them. It may not be possible to release completely, but 
unless something of the vacuum they fill is faced then 
nothing surprising, nothing potent, nothing of fearful poten-
tiality will ever be brought to the surface. The question here 
is one of Being-first, of identifying with the moment 
through the passion of the senses and through an intensity 
of action. The ironic quality of Being-first is apparent in the 
implied contradiction between the ideas of ‘conscious’ and 
‘self-conscious’ states of Being. In the intensity of imagin-
ative involvement one is most fully conscious because most 
fully immersed in the dynamics of the moment. When all 
the senses are engaged, when one acts ‘with the whole soul 
and with the whole body’ one is most alive and yet in that 
very moment one is least conscious of the self. Self-
consciousness implies a distance from the actualities of 
existence, a rationalized separation of the acting self and 
the thinking self, of ‘existence’ and ‘essence’. Self-conscious-
ness is entirely missing in the existential idea of existence. 
Sartre emphasizes the precedence of this idea of existence 
over that of knowing-consciousness by saying that: 
...consciousness is the knowing being in his capacity as being 
and not as being known. ... Of course consciousness can know 
and know itself. But it is in itself something other than a 
knowledge turned back upon itself. 
15. GARDNER, James. James 
Gardner: The Artful Designer.
(Pub. the author), 1993. p.315. 
Evoluon is the Philips sponsored 
science museum near Eindhoven,
Netherlands, opened in 1975. 
The immediate consciousness which I have of perceiving does 
not permit me either to judge or to will or to be ashamed. It 
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does not know my perception, does not posit it; all that there 
is of intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward 
the outside, toward the world.16
In the moment of designing one has an immediate consc-
iousness only of the object of designing, one does not 
know oneself as designing. In fact, such a self-conscious-
ness would defeat the object of designing by reducing the 
activity to one distanced from the actuality of the situation 
by a reflective practical rationality. It is this distancing which 
is able to paralyse the imaginative faculty by allowing the 
space for feelings of self-doubt, anxiety, fear and guilt. 
There is then a radical sense in which the reconstruc-
tion of reality is a creative rather than a re-creative process. 
And at this point we can return to the problem of the 
boundary which, as the site of difference, is the generator 
of meaning and, in its eternal renegotiability, the space of 
the play of différance, and relate this to the situating of the 
designer in cognitive terms. 
Boundary as generator 
As noted earlier, Cooper succumbs too easily to the gestalt 
fallacy which is questioned by Ehrensweig in The Hidden 
Order of Art.17 The division between terms in the process 
of differentiation indeed generates, without privilege, both 
system and environment, which are reversible in position 
analytically. However, this process is symmetrically opposed 
to the dedifferentiating view that must be adopted later in 
the larger design process. Once the focussed attention has 
encompassed both figures of system/environment and 
environment/system the realization of boundary-as-
generator closes off this to and fro activity and, to 
facilitate the creative process of boundary manipulation, a 
process of intellectually achieved release must take place. 
17. See above 3.1 Organization:
Boundary. refs: COOPER, R.
‘Organization/Disorganization’ 
Social Science Information. Sage, 
25, 2, 1986, pp.299-335. and
EHRENZWEIG, Anton. The 
Hidden Order of Art, Weiden-
feld & Nicholson, London, 1967. 
16. SARTRE, Jean-Paul. [1943)
Being and Nothingness. Trans. 
Hazel E. Barnes. Methuen,
1958. Routledge paperback edn.
1991, pp.xxvii & xxix. 
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This intellectual release is experienced as a process of 
dedifferentiation. In it, the gestalt reintegrates with the 
boundary in place but unfocussed to a degree that brings 
system/boundary/environment into syncretism. The 
sustained condition of unfocussed attention allows the 
dedifferentiated field to be held in view whilst changes are 
wrought on previously determined elements such as 
boundary features. Whilst, during the manipulative 
process, the detailed local effects cannot be focussed and 
thus analytically evaluated the impact on 
system/environment and environment/system 
relationships can be viewed 'holistically' as a gestalt shift. 
In the design process, therefore, what is required is the 
development of an intellectual discipline and an 
imaginative skill that facilitates development of designs 
through alternating differentiating processes, which 
involve focussing attention, description, structuring, 
analysis and evaluation, and dedifferentiating processes, 
which involve releasing attention, boundary blurring, 
disintegration and intuitive exploration (Figure 5.1.2.) 
 
 
CONSCIOUS BEING-FIRST 
RATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUS 
Differentiation 
 
 
 
Dedifferentiation 
Figure 5.1.2 
  
Alternating processes of differentiation and dedifferentiation in the 
design process experienced as the focussed attention of the rational 
self-conscious and the unfocussed attention of the conscious Being-
first respectively. 
  
It is this movement in and out of these differentiating and 
dedifferentiating modes that, from an existential view 
point, constitutes the design process. The necessity of this 
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movement in the design process becomes, in an interpretive 
sense, ‘rational’, that is ‘reasonable’, when we observe that 
the manipulation or reconstruing of one difference within 
a system inevitably sends shock waves throughout a 
structure infecting a larger or smaller proportion of other 
differences with a change factor.18 Without a dedifferentiat-
ing mode the complexities of detailed change rapidly 
overwhelm the existent’s (human actor’s) field of view with 
the appearance of catastrophic disintegration of established 
(familiar) structure. With it, focussed attention is resisted, 
local effects suppressed in importance, and shifting 
patterns grasped as a whole. Redescription and restructur-
ing are postponed until that moment when relative gestalt 
stability returns: redifferentiation is then begun generally 
by working from the larger structures down to the smaller 
more localized ones. Thus, radical change becomes, if not 
intellectually then at least emotionally and perceptually, 
manageable. In addition, existential notions of ‘rational 
self-conscious’ and ‘conscious Being-first’ can be associated 
with the differentiating and the dedifferentiating modes of 
attention respectively - the rational self-conscious separates 
subject from object, as well as figure from ground, and 
system from boundary and from environment whereas 
conscious Being-first entails an identification of subject 
with object and a blurring of the field of figure/ground, 
and of system/boundary/environment (Figure 5.1.3.) 
The ideas which Ehrenzweig explores in relation to 
visual art might seem at first sight not to apply to the 
general case of practical thought, particularly that which is 
normally portrayed as purely linguistic in content. But 
visual thinking is far more prevalent than is credited by the 
dominant cultures of philosophy, politics and literature (it 
serves their power plays to raise the linguistic to a 
privileged position), indeed, the visual comes before the 
18. In Eco's terms, this consti-
tutes the genesis of an infinite
semiosis. 
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 RATIONAL 
SELF-CONSCIOUS 
CONSCIOUS 
BEING-FIRST 
Mode of attention
Subject-Object relation
Meaning production
Cognitive status
Cognitive processes
 
Dominant  
psychological functions 
Differentiation 
Separation from 
Pattern of difference 
Thinking-about-doing 
Description, 
structuring, analysis, 
evaluation ... 
 
Thinking - feeling 
Dedifferentiation 
Identification with 
Play of différance 
Thinking-in-doing 
Boundary blurring, 
imagining, intuitive 
exploration ... 
 
Intuition - sensation 
 
Figure 5.1.3 
  
Contrasting characteristics of rational self-conscious and conscious 
Being-first experience of the design process. 
  
linguistic and interpenetrates every aspect of its function-
ing; that is, the linguistic is, in a radical sense, cognitively 
subservient to the visual. This can be argued strongly for 
practical thinking, and weakly, but none-the-less, persua-
sively for theoretical thinking.19
When viewing the object of design as a linguistic 
phenomenon, it is important to recognise that the implicitly 
static view of the system that use of the Saussurian term 
‘difference’ implies is a deliberate faux pas, the point is that 
the use of the Derridian term ‘différance’ is contrasted with 
the previous term in a new way in relation to the outline of 
design process. In the differentiating mode differences are 
apparent and acted upon: in the dedifferentiating mode all 
differences are deferred and therefore a play of différance is 
engaged. There is an important sense in which the self-
conscious, differentiating mode of attention is one which 
deals in expressible terms, in the illusion of stable language. 
It is in this mode that one can think about what one is going 
to do and about what one has done: to the extent that one 
is aware of a present - a pseudo-synchronic ‘moment’ - one 
can even think about what one is doing and, in Jungian 
terms, the flow of libido is inwards: an introversion or 
19. ARNHEIM, Rudolf. Visual 
Thinking. Faber & Faber, 1969. 
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regression is entailed. Equally, there is a parallel sense in 
which the dedifferentiating mode, which involves a release 
of conscious attention to differences, is one that deals in the 
inexpressible, in that which cannot be said but can be shown 
in the doing, in the possibility of a future meaning which is, 
at the moment of action, unself-consciously deferred. It is 
in this mode that one thinks in doing, that one becomes at 
one with the moment, fully immersed in the practical situ-
ation and the outward flow of libido constitutes a moment 
of extraversion or progression (Figure 5.1.4.) 
play of différance pattern of differences 
Figure 5.1.4 
  
Track of the design process as a linguistic construction of alternating play of différance, in which meaning 
is deferred, and pattern of differences, in which a pseudo-synchronic state of meaning is realized. 
  
The background-foreground metaphor can also be used to 
clarify the movement back and forth between difference 
and différance in the design process. 
time
CONSCIOUS 
BEING-FIRST 
 
Dedifferentiating 
mode 
RATIONAL 
SELF-CONSCIOUS 
 
Differentiating 
mode 
Thinking-in-doing 
Thinking-about-doing 
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5.2 Model Transformations 
Organizational Perversion, Subversion, Inversion 
Between actors in the organizational actor-network a 
radical potential is apparent in the moment of design. But 
this potential is not always realized outside of these 
moments, even as one that is latent. The speed and force of 
bureaucratic actions may be such as to cover over the 
counteracting tensions and contradictory positions that 
create the space for interpersonal spontaneity which is so 
essential for growth and change. 
Organizations that realize a growing discrepancy 
between the bureaucratic drive far ‘efficiency’ and the 
distributed interest in ‘effectiveness’ may uncover this 
radical potential. If they do not, they become perverse, 
dominated by the pursuit of an economy of means which 
become ends in themselves. In the organizational context, 
the ossification of programmatic means (documentary 
actions) inevitably leads to a narrowing of prescribed 
concerns, an increase in the range of proscribed activity, a 
general frustration of human interests (Figure 5.2.1.) 
symbolic interests 
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Figure 5.2.1 
  
A performative social space in which defined zones representing narrow concerns are bureaucrat-
ically maintained, locations kept distinct and channels of communication prescribed. 
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Such organizational inertia may only be sustained by a 
conservative and essentially inhuman regime, one founded 
on the perpetuation of differences. 
Where human interests are not being accommodated 
there will be an inevitable reaction directed towards the 
creation of alternative space. Such activity is subversive. 
Working below an organization’s threshold of bureaucratic 
control, in its procedural and documentary interstices, an 
actor network will tend to redifferentiate the organizational 
space, to develop supplementary interfaces to support 
clandestine exchange, to engage the outlawed realm of un-
certainty that is the play of différance. Such inventions may 
be the result of a limited process which quickly subsides to 
allow their normalization, their formal or informal incorp-
oration into the bureaucratic framework (Figure 5.2.2.)  
symbolic interests 
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Figure 5.2.2 
  
A performative social space in which the inventions of a limited process of organizational subversion 
are normalized by the realignment of predefined zones of concern. Ambiguous locations are given 
distinct identity and new channels of communication inscribed. 
  
But taken to the extreme and allowed to multiply and to 
work upon themselves, they lead to an unstoppable subver-
sion of bureaucratic norms and the realization of mutable 
organizational space (Figure 5.2.3.) 
In this unstable condition the mechanisms of control 
and change suffer an inversion and the organization puts  
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symbolic interests 
 
intelectual concerns 
material interests
technical concernsSOCIAL DYNAMICS
Figure 5.2.3 
  
A performative social space in which overlapping zones are contingently defined by distributed 
concerns, locations are interrelated and channels of communication polyvalent. 
  
itself at risk, it becomes chimeric, both dangerous and en-
dangered. We should remember that few mutations are 
beneficial to the organism. On the other hand, successful 
organizational inversion may have peculiar consequences. 
If we consider the mechanisms of control and change in 
non-inverted organizations to be the product of contingent-
ly defined administrative and creative collectives respectively, 
then the moment of design describes the point of inversion. 
Creative and Administrative Collectives 
The collective concern for reinterpreting and restructuring 
the material of the organization, its heterogeneous actors, 
may be objectified in the construction of a creative collec-
tive. Equally, the collective concern for documenting and 
preserving that material may be objectified in the construc-
tion of an administrative collective. These constructions do 
not have any lasting, normative value - I would not wish to 
suggest an orthodoxy of creative and administrative collec-
tives - but, as a heuristic device they facilitate a focus on 
those processes which define the museal quality of material 
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acquired and processed by an organization and the design-
ed quality of that material as it is shaped and projected 
forward as a functional, meaningful complex. 
The non-inverted organization pursues this balance of 
documentary and creative processes within a framework of 
normalized, perfectible operations which exactly equate to 
the museographical tradition. However, just as the recent 
historic transformation of museum organization, which is 
reflected in the moment of overturning the museographical 
tradition in favour of a museological indeterminacy, shows 
museums to be working towards an integration of funct-
ional collectives, organizational inversion represents, not a 
simple reversal of functions, a festival of fools, but some-
thing altogether more unsettling. 
As the administrative collective adopts a design-led 
strategy and the creative collective assumes a process 
documentation-led strategy, a dynamic network of heteroge-
neous management-design actors is brought into play which 
is thereby imbued with peculiar mutational capabilities. 
The process we see operating in institutions such as 
the National Maritime Museum in the 1990s involves certain 
preconditions. First, the individual actor’s autonomy and 
identity has been formally ‘valued’ through what might be 
termed ‘existential’ and ‘functional’ inductions. And second, 
coordinated multiple activities, which characterize the 
hierarchical administered organization, and surface inter-
activity, which characterizes the flat networked organiz-
ation, are both dissolved. 
The Methodologies of Messiness  
The existential induction 
‘Becoming known’ is a museal process which involves docu-
mentation of the actor as formal acknowledgement of acqui-
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sition by the organization.1 Labelling, in the simple sense of 
attaching an identifying tag, is avoided by submitting the 
‘object’ to a process of connoisseurship. Acting in a holistic 
‘curatorial’ fashion, the organization must become acquaint-
ed with the individual through an extended or repeated act 
of direct interaction which aims to reveal the many 
‘qualities’ of the individual - intellectual, biographical, phys-
iological, emotional, etc. The object, rather than being 
subject to a prescribed and definitive act of labelling is 
thereby embraced by an open-ended process of inter-
pretation and reconstruction 
The functional induction 
‘Proving roles’ is an open organizational process which 
involves a series of, initially informal, engagements with a 
range of simulated and actual creative and administrative 
tasks. ‘Pigeon-holing’ is similarly avoided. The ‘subject’ 
engages in an initially unself-conscious but increasingly 
conversational and reflexive process of self-re-creation and 
self-redefinition. This induction is a broad-based form of 
initial training which achieves two main objectives: to 
familiarize the individual actor with the organization (and 
its disorganizational possibilities) and to evaluate the 
actor’s immediate and future potential in terms of various 
explicitly and implicitly sanctioned modes of activity 
within the museum/organization - including that of 
creative counteraction. 
Dissolved Structural Polarities 
1. ‘Acquisition’ here has a 
useful dual meaning: gaining
physical possession of (particu-
larly to advantage) and gaining a
visual grasp on. 
The creative and administrative collectives form two cores 
in the museal organization which may appear both hard-
edged,  clearly  structured  and  definitive,  and  soft-edged, 
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amorphous, overlapping, and contingent. 
The appearance of the collectives depends upon the 
viewpoint of the observer. From the outside they appear to 
be characterized by the former qualities, but they are visible 
only as abstractions - in documentation, on staff rosters, in 
accounts, on databases, etc., that is, as virtual structures. 
The deeper the observer penetrates into the organization the 
richer, more organic, and more interconnected the collect-
ives become. The fully embedded actor no longer sees two 
distinct collectives at the heart of the organization but 
rather sees a single constellation of myriad actors - both 
human and non-human - held in dynamic equilibrium by an 
invisible force field of creative and administrative motives 
in which, to some degree, every actor shares. The museal 
organization, in the new museological sense, is character-
ized by its deep interactivity, the independent collabor-
ative action of its actors in which ideological reflexivity is 
invoked as the guarantor of effectiveness, a process that 
defines a museal ‘management-design’. 
This ‘management-design’ is both design informed by 
management and management informed by design and it 
works towards a sustained, integrated approach to organi-
zational growth and change. 
This statement concerns ‘design’ in all of the four 
senses invoked in this paper: 
• as a quality of the ‘designed’ product in which the 
normative physical reality of the designed object is 
revealed or recovered in an active social space of produc-
tion and consumption, 
• as the programme in context in which the normative 
documentary reality of the object of design is revealed or 
recovered in an active social space of design performance, 
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• as the process of radical change in material conditions in 
which the spatialities constructing the programme are 
reversed and the (psycho-)social reality emerges in the 
documentary spatiality of autographic productions, and 
• as the philosophy of ‘ironic activism’ in which the 
normative ideological realities of design thinking are 
revealed or recovered in an active social space of 
pragmatic communicative action. 
And it concerns ‘management’ in spatially complementary 
senses: 
• as resource procurement and distribution which 
constructs a physical reality which may be mapped in 
architectural and geographical terms. But this physical 
reality is only revealed or recovered in the socially 
constructed processes that define the organization’s 
material dynamics. The movement and transformation 
of resources achieves social purposes by social means, 
• as policy development which, in contrast, ostensibly 
constructs social purposes but only in the sense of an 
expressed, an actually or virtually documented, reality 
which is revealed or recovered through the performance 
of a creative cycle, an organizational design, 
• as procedural administration which secures an account-
able pattern of performances through the construction 
of documentary products, and 
• as the philosophy of collective pragmatism which 
motivates and legitimates the mutual accommodation of 
heterogeneous actors’ reflexive performances, a continu-
ous process of reinterpretation and reconstruction which 
establishes designerly action as a (post-)organizational 
paradigm. 
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What the equation of design, in its generic sense, with 
organizational change and growth does is invoke the 
deconstructive account of organization as a normative 
concept. Cooper has said that: 
... at the level of what we might call the infrastructure, we 
discover an intrinsic undecidability which can only be 
‘organized’ or ‘systematized’ through an external force that is 
wholly foreign to it. It is this level which is resistant to order 
and organization and which we call ‘disorganization’...2
Designerly action foregrounds epistemological complexity 
as a necessary condition in which to proceed and, whatever 
else it does, deals with the embeddedness of heterogeneous 
actors and their immanent relations at an infrastructural 
level. It also posits the perpetual deferral of realized 
structure and meaning, the reality of a ‘state’ of becoming. 
In an important sense, therefore, organization does not 
exist except as the ‘project’ of disorganization and vice 
versa. Organization, as an encounter with epistemologi-
cally complex realities, is simultaneously disorganization. 
The organization/disorganization coupling may seem 
to sound a note of despair, the impossibility of established 
differences, of certain meanings. However, the designerly 
approach offers a strategic solution to this apparent 
negativity. The context of praxis which ‘management-
design’ envisions operates on a meta-theoretical level. In 
the organization of design,3 a protocol is established, at 
this meta-theoretical level, for the transitions between 
physical, social, documentary and paradigmatic spatialities, 
a eclectic holism. The reflexivity of design reveals the 
simultaneity of an organization’s projected futures and 
interpreted pasts and the absence of any logical connection 
between them. Therefore, it points to the moment of design 
as the crucial focus of attention, the site of ironic activism.  
3. See above: consideration of
the constitutive spaces of ‘prod-
uct’, ‘programme’, ‘process’ and 
‘philosophy’ in design in 4.1 
Organization of Design. 
2. COOPER, Robert. 
‘Organization/Disorganization’ 
Social Science Information. 
SAGE, 25, 2, 1986, pp.299-335. 
 
In characterizing management-design praxis as entailing 
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an eclectic holism and an ironic activism, our guilt in 
realizing the inadequacy of logocentric culture - its myth 
of rational explanation - is replaced by a joy in re-engaging 
with the sensual and visionary aspects of our being. These 
bring a rehumanized confidence into play in which one 
‘knows’ how to cope, how to change things for the better, 
how to collaborate hopefully, without the burden of a 
search for, or recapitulation of, explanation, the Logos. 
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6.0 Summary and Conclusions 
Summary 
The following summary highlights the key points in the 
model argument as it progresses from notions of spatiality 
through consideration of the locations organization, 
design, museum, and the intervals organization-design, 
design-museum, museum-organization. 
Spatiality 
Amongst the metaphors commonly utilized to aid a visual-
ization of organization, the spatial metaphor stands in 
contrast to others in proposing a concrete conception of 
abstract relations which is not bound to a particular 
representational image.1 A spatial model realizes a graphic 
or three-dimensional physical frame for a system of signs 
and thereby facilitates a simultaneity and a holism which in 
the linguistic realm of the narrative, the mythic, may only 
be cognitively grasped. The model is both a perceptual and 
cognitive tool it constructs visible relations and effects by 
playing off dimensions of possibility against each other. It 
becomes a radical device, in epistemological terms, by 
redressing a cultural situation in which the written and the 
spoken have been privileged over the visualized and the 
experiential in the contest of knowledges. 
It may be argued that beyond the realm of three-
dimensional physical reality, modelling becomes solipsistic 
in the extreme. But, to do so one must make the assump- 
tion that there is an uncontested spatio-temporal 
formation of physical space. This is not the case. The 
principal consequence of the theories of relativity and 
quantum mechanics for modern physics has been the once-
1. MORGAN, Gareth. Images 
of Organization. Sage, 1986. 
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and-for-all dislocation of the possibility of perceptual and 
‘rational’ correspondence. It seems that physical space is 
multidimensional and that this multidimensionality is a 
contingent construct. We may conclude, therefore, that all 
modelling, whether constructing a realm of physical spatial 
phenomena or something other than ‘hard’ material reality, 
even the most exotic of psycho-social realities, is subject 
to the same disintegration of Cartesian duality and the 
same contest of spatial formations. 
In an important sense, therefore, spatial models, 
whatever ‘reality’ they purport to visualize, have a common 
ontological status and it is only in the epistemological 
sense that their significance separates or connects them. 
As design refers simultaneously to particular kinds of arte-
facts and objects, individual acts and social processes, docu-
ments and drawings, and embodied values and expressed 
beliefs, the spatial formations considered appropriate to 
modelling design are ‘physical’, ‘social’, ‘documentary’ and 
‘paradigmatic’ respectively. 
Physical Space 
The discussion of the relation between the designed object 
and the design drawing illuminates the paradoxical nature 
of physical spatiality. The design drawing itself is a physical 
object, a marked piece of paper. What significance it has is 
constructed in the process of perceptual projection.2 In 
this process attention is paid to the documentary simul-
ation and manipulation of perceptual qualities. We learn to 
see things as they are by requiring of our perceptual accom-
plishment the confirmation that objects occupy their judged 
location in space. In design drawing we apply this sensibility 
to the visualization of inventively imagined objects. We 
simulate our own perceptual processes in order to construct 
2. VELMANS, Max. `Physical, 
Psychological and Virtual 
Realities', conference preprints, 
Embodied Knowledge and 
Virtual Space, Goldsmiths 
College, London, 1995. 
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reality. This insight has a consequence for the ways in 
which we may visualize physical space. We may distinguish 
between realist, dualist and pluralist formulations using 
identical model elements and simply varying the relations 
between them.3
Social Space 
Crucial to conceptions of social space is a topological quality, 
a focus on perceived spatial relations which are independent 
of absolute notions of position and distance. The speed, force 
and rapidity of reciprocal communicative acts across the 
space of a system define the spatial relations between its 
‘actors’. The visualization of social space, therefore, requires 
the playing off of dimensions that re-present particular 
patterns and transformations in communicative activity. 
In Parsonian terms, the possibilities of social space 
extend to three levels - culture system, social system and 
personality system. The ideas of Hofstede, Bourdieu, 
Lefebvre, Freud and Jung are chosen to relate a particular 
constellation of concepts to the breadth of this ‘social 
cosmology’.4 The irresolvable tensions between them do not 
invalidate the procedure, quite the reverse, they liberate a 
potential for a reflexive constructive mapping activity. 
3. See above, figures 2.1.9-11 
 
4. HOFSTEDE, Geert. Cultures
and Organizations: Intercultural
Cooperation and its Importance
for Survival; Software of the
Mind. McGrawHill, 1991. 
BOURDIEU, Pierre. [1979]
Distinction: A Social Critique of
the Judgement of Taste. Trans. 
Richard Nice. Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1984. 
LEFEBVRE, Henri. [1974]
The Production of Space. Trans. 
Donald Nicholson-Smith. Basil
Blackwell, 1991. 
BOCOCK, Robert. Sigmund
Freud. Ellis Horwood, 1983. 
JUNG, C G. Psychological
Types. Trans. H Godwin
Baynes. Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner, 1926. 
In working through the plurality of dimensions 
invoked in the five bodies of social theory the task is to 
choose ground upon which to construct ‘useful’, if contin-
gent, subspaces. 
Freudian and Jungian notions may be used to modify, 
in the direction of personality system, the dimensions 
suggested by Hofstede, Bourdieu and Lefebvre. Hofstede 
touches on emotional, political, behavioural, perceptual and 
cognitive aspects of a group’s cultural place. Bourdieu 
connects the materiality of relations to the more ironic 
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aspects of post-industrial social behaviour. Lefebvre loosens 
the attachment of any scheme to either the material or the 
non-material by invoking the continuous spectrum of 
possibilities for exchange, interaction, communication. 
If one attempts a little violence to Hofstede’s concepts 
by lifting them out of their original empirical quantitative 
context and placing them into an interpretive and essentially 
qualitative scheme, their epistemological status is apparently 
ruined. The possibility of reconstruction only exists in the 
sense that the consideration of small-scale social groups in 
the museum design organization context may identify 
significant areas of commonality in behaviour and belief. 
Dependence relations, forms of self and group identifi-
cation, gender expression and tolerance of uncertainty are 
amenable to such re-formation particularly in the light of 
Freudian considerations. For example, gender expression 
becomes a realm of creative possibility powered by un-
conscious drives, and the tolerance of uncertainty becomes 
directly related to the capacity for alternate exercise of 
imagination and reason. Bourdieu’s reference to levels of 
acquired economic and cultural capital can usefully qualify 
the local construction of dependence relations and the 
expression of collectivism particularly as a political gambit. 
The more concrete interpretation of Lefebvre’s key ideas – 
‘exchange’ as a measure of practical involvement, ‘language’ 
as a measure of difference in final vocabulary, ‘signs’ as a 
measure of documentary visibility, and ‘equivalences’ and 
‘reciprocities’ as measures of functional complementarity - 
have clear connections with the above level of constructive 
possibility. Jung’s ideas generate the potential for opening 
up an enormous depth in any model of social space. By 
extending several dimensions in which to track the prog-
ressive and regressive flows of libido, the realm of the un-
conscious is made as visible as that of the conscious and 
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many non-rational aspects of individual and interpersonal 
behaviour may be (re)presented or (re)constructed. In part-
icular, the Jungian notion of the collective unconscious may 
be mapped into a subspace that accommodates conscious 
identification of the self and with the group to recover the 
possibilities of a non-rational psychic heritage. 
To distil out of the range of dimensional possibilities 
enumerated in the text, the handful that would permit an 
adequate demonstration of museum design organization 
modelling required a recourse to the existential idea of 
‘Being’ and in particular, Heidegger’s adoption of the Dasein 
(the ‘being-there’). Interests, attitudes, concerns and 
demeanour emerge as the key terms of an account of 
being-in-the-world. In the postmodern world the contest 
between the symbolic and the material aspects of our 
involvements entails not a choice between opposing terms 
but an accommodation of the tensions between them. 
Demeanour implies a conversation of gesture, attitude 
an ideology of gesture; both notions skirt the central theme 
of involvement with which museum design organization 
(the design facet in particular) invites us to engage. 
Interests and concerns, on the other hand, focus specific-
ally on intellectual and emotional engagement, on personal 
and social values, and on the organizational processes of 
constructing ourselves and others as objects. 
Demeanour and attitude imply habit, routine and 
predisposition which construct a social dimension charact-
erized by static qualities, a dimension of social status. 
Interests and concerns are opposed to this. Freedom of 
movement is the characteristic quality of the social dimen-
sion they construct, a dimension of social dynamics. 
Setting off these contingently defined dimensions of social 
status and social dynamics and adding a time line as a third 
dimension creates a generic social space open to all the 
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forms of elaboration and transformation suggested by the 
application of dimensions identified in the work of 
Hofstede, Bourdieu, Lefebvre, Freud and Jung. 
Documentary Space 
The design drawing operates in the interstices between 
physical, social and psychological phenomena. The space of 
the design drawing is a peculiar example of the subjunctive 
space in which ‘real things may be substituted for the 
absent’.5 However, the ‘real’ thing to which the design 
drawing, the design construct, refers is an imagined future 
possibility, a deferred presence. The implied play of 
différance entailed in the production of the design const-
ruct is thus a process of semiosis. The terms ‘substitution’, 
‘simulation’ and ‘simulacrum’ come into play. 
In the design construct the substitution is for a mere 
possibility. 
The design construct entails simulation not in the sense 
of direct identification with the physical object but rather 
with an object of linguistic and visual speculation which is 
at one remove from the physical. The design construct is 
characteristically perceptual and cognitive rather than 
material and sensual. 
In the design construct, furthermore, substitution is 
immediately transcended. A parallel reality is invoked, a 
simulacrum. The simulacrum constructs its own semiotic 
space (a documentary spatiality), proclaims its own identity, 
and claims its own place in the material culture. However 
diverse it may be in physical form, the material of the 
design construct is its linguistic formation. This process 
entails a relation between any particular document and the 
object of design which betrays a cognitive style, on the one 
hand, and a perceptual compass, on the other. It rests in 
5. BRYSON, Norman., Michael
Ann HOLLY & Keith MOXEY
(eds.) Visual Theory. Polity
Press, 1991. p.246. 
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the elements of signification and evocation, a simulacrity 
which we believe to be substantial and seminal. Documentary 
‘form’ is the touchstone in this respect, a taxonomy of docu-
mentary products reflecting different kinds of skilful 
communicative activity - generic terms might be: writing, 
drawing, modelling, recording, and performing. The process 
of linguistic formation also attaches a concreteness to the 
signifying/evoking material of the document in which 
what is present to the mind is treated as actually present. 
This attends to documentary content suggesting either a 
further taxonomy, categories of information in a design 
project - conceptual, programmatic, contextual, ideological, 
contractual, etc. - , or an abstract measure of the scope of 
the content acquired in any moment in the design process 
from the local, the smallest relevant detail, to the global, 
the holistic. 
Paradigmatic Space 
The designer acting as a designer is not ordinarily engaged 
in theoretical discourse. The values and beliefs of the 
designer, where they emerge at all, normally do so in 
everyday speech and in working documents intended to be 
anything but ‘philosophical’. But, such linguistic perform-
ance cannot help but be ideological, that is, culturally em-
bedded. It is generally based on subjective and experiential 
knowledge and, therefore, surfaces in the products of the 
designing activity without the reasoned lineage we would 
regard as necessary to theoretical (philosophical) discourse. 
There is good reason for this state of affairs. Designers 
find themselves in situations characterized by epistemol-
ogical complexity - an array of incompatible understandings, 
interests and qualities - in which there is too little inform-
ation and time to employ purely rational means to decide 
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on and devise plans for desirable change.  
Designers make ontological propositions when they 
design and they embody a ‘world view’ in the presentation 
of what they design. Ironically, the values and beliefs 
embedded in what is presented may contradict those 
implied in the narrative means of the presentation. This 
ironic potential arises out of the complex of spatialities 
entailed in design. For example, the physical form and the 
linguistic content of the design document are convention-
ally but not logically connected. 
In each sphere of design - product, programme, 
process - there is the possibility of a separately active 
ideological space. A moment in the ‘ontic’ track of a 
designed object, a narrative turn in a design document, a 
particular social interaction in the design process, each 
embodies a contingent ideological position. The paradig-
matic space is enfolded in the physical, documentary and 
social spaces in which design is (re)constructed. 
6. GOULDNER, A W. The 
Coming Crisis of Western
Sociology. Heinemann, 1970. 
 
7. ATKINSON, D. Orthodox
Consensus and Radical
Alternative. Heinemann, 1972. 
 
8. FRIEDRICHS, R. A 
Sociology of Sociology. New 
York: Free Press, 1970. 
 
9. DENISOFF, R. et al Theories 
and Paradigms in Contemporary
Sociology. New York: Peacock,
1974. 
 
10. EFFRAT, A. (ed.) 
Perspectives in Political
Sociology. New York:
BobbsMerrill, 1973. 
 
11. BURRELL, Gibson. & 
Gareth MORGAN. Sociological
Paradigms and Organisational
Analysis. Heinemann Educational
Books, 1979. 
 
12. HASSARD, John. Sociology
and Organization Theory. Cam-
bridge University Press, 1993. 
These instances of independently deferred, distorted 
and distanced paradigmatic space are, in turn, independent 
of the active philosophical space in which the designer 
might choose to carve out a theoretical position. In abstr-
acting general rules about knowledge from specific physical, 
social and psychological instances, theorizing enfolds these 
spatialities into a chosen location in paradigmatic space. 
A range of paradigm models has been proposed since 
1970 - Gouldner,6 Atkinson,7 Friedrichs,8 Denisoff,9 
Effrat,10 and Burrell and Morgan.11 Approaching Hassard's 
analysis critically,12 I conclude that Burrell and Morgan's 
map of two-dimensional sociological paradigms provides 
the best visualization on three scores. (1) The scheme is 
clear-cut, based on independent pairs of indices it maxi-
mizes the value of paradigm as ‘location’. (2) Insofar as 
praxis, in the museum design organization context, is 
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socially constructed such a paradigmatic scheme applies 
directly. (3) Since the demise of a functionalist museo-
graphy, each of the particular practices involved in museum 
design organization is more or less open to the variety of 
meta-theoretical assumptions and constructs an identical 
space of paradigmatic possibilities. 
The postmodern condition casts as a boon what was 
once regarded as a trivializing quirk, the kind of open inter-
disciplinarity that characterizes design and the new museo-
logy. Both practices occupy the borderlines of a variety of 
other disciplines, both are carving out distinctive ground 
of their own, both are becoming reflexive and particularly 
adept at dealing with incommensurable systems of ideas. 
The Burrell and Morgan map is, therefore, one to be 
used as a way of locating where one is but also as a tool for 
navigating open territory. In these terms this study began 
with certain inclinations - nominalist, anti-positivist, volun-
tarist and ideographic - but then took off at such a speed 
as to collapse their locating power. If this is regarded as a 
process of dissolving the classical dualities then it is so 
only in an ironic sense, only as long as one keeps moving at 
speed, fixing on nothing, accommodating everything in an 
ironic activism. Recent philosophical debate amply reflects 
the experience of design and new museology as an ironic 
activism. As the defining terms of theoretical endeavour - 
nominalisrn/realism, antipositivism/positivism, voluntarism/ 
determinism, ideographic/nomothetic - have become con-
fused in a self-reflexive, self-contradictory discourse, a meta-
theoretical level of thinking has emerged which is pragmatic, 
ironic and embodied in new post-Philosophical practices. 
Organization 
Spatiality is the key metaphor in the project of modelling.  
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This connects directly with the visual possibilities implicit 
in the task of producing a useful tool for praxis, one which 
goes beyond the conventional narrative emphasis apparent 
in qualitative analysis. 
The contingent definition of interfaces is the key to 
initiating the organizational process. The differentiation of 
the space of possibility leads to the play of différance and the 
cycle of dedifferentiation-redifferentiation that generates 
the moments of change. 
A model simplifies in a way that parallels the attenu-
ation of complexity apparent in the myth. As a primarily 
visual construct, however, the model is better able to pre-
serve the quality of dynamism which is crucial in praxis. 
Openness to intervention is generally missing in narrative 
which rather is propelled towards closure. The pseudo-
synchronic ‘slice’ becomes a necessary artifice of the cons-
tructive and reconstructive processes that characterize the 
practitioner’s interventions.13
Design 
There is heuristic value in defining ‘design’ as a character-
istic human trait and not as a quality of things. The 
conceptual constellation which is design has ontological 
and epistemological objects. The ontological object con-
strues design as ‘the things of order’, the material culture, 
which emphasizes human agency in actively constructing 
and interpretively reconstructing a pattern or order to 
things. The epistemological object construes it as one of 
‘knowledge in practice’, praxis. 
However, one must differentiate between the generic 
human trait to which the term ‘design’ refers and the instit-
utionalized professional practice of design. In this thesis, 
following Rorty’s argument in relation to ‘philosophy’ and 
13. See above: 3.1 Organization:
Simplification and adequacy,
and Figure 3.1.5. 
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‘Philosophy’, the latter is referred to as ‘Design’ with a 
capital ‘D’.14
The linearity of the design process is a myth which has 
outlived its usefulness. For one, design picks up where purely 
rational means leave off. That is, design comes into its own 
in dealing with epistemologically complex objects - ones in 
which contradictory/counteracting orders of knowledge 
necessitate non-rational, non-linear approaches that respond 
to the ‘moment’ and the material at hand. The methodo-
logy movement of the 1960s, 70s and 80s largely failed 
because of the temptation of epistemological reductionism. 
The point of this thesis is to propose that, in a focus on 
process that admits dynamic qualities in the design context, 
the pseudo-synchronic nature of any (re)construction poten-
tially liberates the visualization of design from linearity 
and, therefore, that a more adequate model is possible. 
Museum 
The museum provides a microcosm of organizational 
complexity and process which embrace material, social and 
epistemological objects and concerns. This is evidenced in 
the genealogy of museum forms in which each historic 
formation persist as one of many constitutive layers in the 
postmodern museum. 
Using Walker’s production-consumption model of the 
field of design history, it can be shown that potentially the 
museum ‘mirrors’ its every facet. The museum can also be 
shown to behave as a ‘chameleon’ organization, and the 
curator, like the designer, as a ‘chameleon’ practitioner. 
Peculiar paradoxes surround the situation of the 
museologically-oriented curator. It is ironic that the 
curator in the small museum is required to be a generalist 
and is largely unable to spend time working directly with 
14. See above: 3.2 Design: 
‘design’ and ‘Design’, and 2.4 
Paradigmatic Space, note 31. 
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the collection, a task which may be undertaken, under the 
‘curator’s’ supervision, by ostensibly un(der)qualified 
volunteers. In the larger museum, the situation is also 
increasingly at odds with the traditional notion of curator-
ship. The specialist is likely to be largely a facilitator of 
other’s (museum users rather than employees) work rather 
than a practitioner. 
Curatorship, as an interdisciplinary professional practice, 
has either accumulated other practices or has fragmented 
into specialisms depending upon one's perspective on recent 
professional development. Whichever view one takes, the 
disintegration of museographical holism and its former 
certainties is undeniable. The new museological approach, 
which requires the practitioner to question the nature of 
the museum and to continually reconstruct its forms and 
practices, has given birth to the reflexive (situated, self-
consciously critical) practitioner ultimately focussed on 
process-shaping, context-shaping, theory-shaping, that is, 
in the broadest sense, ‘organizational design’ activity. 
Organization of Design 
The Foucauldian notion of the ‘gaze’ implies four orders of 
spatiality in design - the physical, social, documentary and 
paradigmatic - and draws attention to the transitions between 
them.15 These transitions can be taken to describe the trans-
formation of knowledge by stages from the concrete and 
tangible to the abstract and purely linguistic.16 They also 
entail a shift in modes of perception and cognition from 
that immanent in acting, i.e. thinking-in-doing, to that which 
is analytical and abstract, i.e. thinking-about-doing.17
15. FOUCAULT, Michel.
[1963] The Birth of the Clinic.
Trans. A M Sheridan. Tavistock,
1973. p.9. See above 4.1
Organization of Design:
Foncault's Spatial Framework. 
 
16. LEFEBVRE, Henri. [1974]
The Production of Space. Trans. 
Donald Nicholson-Smith. Basil
Blackwell, 1991. See above 4.1
Organization of Design:
Spatiality in Discourse, which
explains the necessity of
accounting for shifts in spatial-
ity entailed in rhetorical and
logical turns. 
The central formation of design derives from the trans-
itions between physical, social, documentary and paradig-
matic  spatialities.  The four  ‘P’s,  product,  programme, 
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process, and philosophy are referred to as: 
• Product: (1) the designed object - the thing, place, 
message, system which is the end product of the design 
process; (2) the object as design, a material cultural 
object (re)constructed through discourse. 
• Programme: the object of design - the design context, 
the problem-solution relation (design idea), and the 
performance of communicative actions circumscribed 
by a system of documentation. 
• Process: (1) the activity of designing as experienced - a 
way of designing peculiar to a designer, a type of 
designer or group of designers; (2) a model providing 
an ideal visualization of or prescription for a way of 
designing. 
• Philosophy: (1) the rationale for a particular design 
and/or way of designing; (2) a set of beliefs and values, 
or guiding principles about design and/or designing in 
general. 
Figure 4.1.12 (p. 211) shows a spatial framework for 
design which encompasses all of the identified design 
phenomena, and clearly delineates the spatial transitions 
entailed in their (re)construction. 
Design of Museum Design 
Design is implicated in every aspect of the multidisciplin-
ary environment. It both shapes and is shaped by the organ-
izational context. The actor-network concept is useful 
because it accounts for this reflexive condition and the 
combinations of human and non-human elements that 
comprise coherent actors in any organization. The 
programmatic activity in an organization and the ideolog-
ical basis of its design act to continually redefine hetero-
geneous actors. 17. See above 2.4 Paradigmatic
Space: The Absence of a
Discourse and note 45. This is necessarily an interpretive point. Analyses of 
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actor-network dynamics in the design/organization context 
have only documentary evidence to work on in respect of 
the tracing of ideological play. Therefore, they may only be 
reconstructed and the process is necessarily reflexive. The 
paradox of the situation must be accepted: there is no 
logical connection between the organizational future 
towards which the play of design ideology directs itself in 
practice and the organizational past to which any evalu-
ation of ideological manoeuvres must refer. 
To make ideological positions and dynamics clear in 
analysis, it is better to define generic roles, e.g. strategist, 
advocate, facilitator and maker, than to rely on contingent 
context-specific role definitions, i.e. in the museum the 
traditional museographically defined roles of curator, 
educator, project manager, conservator, designer, etc. This 
proposition compares favourably with Brunelli’s findings.18
Using this method it is possible to visualize ‘role drift’ 
as a function of project type/scale and to problematize the 
ambiguity of the practitioner’s status by relating the idea 
of generic role drift to the pseudo-synchrony of contin-
gently defined stages or phases in the design process. 
Museality of Organizations 
The institutional definition of a museum inscribes its 
definitive operations in a legitimating code.19 However, it 
is not only museums that adhere to such a code. There is a 
‘museal’ quality to many organizations, a socially construct-
ed field of information, meaning, difference that allows its 
‘actors’ to function as communicative objects. Any organiz-
ational process of complex relocation - relocation in physical, 
social and documentary spatial terms - in which an ‘object’ 
(i.e. actor in the actor network) becomes the site of socially 
constructed meaning, is construed as a sign, and accum-
ulates a special information content related only to the 
18. BRUNELLI, Maria. The 
Role of Designers in the
Management of Museums, Ph.D. 
Thesis, Institute of Advanced
Studies, Manchester Metropolitan
University, 1993. See above: 4.2
The Design of Museum Design:
Generic Roles and Ideological
Stability. 
 
19. A museum is an institution
that collects, documents, pre
serves, exhibits and interprets
material evidence and associated
information for the public benefit.
Museums Association, 1984. 
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extraordinary organizational process. Any such process 
may be connoted by the term ‘museal’. 
The museal organization acquires personnel which take 
on the qualities of the museal object. They are (re)con-
structed as material/informational objects, implicated in 
complex contingent constructs that combine particular 
human characteristics with other non-human ones to form 
heterogeneous actors.20 These actors, like museum exhibits, 
which combine collection item, interpretive materials and 
particular processes of interaction with the museum visitor/ 
user, may be rather temporary constructs, always open to 
radical reconstruction. However, the human component, 
as organizational object, like its museum equivalent, the 
collection item, must be carefully documented and pre-
served. The human is the characteristic material of the 
museal organization and has a value rooted in the nature of 
its relocation from the wider social sphere to a contingent 
position within the organization. 
This view of the human as organizational object reflects 
the museographical priority of the processes of collecting, 
documenting, preserving and researching above those of 
exhibiting and interpreting. This constitutes a functionalist 
conventionalism in organization. However, the new muse-
ology has changed the procedural prescriptiveness implied 
in the traditional view. The new museology focusses 
attention on the necessity of contingent self-definition and 
continual re-creation. In the new museal organization the 
linguistic dimension is brought to the fore. It becomes 
radically renegotiable and makes the museum, the museal 
organization in general, the site of a continual semiosis 
with the potential to realize an infinite variety of unpredict-
able states. In this, intentionality serves as a comforting 
myth, a post-rationalization. Organizations that realize 
their museality in this new spirit become flexible, able to 
reconstrue themselves at will. 
20. See above: 4.2 The Design of
Museum Design: Ideology, Prog-
ramme and Différance, note 8. 
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An organization is museal in as much as it entails a 
sampling of the world in which spatial relations are inscribed 
that substitute for what is absent and where this process is 
interminable, an ‘economy of signs and space’. Such organi-
zations are not singular and purposeful in any straight-
forward sense. They display a chameleon-like adaptability 
in which each actor is able to exercise a dynamic, creative 
reflexivity. They construct an ironic presence to themselves 
which they achieve through the communicative complex of 
organizational actors (collection) and forms of mediation 
(media). They become exhibitionary in character, a spectacle 
in which an order of knowledge and power is called into 
play by the organization of a universal panoptic ritual. But 
at the same time, this process continually changes the 
form, material and content of the organizational ‘display’. 
Only through achieving repeated transmutation can the 
organization sustain its ‘identity’. It may seem paradoxical, 
but, organizational identity can never be fixed and 
singular, rather it is always the result of keeping alive the 
possibility of meaning, structure and utility. 
The museal organization only has clients insofar as 
they become participants, collaborators in the organiz-
ation’s projects. Just as the visitor’s active participation is 
required to construct a particular narrative out of the 
myriad possibilities immanent in the (non-linear) exhibi- 
tion ‘text’, the proper business of the museal organization 
effectively remains unconstituted until catalysed and 
completed by a supplement unique to each client. 
Although this organizational situation is never completely 
open-ended, it should produce a facility for expecting the 
unexpected and ensuring a high probability of success. The 
reflexive aspect of the museal organization makes it alive 
to its own processes as well as to the contingent nature of 
the interfaces it constructs with the outside world. 
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6.1 General Theory 
Contingency, Praxis and Sanity 
The radical uncertainty of our condition as engaged beings 
is amply reflected in the discourses that (circum)navigate 
museum design organization. The practical situations that 
give rise to design activity can not be separated out from 
the design activity itself; the programmatic aspects of design 
are immediately reflexive and arbitrarily delineated. The 
design process engages not with some objective reality but 
with a complex of physical, documentary, psycho-social and 
paradigmatic interests and concerns which, at least in part, 
arise out of the contingent manoeuvres of the process 
itself: in this sense design is necessarily embedded and 
functionally unredeemable. 
It may appear that ‘design’ becomes a trivial concept if one 
insists too much on its all-embracing scope and its thorough 
embeddedness in any practical situation. However, this 
would be to deny the undecidability of design itself. Where 
spontaneous direct action ends and planning for future 
action begins is not a question that can be answered without 
paradoxical implications. 
The necessity of an account that subjectifies subject-
other-than-subject relations is inherent in any modelling 
of a constellation such as museum•design•organization. 
Firstly, the decentred human subject is embroiled in 
actor-network machinations to which unique authorship is 
impossible to assign and which are profoundly ambiguous 
in their purpose. Rational behaviour becomes a question of 
post-rationalization - when one is required to, one becomes 
wise after the fact and, in the process of wising-up, 
serendipity may be covered up as easily as the failure of 
established protocol. 
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Secondly, there can be no simple recourse to some 
notion of ‘collective responsibility’. The collectivity, where 
it exists, changes its constituency as a function of the 
process in which it is constituted and, furthermore, it 
admits non-human and exotic hybrid entities as a matter of 
course. If one sees certain tools - cognitive and perceptual 
aids, cybernetic constructs - as extensions of ourselves, 
embodiments of knowledges, skills and values, one must 
also see them as transfusional. Very quickly they gain the 
power to blur the identities of our collectivities and to 
diffuse (de-fuse) the possibility of clear responsibility. 
Responsibility, as such, may become an abstract, post-
rational, conventional assignment that has little to do with 
practical, political or ethical considerations. 
The upshot is a reflexive formation of a radical sort, 
one which is multidimensional and in-formational. That is 
to say, the idea of praxis, which posits mutually informing 
theory and practical action, is transformed once one accepts 
the invisible transitions between present action and 
deferred action implicit in the idea of design. Design is a 
meta-praxis, a praxis engaged at a deeper level in the 
formation of praxes. By implication, therefore, the reflexiv-
ity of design is a peculiarly valuable one. Its apparently 
quixotic pretensions surface in the work of J. C. Jones 
(Designing Designing)1 and C. T. Mitchell (Redefining 
Designing),2 its mercurial quality I hope may be tracked/ 
traced following the modelling project of this thesis. 
2. MITCHELL, C Thomas. 
Redefining Designing: From 
Form to Experience. New York: 
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1993. 
 
l. JONES, J. Christopher. 
Designing Designing. Archi-
tecture Design and Technology 
Press, 1991 (previously 
published as Essays in Design. 
John Wiley & Sons, 1984.) 
Constellation as the Generator of Meta-praxis 
‘Museum design organization’ implies an object of discourse, 
‘Museum•Design•Organization’ a constellation of dis-
courses. If the tension between these objectifications 
discloses anything it is the fact that the virtual spatialities 
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of the linguistic, the psycho-social, and the paradigmatic 
are the larger part of any reality we may feel or feel we 
know. The future, in a sense, has already arrived. 
Rorty entreats us to accept as mentors the ethnogra-
phers and novelists who, ‘specialize in thick description of 
the private and idiosyncratic’.3 It seems to me that William 
Gibson has captured most vividly the exotic multidimen-
sional actuality of the kind of ‘construct’ museum design 
organization represents.4 In Neuromancer the expert 
‘console man’ or ‘cyberspace cowboy’ is able to navigate 
freely through the virtual realities that represent, in a 
visible time-space simulation, the complexities of inform-
ation structures in cyberspace and animate the more or less 
ephemeral entities constructed by their dynamic interplay. 
An entity, whether a corporation or an artificial intelli-
gence, whose reality is largely or wholly non-physical, has 
an identity and a presence ultimately more powerful and 
more ‘real’ than a building or a body can ever be. Though 
unaided by any virtual reality, the exploration of spatial-
ities and the modelling of museum design organization 
exemplifies the invasion of familiar, if illusory, Cartesian 
reality by multiple simulations of its phenomena.5 This 
invasion, which has accelerated enormously since computers 
started talking to each other, makes the creation of a new 
class of ‘tools’ a priority. We urgently need conceptual and 
navigational aids upon which we can rely as we consciously 
venture into a mediated, dynamic, multidimensional, 
‘wired-up’ world. 
5. MATTHEWS, Geoff.
‘Invasion of the Body Snatchers:
Architecture and Virtual Space’, 
Culture Theory Criticism
Occasional Papers, University of
Humberside, 1994. 
 
4. GIBSON, William. Neuro-
mancer. Victor Gollanez, 1984. 
 
3. RORTY, Richard. Conting-
ency, Irony, and Solidarity.
Cambridge University Press,
1989, p.94. 
The museum’s most powerful presence is no longer 
expressed in the physicality of its collections and their 
arrangement in particular orders in specific architectural 
spaces in specific geographical locations. It is expressed in 
multidimensional actor-network relations, in the cybernetic 
orders of its information structures which are distributed 
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across physical, documentary, psycho-social and virtual 
spaces. The familiar codes of embodied knowledge with 
which we expect to decipher the museal assemblage of 
material culture have become inadequate. The museum 
continues to exist but it also begins to disappear. The 
defining boundaries of the museum which were once so 
concrete and certain - the collection, the archive, the cura-
torial body, the building - have partially dissolved.6 The 
museum has expanded, become porous and mobile, and 
has submitted to varied forms of colonization, assimilation 
and simulation.7 It has become impossible to retain a grasp 
on the idea of the museum without invoking one or another 
constellation of equally contested complex phenomena. 
The constellation forms a matrix capable of giving birth to 
new constructs and experiences: it recognizes the periphery 
as the site of action and meaning. This is the value of 
Museum•Designs•Organization: it sustains the dynamic 
intervals that surround a now uncertain core. 
 
7. SILVERSTONE, Roger.
‘The Medium is the Museum: on
objects and logics in times and
spaces’, in MILES, Roger S &
Lauro Zavala. (eds.) Towards the
Museum of the Future: New
European Perspectives. Routledge,
1994. pp.161-76. 
Both these media [videos and
interactives], once incorporated
into the museum, blur the
boundaries between the museum’s
private space and the public world,
a boundary which was pretty well
held when both objects and
visitors had to cross the same
threshold. But they also blur the
boundaries between the individ-
ual’s private space and the public
space of the museum ... (pp. 172-3) 
 
8. See above: 4.3 The Museality
of Organization. 
6. HOOPER-GREENHILL, 
Eilean. Museums and the Shaping
of Knowledge. London:
Routledge, 1992. 
Design, Organization and Control 
The museal quality of organizations becomes apparent.8 
Put simply, I am proposing that all such organizations ought 
to be continually transformed, from the bottom up, by 
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary creative practices. 
These creative practices are ‘active’ rather than ‘reactive’ 
and ‘ironic’ in the sense that they play off ‘official’ repre-
sentations of organization and function against contingent 
ones operated by the practitioners themselves. They recog-
nize and actively engage in processes of socially construct-
ing organization, meaning and material products which 
have a praxiological rigour that may or may not be ad-
mitted by ‘official’ representations of what is going on in the 
organization and how it is structured. However far the 
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process of organizational representation goes in attempting 
to stabilize structure and function into a model of control, 
creative practices of this sort continuously undermine this 
will to control through a counter process of dynamic 
interactivity. 
The organization’s will to stabilize and control itself - to 
fix a global image of itself - ostensively aimed at assuring 
efficiency and therefore survival, has the effect of rigidifying 
structure and suppressing responsiveness to environmental 
change. As environmental change appears to be inevitable, 
any fixed organizational arrangement can, at best, only 
achieve temporary success. Counteracting practices within 
the organization, a realm of communicative interactivity 
contingently concerned with localised effectiveness, have 
the effect of loosening structure and heightening respon-
siveness to environmental change. 
The irony of the situation is plain; efforts to fix struct-
ure and control activity stimulate unwanted counteractions 
which, when successful, ensure the survival of the organiz-
ation during periods of environmental upheaval. Equally, 
unfettered internal creativity is inefficient and destabilizing, 
and stimulates the imposition of unwanted structure and 
controls which, when successful, ensure the survival of the 
organization during periods of environmental stability. From 
either point of view, therefore, it is possible to assert that 
the enemy within is necessary to every living organization. 
9. STEPHENSON, Neal. Snow 
Crash. Bantam Books, 1992. 
The virus is a self-replicating, 
spontaneously mutating, micro-
organism containing genetic 
material. It is able to penetrate 
the cells of a living organism and 
to alter the way they function. 
Once a virus has been introduc-
ed it never completely disappears. 
Once suppressed it may lay 
dormant for long periods until 
spontaneous mutation triggers 
replication and spread. The virus 
is disruptive. It causes illness and 
disease that affect a whole organ-
ism and may infect a whole 
population. However, whatever 
the short-term cost, the process 
is essential to survival. It prom-
otes a responsive, robust immune 
system. The genetic response is 
to produce antibodies specific 
to each mutation of each virus. 
These accumulate in the host to 
constitute a contingent regime 
of organization and control. 
A useful metaphor here is that of the virus. In the 
novel Snow Crash Neal Stephenson explores the proposition 
that there is a far deeper connection between the digital 
and the biological worlds than we may realize.9 So much so, 
that they may be susceptible to the same viral infections. 
He describes a long-lost Ur-language which reaches down 
to the primitive structures of the brain and affects their 
operation directly. It is the biological equivalent of binary 
 299 
code in the programming of computers. A single inform-
ational virus coded variously in the monosyllabic Ur-
language and in raw binary form can cause the same effect 
in the human brain and in the computer - an irretrievable 
breakdown known as ‘snow crash’. In effect the virus strips 
out all of the higher levels of programming and returns the 
brain/computer to a primitive state, an unstructured state 
in which it is susceptible to radical reprogramming. 
10. The metaphor of the Hox
gene has been proposed by Paul
Hekkert to differentiate between
design which is radical and inno-
vatory, which establishes new
archetypes, and design which is
extrapolatory, which plays out
the potential of an existing arche-
type. I find this unsatisfactory
for two reasons: (1) most design
is neither one nor the other but
somewhere between the two, and
(2) too much emphasis is given
to an objective notion of design,
and particularly to designed ob-
jects and intentional acts, and too
little to programmatic, proced-
ural and philosophical aspects of
design. The virus seems more
immediately ambivalent and
polyvalent. 
HEKKERT, Paul. ‘The 
Designer as a “Hox Gene”: The 
Origin and Impact of Vision in
the Evolution of Design’, in 
Doctorates in Design and
Architecture, EAAE Conference
Book, Delft University of
Technology, 1996. pp.81-2. 
Design is such an informational virus. It is able to 
infect several different spatialities simultaneously. Its effect 
is to open up a situation to radical reprogramming. It affects 
whole organizations and populations, and it mutates.10
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6.2 Museum Design 
Discipline Specific Conclusions 
An idea of modelling can be expressed in one sentence. 
Modelling is a process of discerning, examining and proposing 
a constellation of elements which illustrates a possibility.1
Specifically this project set out to illustrate the possibility 
of a museum design that is ‘effective’ in a profound praxio-
logical sense, one which is: (1) radically creative in its 
approach to, and treats as interdependent and interpene-
trating, the problems of organization, communication and 
action, and (2) humanistic, and develops its humanistic 
qualities through an ironic activism which is quite opposed 
in theory and in practice to the institutionalized conser-
vatism engendered both by traditional museography and 
by material object oriented design. 
The conclusions for general theory point up the nec-
essity of a reflexive condition that affects each actor in the 
museum design organization actor network and amounts 
to a limited mandate for anarchic, that is, anti-organiz-
ational, communicative activity. The ironic quality of this 
localized drive for effectiveness is that, in disrupting organiz-
ational efforts to impose a global image and a rational order 
whose aim is general efficiency, longer term survival is made 
more, not less, likely. The ‘design’ virus, it is argued, rein-
forces the organization’s immune system, that is, makes it 
a dynamic, change-dependent, innovative and responsive 
organization. 
Hierarchy as a Communicative Artifice 
l. POTTER, Norman. Models 
and Constructs: Margin Notes to
a Design Culture. Hyphen
Press, 1990, p.10. 
The above proposition raises a socio-ecological argument 
against the idea of hierarchy. Far from being a natural 
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phenomenon it could be argued from this point of view that 
it is only a metaphor, a way of visualising a transient quality 
that appears from time to time in dynamic organizations, 
part of an essentially mechanistic organizational myth 
which, perhaps, has outlived its usefulness. 
Traditional museography tends to focus on the history 
and mechanics of collecting and preserving material culture, 
a focus which has made good use of static hierarchical 
models of organization. For example, the Victorian ideal of 
a universal, closed system of classification persists in certain 
areas of the museum process. Terminology control in 
collection documentation continues to exercise curatorial 
teams in national and other large museums, and systems 
specialists in organizations such as the Museum Document-
ation Association, not because workable or adequate 
collection documentation activities have not been estab-
lished, but because the universalization and closure of these 
activities remains a goal.2
This is not to say that hierarchical models still 
dominate the field, in many areas of the museum process 
they have been superseded by non-hierarchical ones. For 
example, until recently educational and interpretive activities, 
including exhibition, were based on an essentially linear 
communication model which placed the curator at the top, 
the mediator (educator, exhibit) in the middle, and the visitor 
at the bottom. The belief underpinning this model was that 
the curator gathers information and creates messages some, 
ideally all, of which filter down through the museum comm-
unication system to the receptive visitor. (Figure 6.2.1) 
This model, which implied all power to be in the hands of 
the curator, poor communication to be the mediator’s 
fault, and regarded the visitor as an inessential and totally 
passive beneficiary of the system, has been rightly discred-
ited. More recent models lay emphasis on the participative 
2. Museums Documentation
Association (MDA) see above:
3.3 Museum, note 12. 
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SENDER 
(Curator)
MESSAGE 
(Exhibit) 
RECEIVER 
(Visitor)
Figure 6.2.1 
  
The traditional three-unit model of communication.3
  
role each actor in the system plays in shaping and 
interpreting messages and the interactive nature of the 
communication process. (Fig. 6.2.2) 
Author/message 
relation 
Audience/message 
relation 
Transaction 
questions                                      questions 
Figure 6.2.2 
  
Communication process (Paulette McManus, after Sless, 1981).4
5. 0'NEILL, Mark. ‘After the 
artefact: Internal and external 
relations in museums.’ in The 
Museums Profession. Gaynor 
Kavanagh (ed.) Leicester Univer-
sity Press, 1991. pp. 27-36 (p.28.) 
 
(from CAMERON, D. ‘A 
viewpoint: the museum as a com-
munication system and implica-
tions for museum education’, 
Curator, no. 11 (1968) 33-40.) 
 
4. Op cit. (SLESS, D. Learning 
and Visual Communication, 
London: Croom Helm, and New 
York: John Wiley, 1981.) 
3. Quoted without source by 
McMANUS, Paulette, ‘Making 
Sense of Exhibits’ in 
KAVANAGH, Gaynor. (ed.) 
Museum Languages. Leicester 
University Press, 1991. pp.35-46. 
An alternative generic linear 
communications model is 
provided by HOOPER-
GREENHILL, E. ‘A new com-
munication model for museums’ 
in the same volume, pp.49-61. 
  transmitter?medium? receiver. 
  
One may speculate that the field of museum communica-
tion has been affected by the new museology and that the 
field of museum documentation, particularly the hard-
systems end of it, has not. It is unlikely to be as clear cut 
as this, but the idea is worth pursuing. 
Traditional museography tends to defer indefinitely the 
political and socio-cultural dimensions of its object. To get 
anywhere with the complex detail of technical and academic 
activities its discourse tends to be one of pragmatism and 
scientific discipline. The institutional context is therefore 
accepted as the status quo and this is not open to question 
unless some crisis becomes evident. Mark 0'Neill captures 
this introspective turn in the following way: 
...museums are examples of that extension of human capacity 
through organization called bureaucracies ...usually started by 
people for a very specific purpose. Often such organizations then 
establish a life and purposes of their own ...based on the tradi-
tions which develop within the organization and give priority 
to the needs of staff and their interaction with each other...5
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As long as the investigation and prescription of practice 
appears to be progressing towards better technical and 
professional standards everything is hunky-dory. 
However, a crisis of momentous proportions is affect-
ing museums. First and foremost this crisis is one of 
knowledge,6 if one thinks of philosophy as a river, a channel 
which supplies consistent fresh outlooks and takes prob-
lematic and messy ones away. Then it is a river which has 
burst its banks. The systematizing of knowledge, under-
taken in the name of the Enlightenment, appears to be a 
project which has failed. It seems that knowledge is 
historically and geographically contingent, at least it is not 
possible to make much of it otherwise for very long.7 Even 
the objectivity of science, which was supposed to be guaran-
teed through the careful design of its methods, has become 
subject to relativistic doubt.8 Mainstream philosophy has, 
in a sense, lost much of its job and, increasingly, every 
practice that would once have deferred the problematic 
aspects of its formulation and authority to philosophy is 
instead facing them head on. 
Museums are concerned with knowledge of particular 
sorts - those which can be derived from a consideration of 
material culture. However, to proceed, the museum engages 
in a process which takes material out of its natural context 
in the real world. To a great extent this breaks a dynamic 
network of relations to people, places, events and things, 
in the past, and an immanent present and future. Instantan-
eously, the process radically alters the nature of the 
material it is designed to preserve and study. What is 
preserved and made available for study is often only some 
limited physical aspect of the original material in which 
only problematic traces of its cultural past and potential 
can be discerned. What begins to happen is that a new 
context, a new network of relations, is established, one 
6. LYOTARD, Jean-François. 
[1979] The Postmodern
Condition: A Report on Know-
ledge. Trans. Geoff Bennington
& Brian Massumi. Manchester
University Press, 1984. 
 
7. CAPRA, Fritjof. The 
Turning Point: Science, Society
and the Rising Culture. USA: 
Simon & Schuster, 1982. 
GEERTZ, Clifford. Local 
Knowledge. New York: Basic
Books, 1983. 
RORTY, Richard. Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature. Basil 
Blackwell, 1980. 
 
8. FEYERABEND, Paul. [1975]
Against Method. Revised ed. 
London: Verso, 1988.) 
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which is, to all intents and purposes, limited by the 
perceived boundaries of the museum system.9 One can see 
the ironic quality inherent in the traditional idea of a 
museum - the museum process counteracts the conditions 
which might be preferred for creating knowledge of 
material culture, and yet, as we know, a museum can work 
no other way without losing its current defining qualities. 
There is a parallel here with a fundamental problem in 
particle physics. The process of observing atomic particles 
affects the behaviour and the nature of what is observed, 
the only way to understand what is going on, therefore, is 
to regard the observer as part of the system. We begin to 
come to a similar conclusion in relation to the museum 
object. The process of studying material culture affects the 
possibilities for interpretation, if one is to understand what 
is going on one must account for one’s own participation 
in the formation of cultural objects. This conclusion brings 
to the fore, as contingent practical considerations rather 
than as separable philosophical problems, the issues of (1) 
‘museality’: 
In the acquisition of material, of what ever kind, let alone in 
...making it publicly accessible, museums make certain 
choices determined by judgements as to value, significance or 
monetary worth, judgements which may derive in part from 
the system of values peculiar to the institution itself, but 
which in a more profound sense are also rooted in our 
education, our upbringing, our prejudices.10 
(2) ‘aesthetics’; 
Whether we like it or not, every acquisition (and indeed 
disposal), every juxtaposition or arrangement of an object or 
work of art, together with other objects or works of art, within 
the context of a temporary exhibition or museum display means 
placing a certain construction upon history, be it the history of 
the distant or more recent past, of our own culture or someone 
else’s, of mankind in general or a particular aspect of human 
endeavour.11
9. PEARCE, Susan M.
Museums, Objects and
Collections: A Cultural Study.
Leicester University Press, 1992. 
 
10. VERGO, Peter. (ed.) The 
New Museology. Reaktion Books,
1989, p.2. 
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and (3) ‘interpretation’; 
Beyond the captions, the information panels, [all of the media 
forms used in an exhibition,] the accompanying catalogue, 
the press handout, there is a subtext comprising innumerable 
diverse, often contradictory strands, woven from the wishes and 
ambitions, the intellectual or political or social or educational 
aspirations and preconceptions of the museum director, the 
curator, the scholar, the designer, the sponsor - to say nothing of 
the society, the political or social or educational system which 
nurtured all these people and in so doing left its stamp upon 
them. Such considerations, rather than, say, the administration 
of museums, their methods and techniques of conservation, their 
financial well-being, their success or neglect in the eyes of the 
public, are the subject matter of the new museology.12
This view of the museum practitioner’s working situation as 
inescapably theory-laden is relatively new. Because, as we can 
see, it has arisen out of a crisis in the condition of know-
ledge, those most closely involved in its creation and com-
munication in the museum context have been most affected 
and affected first. On the other hand, those involved in the 
technical, and often less visible, aspects of the more public 
activities have been least affected or affected only latterly. 
Amongst these we can include, not only those allowed to 
specialise in system design and implementation for collection 
documentation, but also those involved in devising and 
executing conservation and security operations. 
Exhibition and museum designers occupy a middle 
position; no longer so commonly isolated from the interpre-
tive dimension of public communications, often they must 
act as a broker not only between the curator as client repre-
sentative and the contractor but increasingly between other 
members of the museum’s exhibition team, which may now 
include curator, educator, audience advocate, and conservator 
as well as the designer and whose agendas and experiences 
may differ but whose practice - input to a project - may 
overlap considerably. 
11. ibid pp.2-3. 
  
12. ibid p.3.  
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A peculiar spectrum of concerns and interests is ass-
embled in the museum which is poorly served by a purely 
instrumental, regulatory approach to organization. As the 
museum organization may be seen as an exemplary 
‘museal’ organization, the processes of exhibition and inter-
pretation are characteristic not just of the public interface 
but of the whole organizational infrastructure. 
The museum may be ‘bureaucratic’ but it is so in the 
special sense of accommodating the inescapably subversive 
dimension of the design-centred museum process. Because 
this embodies an engagement with the complexity of the 
museum environment, because the museality of human 
actors in the museum organization is brought into play in 
the exhibitionary construction of a contingent actor net-
work, it constitutes a reflexive praxis that responds directly 
to the postmodern crisis in knowledge. 
Profession v Professionalism 
It is clear, then, that there is a strand in recent museology 
that questions the status quo in a rather fundamental way. 
In describing where museums have come from, it refers to 
unreconstructed practitioners as exemplifying the worst 
characteristics of bureaucracies: 
The taxonomy of art history and the excavation record feel, well, 
authentically authentic. Being on the inside of an institution 
with this way of thinking - what one might call museum culture 
- feels normal and secure. 
... Collecting and cataloguing artefacts, as if it were an end 
in itself, is the kind of Kafkaesque function at which bureaucra-
cies excel.13
At the same time, in describing their potentially liberatory 
move into reflexive practice, it warns against a blind head-
long drive to form a profession. Neil Cossons, a former 
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president of the Museums Association, has described 
himself as somebody ‘with a deep suspicion of professions 
but an overwhelming admiration for professionalism’.14 
And, although strongly in favour of a single heritage care 
profession, Tomislav Sola, an internationally renowned 
museologist, has spoken of the radical upheaval in theory 
that must follow from recent innovations in practice if such 
a profession is to be formed. Even so, he recognized that it 
will contain a ‘dramatic dichotomy’ and therefore a ‘latent 
disunity’ in accommodating such fundamentally different 
museum functions as conservation and communication.15
It seems that a diverse range of museum professionals 
and museologists alike are increasingly dissatisfied with the 
bureaucratized, inward-looking actuality of many museums 
that appear to be suffering a ‘tyranny of the object,’ a 
domination by the practical and financial difficulties of 
caring for collections. These museums seem uncertain of 
their direction in the face of a transformation in relations 
between museums and society which has taken the form of 
a shift from: ‘... institution to action, from product to 
process, from object to information, concept and idea, 
from education to communication ...’ 16 They are seeking a 
new cornerstone upon which to build a self-aware and self-
respecting profession that knows where it is going and why. 
The process seems to hinge on a number of issues: counter-
acting the bureaucratization of the museum, liberating the 
curator from a mechanized future, unifying the increasing 
diversity of museum professionals, and reconnecting the 
museum to the wider social arena. 15. SOLA, Tomislav. ‘Museum
professionals: the endangered
species.’ in BOYLAN, Patrick
(ed.) Museums 2000: Politics,
People, Professionals and Profit.
Museums Association/Routledge,
1992. pp.101-13 (pp. 108-12.) 
 
16. ibid. p.108.  
 
14. See Neil Cossons, 
Presidential Address, Museums
Journal, Dec. 1982. 
 
13. O'NEILL, 1991, g.29. 
In modelling museum design organization the most 
promising avenue of development is opened up. Continual 
reconstitution of the museal actor-network necessarily 
implies a reflexive organization, but of a peculiarly valuable 
type, a creative organization, a designerly organization, one 
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that deals holistically with communicative complexity, with 
the word-image-artefact-act complex and its context. And 
the participative human actor at the core of this contingent 
network of heterogeneous actors is, therefore, by definition, 
against certain defining features of a profession. He/she is 
against its exclusivity, its prescription of systematized dis-
interested behaviour, its institutionalizing process, and its 
monolithic model of knowledge and power. Neil Cossons’ 
instincts, in these respects are laudable. What the focus on 
professionalism is meant to emphasize is the individual’s 
attitude and demeanour as opposed to a set of concerns 
and interests which are collectively defined, preserved and 
defended. What Cossons admires about professionalism is 
the ethical and aesthetic stance that it entails, the duty of 
care, the sense of social responsibility, the accumulation and 
sharing of knowledge, the belief in high standards of personal 
conduct and value judgement, and the concern for quality 
of life. 
To summarize, the organization of material, interpretations 
and human actors is a dynamic interactive process open to 
radical shifts and conflicts of underlying principles. Over 
time this has the effect of creating a constellation of practical 
fields which is effective and reflects the apparently necess-
ary coexistence of incommensurable paradigms.  
The principles held to be foundational to each of the 
main areas of activity may normally be expected to be, if 
not contradictory, then at least conflicting or counteracting. 
We often couch our discourse in words that avoid contradic-
tion but this cannot hide, neither can it stand in place of, 
activity that plays out conflict or is a game of counterac-
tions. The handling of these conflicts or counteracting 
tendencies between, for example, interpretive flexibility in 
curatorial research, technical determinism in conservation 
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science, and visionary indeterminacy in exhibition design, 
is what lends a particular quality of dynamic complexity to 
the organization of the museum. Simultaneously, it makes 
individual ‘professionalism’ productive and collective 
profession making counterproductive. 
One can say that the domination of traditional museum 
organization by a museography, a hermetic culture of 
curatorship, was a denial of potential and an unnecessary 
limitation on effectiveness. This is a humanistic as well as 
praxiological point. 
What ought to happen in museums is that all of the 
power plays potentially arising from the full range of disci-
plines involved in museum activity be liberated to take their 
place in a constantly evolving dynamic organization. Perhaps 
one cannot compromise between the incommensurable 
but one can and ought to allow them to show as object-
ified propositions in open conflict/counteraction/conver-
sation, to show as a constellation of temporary constructs, 
open to change, open to interventionism on the part of all 
of the human actors involved in the museum process. 
This proposes that the boundary of the museum 
organization is not a certain one and that the museum 
professional is bound to engage the visitor and the other, 
the user and the non-user, in some sense, at some time, as 
a matter of necessity in respect of the continuation of the 
museum. As a network of heterogeneous actors, a museum 
organization is involved in shaping, just as much as it is 
shaped by, its actual and potential audiences and its 
political and economic context. 
The overtones of this are (1) ecological, a particular 
belief in the self-organizing powers of complex communi-
ties and (2) anarchic, museum activity is political activism 
of a profoundly subversive and polyvalent kind. 
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The Reconstruction of Museum Design 
In ‘designed object’ terms, the conventional focus of 
museum design is the exhibition or the museum building, 
but, if one is to consider what one means by the idea of 
‘museum design’, this provides an inadequate starting 
point. Museum design is dependent upon the program-
matic implications of the museum which have the potential 
to construct a much wider range of designed objects than 
these conventional products. 
A museum is not a building. It is not an exhibition. It 
is a complex organization understood via a range of more 
or less contentious and ambiguous sociocultural and socio-
technical interpretations. Even the apparently neutral 
‘official’ definition of a museum can be read as deeply 
imbued with positivistic, realist notions. 
A museum is an institution which collects, documents, 
preserves, exhibits and interprets material evidence and 
associated information for the public benefit.17
The ideology of a separately existing material reality 
subject to processes of objectification, control and disci-
pline, cultural domination and surveillance is embedded in 
the very language of definitions promulgated by museum 
professionals, the institutions and the machinery of legal 
and political control. 
• to collect: acquire, possess and take control of ... 
• to document: claim and enforce the privileges of 
ownership, define in terms of institutional imperatives 
and processes, alienate, objectify, remake identity and 
meaning in terms controlled by an academic elite... 
• to preserve: to take out of natural time, the cyclical or 
spiral time associated with living social and ecological 
processes, and place in artificial linear time where age 17. Museums Association, 1984.
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has nothing to do with the imprint of life and use, and 
everything to do with very, very slow chemical reactions ... 
• to exhibit: to present for public inspection objects 
reduced to the condition of visible sign or action at the 
service of the institution and particularly the purpose of 
displaying the power of the institution over knowledges, 
identities and narratives: ‘...the provision of object lessons 
in power - the power to command and arrange things 
and bodies for public display...’ 18 
• to interpret: to confirm the institution’s power over 
knowledges, identities and narratives through the 
reinforcing of historical and scientific codes, the surveil-
lance of communicative environments, and the limiting 
of visitor experience: 
Public museums instituted an order of things that was 
meant to last. In doing so, they provided the modern state 
with a deep and continuous ideological backdrop...19
... the exhibition transformed the many-headed mob into 
an ordered crowd, a part of the spectacle and a sight of 
pleasure in itself 20
Having deconstructed the museum definition in this way 
to reveal its ideological pedigree, we can begin to subvert 
each fragment in the attempt to liberate other possibilities 
However, this subversion is not just a question of words; 
it means doing things and making things in deliberately 
counteractive ways. 
The friction between factions in the day-to-day con-
tingent engagement with the museum process has very little 
to do with the assumed over-arching power of this ‘official’ 
reality. It represents a living process of socially constructing 
the museum; it reflects sometimes, but just as often blurs, 
the artificially fixed image of a museum presented in unfor-
gettable forms of words.  If we were to favour a structuralist 
18. BENNETT, 1988, p.76. 
  
19. ibid, p.93. 
 
20. ibid, p.85.   orthodoxy we might be deconstructing the following: 
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A museum is a cultural organization created by the trans-
portation of social objects and their material possibilities 
through time. 
if a radical humanist one, the following: 
A museum is the slaughterhouse of certainty, the ultimate 
junk yard and the birthplace of mythologies and identities. 
This process is the essential ‘museum design process.’ Its 
tools and techniques are not just those of the exhibition 
designer or the museum architect, but, it is from an 
experimental, exploratory attitude inherent in all creative 
design practice that the broader range of museum actors 
must take their cue. 
To quote Neal Potter, somewhat out of context: 
‘Technology is just technology - if you want to change 
people’s perception ... the human touch is needed.’ 21 This 
idealizes the ‘designer’. Neal Potter’s example is an encour-
aging one, but many other designers and architects are unable 
to exercise to the full their creative abilities, express the 
liberatory potential of their discipline, win the confidence of 
their sponsors and clients, and create the space for radical 
intervention and innovation, which is a quality only of a 
design that is deeply interactive with its social and physical 
context. 
We need to take this idea of the ideal designer apart also. 
Architects profess a deeply social dimension to their 
discipline, but in their work, they often fail to move beyond 
a conception of society as a timeless generality. What matters 
at every level of design - the social context of end-user and 
the social context of designer-client-contractor team - is 
the unavoidable impact of human interactivity. Architects/ 
designers design buildings and spaces to house and facilitate 
it, and they work in ways which depend upon it. ‘Designed 
object’, ‘design programme’ and ‘design process’ are all 
21. POTTER, Neal. ‘Power to
the People’ Design Week, 
5.3.1993, p.8.  
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fundamentally concerned with the problem of human 
interactivity. In many more cases ‘design philosophy’ 
should also centre on this problematic; not so much the 
socio-political, which is where much architectural philo-
sophy begins and ends, but more the psycho-ecological. 
We have to begin to realize simultaneous qualities of scale 
and complexity in every design situation - the between-
people, the person-and-environment, and the whole-
environment qualities. 
The notion of a ‘creative organization’ connects with 
the idea of socially constructed realities. The museum self-
consciously creates a narrative-based reality in its collec 
tions and in the interface between those collections and 
the public. It constructs spaces - literally in exhibitions, 
metaphorically in its educational and research activities - in 
which interpretations of the world, or parts of it, are made 
explicit. In one sense the material and the narrative are not 
‘in’ the world, they are ‘of’ it; in another sense, however, 
the material and the narrative are brought into the world 
by the exhibition and publishing processes. 
What it is and what it is about cannot be separated. 
The exhibition in particular has this ambiguous status 
evidenced by the difficulty popular critics and journalists 
have in talking and writing about exhibitions. Normally 
they focus their attention on the individual material objects 
that are ‘displayed’; the selection of, and qualities possessed 
by, these collection items receive a great deal of attention. 
In contrast, the exhibition structure and form as a whole, 
as a piece of communication, tends to receive little attention. 
In this respect writers about exhibition have something 
important to learn from the organizational literature which 
includes its biographies and ethnographies, but also its 
structural, cultural and economic analyses, just as it includes 
its practice manuals as well as its underpinning theories. 
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To place a designerly accent on its scope, it is critical as 
well as descriptive, ranges across the spectrum from local 
detail to global context, and more commonly extends its 
focus beyond product and process to embrace programme 
and philosophy/ideology. 
The possibility and, ultimately, the priority of a realm 
of discourse that engages the socially constructive aspects 
of the exhibition is ready for disclosure in the literature of 
exhibition criticism. Dis-closure is the key: the deliberate 
attention-giving process of deferring the kind of concept-
ual ‘closure’ entailed in materialist, functionalist discourse 
characteristic of the focus on material content and rational 
process in traditional exhibition criticism. Once the object 
of discourse is opened up to embrace the actor-network, in 
which the human, the material and the linguistic - the moral, 
the physical/mechanistic/descriptive, the symbolic/virtual/ 
interpretive - are regarded as equal in analysis, the certain-
ties underpinning the objective viewpoint disappear and 
the illusion of achievable closure, final knowledge, is 
shattered. No mean thing ...the most positive achievement 
we may aspire to, after all, is to have kept the conversation 
going, to have identified, explored and negotiated a fresh 
interpretation, a more adequate understanding. If ‘science’ 
means anything it means knowledge at the leading edge of 
a continuing process. One must strive, as the surfer strives, 
to ride before the biggest wave. 
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6.3 New Directions1
Design Research: A New Context 
The movement in design research, signalled by the recent 
expansion of postgraduate activity in the new universities 
(former polytechnics) in the UK, is toward designers’ 
interests and concerns. For too long the field of design 
research has been dominated by the interests of those 
outside the design discipline. Justifiably, design has been 
called merely an activity, not a true profession.2 The main 
complaint being that design has no established body of 
knowledge and no research culture with which it may be 
enriched, renewed and sustained. This situation, however, 
is changing. The activity of designerly enquiry is a novel 
interdisciplinary research methodology which is being deve-
loped by those who have the most to gain, the academics 
and practitioners who work together in the graduate design 
departments of the new (and some of the older) universities. 
As one might expect, the research agenda is a reflexive one 
- given the designer’s postmodern condition the design of 
designing is an inescapable issue - but, whereas those outside 
of the design discipline have taken design phenomena as their 
object of enquiry, designers take theirs to be the complex 
of possibilities presented by the world. Therefore, in the 
future, designers will tend to lead design research prog-
rammes which have at their core a process of designerly 
enquiry and it is they who will determine the scope of 
design research and which other disciplinary approaches are 
brought to bear on its objects of enquiry. Sociologists and 
others may continue to find design a peculiar and fascin-
ating object of enquiry but in the future such researches 
may not claim to comprise the substance of design research 
merely its necessary supplement.  
1. An earlier version of this 
section was presented as a paper 
entitled ‘Why we need a research 
culture in design’, at the EAAE 
conference ‘Doctorates in 
Design and Architecture’ Delft 
University of Technology, 7-10 
February, 1996. 
 
2. HILLS, Sir Graham. ‘A Ren-
aissance in Design Education’, 
in MYERSON, Jeremy. (Ed.) 
Design Renaissance Selected 
papers from the International 
Design Congress, Glasgow, 1993. 
Open Eye/CSD, 1994. 
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Changing Design Research 
There is a need to reclaim design research for designers. Too 
much design research has been conducted by technologists, 
systems practitioners, historians, psychologists, sociologists, 
anthropologists, organization and management theorists. 
Too much design research has been research into design. 
Too little design research has been research conducted by 
designers doing what they do best - designing.3
Design is distinctive; it is concerned with how things 
could or ought to be. It has, therefore, the greatest poten-
tial for a worthwhile influence on political, economic and 
cultural realities. Unlike craft, design addresses radical 
material change: unlike art it must address the interests of 
others. Bound into the very notion of design is the nec-
essity of an engagement with the complexity of the human 
situation in the world. Design is not only a great orchestrater 
of knowledges, it constructs its own peculiarly polyvalent 
knowledge which makes visible and realizable the possibility 
of change. 
In design we have a peculiar problem: generally design 
does not communicate anything important through its end 
products. The things, places, messages4 and systems which 
are the outcomes of implementing designs normally are 
not readily interpretable as generalized knowledge. Generally 
speaking, designed objects are poor vehicles for the commun-
ication of useful information about the world, even to 
most designers never mind to politicians, executives, techno-
logists, and academics. The knowledge that is embodied in 
a designed object forms only the tip of a potential iceberg 
of insight. To recover what is beneath the inscrutable 
surface of the designed object one must allow the design 
process itself to speak and in the same operation one must 
facilitate the recovery of the programmatic and philosophical 
3. The contents of Design
Studies, until recently the only
refereed design research journal,
is almost exclusively research
into design. Practicing designers
rarely contribute unless as
design academics. 
 
4. POTTER, Norman. (1969)
What is a designer: things.
places. messages, London:
Studio Vista. 
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dimensions of design. This requirement involves a sea 
change in the way that design as a practice is viewed by its 
practitioners. It requires the acquisition of a research 
orientation during training - an early initiation into a 
discipline-specific research culture. 
Developing a Research Culture 
Culture is not a straightforward concept as anyone who 
has encountered Zygmunt Bauman’s analysis will know.5 But 
certain aspects of the designer’s experience, in existential as 
much as in social terms, reveal the fragmentation and uncert-
ainty of the practitioner’s condition. Design knowledge, as 
expressed competencies, is hard won. A succession of 
master-apprentice relationships is the making of most 
designers whilst for some a more isolated struggle set against 
the background of an unforeseeable succession of design 
opportunities characterizes their personal development. 
Traditionally little comes to the designer by way of an 
openly accessible accumulation of design knowledge. 
Designers have tended to avoid recording the intricate 
relationship between the design process and its outcomes 
and reflecting on the experience of designing in terms of the 
knowledge it generates of the world. Only infrequently are 
means sought to produce a transferable knowledge - that 
rare exhibition that tells the story of a design project,6 that 
rare publication that systematizes the knowledge of extensive 
experience.7 Most design knowledge dies with the designer. 
Only when designers believe in and value - and practice as 
a duty - the systematic documentation and evaluation of 
designing will things change. 
5. BAUMAN, Zygmunt.
Culture as Praxis. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. 
 
6. For example: The Car
Programme: 52 Months to Job
One or How they Designed the
Ford Sierra, Boilerhouse 
Exhibition, Victoria & Albert
Museum, 1982. 
 
7. For example: BRAWNE,
Michael. (1992) From Idea to
Building, Butterworth-
Heinemann. 
What has already changed is that through the recent 
proliferation of postgraduate design courses and the address 
of conferences such as: Design Renaissance (Glasgow 1993), 
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Embodied Knowledge and Virtual Space (London 1995), 
4-D Dynamics (Leicester, 1995), and Doctorates in Design 
(Delft, 1996) expectations have been raised, and numerous 
groups in universities and in professional practice have 
begun developing methodologies and establishing values 
for the future of design as a research practice. Dean Hawkes 
refers to Lord Esher, former President of the Royal 
Institute of British Architects, who 
chastised the profession, and in particular its academic 
members, for allowing themselves to be enchanted by the siren 
attractions of other disciplines ...[a] state he characterised as 
‘the flight to the periphery’.8
Now, the return to the centre in architectural design research 
is underway. Architectural Research Quarterly published 
Hawkes’ paper in its first issue in 1995: it is the only refereed 
journal in the field. Other fields of design are served by 
Co-Design, another new journal with a refereed section. 
Design Studies, which has been published since 1979, has 
been dominated by the periphery. Perhaps this will change, 
it needs to: the study of design from a variety of disciplin-
ary perspectives is not the same as the study of possibilities 
for change from the perspective of design. 
Knowledge and Power in Design Research 
Designers are the natural torch bearers for interdisciplin-
arity. As this study makes visible in its hyperspatial 
modelling of museum design organization, design addresses 
the complexity of the human condition because it requires 
a simultaneous attention to social, psychological, aesthetic, 
political, ethical as well as technical difficulty. In analytical 
terms it resists reductionism and pursues the accommo-
dation of difference. It is, therefore, a hopeful resource in 
the postmodern boom of interdisciplinary research. To make 
8. HAWKES, Dean. ‘The 
Centre and the Periphery: some 
reflections on the nature and 
conduct of architectural 
research’, Architectural Research 
Quarterly: 1: l, (1995): pp.8-11. 
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this a reality, however, designers need to be at the core of a 
research culture, able to decide who is admitted to design 
research programmes and who not. This provides the only 
hope of organizing in the face of already powerful research-
based cultures in the sciences and the humanities. 
The continued health and influence of the design disci-
pline requires the establishment of a position of strength in 
relation to disciplines such as management, economics, social 
science, planning, engineering, etc. each of which derives 
its credibility with the policy makers, if not always its 
efficacy in practice, from rigorous and well presented 
research. Design was born with and developed as a nec-
essary adjunct to industrialization. In the post-industrial 
era, the so-called information age, a discipline which cannot 
renew itself in a radical sense and articulate the relevance 
of that process will surely be extinguished. Therefore, 
although ‘new knowledge’ is, one hopes, the outcome of 
research, the main reason for developing and continuing in 
a particular research culture is to share in the influence one’s 
discipline gains over the direction of human affairs. In this 
sense the development of a research culture is not primarily 
about advancing knowledge, it is about power. 
Research Agendas 
In the new context the design research agenda arises out of 
the address of different groups to certain key issues in 
developing a research methodology: 
• formulation of viable research proposals  
• organization and monitoring procedures 
• quality and breadth of documentation  
• aims and methods of analysis 
• forms of presentation  
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• critical feedback 
Formulation of viable research proposals 
In 1995 Bruce Archer set out the criteria that define valid 
research in any field.9 Applying these specifically to what he 
originally called 'designerly enquiry' 10 produces a checklist 
against which one might evaluate the validity of a research 
project that centres on ‘core’ design research methods, i.e.: 
As a form of applied research the project will: 
• employ design methods, techniques, procedures - a design 
process - that are planned, documented, transparent and 
open to explanation and interpretation; 
• formulate and address explicit questions about possibilities 
for change in an actual or envisaged practical situations; 
• identify specific objects of design through the develop-
ment of a design programme; 
• produce design outcomes, supported by explanation and/ 
or interpretation, that constitute new knowledge; and 
• employ forms, methods and techniques of exposition that 
communicate an intelligible content to appropriate 
audiences. 
As action research, it will, in addition: 
• engage in a ‘real world’ practical situation; 
• entail collaboration with individuals and groups whose ex-
perience forms the (or one of the) objects of design; and 
• include an overarching aim to produce results that feed 
into more broadly formulated applied research. 
9. ARCHER, Bruce. (1995) 
‘The nature of research’, Co-
Design, 01.02.03-95. p.6. 
 
10. ARCHER, Bruce. (1981) ‘A 
view of the nature of design
research’ in JACQUES, Robin.
& James A. Powell. (eds.)
Design: Science: Method.
Westbury House, pp.34-47. 
These general guidelines, however, must be seen in the light 
of a complexity inherent in the formulation of any object 
of design. The subject is embedded and simultaneously 
deconstructed, made non-discreet as an entity. 
As this project in modelling museum design organization 
reveals the complex of spatialities constitutes an unstable 
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grounding which one may not escape. In a proactive but 
profoundly ironic gesture a model has been constructed as 
if the reflective practice of visualization it entails need only 
gaze upon the actuality, ontically referenced or imagined, 
of the physical, the social, the individual, and the encrypted. 
But, this is only an as if; the gesture is a designerly 
manoeuvre. The clearest implication for a decentred view 
of the human actor, of a holistic view of actor networks, is 
that the categories of the physical, the social, the individ-
ual, and the encrypted have themselves to be comprom-
ised. As infinitely fragmented, reconfigurable entities, the 
actors of whom we speak are neither machines, nor signs, 
nor bodies plain and simple. They can never be the norm-
ative collectivities of components implied by modernity. 
Since the dominant mode of rationality, the Telos, is a myth 
that has been exploded - a comforting mirage, a discom-
forting chimera - we have come to believe that there are 
only consensual illusions - hyper-realities or virtual realities? 
- the most enduring of which is the vision of a receding 
past. Our arrogant chauvinism has us staggering back-
wards into bedlam. 
The designerly gesture may be ironic but it is 
necessary. To paraphrase Norman Potter, the value of a 
model is in its rendition of a possibility.11 But, by making 
visible a complex of functions, bodies, mechanisms, signs, 
collectivities, etc. operating in museum design organization 
one immediately invites the dedifferentiation of its 
apparently definitive contents. Because complexity, as 
defined here, imposes interminable reflexivity, it is not the 
particular model one constructs that matters but the 
process of modelling itself. From within what is modelled, 
human perceptions appear to provide a frame of reference 
but from without, something more radical and immanent 
is implied - a new ontology. 
11. POTTER, Norman. Models 
and Constructs: Margin Notes to a
Design Culture. Hyphen Press, 
1990. 
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The invasion of the space of the body, the space of 
bodies, by the spaces of the virtual, the virtualities of cyber-
space, presents the possibility of new hybrid entities and 
their dynamic interplay in a fused and fluid multidimen-
sional cyber-reality. An intimation of the new ontology is 
already present. 
The curator is being fragmented into a complex of 
specialist functions: collecting, researching, collection 
managing, conserving, exhibiting, designing, guarding, 
interpreting, administrating, etc. We can no longer straight-
forwardly centre our critical gaze on the professional 
individual, an indivisible human actor, rather we must scatter 
our attention across the museum design organization 
complex to perceive in a pattern of activity an idealized, 
simulated, reconstructed curatorial role. 
Under the structuring power of taxonomy, museum 
collections were conventionally discreet. They are being fused 
with archives to form an informatic-material complex whose 
structure is contingent, fluid, cybernetically determined. 
The boundaries defining the designer and the conser-
vator are being eroded. Professional identities are being 
blurred as each embodies aspects of curatorial knowledge 
and power in an organizational presence extended by a 
common aura of computer-mediated intelligence. 
Security staff and various surveillance technologies are 
being enmeshed in the processes of public relations and 
communication and the resulting hybrid forms embedded 
in the fabric of buildings, spaces and exhibits - CCTV 
becomes exhibit, educator becomes intelligence gatherer, 
guard becomes interpreter, interpreter becomes exhibit 
component, exhibit becomes building component, etc. 
No traditional function or entity remains untouched 
by the emergence of ironic dissembling virtualities. The 
new entities construct a greater number of interfaces than 
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their precursors, have more permeable and mobile 
boundaries, and therefore, more readily interchange and 
transform their contents. Moreover, the principle applies 
at a meta-level. The museal complex is one of a range of 
compromised institutions participating in a global contest of 
faculties - the museum boundary extends beyond the walls 
of its building into the urban environment, beyond the 
system of its taxonomies into the narratives of existence, 
beyond the material of its collections into the conservable 
heritage, beyond the interpretive act of exhibition into the 
realm of media production and telecommunication, etc. 
The museum is being fragmented - geographically and cyber-
netically dispersed - and increasingly it shares the marginal 
elements that construct its shifting identity with a range of 
heterogeneous complexes – consultancy and facility services, 
urban development, tourism and leisure promotion, environ-
mental conservation, etc. may all extend beyond the require-
ments of purely museological rationale. 
The formulation of viable research proposals in the 
design field must encounter the radical uncertainty inherent 
in the postmodern, post-structural future of possibilities. 
The implications, in general terms, for developing designing 
as a research methodology are paradoxical. The checklist 
developed from Bruce Archer’s list of criteria for what 
qualifies as research is problematic in every aspect. 
The requirement that the design methods, techniques, 
procedures employed are ‘planned’ requires us to define 
the notion of planning in an unorthodox way. We rid the 
notion of establishing goals, policies, procedures of its teleo-
logical overtones - the implication that planning must happen 
in advance of and have a straightforward intentional relation 
to implementation. Planning becomes a type of activity 
distinguished from others in the design/research process by 
its cognitive style and its characteristic products rather than 
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by its temporal position in a sequence or cycle of activities. 
The requirement that the design/research methods 
employed are ‘transparent and open to explanation and 
interpretation’ requires us to qualify the implied rationality 
of procedural analysis. The design process admits the non-
rational as a consequence of the shift in and out of contrast-
ing cognitive styles. Whilst engaged in self-conscious 
activities, characterized as ‘thinking about design’, rational 
procedures of selecting and evaluating techniques may be 
entailed. In these moments of the design process a subject-
object relation is constructed: the material upon which the 
designer may act is differentiated out in an analytic sense. 
However, whilst engaged in unself-conscious activities 
characterized as ‘thinking in designing’ non-rational proced-
ures prevail. In these moments the designer is immersed in 
the work and constructs a de-differentiated identification 
with the material of the design. The implication for the 
demand that methods, techniques, procedures are transparent 
is compromised. The designer, as reflective practitioner, is 
faced with the task of placing an epistemologically coher-
ent construction on events of which memory and formal 
documentation provide an incomplete picture. A messiness 
born of epistemological discontinuity is tidied up in retro-
spect and ‘explanation and interpretation’ are therefore 
collapsed into a process of post-rationalization. The outside 
observer of events in the design process is equally faced 
with evidence of the behaviours of the designer and the 
products of the designing activity which may fail, at first 
sight, to hang together. Only in retrospect, as a result of 
an attenuating process of post-rationalization, may the appar-
ent discontinuities and complexities of the design process 
be made to make sense. Post-rationalization is therefore 
defined as the characteristic of any explanatory narrative of 
design process. This means that such explanation necessarily 
has mythic qualities and is ideological and contingent. 
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The kind of questions that the procedures of design-
erly enquiry best address also pose paradoxical, reflexive 
problems. The characteristic ‘what if ...?’ starting point in 
design leads to an opening up of two fields, a bifurcation 
of the practical situation into an object of design (the 
programmatic/ideological arena) and a design project (the 
process/product arena) - in classical functionalist terms, 
the problem definition and the solution definition. Design 
proceeds in parallel to explore the spaces of ideology and 
process and to develop programme and product as a 
necessarily holistic activity. At some point, prescribed by 
contingent circumstance, a realizable possibility for material 
change is made to crystalize out of the design complex 
(matrix) via a more or less self-conscious, synthetic process 
of design communication. Only at this point do the problem 
definition and the solution definition become focussed, do 
the precise nature of the question that has been addressed 
and the consequences that have been embodied in an 
‘answer’, a realizable possibility, become ‘explicit’. 
The form of research proposal appropriate to the core 
area of design research is, for the above reasons, unlikely 
to be conventional. First, rather than demonstrating the 
potential of a specified methodology to produce a particular 
form of new knowledge, I believe it should demonstrate 
the potential of a particular point of departure to open up an 
appropriate arena of possibilities. Second, given the difficulty 
any proposal will have in fulfilling normal research funding 
criteria the destination of any proposal is unlikely to be one 
of the existing research funding councils. There may be some 
scope in the approach taken by the independent found-
ations, but my suspicion is that the multi-client consultant 
arrangement, typical of the projects undertaken by the 
architectural/research practice DEGW, offers the greatest 
scope in the immediate future.12
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Organization and monitoring procedures 
The nature of the ‘project’ in designerly enquiry does not 
lend itself to a detailed procedural pre-programming. Rather 
the process of designerly enquiry itself generates the imm-
anent possibilities for action. Thinking in doing becomes a 
traceable phenomenon via the embedded and reflexive 
documentary activity which embraces the production of 
the design products - plans, visuals, models, storyboards, 
etc. - and the production of programmatic information. In 
the intersubjective arena of the design team, in the broadest 
sense of all those creatively involved in the shaping of the 
design situation, the means of communication are simultan-
eously the means of creative transaction, the substance of a 
process of social construction. The possibility of an organiz-
ational and monitoring construct exists in the moment of 
semiosis, a pseudosynchronic slice through the social space 
of the design which is perpetually deferred and may only be 
reconstructed in an evaluative process of post-rationalization. 
The relativism upon which this existential notion of 
the ‘moment of semiosis’ appears to depend is countered at 
the metalevel of enfolded spatialities. Only by committing 
the ‘perfect paralogism’, against which Lefebvre warns us, do 
we confuse the logics of the documentary activity with those 
of the social matrix and with those of the material realization 
of a design and of the design’s philosophical formations. The 
charge of relativism loses its bite once we admit the epistem-
ological complexity proper to design: relativism requires a 
commensurability of terms that cannot survive the discont-
inuities of navigating radically different spatialities. 
In reclaiming design research for designers one is not 
eliminating the grounded approaches typical of established 
sociological paradigms. Ethnomethodology, for example, 
remains viable and open to reinterpretation in terms of the 
designer’s modus operandi. However, what the designer is 
12. See DUFFY, Frank. (Key
note speech) in Doctorates in
Design and Architecture, confer-
ence book, EAAE/DeIft
University of Technology, 1996. 
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doing in adopting an ethnomethodological mode of enquiry, 
perhaps to develop an ‘insider’s’ understanding of the 
context of the design, is bracketing other activities, cognit-
ively and temporally, in order to introduce conscious analysis 
into work which is felt to be lacking on an unconscious 
level. In this case thinking about the design from a participa-
tory perspective temporarily replaces thinking in designing 
which is essentially egotistical, that is, fully immersed in the 
material of the design, in an attempt to counter a feeling 
that, at a particular moment, something is wrong with the 
‘fit’ of the design product to its programme. Such an activity 
is therefore motivated by a perceptual response to the 
material of the design, its contingent documentary products, 
and it is purely instrumental. Designerly enquiry pursues a 
goal other than the explanation which might arise from a 
social-scientific enquiry: it seeks to produce realizable 
possibilities rather than an explanation or interpretation of 
existing phenomena. The design project is literally a ‘project’, 
an imaginative construct that points forward to a possibility. 
It, therefore, resists the constraint of epistemological closure 
which is entailed in any ‘rational’ explanation that points to 
a probability. 
Breadth and quality of documentation 
The museum design organization model developed here 
prompts, at every turn, an attention to product, 
programme, process and philosophy - the 4Ps of design. 
The central concern, in developing core design research 
methodology, is with the production of an externalized, 
visible documentary product in which the ontic possibilities 
and the epistemological complexity of the design are amply 
recorded. The spatialities explored in constructing a 
holistic modelling of design include a proper account of the 
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relations between the psycho-social dimensions of design-
erly and interpretive activity and the formal and documentary 
dimensions of the various products upon which must be 
based analysis and evaluation. Therefore, it is possible to 
articulate the criteria for quality in the material of research 
documentation by reference to the appropriate epistem-
ological sphere. For example, a design process model based 
on the playing off of techniques, methods and media against 
the scope of cognitive attention to the design (from the 
smallest relevant detail to the global) can be used to map, 
track and navigate the design process as experienced, to 
compare with ideal prescription for the design process, to 
make visible any deficiencies in documentation early in the 
process, and to provide a frame of reference against which 
to post-rationalize the deferred, distorted and distanced 
psycho-social dimensions of the design. 
Aims and methods of analysis 
A particular realm of possibilities for change in material 
conditions and the criteria defining success emerge simulta-
neously out of the design matrix. Reflexivity is immanent 
in design research methodology and imposes the need for 
rigorous iterative procedures of exposition, review and 
refinement of, what may be thought of as the ‘sense-
making’ aspect of designing. In dealing with complexity, 
designing does not involve a straightforward, self-conscious 
process of interpreting given signs and texts. Rather, the 
activity involves a repeated dedifferentiation and redifferent-
iation of the space of signs and texts. This is a process that 
is both creative and interpretive, involves both conscious 
and self-conscious modes of attention, and, therefore, 
constructs and reconstructs the material of the world so 
that they literally ‘make sense’. Designing makes visible and 
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sensible and realizable the possibilities for change in material 
conditions: as research, it also makes itself visible, sensible 
and realizable, and thereby open to critical attention. 
Forms of presentation 
A great deal of experimentation has been undertaken in 
recent times to explore and evaluate a range of presentation 
formats for art and design research.13 The possibilities that 
have already emerged include the traditional forms of written 
academic exposition - progress report, working paper, con-
ference paper, journal paper, book chapter, book - forms 
involving time-based presentation - video, CAD animation, 
multimedia publication - the traditional forms of artistic 
exposition - exhibition, performance, documentary product-
ion, catalogue annotation, essay - and various innovative 
combinations of the three types of exposition. The particular 
form or combination of forms of exposition employed in a 
specific design research project may need to be innovative. 
Ultimately, what matters is that the research is commun-
icated unambiguously and persuasively, is open to detailed 
analysis and critical evaluation, and is in a form appropriate 
to its information content and intended audience, and 
suitable for archive storage and retrieval. 
Critical feedback 
Traditionally the avenues of critical feedback on research 
include the seminar and the academic journal. Although 
these remain important channels also for design research, 
there are others that have a, perhaps, crucial role to play in 
the future. The distribution of research via the internet 
offers the potential for a rapid two-way process: in text-
based form this is already commonplace. However, with 
projects such as the three-dimensional virtual museum 
13. In particular: Centre for
Research in Art and Design
(CRiAD), Grays School of Art,
The Robert Gordon University;
the Royal Collage of Art; the
University of Central England;
and the University of Sunderland. 
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currently under development in the Tel Aviv University’s 
Knowledge Technology Lab,14 and the ‘Conceptual Kiosks’ 
developed by John Morgan at Auburn University, 
Alabama,15 the beginnings of a new possibility is evident. 
The virtual, four-dimensional exposition becomes available 
to interactive development and critique. In effect, the 
traditional artistic forms of exposition - the exhibition and 
its textual supplements, the catalogue and the essay - are 
made available indefinitely and at a distance. But, more 
than this, they are integrated in the multimedia format and 
easily made archivable on optical disk. 
Coda 
Design is in the marketplace of ideas: ‘No theory today 
escapes the marketplace. Each one is offered as a 
possibility among competing opinions’.16 Without its own 
core of powerful, intellectual leaders active in investigating 
through design the direction of future material culture and 
committed to articulating, communicating and advocating 
design knowledge, design will suffer technological and 
political instrumentalization, extra-disciplinary mytholo-
gizing, and perhaps oblivion. 
14. Times Higher Education
Supplement, Multimedia Features,
12 April 1996. p.vi. 
 
15. MORGAN, John S. 
‘Conceptual Kiosks: New
Information Environments’ in 
4D Dynamics: Proceedings of the
Design Research Society
Conference held in Leicester 21
September 1995. Compiled by 
Alec ROBERTSON, De
Montfort University/Design
Research Society, 1995. 
 
16. ADORNO, Theodor. [1966]
Negative Dialectics. Trans. E B
Ashton. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1973. p.4. 
This project is in at the beginning of a long-term 
collaborative project which aims to pull the design disci-
pline up by its boot straps. If we sustain our postgraduate 
students in a newly invigorated research environment and 
help them to develop ways of designing and communi-
cating that command the serious attention of others, we 
can look forward to a future in which designers have a 
commensurate share in the exercise of power. 
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GLOSSARY 
Artwork  Illustration, photography, typography or three-dimensional 
material, or any combination of these used as an original image and
presented with specifications for graphic reproduction. 
Briefing Process  A dialogue between client and designer which produces a 
progressively more adequate or detailed design brief. 
Design Brief  A document defining the nature of a specific design project - an 
initial brief may be a short general definition, a final brief may
include: context of the project; overall aims and objectives; physical, 
human and financial resources available; organization and timescale;
detailed functional requirements; performance criteria; etc. (see:
Design Programme) ‘Brief’ is the common British term. 
Design Concept  A design idea which has been visualized and therefore given
potentially realizable visual and material qualities. 
Design Contract  A contract between the designer and the client. 
Design Idea  1. A transcendent design archetype. 2. An intention for a design
which exists in the mind and may be expressed in words. 
Design Philosophy  1. The theory or principles underpinning design activity. 2. An
explicit system of values and beliefs about the nature and meaning of
design in general. 
Design Process  1. An ideal or generic model of design activity (used as a conceptual 
tool). 2. A particular way of conducting design activity. 
Design Programme  The object of design: the practical situation, the design idea or
design problem, and the design process encompassed by a system of 
documentary procedures (see: Design Brief) ‘program’ is the 
common American term. 
Design Rationale  l. The designer’s way of explaining the what? when? how? and, most
importantly, the why? of designing. 2. A systematic written
justification for a particular design. 
Design Object  The end product of the design process: the thing, place, message,
system that results from the implementation of the design. 
Display  l. A general term which can refer to an individual exhibit, groups of
exhibits or an entire exhibition.1 2. An organized arrangement of 
artefacts and/or information. 
Exhibit  l. A single unit within an exhibition...
1 2. Any organized 
combination of artefact(s), information in graphic, typographic and
audiovisual form, supporting structure, and enclosure or housing, 
which is designed to communicate. 
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Exhibition  Any organized assemblage of exhibits which is designed to serve an
overall purpose or present a theme or narrative. 
Interpretive Scheme  The information structure or narrative/thematic framework and the 
system of collection organization used to guide the design of
museum communications, particularly: exhibits, exhibitions,
educational programmes, publications and publicity.2
Mock-up  A roughly constructed approximation to a finished exhibit, usually 
produced for purposes of evaluation...1
Mood Board  Any assemblage of images, materials and/or objects mounted on a
board to convey an abstract notion of the ambience, style, feel, 
mood, etc. of an interior, place, exhibit - usually produced early in 
the design process as a visual reference/aide-memoire. 
Object of Design  see: Design Programme. 
Specifications  Details of dimensions, materials, methods of production, finishes,
etc. required to produce and install an exhibit or exhibition.
Specifications are annotated on the artwork or working drawings, as
appropriate. In complex work they are also normally produced as a
written document. 
Story-board  1. A series of key images for a proposed exhibit, etc. with copy and
directions beneath.1 2. The technique of explaining a sequence of 
events, images or views in an audiovisual presentation, exhibit or
exhibition using a series of captioned visuals. 
Visual  A perspective drawing or a plan of the basic elements of a design
1 -
usually rendered in tone or colour. 
Visualization  The process of externalizing ideas and making them visually
comprehensible to others. 
Working Drawings  A series of drawings produced to communicate exhibit construction
and installation to an exhibition contractor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. MATTHEWS, Geoff. 
Museums and Art Galleries: A 
Design and Development Guide. 
Butterworth Architecture, 1991. 
 
1. MILES, Roger S. et al. The 
Design of Educational Exhibits. 
Unwin Hyman, 1982. 
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Appendices 
  
A.1 Notation 
A.2 Museum Staffing 
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A.1 - Notation  
The system of notation used throughout 
this thesis is designed to reflect each of the 
following criteria (see 3.1 Organization): 
use in analysis and design; clear visualization 
of interval and space; and flexibility in 
juxtaposing dimensions however they may be 
Type A: two limits. 
Type B: one limit and one extension to infinity 
Type C: two extensions to infinity 
Figure A.1.1 
  
One-dimensional schemata. 
  
characterized: i.e. scale (proportion/speed), 
scope (range/distance), series (sequence/ 
cycle), or spectrum (band/continuum). 
Below are set out the schemata for notating 
one-dimensionality (Figure A.1.1) and two-
dimensionality (Figure A.1.2.) 
Although it would be possible to 
render the three-dimensional schemata quite 
clearly using a conventional projection such 
as oblique, isometric or perspective. I have 
assumed that in principle the system of 
notation can be understood from the one 
and two-dimensional schemata and a single 
example of three-dimensional notation 
(Figure A.1.3.) 
 
Type B-C: Section 
A 
A
B B
A B
Type A-A: Region Type A-B: Stretch Type B-B: Quarter 
C 
A
C C
B C
Type A-C: Tract Type C-C: Plane 
Figure 5.2.3 
  
A performative social space in which overlapping zones are contingently defined by distributed 
concerns, locations are interrelated and channels of communication polyvalent. 
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for this application. As the project ultimately 
demands a dimensionality higher than three 
in any case I have generally resorted to the 
style of graphic series mapping techniques 
demonstrated in Hofstede’s work and 
referred to above (3.1.) 
A 
A
A
Type A-A-A Enclosure 
 number of 
triangle sum dimensionality schemata 
Figure A.1.3 
  
Example three-dimensional schema (oblique 
projection) 
  
The number of schemata for each level of 
dimensionality follows the triangle 
summation rule (Figure A.1.4). Although 
computer software does exist for visual 
virtual modelling in three-dimensions, none 
is intended  
0  1 
1  3 
2 6 
3  10 
4  15 
5  21 
6  28 
Figure A.1.4 
  
Calculating the number of types of schemata at a 
particular level of dimensionality. 
  
 
A.2 - Museum Staffing 
This analysis is based on ‘Staffing Profiles – Overview’ in PRINCE 
& HIGGINS-McLOUGHLIN, 1987. pp.78-80. and Figure 4.2 
‘Proportion of total full-time staff employed in each activity, by 
type of museum’, p.81. (See above: 2.3 Museum, note 50.) 
 Full-time Part-time Volunteer MSC Total (N) 
Nationals 4341 277 129 65 4812 77 
Local Authority 3728 934 1646 938 7246 525 
Others 1976 1267 7562 1203 12,008 618 
All 10,045 2478 9337 2206 24,066 1220 
Figure A.2.1 
  
Numbers of full-time, part-time, volunteer and MSC1 staff by type of 
museum. 
  
1. Manpower Services 
Commission - qualified but 
long-term unemployed people 
engaged on special projects. The 
scheme was terminated by the 
Government in 199? 
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 Full-time Part-time Volunteer MSC Total  
Nationals 90.22 5.75 2.68 1.35 100  
Local Authority 51.45 12.89 22.71 12.95 100  
Others 16.45 10.55 62.98 10.02 100  
All 41.74 10.30 38.80 9.16 100  
Figure A.2.2 
  
Percentage of full-time, part-time, volunteer and MSC staff by type of 
museum. 
  
 
 Full-time Part-time Volunteer MSC Total  
Nationals 56.38 3.60 1.67 0.84 62.49  
Local Authority 7.10 1.78 3.13 1.79 13.80  
Others 3.20 2.05 12.24 1.94 19.43  
All 8.23 2.03 7.65 1.81 19.73  
Figure A.2.3 
  
Mean numbers of full-time, part-time, volunteer and MSC staff in a 
museum, by type of museum. 
  
 
 %(2) mean number  
Nationals 9.9 5.58    
Local Authority 19.6 1.39    
Others 11.1 0.35    
All 15.0 1.23    
Figure A.2.4 
  
Full-time staff employed in curatorship by type of museum. 
  
 
2. These figures derive from the
answers to a different section of
the original Museums Database
questionnaire and are therefore
based on a different response rate
to those in Figures A.2.1-3. 
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